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In 1976, the legislature introduced a far-reaching amendment to the Pension Funds Act. The 
amendment was the insertion of s37C into the Act. Section 37C effected a fundamental 
change to the law of succession and the principle of freedom of testation. It did so by 
removing what, for many, is their most valuable property, from the reach of the law of 
succession or any other law and subjecting it to a sui generis statutory regime. Under this 
regime, the power to control the devolution of death benefits has been transferred from the 
individual who ‘owns’ the benefit to the trustees of the pension fund. Trustees are, in turn, 
permitted to delegate their power. The result is that a stranger or a group of strangers have 
the power to select the beneficiaries of the deceased’s principal asset from amongst the 
deceased’s dependants, as defined, and any additional non-dependent nominated 
beneficiaries, with far-reaching and possibly life-changing consequences for those affected 
by the decision. The trustees are even permitted to make decisions that are contrary to, and 
arguably less equitable than, those of the individual, and yet their right to do so is recognised 
in law. Section 37C has been in existence for 40 years; its import, and impact, has increased 
significantly over the course of the past 20 years – yet most of those affected remain 
unaware of its existence. The study demonstrates that in its present form, s37C is both 
unconstitutional in its design and inequitable in its operation. As such, it is in urgent need of 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
(the) Act: The Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956.  
Adjudicator: The Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator, established in terms of s30B of the 
Act. 
Appellate Division:  Former name of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal 
Beneficiary: Dependant and/or nominees. 
Complaint: Complaint lodged with the Adjudicator in terms of s30A of the Act. 
Death Benefit: Any lump sum (i.e. not a pension) that is paid on the death of the member. 
The death benefit always consists of the member’s own contributions and investment growth 
on those contributions (the savings portion) and it may also include the proceeds of a group 
life insurance policy taken out by the retirement fund (in the case of occupational funds). 
Dependant: See the definition of dependant in the Pension Funds Act, which encompasses 
so-called legal dependants, financial dependants, spouses and children, and future 
dependants. 
Determination: the word used to refer to decisions of the Adjudicator regarding the outcome 
of complaints. It has the status of a civil judgment under the Act. 
Defined benefit fund: The fund promises to pay the member a fixed benefit on retirement that 
is calculated according to a formula, usually based on the member’s final salary x years of 
service.  
Defined contribution fund: The member’s benefit consists entirely of savings (contributions 
paid by the member as employee and/or the employer) and whatever investment return 
those savings have yielded. 
Insured portion: The part of the death benefit that is funded by the group life insurance 
policy taken out by the fund and payable only on the death of the member to the 
member’s beneficiaries. 
Member: an individual who joins a retirement fund, either voluntarily in the case of retirement 
annuity funds, or compulsorily in the case of occupational pension and provident funds.  
xv 
 
Minimum Benefit: see ss14A and 14B of the Act. Essentially the member’s and employer’s 
contributions, plus investment return, less administration costs. 
Nominated beneficiary: a person the member has designated, in writing addressed to the 
fund, as a person the member wants to share in the death benefit. 
Nominee: A non-dependant whom the member has nominated, in writing, to receive the 
whole or part of the death benefit. Although a member can nominate a dependant, a 
person will only technically be a nominee if they are not also a dependant.  
Occupational Retirement Fund: A retirement fund created by an employer for the benefit of 
its employees, and to which employees compulsorily become members by virtue of their 
employment with the employer. 
Pension Fund: A retirement fund in which only one-third of the retirement benefit may be 
paid out as a lump sum, while the remaining two-thirds must be used to fund a monthly or 
yearly annuity/pension. The pension may either be provided by the employer, or by a 
separate insurance company, in which case the employer will purchase the pension on the 
employee’s behalf.  
Pension Funds Adjudicator: Any one of Adjudicators, deputy Adjudicators or assistant 
Adjudicators. Only one Adjudicator is appointed to office at a time, but the Adjudicator has 
a deputy and numerous assistants. There have been six Adjudicators to date: John Murphy (1 
January 1998–31 May 2003); Vuyani Ngalwana (17 March 2004–28 February 2007); 
Mamodupi Mohalaha (1 June 2007–September 2009); Elmarie de la Rey (Acting Adjudicator, 
October 2009–1 April 2010); Charles Pillai (1 April 2010–5 November 2010); Elmarie de la Rey 
(Acting) (15 October 2010–30 May 2012); Muvhango Lukhaimane (1 June 2012–to date)  
Pension Interest: A term that derives from the Divorce Act 70 of 1979. A spouse married in 
community of property or out of community of property subject to the accrual system 
ordinarily becomes entitled to share in the member’s pension interest on divorce. It usually 
consists of the member’s savings portion.  
Pensions Ombudsman: Counterpart of the Pension Funds Adjudicator with jurisdiction in 
England and Wales. 
xvi 
 
Provident Fund: A retirement fund in which the member’s entire benefit may be paid out in a 
lump sum on retirement. 
Retirement Fund: A pension fund organisation as defined in the Pension Fund Act, i.e. one 
that includes a provident fund, a pension fund, and an annuity fund.  
Road Accident Fund: A statutory body that provides financial compensation for injury or 
wrongful death arising from a motor vehicle accident caused by a third party. 
Retirement Annuity Fund: A voluntary retirement fund into which individuals can make 
monthly contributions as savings towards their retirement. They are commercial funds. They 
are the only form of retirement funds available for employees who want to make additional 
savings towards their retirement, or for individuals who don’t belong to occupational 
retirement funds. They are a pension rather than provident fund.  
Savings portion: The monetary contributions that have been paid to the retirement fund by 
or on behalf of the member. In an occupational fund the member’s employer pays the 
member’s contributions to the fund on behalf of the employee, since the contributions are 
part of the member’s salary. In a retirement annuity fund the members pay their own 
contributions.  
Separate Group Life: a group life policy that is not taken out by the retirement fund, but by 
the employer. Section 37C therefore does not apply to any lump sum proceeds of such 
policies. 
Stand-alone Fund: A retirement fund created by an individual employer for the benefit of 
only its employees. It therefore stands alone, separate from other funds. Standalone funds 
used to dominate the retirement fund industry, but they are gradually being replaced by 
umbrella funds. 
Superannuation: term used in Australia to refer to retirement savings, which are usually paid 
as a lump sum rather than a pension. 
Superannuation Complaints Tribunal: The Australian counterpart of the Pension Funds 
Adjudicator between 1993 and 2018. The Australian Financial Complaints Authority is the new 
counterpart as from 1 July 2018.  The Superannuation Complaints Tribunal stopped 
xvii 
 
accepting new complaints as from 31 October 2018 and ceased operating as from 30 June 
2020. 
Survivor: Surviving spouse 
Umbrella Fund: A retirement fund in which a number of employers participate, and the 








1. Extracts from the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956  
 
1. The definition of dependant 
2. The definition of spouse 
3. Section 37C(1) 
 
2. Extracts from the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
 










The legislature regards pension assets as a critical and essential component of 
any natural person's rights and therefore it has established a mandatory 






Section 37C of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 (the Act) is a provision that is completely 
destructive of some individuals’ fundamental freedoms. Despite the radical nature of the 
provision, its existence and import are not widely known. On its face it is simply one of three 
contemporary restrictions on an individual’s freedom of testation. The first is a child’s 
common law right to claim maintenance from a deceased parent’s estate. The second, and 
most recent restriction, is the right of surviving spouses to claim maintenance from their 
deceased spouse’s estate.2 The third, section 37C (s37C),3 governs the distribution and 
payment of so-called ‘death benefits’ that are payable by retirement funds. A death benefit 
is a monetary lump sum that a retirement fund is, in terms of its own rules, obliged to pay 
upon the death of any one of its members. This lump sum consists of savings the member has 
made towards her retirement by way of contributions to the fund. In many cases, these 
savings represent the largest source of savings, or even the most valuable asset, of the 
member.4 In addition, a portion – often the greater portion – of the lump sum may consist of 
 
1 Williams v FFE [2001] 2 BPLR 1678 (PFA) [14].  
2 Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 (MSSA).  
3 I have chosen this abbreviation in preference to the standard s (space) 37C, because the 
abbreviation is used so frequently and because the shortened form enhances visual clarity, particularly 
when the s and 37C appear on different lines as a result of the separation.  
4 Old Mutual Comments on the Retirement Fund Reform Discussion Paper issued by the National 
Treasury of the Republic of South Africa December 2004 (29 March 2005), 50; National Treasury 
Memorandum on the objects of the Pension Funds Amendment Bill 2007, para 1.1. The same holds true 
in other jurisdictions, see eg Superannuation Complaints Tribunal (SCT) Annual Report 2015–16, 2. 
Similarly, ‘According to the Wall Street Journal, 401(k)s and IRAs account for about 60% of the assets of 
2 
 
the proceeds of life insurance cover that the retirement fund has taken out on the life of the 
member.5 The contributions to the fund and the insurance premium are part of the 
remuneration the member earns from her employer. Section 37C takes away the member’s 
right to choose who amongst her kith and kin will share in her benefit and transfers it to the 
trustees of the retirement fund. 
 
The value of death benefit lump sums can range from the seemingly paltry to the substantial, 
from a few thousand rand to many millions of rand.6 Whether small or large, most members 
and beneficiaries care about the ultimate distribution of death benefits. Members show they 
care by completing nomination of beneficiary forms, in which they identify their chosen 
beneficiaries and how they wish the death benefit to be divided between them. 
Disappointed beneficiaries show they care through their frequent complaints to the Pension 
Funds Adjudicator. Who will receive what share of the death benefit therefore matters to 
members and beneficiaries alike.7 This is hardly surprising, given that in 2015 almost R10 billion 
was paid by way of lump sum death benefits.8 The comparable value of deceased estates in 
2013 was roughly R9 billion.9  
 
U.S. households investing at least $100,000’, see 
<http://www.connorsandsullivan.com/Articles/Beneficiary-Designations-Getting-the-Right-Assets-to-the-
Right-People.shtml>.  
5 Jeram ‘Disposition of lump sum death benefits’ in Hanekom (ed) Manual on Retirement Funds and 
other Employee Benefits 25ed (2018), §9.15.4.3. Writing in the 1930s already, Taylor ‘Beneficiaries of Life 
Insurance Policies’ (1944) 22 Canadian Bar Review 509, 517 observed that the proceeds of life 
insurance policies often represent the insured’s ‘main estate’. In the context of retirement fund group 
life policies, members are usually insured for a variable multiple of their salaries. 
6 The smallest benefit I have come across is R10 920 (Esterhuizen v CRAF [2013] 3 BPLR 355 (PFA)); the 
largest R7 125 118 (Jacoby v Metal Industries [2017] JOL 38735 (PFA)).  
7 Understandably, when the member has no separate estate to speak of or the estate is insolvent, for in 
these cases the only property that is available for the member’s beneficiaries is the death benefit. 
Sometimes beneficiaries are aggrieved even where there is a significant separate estate and the 
benefit is negligible. See the long-running saga of Smith v SAA [2010] 3 BPLR 330 (PFA), in which the 
benefit was just under R800 000, but the value of death benefits payable by other funds was over R15 
million, and the estate was of unknown value. The dispute between the parties led to arbitration in 
respect of the other benefits, and to extensive litigation before the ordinary courts (Smith v Parsons 2009 
(3) SA 519 (D), reversed on appeal in Smith v Parsons  2010 (4) SA 378 (SCA). This was an exceptional 
case. 
8 Registrar of Pension Funds (RPF) 57th Annual Report (AR) 2015, Table 13, note 6.1. The actual figure was 
R9.347 billion. In 2017, the figure was R10.027 billion. See RFP AR 2017, Table 3.3, note 6.1 
9 Derived from the Davis Tax Committee (DTC) First Interim Estate Duty Report (2015), which reports that 
R1.13 billion was collected in estate duty in 2013. Since estate duty was levied at 20% of the value of the 
dutiable estate, the total dutiable estate would have been R1.13bn x 5 (R5.65 billion), to which must be 
added the value of the statutory abatement (currently R3.5 million). The DTC analysed a sample of 659 
estates, and the estate duty collected constituted 70% of the total estate duty received. Extrapolating 
3 
 
Applying the ordinary principles of the law of property, contract and succession, one would 
expect that members would be entitled to decide who should share in the death benefit, 
and in what proportion. After all, to the extent that the savings portion of the death benefit 
represents the fruits of the member’s own labour, those familiar with the law of property and 
the law of succession would expect them to form an asset in the estate of the member and 
to be subject to the member’s testamentary power. Similarly, in so far as insurers are 
contractually obliged to pay the proceeds of life insurance policies to the nominated 
beneficiaries of the policyholder,10 one would expect the same to apply in the context of the 
life insurance component of death benefits.11  
 
However, for the past 40 years, most retirement fund members have not enjoyed freedom of 
testation in respect of their death benefits.12 The reason is because of the existence of s37C 
of the Pension Funds Act. Inserted into the Act by way of an amendment in 1976, s37C 
expressly deprives members of their testamentary power.13  
 
Section 37C does so by stating, very simply, that death benefits will not form part of the assets 
in the estate of the deceased member if the member is survived by one or more 
dependants. As such, the benefits will not be subject to the testamentary control of the 
member.14 Instead, where a member is survived by dependants, the authority and 
responsibility for allocating the death benefit falls to the management board (henceforth 
 
from this, the approximate number of deceased estates in 2013 was 1000, and the total abatement 
would thus have been roughly R3.5 billion. This, however, assumes that the value of each net estate 
would be at least R3.5 million, which is of course not the case. The estimated figures are thus a very 
rough approximation only. More recent figures on the numbers of deceased estates are not available. 
Estate duty of R2.2 billion was collected in 2017, meaning that the dutiable value of deceased estates 
was roughly R11 billion.  
10 Pieterse v Shrosbree; Shrosbree v Love 2005 (1) SA 309 (SCA).  
11 As unsuccessfully argued by the applicants in Kaplan v Professional and Executive Retirement Fund 
1999 (3) SA 798 (SCA). Citing Kaplan, the Adjudicator has also held that trustees may not adopt a 
settlement agreement entered into between beneficiaries, see Brummer v CSIR [2005] 9 BPLR 797 (PFA).  
12 Life insurance nominations are described as ‘will-substitutes’, for their effect is the same as a 
testamentary bequest, although the proceeds bypass the deceased’s estate. In the absence of a 
nomination, the proceeds will fall into the policy holder’s estate and devolve on the legatee or heirs, 
subject to creditors’ claims. For a comparative examination of will-substitutes, see Braun & Röthel 
Passing Wealth on Death (2016). 
13 Inserted by Financial Institutions Amendment Act 101 of 1976, s24. 
14 See also Kaplan (n11); Igesund & De Lange v KwaZulu-Natal, discussed in OPFA AR 2013/2014, 13.  
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‘trustees’) of the retirement fund. The trustees are obliged to allocate the death benefit 
between the member’s dependants and nominees in the proportion that they, the trustees, 
consider to be equitable.  
 
The Act provides no further guidance to trustees. The only guidance they do receive is from 
the determinations handed down by the Adjudicators in the Office of the Pension Funds 
Adjudicator (Adjudicator). Adjudicators hear complaints from beneficiaries aggrieved by the 
trustees’ exercise of their s37C duties, and hand down written determinations in response to 
such complaints. It is these determinations that provide the lens through which to analyse 
s37C in practice. They provide insight into both trustee decision-making, and the role of the 
Adjudicators in shaping their decision-making.  
 
The difficulties occasioned by s37C were highlighted by the first Adjudicator in one of his 
earliest determinations, 20 years ago, when he recommended that s37C be reformed, 
without articulating what that reform should be:15  
 
One thing is certain about section 37C, it is a hazardous, technical minefield potentially 
extremely prejudicial to both those who are expected to apply it and to those intended to 
benefit from its provisions. It creates anomalies and uncertainties rendering it most difficult to 
apply. There can be no doubt about its noble and worthy policy intentions. The problem lies in 
the execution and the resultant legitimate anxiety felt by those who may fall victim to a claim 
of maladministration in trying to make sense of it. Any successful claim for maladministration will 
be borne ultimately by the other members, the participating employer, or perhaps even the 
members of the board of management.  
 
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
 
In principle, s37C appears to serve an important social function.16 A member’s dependants 
are prioritised over the interests of creditors of the estate, and the only cost to the member is 
the loss of her own freedom to determine who her beneficiaries should be or in what 
proportion they should share in the death benefit. Trustees remain obliged to consider the 
 
15 Dobie v National Technikon [1999] 9 BPLR 29 (PFA) (emphasis added). 
16 Mashazi v African Products 2003 (1) SA 629 (W). 
5 
 
member’s wishes, and to effect an equitable distribution between her dependants and 
nominees. In the absence of a comprehensive state social welfare system, it is left to 
individuals to fund their own retirement, and to make provision for surviving dependants 
should they predecease their dependants. The state has a legitimate interest in incentivising 
individuals to save towards their retirement, and in ensuring that, should a person with 
dependants die, their death benefits, which includes their retirement benefits, are utilised for 
the benefit of those dependants.  
 
Although s37C serves an apparently clear and legitimate social purpose, it represents a 
significant restriction on individuals’ testamentary freedom and, in consequence, on their 
rights to property and dignity. It mandates trustees, who can only ever hope to know the 
barest information about members and their ‘circle of beneficiaries’, to discount even the 
considered wishes of caring and conscientious members. It obliges trustees to substitute their 
view of what is equitable for the member’s view of what is equitable, even where there is 
nothing obviously wrong with the member’s own view.17 It even permits trustees to delegate 
the collective exercise of their discretion to an individual third-party functionary.18 
Conversely, however, trustees can be held personally liable for any losses to the retirement 
fund arising from a distribution that an Adjudicator or court considers to have been 
improperly made.19  
 
The social benefit of depriving members of the right to choose how their death benefits 
should be allocated, even when their choice is a rational and reasonable one, and even 
when their chosen beneficiary falls within the circle of eligible dependants, is questionable. 
 
17 Trustees are required to allocate the benefit as they deem equitable. Adjudicators have repeatedly 
emphasised that trustees may not ‘follow’ or attach ‘undue weight’ to the member’s wishes, for in 
doing so they are failing to apply their own minds. Determinations suggest that Adjudicators draw a 
positive inference when trustee distributions depart from members’ wishes, and a negative inference 
when they do not. See further §5.5.1 below. 
18 Kaplan (n11), confirming the decision of the High Court in Kaplan v Professional and Executive RF 
1998 (4) SA 1234 (W), which held the delegation effective notwithstanding the delegee’s ‘relatively 
subordinate position and lack of qualification’, 1239.  
19 Sithole v ICS [2000] 4 BPLR 430 (PFA); Matene v Noordberg (2) [2001] 2 BPLR 1610 (PFA); Coetzee v 




Equally, the social benefit of vesting trustees with the onerous responsibility of, and potential 
personal liability for, making choices for members (who have failed to make a choice), or of 
confirming that the member has made the ‘right’ choice, or of making better choices than 
the member has made, is also questionable. It is particularly questionable when the trustees 
have been given absolutely no guidance in the Act as to how they should exercise their 
discretion. They are told only that they should allocate the benefit amongst the beneficiaries 
in the proportion they consider to be equitable.  
Section 37C does not only deprive members of their testamentary freedom. Section 37C has 
been interpreted as supplanting all laws that would otherwise apply.20 The rights that spouses 
married in community of property would have had to share in the death benefit are 
expunged, as are any maintenance claims that they and the member’s children may have 
had against the member’s estate.21 Their rights are sacrificed, in the expectation that 
trustees exercising discretionary powers will achieve more equitable outcomes, for all the 
member’s dependants, than inflexible rules of law. This is a Herculean task for judges,22 much 
less trustees untrained in law.23 
1.3 AIM OF THE THESIS 
This thesis seeks to interrogate this transfer of rights and responsibility from the perspective of 
all those affected by the transfer: from the perspective of the member, whose rights have 
been limited; the trustees, who have been tasked with the onerous responsibility; and those 
persons who have either been deprived of a benefit they would otherwise have received, or 
received a benefit to which they would otherwise not have been entitled. It seeks to 
investigate whether the extent of the limitation of the member’s rights is proportionate to the 
objective the legislation seeks to achieve; and whether the responsibility on trustees, coupled 
20 Subject to the forfeiture rule for unlawful killing, see Jeram (n5) §9.15.5.7.  
21 See further §3.3, 6.4 & 6.5 below. 
22 See further §7.3 below, which discusses judicial limitations on testamentary freedom. 
23 See further §1.6.3 below. 
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with the potential personal liability they face for the erroneous exercise of their duties, 
exceeds the bounds of what can reasonably be expected of them. Ultimately, the 
dissertation seeks to address the question whether, from the perspective of members, trustees 
and beneficiaries, the extent of the wholesale transfer of right and responsibility is 
constitutional. If it is constitutional, the further question is whether s37C, as interpreted and 
applied by trustees and Adjudicators, yields outcomes that are equitable. If it is either 
unconstitutional or inequitable, a further question is whether it should be discarded 
altogether, or whether it should be reformed. 
 
There are three aspects to s37C and its operation that I seek to analyse in the dissertation: 
 
- Its inherent challenges. These challenges arise from the Act’s definition of dependant. 
Trustees are expected to correctly identify who the member’s dependants are, in 
accordance with the categories of dependants laid down in the Act. This imposes both 
an investigative and quasi-judicial role on trustees that they are ill-equipped to perform. 
 
- Its applied challenges. These challenges arise from the wide discretionary power vested 
in trustees and the lack of accompanying guidelines. Trustees are simply enjoined to 
select the beneficiaries and apportion the death benefit as they deem equitable. 
 
- Its constitutional implications. These implications arise from the breadth of the discretion 
vested in trustees and, in consequence, the extent of the restriction on the individual’s 
dignity and freedom of property.  
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY  
 
The literature on s37C is limited. It has generated very little by way of academic 
commentary: the textbooks that exist provide a broad overview of the pension funds industry 
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and are aimed at practitioners within the industry;24 the academic articles are relatively few. 
Their main focus has been a critique of select Adjudicator determinations in so far as the 
identification or treatment of dependants is concerned.25 There is no literature that seeks to 
unpack the way in which trustees exercise their discretion, or that has seriously questioned 
s37C’s constitutionality.26  
 
My research has involved a desk-top analysis of Adjudicator determinations, domestic and 
foreign case law and relevant literature. I read approximately 400 determinations, handed 
down between 1998 and 2019. The main sources of the determinations are law reports and 
the Adjudicator’s website, where most determinations are posted. Some determinations 
 
24 The three leading general texts are: Downie Essentials of Retirement Fund Management (2018); 
Hanekom (ed) Manual on Retirement Funds and other Employee Benefits (2018); Hunter et al The 
Pension Funds Act, 1956: A Commentary (2010). The leading general analysis of s37C is that by Jeram 
(n5) §9.15.  
25 Dyani ‘Extending death benefits to cohabitants under section 37C of the South African Pension Funds 
Act: Hlathi v University of Fort Hare Retirement Fund’ (2012) 56 Journal of African Law 296; Dyani & 
Mhango ‘How could the Pension Funds Adjudicator get it so wrong? A critique of Smith v Eskom Pension 
and Provident Fund’ (2010) 13 PELJ 162; Dyani & Mhango Reflections on recent South African pension 
jurisprudence on death claims (2011) 32 ILJ 2385; Dyani & Mhango ‘Pension death benefits under the 
Malawi Pension Bill 14 of 2010: reflections from South Africa and Australia’ (2012) 45 Comparative & 
International LJ Southern Africa 18; Manamela ‘Chasing away the ghost in death benefits: a closer look 
at section 37C of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956’ (2005) 17 SA Mercantile LJ 276; Mhango, Duty to 
investigate factual dependants: a comment on De Beers v Hosaf Fibre Provident Fund (2008) 29 Indus 
LJ 2439; Mhango & Dyani The duty to effect an appropriate mode of payment to minor beneficiaries 
under scrutiny in death claims (2009) 12 (2) PEJL 168; Mhango ‘What should the board of management 
of a pension fund consider when dealing with death claims involving surviving cohabitants?’ (2010) 13 
PELJ 204; Mhango ‘Examining the provision of pension death benefits to co-habitees or life partners 
under the South African Pension Funds Act of 1956’ (2010) 15(3) Pensions: An International Journal 226; 
Mhango & Thejane ‘The Malawi Pension Act: a general commentary on some of its core mandatory 
provisions with specific reference to sections 9, 10 and 15’ (2012) 129(4) SALJ 758; Mhango ‘Challenges 
in the distribution of death benefits under the Pension Funds Act: the extent of dependency 
considered’ (2013) 46 Comparative & International LJ Southern Africa 474; Mhango ‘Does the South 
African Pension Funds Adjudicator perform an administrative or a judicial function?’ (2016) 20 Law, 
Democracy & Development 20; Mhango The Swaziland Retirement Funds Bill 2011: Reflections on 
parliament's override of the supreme court statutory interpretation of the definition of dependant for 
death benefits (2017) 38(1) Statute Law Rev 40; Nevondwe ‘Death benefits and constitutionality: is the 
distribution of death benefits under the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 constitutional’? (2007) 15 Juta’s 
Business Law164; Nevondwe ‘The law regarding the division of the retirement savings of a retirement 
fund member on his or her divorce with specific reference to Cockcroft v MEPF [2007] 3 BPLR 296 (PFA)’ 
(2009) 13 Law Democracy & Development 1; Nevondwe ‘The distribution and payment of a death 
benefit in terms section 37C of the South African Pension Funds Act, 24 of 1956’ (2010) 15(1) Pensions: 
An International Journal 38; Nevondwe ‘South African social security and retirement reform: A long 
journey towards the redrafting of the new Pension Funds Act’ (2010) 15(4) Pensions: An International 
Journal 287; Nevondwe ‘Does freedom of testation supersede the powers of the board of trustees to 
allocate a death benefit in terms of section 37C of the South African Pension Funds Act, 24 of 1956?’ 
(2011) 16(4) Pensions: An International Journal 285; Nevondwe & Rapatsa ‘Cohabitation: a nightmare 
on the allocation and distribution of death benefits in terms of s37C of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956’ 
(2012) 27(3) Pensions: An International Journal 153; Nevondwe & Odeku ‘An analysis of the role of 
Pension Funds Adjudicator in South Africa’ (2013) 4 Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 817. 
26 Manamela ‘Chasing away the ghost in death benefits’ and Nevondwe ‘Death benefits and 
constitutionality’ (n25) do not so much question as conclude that s37C is constitutional.  
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appear in the published law reports but do not appear on the Adjudicator’s website, and 
vice versa. Occasionally a determination appears in neither but is discussed in the 
Adjudicator’s annual reports. Where a determination has been published in the law reports, 
the reported citation is provided. Where it is unreported, the reference used by the 
Adjudicator is provided. In every case before the Adjudicator the respondent is a retirement 
fund. In the interests of brevity and clarity have shortened the footnote citation to dispense 
with the reference to retirement fund/pension fund/provident fund/retirement annuity fund, 
but the full name appears in the bibliography.  
 
The determinations are all relatively short. They are usually between four and 10 pages in 
length. When reading the determinations, I sought to extract the relevant findings of law and 
fact, the Adjudicators’ interpretation of the law and how it should be applied, and the 
extent to which Adjudicators have influenced or expressed a view on the equitability of the 
actual distribution of the death benefit.  
 
1.5 A VERY BRIEF HISTORY OF SECTION 37C  
 
Section 37C is one of three contemporary restrictions on freedom of testation. All three are of 
relatively recent origin. The first, and original restriction, is that which children, irrespective of 
age, have to claim maintenance from their deceased parent’s estate. This right was 
judicially-introduced in 1906, as a result of a court’s misreading of the relevant Roman-Dutch 
authority.27 Once the misinterpretation was discovered, the principle was so well-established 
that it had become an accepted part of the law.28 The second was created by the 
legislature in 1990, with the introduction of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 
 
27 Carelse v Estate de Vries (1906) 23 SC 532. See Beinart ‘Liability of deceased estates for 
maintenance’ 1958 Acta Juridica 92. A minor child’s right to maintenance now finds statutory 
expression in the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, s18.  
28 Hoffmann v Herdan 1982 (2) SA 274 (T). In Hoffmann, the right was extended to adult children. A 
major child’s right to maintenance cannot yet be accepted as an indisputably binding principle of law, 
however, since this is the only reported decision involving an adult child claiming from a deceased 
estate and the child suffered from ill-health. 
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(MSSA).29 The third is s37C, which was introduced in 1976 and which is quite different from a 
child or spouse’s right to claim maintenance. The latter is a restriction on the deceased’s 
freedom of testation, but executors and courts do not have the freedom to disregard the 
deceased’s wishes and allocate the deceased’s property as they think fit. A spouse or child 
must apply for maintenance and must prove that they need maintenance, and the wishes of 
the deceased may be upset only to the extent necessary to make provision for their 
reasonable maintenance needs. Section 37C, on the other hand, gives trustees a power that 
is analogous to giving an executor or court the power to rewrite a deceased’s will. Given the 
history of previous attempts to limit freedom of testation in South Africa, that s37C exists at all 
is surprising.  
 
For a century, between 1874 and 1976, South African testators enjoyed near unfettered 
freedom of testation.30 Only children were entitled to claim maintenance from their 
deceased parent’s estate. The wide freedom enjoyed by testators was criticised by 
academic writers, who called for the law to be reformed, by reintroducing either the 
legitimate portion that had formed part of Roman-Dutch law or by allowing maintenance 
claims against a deceased estate.31 In response to these criticisms and to legal 
developments in other jurisdictions,32 the Law Review Committee in 1969 proposed a Family 
Maintenance Bill, in terms of which the same relatives towards whom a deceased had owed 
a duty of support while alive would have been able to claim maintenance from the 
deceased’s estate. The Bill expressly conditioned a major child’s, parent’s and sibling’s right 
 
29 Act 27 of 1990. Courts had previously refused to extend the common law duty of support to spouses. 
See Glazer v Glazer 1963 (4) SA 694 (A) 707. 
30 Prior to 1874, during the Dutch colonisation of the Cape, certain relatives were entitled to share in the 
deceased’s estate as of right. Their right, often referred to as the legitimate portion, was smaller than 
what they would have inherited on intestacy. It served to protect them from complete disinheritance. 
These rights ceased as a result of the influence of English colonists and to reflect the laws of England 
then in force, in which the main restriction on freedom of testation, a widow’s right to dower, was 
extinguished with the adoption of the Dower Act 1833. See further Du Toit ‘The impact of social and 
economic factors on freedom of testation in Roman Law and Roman Dutch Law’ (1999) 10 Stell LR 232; 
Lehmann ‘Testamentary freedom versus testamentary duty: in search of a better balance’ 2014 Acta 
Juridica 9. 
31 Beinart (n27); Hahlo ‘The case against freedom of testation’ (1959) 76(4) SALJ 435.  
32 The adoption of legislation that granted courts the power to award maintenance from a deceased 
estate to eligible applicants, which started in New Zealand with the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 
1900. See further §7.3 below.  
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to do so on their being unable to support themselves by reason of age, infirmity or disability. 
The Bill was, however, rejected by a parliamentary select committee even before it could be 
presented to Parliament, on the basis that it resulted in too great an intrusion into freedom of 
testation.33  
 
Yet only six years later, in 1976, the Pension Funds Act was amended by the introduction of 
s37C.34 The amendment was approved by Parliament without debate, and no-one 
expressed any concern about the extent to which it intruded into freedom of testation.35 
There are two possible explanations for its ready passage through Parliament. One is that 
parliamentarians did not appreciate the extent of the intrusion. The other is that they were 
willing to approve it, without comment, fully realising its import. The first explanation is the 
more probable. The Minister of Finance, who presented the provision to Parliament, provided 
only a brief explanation of the rationale behind its introduction – that it was intended to 
protect retirement benefits from creditors’ claims, to ensure that such benefits were available 
to dependants. The first iteration of s37C also suggests that the drafters assumed that 
identifying the member’s dependants was a mere formality, one which a retirement fund 
could do readily as part of its routine business.36 It is probable that the drafters and 
parliamentarians believed that the potential beneficiaries of a deceased’s estate, and the 
beneficiaries of a deceased’s death benefit, would be the same persons. The principal 
beneficiaries, both under testate and intestate succession,37 are, after all, a deceased’s 
 
33 Hahlo ‘The sad demise of the Family Maintenance Bill 1969’ (1971) 88(2) SALJ 201. 
34 Financial Institutions Amendment Act 101 of 1976, s24. 
35 Hansard House of Assembly Debates col 3241 (16 March 1976). 
36 The original wording in Act 101 of 1976, s24 simply directed that the benefit be paid to ‘any one or 
more dependants of the member’. No mention was made of the basis on which it was to be allocated, 
such as equally or equitably.  
37 For a comparative discussion on the laws of intestate succession, see Reid, De Waal, Zimmerman 
(eds) Comparative Succession Law Vol 2: Intestate Succession (2015). For a comprehensive discussion 
of intestacy laws within Europe, see Ruggeri, Kunda, Winkler (eds) Family Law and Succession in EU 
Member States (2019). Studies into testamentary choices confirm that most testators choose their 
spouse and/or children as their beneficiaries. See further Douglas et al ‘Enduring love – attitudes to 
family and inheritance law in England and Wales’ (2011) 38 Journal of Law & Society 245, confirming 
that most individuals surveyed had included their children and spouse amongst their beneficiaries, 
while only a relatively small proportion had included other relatives or charities. The laws of intestate 
succession in some jurisdictions are designed to reflect the ‘presumed’ intention of the deceased, 
which are based on the preferences of the majority of testators as evidenced by such information as is 
publicly available. See eg Alberta Law Reform Institute Reform of the Intestate Succession Act (1999); 
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spouse and children.38 The same of course was not true under customary law, given that the 
estate would have devolved on the nearest male relative.39 However, there is no indication 
that the provision was drafted with an appreciation of, or concern for, the consequences of 
the customary law of succession. 
 
The belief that Parliament did not appreciate s37C’s true scope is bolstered by the 
investigation and deliberation that preceded the adoption of the MSSA in 1990.40 Numerous 
bodies were opposed to the introduction of the MSSA, including the Association of Law 
Societies, Association of Trust Companies, and Clearing Bankers Association.41 They felt that it 
represented too great an intrusion into an individual’s freedom of testation. The General 
Council of the Bar was concerned that the exclusive focus on surviving spouses could 
prejudice other testamentary heirs and legatees, even when they had also been dependent 
on the testator in life, and towards whom the testator also owed a duty of support.42 The Law 
Commission dismissed the various objections and concerns, and justified its exclusive 
protection of surviving spouses on the basis that it wanted to limit freedom of testation as little 
as possible.43 Since s37C represents a far greater intrusion into freedom of testation than does 
the MSSA, the most plausible explanation for the lack of debate preceding its adoption is 
that parliament either did not fully understand its import, or that it did not anticipate that it 
would be, or become, so great a restriction on freedom of testation.  
 
 
Reinhartz ‘Recent changes in the law of succession in The Netherlands: on the road towards a 
European law of succession’ in Van Erp & Van Vliet Netherlands Reports to the Seventeenth 
International Congress of Comparative Law (2006); Wright & Sterner ‘Honouring probable intent on 
intestacy: an empirical assessment of the default rules and the modern family’ (2017) 42 ACTEC LJ 431. 
38 The reference to spouse includes a registered civil partner, since most common law and civil law 
countries extend the legal consequences of marriage to civil partnerships. See §2.3 below. 
39 For a discussion of the principle of primogeniture in the customary law of succession, see Bhe v 
Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) [75-100] [declaring primogeniture unconstitutional]. The 
Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 provides that 
the intestate estates of individuals subject to customary law will devolve in accordance with the 
Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987. 
40 Act 27 of 1990; SALC (Project 22) Report on the introduction of a legitimate portion or the granting of 
a right to maintenance to the surviving spouse (1987). 
41 SALC (Project 22) (n40) para 4.3 & 4.6. 
42 Ibid, para 6.26. 
43 Ibid, para 4.4. 
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1.6 THE RETIREMENT FUND INDUSTRY 
 
Section 37C is part of the Pension Funds Act.44 The Act regulates the retirement fund industry, 
which is responsible for investing and administering the retirement savings of millions of South 
Africans. The responsibility for applying s37C thus does not fall to courts or to those trained in 
the law; it falls to the trustees of each individual retirement fund. There are approximately 1 
650 active retirement funds in South Africa.45 Collectively they have almost 17 million 
members, of whom 11 million are ‘active’ members still contributing to a fund.46 The 
remainder are pensioners or beneficiaries who are receiving benefits from the fund. It is the 
active members, and their dependants and nominees, to whom s37C will apply if they die 
before retirement. It is estimated that one in three employees die or become disabled 
before retirement.47 Section 37C therefore affects the rights and futures of many millions of 
people.  
 
Most individuals who contribute to retirement funds do so in the course and scope of their 
employment.48 A smaller proportion voluntarily contribute to commercial retirement annuity 
funds, which is the only retirement savings vehicle available for the self-employed and for 
those whose employers do not provide retirement benefits. The total asset value 
administered by retirement funds, which represents the accumulated contributions of all 
members, is almost R4.3 trillion.49 The assets held by retirement funds thus represent the future 
pensions of millions of South Africans.  
 
 
44 Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 (PFA). 
45 Financial Services Board (FSB) Annual Report (AR) 2018, 43. All organisations that meet the definition 
of ‘pension fund organisation’ in the PFA, s1 must register with the Registrar of Pension Funds (s4). There 
are over 5000 registered funds, but the majority are dormant funds.  
46 RPF 59th AR 2017, 17. A fund is active if it receives either contributions or pays benefits, but most do 
both. 
47 Sanlam Benchmark Survey: Research Summary (2017), 16. 
48 Contributions to employer-created retirement funds are usually a compulsory incident of an 
employee’s contract of employment. Individuals may, however, voluntarily contribute to non-employer 
retirement annuity funds, which are offered by numerous firms within the financial services industry. Total 
contributions to all retirement funds in 2016 was about R227 billion, FSB AR 2018, 46.  
49 RPF 59th AR 2017, 19.  
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The essential object of each fund is to provide its members, or their beneficiaries, with an 
income once they are no longer in active employment and thus no longer in receipt of a 
regular salary.50 All private retirement funds are regulated by the Pension Funds Act, which 
was enacted into South African law in 1956.51 Public sector funds, which are created by 
statute for government and some parastatal employees, need not be registered in terms of, 
and therefore be subject to, the Pension Funds Act.52 However, the only public sector 
pension fund with significant membership is the Government Employees Pension Fund 
(GEPF), which has roughly 1.2 million members and is the single-largest occupational 
retirement fund in South Africa.53 The Pensions Fund Act, and therefore s37C, does not apply 
to it.54  
 
In 2017, retirement funds paid benefits of R314 billion, either as pensions or lump sum 
retirement, death or withdrawal benefits.55 Of that, about R120 billion was for retirement and 
death benefit lump sums.56 Approximately 250 000 people between the ages of 20 and 65 
died in 2015-2016.57 The mid-year population estimate in 2016 was approximately 56 billion.58 
Assuming that employees are almost all in the 20 – 65 year-age-group, and that their 
mortality rate is the same as the general population, it would mean that about 75 000 
employees died in 2016. The fates and fortunes of their dependants and nominees then 
turned on what trustees considered to be an equitable division of their death benefits.  
 
1.6.1 The history of retirement funds 
 
The Pension Funds Act does not create retirement funds – it merely regulates their creation, 
administration and dissolution. Occupational retirement funds existed long before 
 
50 PFA, s1 definition of ‘pension fund organisation’. 
51 The Act commenced on 1 January 1958. 
52 Section 4A. 
53 Established by the Government Employees Pension Law 1996. 
54 Ibid, s22. The other public sector funds are listed in RPF 59th AR 2017, Table 1.1. 
55 RPF 59th AR 2017, Table 1.5.  
56 The figures are not disaggregated into retirement and death benefits.  
57 StatsSA Mortality and Causes of Death in South Africa 2016 (PO309.3) Appendix D6. 
58 StatsSA Mid-year Population Estimates 2016 (PO302) Table 1. 
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governments considered it necessary to provide general regulatory oversight of the 
retirement industry.59 Early funds were typically created by the state for the benefit of state 
employees.60 There is no record of the date on which the first private occupational fund in 
South Africa was created, but the first such fund in the United States of America (USA) was 
established in 1875.61 By the early 1900s, employers in South Africa were regularly granting 
pensions to employees of long-standing,62although the pension was sometimes given as a 
gratuity rather than as a contractual entitlement.63 Little is known about the nature of the 
funds that existed prior to 1956. The probability is that they were trusts, as their English, and 
some Australian, counterparts still are.64 The members who serve on the management board 
of retirement funds are still referred to as trustees in the literature and retirement fund industry, 
and they are subject to much the same fiduciary duties as are the trustees of ordinary trusts.65 




59 The PFA has been described as ‘pioneering’, for South Africa is said to have been the first country to 
adopt a single statute providing for the comprehensive regulation of the retirement fund industry. See 
Downie (n24) A.1.2. By comparison, the first comprehensive statute in the USA was, and remains, the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act 1974 (ERISA).  
60 Their existence is recorded in the law reports. See Crossley v Union Government (1921) 42 NPD 114, for 
a discussion of the Natal Pensions Law of 1874 and the associated Police Superannuation Fund Rules of 
1905; Lyttle v Union Government (Minister of The Interior) 1920 CPD 444 [Public Service and Pensions Act 
29 of 1912]; Fraser v Durban Corporation (1922) 43 NPD 231 [Durban Corporation Provident Fund, 
established in 1920]; Mills v Church 1935 GWLD 24 [Railways Pension Fund]; Ketteringham v City of Cape 
Town 1934 AD 80 [Cape Town Municipal Pension Fund, established in 1919]; Whelehan v Union 
Government 1934 AD 123 [Act 12 of 1882 (Cape) re police pensions]. 
61 -- A timeline of the evolution of retirement in the United States Workplace Flexibility 2010 Georgetown 
Law Center. 
62 Eg Faustmann v GA Fichardt 1910 ORC18; Stevenson v Morum Bros 1926 EDL 406. 
63 Ibid. Some modern funds still use the term gratuity to refer to a lump sum payment, even though the 
member is entitled to the sum as of right in terms of the fund’s rules, see eg the definition of ‘gratuity’ in 
the Government Employees Pension Law 1996, s1.  
64 They were not, however, trusts as understood in English law, for the English conception of trust was 
never received into South African law. When South Africa became an English colony the terminology of 
trusts and trustees was in wide-spread use, but the legal nature of trusts in South African law only began 
to engage serious judicial attention with the decision of Estate Kemp v McDonald’s Trustee 1914 CPD 
1084. Crookes v Watson 1956 (1) SA 277 (A) held that an inter vivos trust is a stipulatio alteri between the 
founder and trustees for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries. Laverick, a former Pensions Ombudsman 
for England & Wales, considers it inappropriate that ‘historic trust law’ continue to apply to modern 
pension funds, see Pensions Ombudsman AR 2002-2003, 56. 
65 See PFA, s7. 
66 PFA, s4. Section 38 specifically exempts retirement funds from the application of the Trust Property 




The number of occupational funds burgeoned during the 20th century. In 1976, when s37C 
was introduced into the Act, there were 10 175 private funds with some 3 million members.67 
By the end of 1999 that number had grown to 16 164.68 Since then, the number has shrunk 
significantly because the Financial Services Board began a process of cancelling dormant 
funds, and because of the increasing preference, amongst employers and existing funds, for 
participating in commercial umbrella funds rather than retaining their stand-alone fund.69  
 
1.6.2 Types of retirement funds 
  
Section 37C applies to all retirement funds that fall within the definition of ‘pension fund 
organisation’ in the Act.70 The essence of a pension fund organisation is that it is one that has 
been established with the object of providing lump sums or annuities to either or both 
members, when they retire, or to their dependants, should they die before retirement. The 
reference to ‘lump sum’ or ‘annuities’ indicates that pension fund organisations come in two 
forms: pension funds and provident funds.71 These terms are not used in the Pension Funds 
Act. They derive from the Income Tax Act (ITA).72 A fund is a pension fund if its rules require 
that at least two-thirds of a member’s retirement benefit must be used to purchase an 
 
67 RPF 18th AR 1976, 2. 
68 FSB AR 2000, 18. Most of these funds were not active funds. By 2011 the number of registered funds 
had decreased to 10 032, of which 3 160 were active funds, see FSB AR 2011,70. As at March 2017 there 
were 5119 registered funds of which 1758 were active (FSB AR 2017, 34). 
69 FSB AR 2015, 71 and Hanekom (n24) §9.1. In a stand-alone fund the trustees are employees of the 
employer, and it is they who are responsible for every aspect of the fund’s governance. Umbrella funds 
are established and administered by insurance companies and employers ‘join’ the umbrella fund. 
Although the umbrella has sub-funds for each participating employer, the trustees of the umbrella fund 
are responsible for the governance of the funds. Amongst the reasons for the increasing preference for 
umbrella funds is because of the increasingly complex and onerous regulatory burden.  
70 The definition includes pension and provident funds, which are funds established by employers, and 
retirement annuity funds, which are commercial funds established by insurers. Preservation funds are 
commercial funds into which employees, whose membership of an occupational fund terminated as a 
result of resignation, dismissal or retrenchment, could transfer, and thereby preserve, their accrued 
savings. They are no longer as essential since occupational funds are now obliged to permit former 
employees’ savings to remain, and be preserved, within the fund if they so choose. See Pension Funds 
Final Default Regulations in GN 41064 of 25 August 2017. 
71 Retirement annuity funds are thus a sub-species of pension funds. However, they are not 
occupational retirement funds but commercial retirement funds to which members contribute 
voluntarily.  
72 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (ITA), s1. The definitions appear in the ITA because prior to 2016 they were 
subject to different taxation regimes.  
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annuity (pension).73 A fund is a provident fund if the member is entitled to take her full 
retirement benefit as a cash lump sum.74 The terms pension and provident fund thus describe 
the form in which the retirement benefit is payable.75 Even under a pension fund, the full 
death benefit is usually payable as a lump sum, although some funds still provide pensions to 
the deceased member’s spouse and dependent children.76  
 
Pension and provident funds come in one of two forms: defined contribution funds and 
defined benefit funds. Pension funds are more often defined benefit (DB) funds, and 
provident funds are more often defined contribution (DC) funds, but that is not invariably the 
case.77 The distinction between DB and DC funds pertains to the nature and value of the 
benefit that is payable on the member’s retirement or death. In both DB and DC funds, 
employees and/or their employers make contributions to the retirement fund as part of the 
employee’s remuneration package. In a DC fund, the value of the retirement benefit is the 
invested value of the accumulated contributions (savings portion).78 In a DB fund, the 
retirement benefit is as defined in the rules of the fund, and it may be more or less than the 
value of the accumulated contributions. The benefit is usually defined by reference to the 
member’s final salary and years of service.79 For example, a member may be promised a 
benefit equivalent to 15% of her final salary multiplied by her years of service.80 Calculating 




75 These distinctions will gradually disappear if the legislature’s intended retirement reforms are finally 
introduced, which will require that provident fund members also utilise two-thirds of their retirement 
savings to purchase a pension. The reforms were supposed to take effect on 1 March 2016, alongside 
the harmonised tax treatment of pension and provident funds. For an explanation of the reforms, see 
Sanlam ‘T-Day – Retirement reform and tax changes’ <https://seb-news.sanlam.co.za/consultant-
toolkit/t-day-1-march-2016/>. 
76 In 2014, 98% of funds surveyed by Sanlam provided a lump sum, 19% a spousal pension and 14% a 
child’s pension on the death of a member, see Sanlam Benchmark Survey: Research Insights Report 
(2014), 13. I have not found more recent information on point.  
77 Sephton, Cooper, Thompson A Guide to Pension and Provident Funds (1990), 5. 
78 Every member has an individual account within the fund, the value of which is determined by the 
contributions, the fund return (investment growth or loss on the contributions), and the member’s share 
of the expenses incurred in the administration of the fund, see PFA, s14(B)(1).  
79 See further Glossary of Terms in Downie (n24). 
80 See eg the defined benefit promised to government employees in rule 14 of the Rules of the GEPF, 
contained in Government Employees Pension Law 1996 (as last amended by GN 919 in GG 36817 of 5 
September 2013), Schedule 1. 
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value of the member’s contributions.81 In a DC fund, the member bears the risk that her 
accumulated contributions will not be sufficient to meet her retirement needs. The risk 
emanates both from the level of contributions she chooses to make, if she has a choice, and 
from the investment returns generated by her contributions. Members are therefore said to 
assume the ‘market risk’ in a DC fund. In a DB fund the employer bears the risk that the 
member’s accumulated contributions will be insufficient to fund the promised retirement 
benefit. If the contributions are insufficient, the employer must make good the shortfall.  
 
Historically, most pension funds were DB funds, while most provident funds were DC funds.82 
The distinction between DB and DC funds is of far less significance today outside the public 
sector.83 Due to the financial risk that DB funds hold for employers, and for members should 
the employer or fund go insolvent, a ‘dramatic shift’ from DB to DC funds occurred during 
the 1980s and 1990s.84 The result is that the majority of funds in South Africa today are DC 
funds, and most of them in turn are provident funds.85  
 
Irrespective of these differences, in both DB and DC funds the member’s savings portion is 
the minimum to which the member’s beneficiaries are entitled by way of a death benefit. In 
both DC and DB funds it is common for the fund to promise that an additional sum will be 
payable should the member die before retirement. This additional sum is usually expressed as 
 
81 The member’s savings portion may be smaller or larger than the promised benefit. If it is larger, the 
savings portion is the minimum benefit to which members are entitled if they leave the fund prior to 
retirement, see PFA, s14A(1)(a) and 14B(2).  
82 Sephton (n77). 
83 The GEPF is a defined benefit fund, as are most other public-sector funds.  
84 National Treasury Retirement Fund Reform: a discussion paper (December 2004), 6; Editorial ‘Now you 
see Benefits, now you don’t’ Today’s Trustee (April 2005); George Analysis of South African Pension Fund 
Conversion: 1988–2006: Developing a model for dealing with Environmental Change (2006) Doctor of 
Business Leadership, University of South Africa. The shift was not unique to RSA but occurred fairly early 
in RSA following its start in the USA. European countries and the UK have been slower to commence the 
shift. For a more comprehensive discussion on the general demise of DB funds in the USA, see Ippolito 
Tenuous property rights: the unravelling of defined benefit pension contracts in the USA George Mason 
Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03–06. For an explanation of more recent conversions in the UK 
and EU, see Van Meerten & Borsje ‘Pension rights and entitlement conversion (Invaren): Lessons from a 
Dutch perspective with regard to the implications of the EU Charter’ (2016) 18 (1) European Journal of 
Social Security 46. 
85 National Treasury Retirement Fund Reform (n84) 6; George (n84), 20ff explains that pressure for the 
shift initially came from trade unions (1980s) and was then embraced by employers in the 1990s.  
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a multiple of the member’s salary at the time of death,86and it is funded by the proceeds of 
group life insurance cover that the fund has taken out for the benefit of its members.87 In a 
provident fund these proceeds are added to the member’s accumulated contributions 
(savings portion) and both together make up the lump sum that is payable on the member’s 
death. In a pension fund the insured portion is usually payable as a lump sum, while the 
savings portion is used to fund any pensions that are payable. In a provident fund the savings 
portion and insured benefit are combined into a single lump sum. All lump sums that are 
payable by a fund on the death of the member, whether they consist of the savings portions 
and/or the insured benefit, are governed by s37C of the Act. The further result is that s37C is 
thus of greater significance to beneficiaries today than it was in 1976, when it was enacted. 
In 1976 most funds were DB pension funds, in which only a proportion of the death benefit 
was paid as a lump sum and the balance used to pay a pension to the deceased’s spouse 
and/or children. Today the majority are DC funds, in which the entire benefit is payable as a 
lump sum and is, therefore, apportioned at the discretion of the trustees. 
 
1.6.3 Retirement fund governance 
 
The Pension Funds Act provides that the operation of the fund is the responsibility of the 
board of trustees.88 The Act does not use the word ‘trustees’ to describe the members of the 
board, but the term is accepted usage within the industry and legal fraternity, including the 
Adjudicator’s office. The term reflects the trust-law origins of retirement funds and the 
fiduciary responsibilities associated with the office of trustee.89 Notwithstanding that they are 
 
86 Sanlam Benchmark Survey: Stand-alone survey (2017), Q5.1.A,19, indicates that out of 81 funds 
surveyed, 14.8% promised a lump sum death benefit of x2 annual salary, 23.5% promised x3 annual 
salary, and 25.9% promised x4 annual salary. Only one fund surveyed did not offer any lump sum – the 
benefit would thus have been limited to the member’s savings portion. There are, however, funds that 
subsume the member’s savings within the promised lump sum, and do not provide payment of both 
the savings portion and the insured portion (see Q5.6 Sanlam Benchmark Survey: Stand-alone Funds 
Databook (2014), 24). See further Jeram (n5) §9.15.4.3. 
87 Jeram (n5) §9.15.4.3. 
88 Section 7A. 
89 See sections 7C and 7D. 
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responsible for the welfare of millions of retirement fund members and their families, members 
of the board are in the main lay rather than professional trustees.90  
 
At least half the trustees must be elected by the members of the fund, while up to half may 
be appointed by the employer.91 The employer is expected to use its power of appointment 
to ensure that the board has the necessary skills to fulfil its statutory and common law 
duties,92while the board is expected to ensure that trustees receive the necessary training to 
equip them for the role.93 Although trustees are rarely legal or financial experts, they are 
expected to conduct themselves to the standard that would be expected of professional 
trustees. In particular, they are expected to take all reasonable steps to ensure that 
members’ interests are protected at all times, to act with due care, diligence and good faith, 
to act independently and to be impartial.94 They also have a general fiduciary duty to act in 
the best interests of members and beneficiaries.95 An intentional or negligent failure to fulfil 
their duties or act to the required standard exposes the trustees to potential personal 
liability.96 They may only be relieved of such liability if a court is satisfied that they acted 
‘independently, honestly and reasonably’, or if the court feels it would be ‘fair to excuse’ the 
trustee having regard to all the circumstances of the case.97 
 
 
90 Jeram (n5) §9.15.11. This is true for stand-alone funds. One of the perceived advantages of umbrella 
funds is that the governance is entrusted to professional trustees who have the skills necessary to govern 
the fund without the need to rely on external service providers.  
91 Section 7A(1), subject to the limited exemptions contained in 7B. 
92 FSB ’Good governance of retirement funds’ Circular PF No. 130 (11 June 2007), para 23.  
93 Ibid para 30. See also PFA, s 7A(3), inserted into the Act in 2013. With effect from 10 July 2020, trustees 
are now required to complete a basic online ‘trustee training toolkit’ within six months of their 
appointment, see FSCA Conduct Standard 4 Minimum skills and training requirements for board 
members of pension funds in GN 53415 of 10 July 2020. 
94 Section 7C(2). 
95 Section 7C(2)(f); Meyer v Iscor 2003 (2) SA 715 (SCA), 730. 
96 See eg Seymour-Smith v Maxam Dantex 2008 JDR 0362 (W), in which the court awarded costs de 
bonis propriis on an attorney and client scale against the trustees for their discourteous treatment of the 
applicant and his attorney. The Adjudicator has also indicated that funds could recover financial losses 
from the trustees arising from their improper distribution of death benefits, see Sithole (n19); Matene 
(n19). 
97 Section 7F.  
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The requirement that at least half the trustees be elected by the members of the fund was 
introduced as a statutory requirement in 1998.98 When retirement funds were predominantly 
DB funds, the boards of trustees were smaller and mostly appointed by employers.99 As DC 
funds began to predominate it was thought fair that trustees representing the employees be 
given a voice in managing the fund, since it is the employees who will suffer the loss should 
there be a failure in governance.  
 
The second Adjudicator considered the member-elected representation rule a ‘laudable’ 
but ineffective attempt to improve the administration and oversight of retirement funds, 
given that many trustee boards delegate their functions, in his words ‘pass the buck’, to third 
parties, notably life insurance companies.100 When trustees exercise their power of 
delegation, the responsibility entrusted to them as a collective under s37C is in practice 
frequently exercised by a single individual, an employee within the insurance company 
responsible for the day to day administration of the fund.101 The reason for such delegation is 
that trustees, particularly member-elected trustees, lack the ‘legal, financial, and investment’ 
skills needed to administer retirement funds and fulfil their onerous common law and statutory 
duties. 102  
 
In England, by contrast, the Court of Appeal has reasoned that: 
 
 
98 Section 7A was inserted into the Act by Act 22 of 1996, but only commenced on 15 December 1998. 
See George (n84), 4. 
99 Section 7A(1) provides that the board must consist of at least four trustees, and that members of the 
fund must have the right to elect at least 50% of the board. 
100 OPFA AR 2004/2005, 83. The Act expressly permits trustees to delegate their duties, although they 
remain responsible for the delegee’s decisions (s7D(2)). 
101 See eg Kaplan (n11). Most boards do not delegate their s37C powers: see Sanlam Benchmark 
Standalone Survey 2017, which indicates that 82% of boards apply their mind to the distribution and do 
not simply follow the recommendation of the administrator (Q 12.3). The survey also indicates that 109 
of 113 respondents believed that the distribution should either be made by the full board or a 
committee of the board, and only 4% were of the view that the administrator should make the decision 
(Q 12.8). 
102 George (n84). Section 7(2)(e) of the Act recognises that trustees may lack the knowledge and skills 
necessary to govern a fund. It therefore requires that trustees obtain expert advice on matters in which 
they lack expertise. The problem is that the legal and regulatory environment within which funds 
operate is so complex that lay trustees may not realise that a matter raises issues that require expert 
advice.  
22 
… trustees are entrusted with the powers which they have under the scheme for just the reason 
that they are likely to be persons with the knowledge and experience relevant to the questions 
with which … they will, from time to time, be faced. 103 
If trustees are in the main lay people rather than experts, what justification is there for 
entrusting them with the power to distribute the member’s death benefits? No other 
legislature has seen fit to do so, after all, even when its legal and social environment is 
considerably less challenging and the trustees more knowledgeable and experienced than 
their South African counterparts.  
1.7 THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
Most South Africans are economically vulnerable: they are either too young to work, too old 
to work, or they are not in work. The ability to work does not mean the ability to find work. 
South Africa’s unemployment rate is high. Its youth unemployment rate is even higher.104 
Those in work are also vulnerable to the loss of their employment. The very young are 
dependent on others, and possibly the state, for support. The old may be self-supporting, 
dependent on others, or on the state. The unemployed also almost inevitably depend on 
others, unless they fall into a small pool of recipients of social grants or an even smaller pool 
of the independently wealthy. Vulnerability therefore stretches across South African society, 
and only a small minority of individuals will easily withstand the loss of their employment, or 
the loss of a breadwinner on whom they depend.  
1.7.1 Unemployment 
South Africa’s current employment rate is 43%. In other words, only 43% of South Africans of 
working age population, aged 15–64, are employed – that is 16 million out of a total working 
103 Edge v Pensions Ombudsman [1999] 4 All ER 546 (CA), 569. 
104 It is so high that it has been described as a ‘scourge’, see StatsSA Vulnerable Groups Series 1: The 
Social Profile of Youth 2009–2014 (2016), 76.  
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age population of 37 million.105 A person is, however, considered to be employed if they 
worked only one hour in the previous week.106 South Africa’s official unemployment rate is 
almost 28%.107 The extended unemployment rate, which includes discouraged jobseekers, is 
37%.108 Of the 43% who are employed, 30% work in the formal sector. It is they who are most 
likely to be contributing members of retirement funds.109 The remaining 13% are employed in 
the informal sector, private households or agricultural industry. They are unlikely to be 
members of retirement funds. These statistics do not represent the extent of unemployment 
amongst the youth population, those aged 15–34. About 31% of youth, aged 15–24, are not 
in education, employment or training. Of those aged 15–34, 39% are not in education, 
employment or training. Over three out of every 10 young men, and over four out of every 10 
young women, are unemployed.110 Together they account for 70% of the officially 
unemployed.111 The highest incidence of unemployment amongst the youth population is 
the 25–34 year age group.112 The least qualified are the most likely to be unemployed: 50% of 
the unemployed do not complete their secondary schooling; 35% do have a matric 
qualification but no post-secondary education.113 However, 8.3% of the unemployed do 
have some tertiary education.114 Numerically, what these percentages mean is there are 
only about 11.3 million people employed in the formal sector at present – 20% of the total 
 
105 StatsSA Quarterly Labour Force Survey: Quarter 3 2018 (PO211), Table A.  
106 Ibid, 16. 
107 Ibid, Table A.  
108 Ibid, Table 2.4. 
109 National Treasury Strengthening Retirement Savings (14 May 2012),3 reported that only about half of 
South African workers belong to a retirement fund. The term ‘worker’ is not defined in the report, but 
presumably includes workers in the informal sector, given that there are 11 million active members of 
retirement funds and approximately the same number of employees in the formal sector, meaning that 
almost all workers in the formal sector are members of retirement funds.  
110 StatsSA Quarterly Labour Force Survey (n105), Figure 9a & b. Cf Dezius v Dezius 2006 (6) SA 395 (T) 
[20], in which the judge stated that ‘Both poverty and its twin, indigence, are gender-blind. They are 
non-sexist in their affliction.’ Despite the higher unemployment and poverty rate amongst women, I 
agree with this sentiment when judged from the perspective of the individual.  
111 StatsSA Vulnerable Groups (n104), 1. 
112 Ibid, Figure 5.5. 
113 See StatsSA Census 2011 Fact Sheet, Tables 2 & 4, which indicate that most South Africans have not 
completed high school. 
114 StatsSA Quarterly Labour Force Survey (n105) Figure 8. The average unemployment rate for those 
with tertiary education is similar in OECD countries, see OECD Education at a Glance Interim Report: 
Update of Employment and Educational Attainment Indicators (2015),19.  
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population of 57.7 million.115 The remainder are either employed in the informal sector, rely on 
their own savings, on those who are employed, or on the state for social assistance.  
1.7.2 Savings 
The savings rate in South Africa is low. The poorer the individual, the less able they are to 
save.116 About 30% of income-earners do not save towards retirement.117 This figure is 
explicable, in view of the relatively low average incomes, and the fact that savings is dis-
incentivised for those who hope to access the state old age grant once they retire.118 When 
individuals do save, their retirement savings represent their most significant form of savings.119 
National Treasury estimates that 60% of employees’ savings goes towards retirement 
funding.120 This is compulsory saving in the form of contributions made to an occupational 
retirement fund as part of the employee’s remuneration. However, even amongst those who 
have retirement savings, the rate of savings is in most cases far below what they will need to 
meet their retirement needs. Only 6% of South Africans are likely to be able to maintain their 
standard of living after retirement.121 About half of those who have saved towards their 
retirement will retire on less than 28% of their pre-retirement income.122 It is these savings that 
make up either the whole, or part of, the lump sum death benefit that will be payable to a 
member’s beneficiaries should they die before retirement.  
115 StatsSA Mid-year Population Estimates 2018 (P0302), Table 6. 
116 Old Mutual Savings and Investment Monitor (2015) indicates that 73% of those who earn less than 
R6000 per month, 37% who earn between R6000 and R14000 per month, 29% who earn between 
R14000 and R20 000 per month, 20% who earn between R20 000 and R40 000 per month, and 12% of 
those who earn over R40 000 per month do not contribute towards a retirement fund. 
117Institute of Retirement Funds Africa Dispatch (10 March 2017), 4.  
118 There are perverse incentives not to save towards retirement that arise because the means test for 
the state old age grant penalises lower-income earners who have saved towards retirement, while the 
tax incentives on retirement savings benefit mainly higher-income earners, see National Treasury Social 
Security and Retirement Reform: a second discussion paper (February 2007), para 10. 
119 National Treasury Memorandum on the Objects of the Pension Funds Amendment Bill, 2007, para 1.1 
120 Strengthening Retirement Savings (n109), 4. They include employer and employee contributions, 
together with the premium paid to purchase long-term insurance, in their calculation of retirement 
savings (at 7).  
121 Lamprecht ‘Why only 6% of South Africans can retire comfortably’ Moneyweb (5 August 2015). This is 
despite the fact that for employees earning above the income tax threshold, contribution rates to 
retirement funds are high, and that the value of the assets managed by funds is amongst the highest in 
the world as measured against GDP, Strengthening Retirement Savings (n109), 6. 
122 Social Security and Retirement Reform: a second discussion paper (n118) para 21. 
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1.7.3 Social Assistance 
Although a vital source of income for over 17 million South Africans, the reach of social 
assistance is limited.123 The social grants landscape is complex. Individuals can potentially 
qualify for any one of seven different types of social grants. The grant-eligibility criteria are 
narrow, and the receipt of one grant usually excludes the recipient from eligibility for 
another.124 Between April 2017 and March 2018, the South African government paid almost 
R150 billion in social grants.125 The principal beneficiaries of social grants are the 
elderly,126followed by child support grants,127disability grants,128and then foster care grants.129 
The maximum value of the old age grant for 2017 was R1 600; for foster care R920, and for 
child support R380.130 Most grants are means-tested, and the thresholds provide helpful 
indications of the income and asset levels the government considers so low as to entitle the 
recipients to support: for old age (above 60) and disability grants, individuals whose annual 
income exceeds R73 800, or who have assets in excess of R1 056 000, are not eligible for the 
grant.131 The amount a recipient receives by way of a grant depends on her monthly income 
from other sources. In order to qualify for the maximum grant (R1 600 in 2017), the recipient’s 
monthly income must have been below R2 250.132 The amount of the grant is progressively 
reduced, and the lowest grant is R100 per month, for individuals with a monthly income of R5 
123 South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) AR 2016/2017, Table 1. 
124 Exceptions are Foster Care and Care Dependency Grants for severely disabled children. The seven 
social grants are: social relief of distress; grants-in-aid; child support grant; foster care grant; care 
dependency grant; war veteran’s grant; disability grant; grant for older persons. 
(www.sassa.gov.za/index.php/social-grants). 
125 SASSA AR 2017/2018, Table 2. 
126 Eligibility for old age grants is age 60. R64 billion was paid to 3.4 million pensioners (SASSA AR 
2017/2018, Tables 1 & 2). 
127 R56 billion for 12 million children.  
128 R20 billion for 1 million disabled persons.  
129 R 4.9 billion for 416 000 children.  
130 SASSA You and Your Grants 2017/2018. Slightly higher, at R1620, for those older than 75. The disability 
grant was also capped at R1600. These grants increase year on year. 
131 Ibid. Foster care grants are not means tested. 
132 The income an applicant receives as maintenance from any person legally obliged to maintain 
them is supposed to be included in the assessment of their means, see the Social Assistance Act 13 of 
2004, Regulations relating to the application for and payment of social assistance and the requirements 




750. The primary recipients of social grants are likely to be women – both by virtue of their role 
as primary carers of minor children eligible for child support or foster care grants and 
because the mortality rate amongst men is higher. For those aged above 60, the proportion 
of women significantly outnumber men.133 
 
The single-most important feature of the social grants landscape is that it provides no 
assistance to the unemployed.134 The most vulnerable in society are therefore arguably not 
the young or the old, from an income perspective at least. They have access to some 
measure of social assistance, albeit limited and insufficient to meet any individual’s 
reasonable maintenance needs.135 The most vulnerable are those who are unemployed, 
who have no private savings and who do not have access to any form of social assistance 
from the state – for it is they who are utterly dependent on the support of others. Those in 
employment and in receipt of social grants number roughly 33 million, out of a population of 
57 million. That leaves 24 million who are either completely reliant on their own savings, on 




The official dependency ratio in South Africa is in the region of 61%.136 Dependency ratios 
simply measure the proportion of the non-working-age population to the working-age-
population – in other words, the percentage of those younger than 15 and older than 64 to 
all those of the working age population.137 The premise is that the working-age population is 
the productive part of the economy, and that the young and the old are part of the non-
productive population. They are therefore dependent on the employed for support, both 
 
133 StatsSA Mid-year Population Estimates 2018 (P0302). 
134 Retrenched employees are entitled to claim unemployment insurance for a maximum of 34 weeks, 
see Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001, Schedule 2. 
135 RAF v Mohohlo 2018 (2) SA 65 (SCA). Cf Thene v Bidcorp (2008) PFA/GA/6863/05/LCM. 
136 Dependency ratio is the proportion of those younger than 15 and older than 64 divided by the 
working age population. See further UN explanation of ‘Dependency Ratio’ available online at 
<http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/indicators/methodology_sheets/demographics/dependency
_ratio.pdf>.  
137 21 932 823 / 35 792 783 = 61.27%. 
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directly and indirectly via the state’s social assistance programmes, which are funded 
through taxation. The higher the ratio, the greater the burden on those in employment. As 
with official unemployment rates, the official dependency ratio understates the true extent 
of dependency. In the absence of personal savings and social assistance, all those not in 
employment depend upon those in employment. Using this as the measure, the true 
dependency ratio is closer to 260%.138 For every income earner, there are on average almost 
three additional people who depend on that person’s earnings. Familial interdependency is 
high in South Africa.139 Parents support adult children;140 adult children their parents;141 siblings 
each other.142 The ongoing provision of support amongst family members is a consequence 
of economic circumstance, but it evidences the moral obligation family members accept 
they owe one another, quite apart from any legal obligation that they may be under.143   
1.8 THE OFFICE OF THE PENSION FUNDS ADJUDICATOR 
The Adjudicator’s office is an administrative body with judicial functions.144 It is modelled on 
its English counterpart, the Pensions Ombudsman, rather than Australia’s Superannuation 
Complaints Tribunal.145 The office was established in April 1996 to provide complainants, who 
138 57.7 m–16 m = 41m/16m = 256%. 
139 Old Mutual Savings and Investment Monitor (2018), 12, indicates that over 20% of South Africans 
provide financial support to their parents, and 13% to their siblings. The degree of sibling dependence 
has increased significantly since 2013, when it stood at 5%.  
140 See eg Radebe v Sosibo [2011] JOL 26931 (GSJ). 
141 See eg Seleka v RAF [2016] JOL 35830 (GP); RAF v Mohohlo (n135). 
142 See eg Fosi v RAF [2007] JOL 19399 (C).  
143 The lack of litigation between family members, other than spouses and minor children, supports the 
view that family members support one another out of a sense of moral rather than legal duty. The 
probability is that they are unaware of the existence of an enforceable legal duty. 
144 See Henderson v Eskom [1999] 12 BPLR 353 (PFA); Wolf v Cabris [2001] 1 BPLR 1557 (PFA) and Meyer v 
Iscor (n95), in which the Adjudicator described her office as a quasi-judicial body. In Old Mutual Life 
Assurance Co (SA) v Pension Funds Adjudicator 2007 (3) SA 458 (C) [12] the High Court held that the 
Adjudicator performs ‘a judicial function proper, and not merely a quasi-judicial function’. See further 
Mhango ‘Does the South African Pension Funds Adjudicator perform an administrative or a judicial 
function?’ (2016) 20 Law, Democracy & Development 20, who argues that because the Adjudicator 
performs a judicial function, its decisions should not be subject to review under the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA). 
145 Wolf v Cabris (n144) and Meyer v Iscor (n95). Hanekom (n24) §9.24.1, explains that the nature and 
powers of the Adjudicator reflect a ‘compromise’ between the FSB’s desire that a ‘special court’ with 
the power to hand down binding decisions be established, and the industry’s preference for a 
conciliatory and mediatory body with the power to make non-binding decisions only. See further 
Murphy ‘Alternative dispute resolution in the South African pension funds industry: An Ombudsman or a 
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‘through lack of resources are generally denied access to courts’,146 with a ‘procedurally fair, 
economical and expeditious’ forum for the resolution of complaints against retirement 
funds.147 The High Court has both concurrent jurisdiction to hear complaints against 
retirement funds,148 and to hear appeals against Adjudicator determinations.149 The 
overwhelming majority of death benefit complaints are taken to the Adjudicator150  not the 
High Court,151 and appeals against such determinations are very rare.152 The recognition that 
complainants, and other affected parties, lack the resources to pursue their concerns in 
court is important. It underscores the need for the Adjudicator to resolve complaints correctly 
and fairly, not merely cheaply and quickly, for just as complainants cannot afford to 
commence legal proceedings in the High Court, so they and other aggrieved beneficiaries 
cannot afford appeals against Adjudicator determinations.153  
 
The Adjudicator does not have the jurisdiction to determine any and every complaint 
against any and every retirement fund. It may decide complaints only as defined in the Act, 
 
Tribunal?’ (2001) 7(1) Journal of Pension Management 28, who expresses a preference for the 
approach of the Australian Superannuation Complaints Tribunal (SCT). The SCT has been phased out. 
As from 1 November 2018 new death benefit complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the Australian 
Financial Complaints Tribunal. The SCT will cease operating entirely on 30 June 2020.  
146 Till v Unilever [2000] 11 BPLR 1297 (PFA) [30]. 
147 PFA, s30D. It was established following the recommendations of the Mouton Commission, in order to 
relieve pressure on the FSB, see Murphy (n145).  
148 Section 30H(2). 
149 Section 30P. The appeal is one in the wide sense, and the court may decide the matter afresh. See 
Meyer v Iscor (n95). Some Adjudicators have expressed their unhappiness at the court’s wide powers to 
decide complaints de novo. See Murphy (n145). The second Adjudicator was of the view that in 
allowing for a wide rather than ordinary appeal, s30 essentially consigned its office to the ‘scrapheap’. 
See OPFA AR 2004/2005, 31. 
150 Roughly 10% of annual complaints concern death benefit disputes. In 2016/2017, the Adjudicator 
handed down about 3300 determinations in total. See OPFA AR 2016/2017, 9, and the comparable 
figures in previous years annual reports, all of which are available on its website at www.pfa.org.za.  
151 Those that have include Kaplan (n11); Seymour-Smith (n96); Mashazi (n16); Ramoitheki v Liberty 
[2006] JOL 18075 (W); Makume v Cape Joint RF [2007] 2 BPLR 174 (C); Titi v Fundsatwork [2011] JOL 
28125 (ECM); Guarnieri v Fundsatwork 2018 JDR 0740 (GP).  
152 There are only a handful of reported appeals, which include Hattingh v Murphy [2006] JOL 17709 (C); 
Pillay v Ngalwana 2007 JDR 0588 (D); Berge v Alexander Forbes [2009] JOL 23698 (W); University of 
Pretoria  v Du Preeze [2016] JOL 35014 (GP); Maphothoma v Pension Fund Adjudicator 2017 JDR 0909 
(GP); Letsoalo v Lukhaimane 2018 JDR 0277 (GP). As of 1 April 2018, individuals aggrieved by a 
determination must first approach the Financial Services Tribunal before appealing to the HC, see 
Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017, s230.  
153 A point that was raised by the second Adjudicator when criticising the wide appeal powers given to 
courts in terms of s30P of the Act. His criticism is premised on his belief that appellants will in most cases 
be retirement funds and that complaints should sometimes be decided on equitable principles, which 
HC’s are ill-suited to applying, rather than rigid rules of law. He proposed the formation of a specialist 
appeal court, OPFA AR 2004/2005, 31-35. A recent amendment to the PFA grants the Adjudicator 




and only against funds registered in terms of the Act.154 The Adjudicator receives thousands 
of complaints each year,155about 3000 of which result in formal determinations.156 Over 80% 
of the determinations find in favour of the complainants.157 Complaints related to death 
benefits account for the second highest percentage of determinations, roughly 10% in 
total.158 In Australia, death-benefit complaints account for approximately 30% of all 
complaints to the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal (SCT), and are the second largest 
category of complaints (after administration).159 By contrast, complaints to the English 
Pensions Ombudsman are only in the region of 5%.160 The differences are probably 
accounted for by the different powers of the three bodies. The Adjudicator has interpreted 
its powers as limited to those of ‘common law’ review,161 modelling itself on the English 
Pensions Ombudsman,162 which is not permitted to substitute its conception of what is fair 
and reasonable for that of the trustees unless the decision was so perverse that it was one no 
reasonable body of trustees could have reached.163 The SCT, on the other hand, is 
specifically required to scrutinise only the substantive merits of the trustees’ decision – 
whether the allocation of the death benefit as between the beneficiaries was fair and 





154 All private occupational retirement funds must register, PFA, s4.  
155 The exact figures are reported in the OPFA AR. By way of example, the reports indicate that the 
following numbers of new complaints were received during the relevant financial year: 5405 (AR 
2013/2014, at 6); 7010 (AR 2014/2015, at 4); 9967 (AR 2015/2016, at 3); 7501 (AR 2016/2017, at 8). 
156 For example, 3651 (AR 2013/2014, at 7); 2879 (AR 2014/2015, at 9); 3475(AR 2015/2016, at 3); 3309 (AR 
2016/2017, at 9). 
157 83% (AR 2015/2016, at 6); 86% (AR 2016/2017, ‘Key Figures’). 
158 9% (AR 2013/2014, at 8); 10.2% (AR 2014/2015, at 10); 10% (AR 2015/2016, at 10); 8.3% (AR 2016/2017, 
at 10). 
159 See Australian SCT AR 2016–2017 (2017) Figure 3.4, which records the percentage of death benefit 
complaints between 2012 and 2016.  
160 The Pensions Ombudsman (UK) Annual Reports for the years 2013–2014, 2015–2016 and 2017–2018 
indicate that death benefit complaints accounted for 4.2%, 3.7% & 5% of total complaints respectively.  
161 Schleicher v SARAF [2002] 7 BPLR 3677 (PFA); Jeram (n5) §9.15.7.3.7.  
162 Van Schalkwyk v MEPF [2003] 8 BPLR 5087 (PFA). 
163 Edge v Pensions Ombudsman (n103); Catchpole v The Trustees of the Alitalia Airlines Pension 
Scheme [2010] EWHC 1809 (Ch) [35].  
164 Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993, ss14(2) & 37.  
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The Act defines a complaint as one ‘relating to’ the administration of a fund, the investment 
of its funds or the interpretation and application of its rules.165 It further requires that the 
complaint provide greater particularity by specifying either that: a decision purportedly 
taken in terms of the rules of the fund was in excess of, or an improper exercise of, the 
decision-maker’s powers; that there has been maladministration of the fund which is or may 
be prejudicial to the complainant; or that a dispute on a matter of fact or law has arisen 
between the complainant and the fund.166  
 
Considering the rather tortuous definition, it is little wonder that the Adjudicator and courts 
have not always seen eye to eye on whether the Adjudicator has jurisdiction to determine a 
particular complaint. There have been cases in which the Adjudicator has declined to 
investigate a matter on the basis that it lacks jurisdiction, while a court has decided that it did 
have jurisdiction, and vice versa.167 Many complaints are turned away by the Adjudicator on 
the basis that it lacks jurisdiction, with the complainant referred to other bodies.168 The 
question of jurisdiction has also arisen in the context of death benefits, albeit rarely.169 There 
was some doubt as to whether the Adjudicator has the jurisdiction to hear complaints 
pertaining to the distribution of the insured portion of the death benefit, or whether that falls 
under the jurisdiction of the Long-term Insurance Ombudsman. Since the insured portion 
forms part of the lump sum that is payable by a fund in terms of s37C, the Adjudicator has 
asserted jurisdiction, and the industry has accepted its jurisdiction.170 For the most part, funds 
 
165 Section 1. 
166 Ibid. The fourth allegation, pertaining to investment, is not relevant to s37C. The allegation does not 
have to be made expressly; it is sufficient that the complaint sets out the essential facts. See Mungal v 
Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd [2010] 1 BPLR 11 (SCA).  
167 Mungal (n166); Grobler v Pension Funds Adjudicator [2006] 1 BPLR 26 (T), which was reversed on 
appeal in Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Grobler [2007] 1 BPLR 1 (SCA). See also Hoffmann v Pension 
Funds Adjudicator 2011 JDR 1724 (WCC). 
168 In 2016/2017 about 30% of the new complaints received were held to be outside the jurisdiction of 
the Adjudicator, and about 10% were referred to other bodies, OPFA AR 2016/2017, 9. The second 
Adjudicator identified 13 fora with jurisdiction to hear complaints related to retirement funds in some 
way, OPFA AR 2004/2005, 28. 
169 Moir v Reef Group [2000] 6 BPLR 629 (PFA). 
170 Ibid. Cf Van Zelser v Sanlam [2003] 2 BPLR 4420 (PFA), in which the complainant was referred to the 
Ombudsman for Long-term Insurance in respect of proceeds payable from a separate group life 
scheme, which are usually taken out by employers as an additional or alternative form of the group life 
cover purchased by the retirement fund. The legal basis on which the trustees of the fund had 
allocated those proceeds is not apparent from the determination.  
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and the Adjudicator today appear to accept that all decisions taken in terms of s37C may 
give rise to a complaint as defined. However, the determinations do not crisply locate the 
complaint within the appropriate part of the definition. Some determinations characterise 
the complaint as one involving either the improper exercise of power or maladministration of 
the fund,171without definitively deciding into which category it falls.172 In others, 
determinations opt for one or the other characterisation,173 or avoid doing so altogether.174  
The Act does not define maladministration.175 The first and second Adjudicators sought to 
give meaning to the concept. In Pistor v Sanlam Preservation Pension Fund, the first 
Adjudicator likened maladministration to a delict, stating further that ‘the usual requirements 
to establish a delict must be satisfied; there must be an unlawful (wrongful), blameworthy act 
or omission causing damage or patrimonial loss.’176 
While investigatory failures could quite conceivably constitute a delict, it is difficult to imagine 
the circumstances under which the honest and good faith exercise of a discretion could 
ever do so.177 The second Adjudicator was nevertheless of the view that it could. He sought 
to provide greater content to the concept and proposed a considerably more expansive 
meaning of the term, that ‘[m]aladministration is essentially an administrative action that is 
unlawful, arbitrary, unjust, oppressive, unjustifiably discriminatory, or taken for an improper 
purpose.’ 178 
171 These are also the only two bases for complaint in England. See Pension Schemes Act 1993, 
ss146(1)(a) & (1)(c). 
172 See eg Van der Merwe v Southern Life [2000] 3 BPLR 321 (PFA) [10}; Chittenden v Estcourt Butchery 
[2001] 5 BPLR 2001 (PFA).  
173 See eg Gorrah v Metal Industries [2014] JOL 31420 (PFA); Cafun v Alexander Forbes [2017] JOL 38730 
(PFA). 
174 See eg Gowing v LRAF [2007] 2 BPLR 212 (PFA). 
175 It is a term drawn from its English counterpart, the Pension Schemes Act (n171), which similarly 
contains no definition. 
176 PFA/GA/1211/02/SM, quoted in Davidson ‘Dispute resolution’ in Hanekom (n24) §9.24.13.  
177 See eg the determinations of the English Pensions Ombudsman in Dewhurst v Standard Life (H00527, 
15 June 1999) and MacKay v Oban Times Scheme Trustees (J00296, 22 February 2000). The first held that 
a failure to consider all the pertinent facts, which had been available to complainants, constituted 
maladministration. The second held that the decision to award the benefit to the nominated 
beneficiaries, in circumstances in which the trustees had considered all the relevant facts, could not be 
maladministration.  
178 OPFA AR 2004/2005, 66, which approves and expands upon the examples of maladministration 
identified by the English Ombudsman.  
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In finding pertinent examples to support his view — that the retirement funds industry acts 
with ‘generally wanton disregard’ for member’s rights — he singled out the ‘improper 
exercise of discretion’ by trustees for particular criticism: 
Now, although in our statistics we do not have a category that shows the number of instances 
in which we have had to grapple with the issue of trustee discretion in the complaints we have 
received, I can confidently say this issue has come up (directly or indirectly) in most of the 
complaints.179 
Trustees face the spectre of personal liability when their decision-making is held to constitute 
an improper exercise of their powers or maladministration.180 The trustees of the GEPF, by 
contrast, are statutorily indemnified against all losses incurred by the fund, provided those 
losses have not been caused by the trustees’ fraud, dishonesty or gross negligence.181 
Adjudicators are similarly exempt from liability for decisions taken in good faith in the exercise 
of their duties.182 An unskilled body of trustees can therefore be held liable for exercising their 
powers in good faith in circumstances in which the GEPF trustees and the Adjudicator, 
making an identical decision, will be exempt.  
1.8.2 Organisational structure 
There have been six Adjudicators to date. The Adjudicator is assisted by a deputy 
Adjudicator, and numerous assistant Adjudicators. 183 The adjudicative function is performed 
by assistant Adjudicators who investigate complaints and prepare draft determinations for 
signature by the Adjudicator.184 That this should be the case is unsurprising, given the large 
179 Ibid, 68. The Adjudicator was particularly aggrieved when trustees decided to pay the benefit to a 
trust or beneficiary fund rather than to the major beneficiary or guardian of a minor beneficiary, as 
appears from the cases discussed in the report at 68–69.  
180 See Sithole (n19); Morgan v SA Druggists [2001] 4 BPLR 1886 (PFA).  
181 Government Employees Pension Law, 1996, Schedule 1, rule 4.5.1. 
182 PAJA, s10A.  
183 The OPFA AR 2007/2008, 35–36, exceptionally, details the names and qualifications of the 
professional staff responsible for investigating and drafting determinations. In 2007/8, the Adjudicator 
was assisted by a deputy, 9 senior and 12 assistant Adjudicators. The assistants were divided into seven 
teams, each one led by a senior Adjudicator.  
184 Murphy (n145), 36. The adjudicative team is supplemented by a conciliation team and a New 
Complaints Unit (NCU). The NCU does not adjudicate complaints or draft determinations. It processes 
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number of complaints. There has, unfortunately, been a high turnover amongst assistant 
Adjudicators.185  
In 2008 the newly appointed fourth Adjudicator, Charles Pillai, expressed concern at the lack 
of institutional knowledge within the Adjudicator’s office. He noted that almost the entire 
staff complement as at that date was new, and that the majority were either recent 
graduates or newly-admitted attorneys and advocates with little or no experience in 
practice prior to their appointment.186 They were themselves thus in ‘urgent need’ of 
training.187  
Charles Pillai’s observations, coupled with the determinations that display a lack of 
understanding of fundamental aspects of the law governing death benefits, casts doubt on 
the claim that the Adjudicator’s office is a ‘repository of specialist knowledge in pension 
funds law’ which resolves disputes economically and expeditiously while ‘adhering to the rule 
of law’.188 This is not to say that there is no one with specialist knowledge and experience, or 
that it does not perform an important role. There is, and it does. Its existence is extremely 
important in providing what it aims to provide – accessible justice for vulnerable individuals 
trying to enforce their rights against often-unsympathetic actors governed by opaque 
rules.189 The Adjudicator has helped many individuals vindicate their rights or protect their 
interests.190 Section 37C, however, imposes obligations on trustees that are distinct from the 
ordinary administrative responsibilities that governing a retirement fund entails. It requires that 
complaints and determines whether they are within the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator. It also 
endeavours to settle matters prior to the adjudicative stage.  
185 The exact figure is not known. OPFA AR 2016/2017,14, states that 10 individuals resigned because 
they were not ‘meeting the required performance expectations’ of the Adjudicator. The total staff 
complement was 58. A similarly high turnover is apparent in previous reporting periods. On the other 
hand, the senior Adjudicators had occupied that position for at least the four previous reporting 
periods.  
186 OPFA AR 2009/2010, 7. 
187 Ibid. Expenditure for staff training increased from R37 000 in the previous year to over R334 000 (at 
52). Similarly, in the AR 2013/2014, 9, mention is made of 12 staff members who received bursaries for 
additional training in different fields, including training in pensions law.  
188 OPFA AR 2016/2017,15. 
189 Examples include Malatji v Gauteng Building Industry PFA/NP/9447/2011/LPM; Sekiti v Amplats 
PFA/MP/21179/2007/TD; Nodude v Bosele [2013] 2 BPLR 241 (PFA). 
190 See eg Kubeka v South African Local Authorities PFA/GP/00023400/2016/MD; Shongwe v South 
African Local Authorities PFA/ LP/00024152/2016/UM; Hlatshwayo v Iscor [2016] 1 BPLR 58 (PFA). 
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trustees, and Adjudicators understand and apply laws that are uncertain, incomplete and in 
a state of flux. It requires that trustees understand the nature and bounds of discretionary 
decision-making, and that Adjudicators understand the extent of, and limits on, their 
authority to intervene in such decision-making. Just as it imposes different responsibilities on 
trustees, so it requires different adjudicative skills of Adjudicators. The variable quality of 
determinations suggests that not all Adjudicators are uniformly equal to the task. Any 
criticisms of the Adjudicator in this dissertation are specific to s37C decision-making and 
adjudication, and all flow from the nature of the rights and obligations contained in s37C 
itself.  
1.9 THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
South Africa has, since 1994,191 been a constitutional democracy.192 The Constitution is the 
supreme law; all law, including pre-Constitutional legislation,193 and all conduct that is 
inconsistent with it is invalid.194 The Constitution contains an entrenched Bill of Rights (BoR).195 
The first provision in the BoR reveals its purpose and its boundaries. It is the ‘cornerstone’ of 
South Africa’s democracy, enshrining the rights contained therein and affirming the 
Constitution’s commitment to the democratic values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom.196 The state is obliged to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil’ the enumerated 
rights.197 The rights are, however, not absolute but may be limited in accordance with either 
the general limitations clause in s36 or a specific limitation contained within a right itself.198   
191 The Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993 commenced on 27 April 1994, the date of the first 
democratic election, and the Final Constitution came into effect on 18 December 1996.  
192 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (FC), s1(c) & 2. 
193 Including pre-constitutional legislation, see Ferreira v Levin 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) [27-28]. It remains 
operational until declared invalid by a court. Original legislation becomes invalid only once the CC has 
confirmed its invalidity, s172(2).  
194 FC, s2. 
195 FC, Ch 2. FC. s74(2) requires that any amendment to the BoR be approved by two-thirds of both 
houses of parliament (the National Assembly and National Council of Provinces). 
196 FC, s1(a). 
197 FC, s7(2). 
198 FC, s7(3). 
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Section 37C violates the Constitution in two ways: its direct impact on constitutionally 
guaranteed rights; its indirect impact on those same rights, as a result of the wide and 
legislatively unguided discretion it has conferred on trustees.  
The rights implicated are the right to equality;199 human dignity;200 property;201 parental 
care202 and just administrative action.203 From the perspective of members, it is their rights to 
dignity and property that are directly violated. For spouses, it is principally their right to 
property and equality, and for children, their right to parental care. The rights, in relevant 
part, read as follows: 
9. Equality (1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and
benefit of the law.
10. Human dignity Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected
and protected.
25. Property No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general
application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application—
(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of
which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court.
28. Children Every child has the right—
…
(b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the
family environment;
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services;
33. Just administrative action (1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful,
reasonable and procedurally fair.
Human dignity and equality are thus both foundational values of the Constitution and 
foundational rights. They are the first rights enumerated in the BoR. In order of importance, it is 
dignity that comes first. Dignity has been described as the most important right alongside the 
199 FC, s9. 
200 FC, s10. 
201 FC, s25. 
202 FC, s28. 
203 FC, s33. The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 gives effect to the right. 
36 
 
right to life,204 the ‘source’ of all the other rights in the BoR,205 and the ‘touchstone’ of South 
Africa’s democracy.206 All the other rights are, in essence, facets of the right to dignity.207  
 
The rights to dignity and equality may only be limited in accordance with the general 
limitations clause contained in section 36: 
 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, 
including— 
 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law 
may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
 
The limitations clause does not apply directly to the s25 right to property, which permits non-
arbitrary deprivation of property. If the deprivation of the right to property, short of 
expropriation, is permitted, provided only that the deprivation is not arbitrary, while the 
deprivation of other rights must pass the more rigorous scrutiny of the general limitations 
clause, against which standard must s37C’s constitutionality be assessed? The answer in this 
case is that it will not matter which is chosen, because the standard of scrutiny will be the 
same.  
 
The reason is that the test for arbitrariness is not a static test. It lies on a spectrum, ranging 
from a limited rationality test to the rigorous proportionality analysis required under section 36. 
If the deprivation affects only the right to property, the test for arbitrariness may require only 
that the deprivation is rational. However, if the deprivation is ‘of property closely connected 
 
204 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) [144]. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid [329]. 
207 The right to equality is usually interpreted through the lens of human dignity. See Weare v Ndebele 
2009 (1) SA 600 (CC). See also Cowen ‘Can dignity guide South Africa’s equality jurisprudence’ (2001) 
17 SAJHR 34. 
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to the other fundamental rights’, the test for arbitrariness will be akin to the section 36 
proportionality analysis.208  
 
This thesis in its entirety is a limitations analysis. Space constraints do not permit me to engage 
in a separate analysis in respect of each right, nor is it necessary to do so. The rights are 
interconnected, and the more rights s37C violates, the greater its adverse impact, and the 
more compelling the justifications for its existence will need to be.209  
 
The thesis is structured around the factors that are relevant to determining whether a 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable. Although I consider each factor in turn, they are not 
discrete but inter-related and part of a holistic enquiry.210 My conclusion is that s37C is not 
saved by the limitations clause, however compelling its purpose. Its design is so flawed that it 
is not reasonably capable of consistently achieving its objective, while the extent of the 
limitation, and the impact on those adversely affected by its application, is such that its harm 
is disproportionate to its benefits.  
 
Chapter two examines why freedom of testation – the right to choose who should benefit 
from one’s property when one dies – is an important and indivisible part of the bundle of 
rights that individuals enjoy over their property. It considers the relationship between property 
and the ‘advancement of human rights and freedoms’,211 and why it is that testamentary 
freedom is protected both by the constitutional right to property and by the right to human 
dignity.212   
 
 
208 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank (FNB) v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) [100]; 
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism: Eastern Cape 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC) [79-80].  
209 S v Manamela 2000 (1) SACR 414 (CC) [33],[69]. See also Woolman & Botha ‘Limitations’ in 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2018) para 34.8(c)(i).  
210 In Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC), O’Regan J did not follow or separately 
address each factor. After describing the facts and the nature of the right, she first considered the 
scope of the limitation, then its purpose, importance and effect, and finally concluded with a brief 
proportionality analysis.  
211 FC, s1(a). 
212 FC, s25 & s10. 
38 
 
 In chapters three and four I seek to establish s37C’s purpose and, thereafter, the meaning of 
the term ‘dependant’. These are related issues that ultimately speak to the same issue: its 
raison d’être. The limitation must be one that is rationally connected to its purpose.213 The 
limitation’s design is important to this enquiry.214 A poorly designed limitation that is not 
reasonably capable of achieving its purpose is not a justifiable limitation. 
 
 At a minimum, a limitation must be for a ‘sufficient purpose’, failing which the limitation will 
be considered arbitrary.215 When the limitation affects core rights, like the right to dignity, the 
purpose must be ‘substantially compelling’216 — one that ‘relate(s) to societal concerns 
which are pressing and substantial’ in a democratic society.217 Establishing whether the 
limitation was enacted for a sufficiently compelling reason presupposes, however, that its 
purpose can be clearly discerned.218  
 
Chapter three seeks to identify s37C’s true purpose, the mischief it was intended to guard 
against. The standard explanation for s37C is that it was enacted to protect a member’s 
dependants from the member. I ask whether this is its true purpose and whether there is a 




213 Minister of Justice & Constitutional Development v South African Restructuring and Insolvency 
Practitioners Association [2018] ZACC 20 [55]: ‘All that is required for rationality to be satisfied is the 
connection between the means and the purpose. Put differently, the means chosen to achieve a 
particular purpose must reasonably be capable of accomplishing that purpose. They need not be the 
best means or the only means through which the purpose may be attained.’ 
214 R v Oakes 1986 CanLII 46 (SCC), 106: ‘the measures must be fair and not arbitrary, carefully designed 
to achieve the objective in question and rationally connected to that objective’; Sauvé v Canada 
(Chief Electoral Officer) 2002 SCC 68 [27]: it must be demonstrated, ‘by evidence or in reason and 
logic’, that the measures are likely to promote the objective. 
215 FNB (n208) [100]. 
216 S v Manamela (n209).  
217 R v Oakes (n214), 105. 
218 Sauvé  (n214)[23-24]: ‘[T]he objective "must be accurately and precisely defined so as to provide a 
clear framework for evaluating its importance, and to assess the precision with which the means have 
been crafted to fulfil that objective” … To establish justification, one needs to know what problem the 
government is targeting, and why it is so pressing and important that it warrants limiting a Charter right. 
Without this, it is difficult if not impossible to weigh whether the infringement of the right is justifiable or 
proportionate.’ See also Lawen Estate v Nova Scotia (Attorney General) 2019 NSSC 162. 
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Chapter four focuses on the definition of dependant and the inherent challenges trustees 
face in interpreting the definition. This discussion is relevant both to s37C’s purpose, and to 
the relationship between the limitation and its purpose. Dependants lie at the heart of s37C. 
The entire section presupposes that trustees can and will correctly identify who is or is not a 
dependant. If the definition of dependant does not simply tell trustees who qualifies as a 
dependant, but requires that they first interpret the definition, against a fast-changing legal 
environment, creating considerable uncertainty as a result, can it be said that the limitation is 
‘rationally connected’ to, or reasonably capable of achieving, its purpose?  
 
Chapter five analyses how trustees exercise their discretion in practice, through the lens of 
Adjudicator determinations.219 This discussion speaks to the nature and extent of the 
limitation. I highlight the regularity with which trustees override members’ wishes, and the 
extent to which the Adjudicator’s Office has shaped trustee decision-making. I consider 
whether s37C, as applied, yields consistently equitable outcomes, since the directive that 
they do what they ‘deem equitable’ is the only guidance the legislature has given trustees. 
Chapter five also provides context for my examination, in chapter six, of s37C’s impact on 
fundamental constitutional rights.  
 
Chapter six is the heart of the analysis. How harmful is s37C, and is that harm justified by its 
purpose? The extent of the limitation is measured both by its impact on the constitutional 
rights that have been limited, and on the persons ‘deleteriously affected’ by it.220 The 
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) considers this to be the most important stage of the 
analysis, 221 for it is only at this stage that one can properly assess whether the harm is 
proportionate or disproportionate to the benefit society obtains from the limitation. If the 
 
219 See Dawood (n210), in which O’Regan analysed the wide and unguided discretion granted to 
administrative officials under the head of the ‘scope’ (nature and extent) of the limitation. 
220 Woolman & Botha (n209) para 34.8(c)(iii).  
221 R v KRJ 2016 SCC 31 [77-79].  
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harm outweighs the benefits, the limitation is unconstitutional.222 A benefit that is speculative 
or marginal is not sufficient when the deleterious effects are substantial.223  
 
In chapter six I consider, firstly, whether s37C is constitutional in so far as trustees have been 
given the right, and responsibility, to distribute a member’s property without having been 
provided with any direction as to how they should exercise their power. I then consider 
whether s37C violates the member’s right to property and, in consequence, a spouse’s right 
to property. As the final part of my analysis, I consider the impact that s37C has on the rights 
to dignity, equality and parental care, of members, spouses and children. My purpose is to 
demonstrate that s37C’s deleterious impact, on the affected persons and the rights and the 
values of an open and democratic society, outweighs its social benefits.224  
 
Chapter seven examines the treatment of death benefits and the judicial control of 
testamentary power in Australia, Canada, England, Malawi and New Zealand,225 in order to 
determine whether their treatment of death benefits provides a useful comparator for South 
Africa, and to distil the elements of judicial control that I think speak specifically to the issues 
and tensions raised by the application of s37C.  
 
Chapter seven does not provide a detailed comparison of the applicable laws and 
jurisprudence. Its aim is three-fold. Firstly, to demonstrate that there are less restrictive 
alternatives to s37C. Secondly, to highlight how courts in numerous jurisdictions, faced with 
an arguably easier task than that of the trustees, have nevertheless for decades grappled to 
identify the circumstances under which it is appropriate to interfere with a deceased’s 
distributive choices. Thirdly, to see whether their experiences provide a basis from which a set 
of guidelines could be developed that promote equitable decision-making and that remedy 
the possible unconstitutionality of s37C. The countries have been selected because they all 
 
222 S v Manamela (n209); See also R v KRJ (n221). 
223 R v KRJ (n221) [92].  
224 The Canadian Supreme Court has identified the ‘proportionality of effects’, as the most important 
part of the limitations analysis, see R v KRJ (n221) [77-79].  
225 FC, s39(2) expressly allows courts to consider foreign law when interpreting the BoR.  
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have significant private occupational retirement funding,226 they have a shared legal history 
as former English colonies, and they have all granted their courts discretionary powers to 
override a deceased’s testamentary choices.  
 
Chapter Eight concludes the dissertation and provides some suggestions for reform. 
 
 
226 OECD Pensions at a Glance (2017) Table 4.5. I do not examine the treatment of death benefits in 
New Zealand, because the retirement fund landscape is not comparable to that of the other 
jurisdictions. Occupational retirement funds account for less than 20% of retirement funding. The 
government has a voluntary funding scheme (Kiwisaver), but should a member die before retirement, 
their accumulated savings will be paid to their estate. See further Kiwisaver ‘What happens if you die’ 











This thesis posits that s37C violates the constitutional rights to human dignity,1 equality2 and 
property.3 The argument is essentially that s37C is a positive violation of each of these rights, 
independently of the other. Rights reinforce one another, and the violation of one right may 
implicate another. A violation of the right to equality is therefore usually analysed through the 
lens of the right to dignity.4 A violation of the right to private property, as manifested by 
freedom of testation, is also considered a separate violation of the right to dignity.5  
 
Therefore, had the Constitution not contained an express property right, the argument would 
still have been made that s37C violates the Constitution. The argument would then have 
focused on the violation of the common law rights in and to property, which encompass 
freedom of testation, and why depriving individuals of their testamentary freedom is in and of 
itself a violation of the right to dignity.6  
 
If freedom of testation is protected by the right to dignity, why does it matter whether it is also 
a violation of the right to property? For two reasons. The claim has been made that death 
 
1 FC, s10.  
2 FC, s9. 
3 FC, s25.  
4 Cowen ‘Can dignity guide South Africa’s equality jurisprudence’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 34. 
5 BOE Trust Ltd 2013 (3) SA 236 (SCA); Harvey v Crawford 2019 (2) SA 153 (SCA).  
6 The Nova Scotia Supreme Court recently held that freedom of testation was protected by the right to 
dignity under s7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which contains no constitutional 
property clause. See Lawen Estate v Nova Scotia (Attorney General) 2019 NSSC 162. 
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benefits are not property in the hands of the member.7 If the claim is correct, a further 
argument could then be made that it is their inherent nature that places death benefits 
outside the individual’s contractual or testamentary control, rather than that the legislature 
has deprived the individual of a right they would otherwise have had to dispose of their 
death benefits via a contract or a will.   
 
In other words, the argument could be that the legislature has simply not given the individual 
the right to select beneficiaries, rather than depriving them of the right to do so.8 My later 
analysis of the concept of constitutional property aims to refute this possible argument, by 
demonstrating that death benefits are property, in both the private law and constitutional 
sense, in the hands of the member.9 Section 37C therefore does deprive individuals of their 
property, viz death benefits, and in consequence limits their freedom of testation and, in so 
doing, also impairs their right to dignity. In addition, unless death benefits are the member’s 
property, spouses cannot obtain any proprietary rights to that property by virtue of their 
matrimonial property regime. In order to establish that s37C deprives some spouses of their 
proprietary rights, it is necessary to first establish that death benefits are property in the hands 
of the member.   
 
The constitutional right to property serves another purpose. It is not simply that it protects 
property rights, but that it serves as a reminder of why it is important that property rights, 
including freedom of testation, be protected. Some constitutional and property scholars 
suggest that constitutional guarantees to property are no longer either important or 
necessarily desirable, because the role once played by property guarantees, as a ‘bulwark 
 
7 See Tek Corporation Provident Fund v Lorentz 1999 (4) SA 884 (SCA) & Mostert v Old Mutual Life 
Assurance Co (SA) Ltd 2001 (4) SA 159 (SCA).  See further §6.3.1 below.  
8 In the USA courts have held that inter vivos property rights are part of natural law, but that rights of 
bequest and inheritance exist only because, and to the extent, states permit it. See eg US v Perkins 163 
US 625 (1896), which held that the ‘right to dispose of property by will has always been a creature of 
statute’ and that ‘we know of no legal principle to prevent the legislature from taking away or limiting 
the right of testamentary disposition’. See also Brashier ‘Disinheritance and the modern family’ (1995) 
45(1) Case Western Reserve LR 83, fn6; Scalise ‘Public policy and antisocial testators’ (2010-2011) 32 
Cardozo LR 1315, 1318.  
9 See §6.3.1 below. 
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against the abuse of state power’, is today more appropriately and as effectively fulfilled by 
the rights to dignity and equality.10 They claim that the inclusion of the property clause is 
‘testimony to the strength of the utilitarian defence of property rights’ and they appear to 
doubt the validity of the ‘philosophical justifications for the right to private property … which 
still emphasise the connection between property rights and individual freedom, at least as 
one of several mutually reinforcing arguments’.11 Their scepticism of the value of 
constitutionally-protecting property is due to their belief that such protection only serves the 
interests of those who already own ‘significant property’.12  
 
Section 37C belies this claim. Section 37C demonstrates how the state can readily interfere 
with the property rights of the poor as well as the wealthy, and how the constitutional 
protection of property is arguably a more important bulwark against state interference for 
those with limited property than for those with substantial property. The constitutional right to 
property is important precisely because it is a reminder of the role property plays in 
achieving, and securing, human dignity and freedom. Both the right to property, and many 
of the limitations on the right to property, aim to ‘protect, promote and fulfil’ the 
foundational values and rights of freedom, dignity and equality. The right to property helps 
anchor, and give meaning to, the right to dignity and equality.  
 
 
2.2 FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 
 
The most compelling justification for private property is that it is a necessary precondition for 
human dignity and freedom.13 The relationship between dignity, freedom and property, is 
 
10 Roux & Davis ‘Property’ in Cheadle, Davis, Haysom (eds) South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of 
Rights (2019), para 20.1; Nedelsky ‘Reconceiving rights and constitutionalism’ (2008) 7 Journal of Human 
Rights 139, 155 who believes that a constitutional right to property is not necessary because it is a 
second-order right - simply a means of securing first-order rights like dignity and security. Cf Coval, 
Smith, Coval ‘The foundations of property and property law’ (1986) 45(3) Cambridge LJ 457, who argue 
that property is as essential for securing freedom of action as the other civil and political rights that are 
usually found in constitutional texts. 
11 Roux & Davis (n10), para 20.1. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ferreira v Levin 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) [50]: ‘[F]reedom is indispensable for the protection of dignity.’ 
See Barros ‘Property and Freedom’ (2009) 4 New York University Journal of Law and Liberty 36, esp fn1. 
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implicitly recognised in the Constitution. Section 1 of the Constitution provides that South 
Africa is a democratic state founded on the values of ‘human dignity, the achievement of 
equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.’14 In so doing it locates the 
Constitution within a particular philosophical tradition, that of liberalism.  
 
It is liberalism as shaped by the ideas of 17th to 19th century philosophers, particularly John 
Locke,15 Immanuel Kant,16 and John Stuart Mill.17 Mill, the ‘most influential’ of the 19th century 
English-speaking philosophers,18 has been described as the ‘intellectual father’ of modern 
liberalism.19 He is the philosopher most cited by the Canadian Supreme Court,20 whose 
comparative jurisprudence the CC frequently draws upon,21 and he, together with modern 
liberal philosophers like Dworkin,22 has similarly been cited by South African courts in cases 
involving individual freedom.23 Mill provides the most compelling explanation of why 
 
14 Isaiah Berlin described the word freedom as so ‘porous’ and ‘protean’ that it could be interpreted in 
the service of almost any cause, Berlin Two Concepts of Liberty (1958) 1. Dignity has similarly been 
described as a ‘slippery concept’, see Du Bois ‘Freedom and the dignity of citizens’ 2008 Acta Juridica 
112, 130. See further Cowen (n4). 
15 Particularly his Two Treatises of Government (1689, 1764). 
16 Kant has strongly influenced the CC’s understanding of dignity as a constitutional value and right. 
Ackerman quotes Kant in his analysis of the relationship between freedom and dignity in Ferreira v Levin 
(n13). Woolman ‘Dignity’ in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law in South Africa 2ed (2018), para 
36.1, is of the view that the CC’s dignity jurisprudence is a direct derivative of Kantian ethics. Roux ‘The 
dignity of comparative constitutional law’ 2008 Acta Juridica 185, 189 also points to Kant’s influence on 
Ackerman’s conception of freedom. Other CC cases citing Kant include Bernstein v Bester 1996 (4) 
BCLR 449 (CC); South African Police Service (SAPS) v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 (10) BCLR 1195 (CC). 
Kant’s imperative that every individual be treated as an end and not merely as the means to an end 
has been described as the ‘bedrock’ of the right to dignity, see Lubbe ‘Taking fundamental rights 
seriously: the Bill of Rights and its implications for the development of contract law’ (2004) 121(2) SALJ 
395, 421.  
17 Especially Principles of Political Economy (1848), On Liberty (1859) Utilitarianism (1861) and The 
Subjection of Women (1869). The dates are those on which the works were first published. 
18 See McLeod ‘John Stuart Mill’ in Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy. 
19 Hill ‘The father of modern constitutional liberalism’ (2018) 27(2) William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 431, 
432, who concludes that Mill’s views have frequently been relied on by courts but without proper 
attribution. See also Schapiro ‘John Stuart Mill, pioneer of democratic liberalism in England’ (1943) 4(2) 
Journal of the History of Ideas 127, 134.  
20 See McCormack ‘When Canadian courts cite the major philosophers’ (2017) 42(2) Canadian LR 9, 15. 
21 FC, s36 is modelled on the limitations clause in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, see 
Cheadle ‘Limitation of Rights’ in South African Constitutional Law (n10), 11. See also Klug ‘The Canadian 
Charter, South Africa and the Paths of Constitutional Influence’ in Albert & Cameron (eds) Canada in 
the World: Comparative Perspectives on the Canadian Constitution (2017). 
22 Dworkin’s views, especially those expressed in Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 
(2000), have been described as ‘paradigmatically liberal’ by Meyerson ‘Three versions of liberal 
tolerance: Dworkin, Rawls, Raz’ (2012) 3(1) Jurisprudence 37, 62. 
23 See eg Oriani-Ambrosini, MP v Sisulu, MP, Speaker of the National Assembly 2013 (1) BCLR 14 (CC); 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice [1998] 3 All SA 26 (W); Mandela v 
Falati 1995 (1) SA 251 (W); S v K 1997 (9) BCLR 1283 (C); Prince v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development [2017] 2 All SA 864 (WCC).  
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individual freedom and private property is deserving of recognition and protection, and this 
thesis draws extensively from his work. 
 
At its core, liberalism is a philosophy of freedom.24 It is a philosophy founded on the desire to 
liberate individuals from the repressive control of state and church regarding matters of 
belief and behaviour. It is a philosophy that believes in the inherent dignity and equality of all 
individuals. It advocates tolerance, respect, openness.25   
 
It is from within this tradition that the constitutional values of ‘freedom’ and ‘dignity’ must be 
understood. Freedom is, in essence, the freedom to be the author of one’s own life. Its basic 
premise is that individuals should be permitted to make their own life choices, free from the 
will of others.26 It is the freedom to be and become oneself. In this sense it is intended, at a 
minimum, to safeguard individual autonomy from external interference from a community 
seeking to dictate to individuals what they should believe and how they should conduct 
themselves.27  
 
Freedom lies at the heart of dignity,28 but dignity explains why freedom matters.29 Dignity’s 
central claim is that everyone has the same inherent worth.30 Every human is born equal. 
 
24 The etymology of ‘liberal’ is the Latin ‘liber’, meaning ‘free’.  
25 See Russell’s chapter on ‘Philosophical Liberalism’ in his History of Western Philosophy (1946).  
26 See eg LS v RL 2019 (4) SA 50 (GJ)[33] in which the court declared the customary law requirement for 
the validity of a customary marriage, that of the formal handing over of the bride from the bride to the 
groom’s family, to be unconstitutional on the basis that: ‘The autonomy and control over one’s 
personal circumstances are fundamental aspects of human dignity’. Cf Nedelsky ‘Law, boundaries and 
bounded self’ (1990) 30 Representations 162, who considers individual autonomy claims ‘wrong-
headed and destructive’. She criticises liberalism for propagating an unrealistic and harmful ideal of 
the individual living in splendid isolation, rather than within a network of relationships. See also Nedelsky 
‘Reconceiving autonomy: sources, thoughts and possibilities’ (1989) 1 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 
7. The version of liberalism at which she directs her ‘rage’ (at 9) is not liberalism as formulated by Locke 
or Mill or as understood by the South African CC. 
27 Ackerman’s acceptance of Berlin’s ‘negative’ conception of liberty in Ferreira v Levin (n13) [52] has 
been criticised by several commentators. See Fagan ‘Dignity and the political right to freedom’ 2008 
Acta Juridica 177; Liebenberg ‘The value of freedom in interpreting socio-economic rights’ 2008 Acta 
Juridica 149. 
28 See Ackerman in Ferreira v Levin (n13) [49]: ‘freedom is indispensable for the protection of dignity’.   
29 Ackerman ibid [fn34], quoting Berlin (n14): ‘(T)hose who have ever valued liberty for its own sake 
believed that to be free to choose, and not to be chosen for, is an inalienable ingredient in what 
makes human beings human.’ 
30 See O’Regan J’s comment in S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) [328]: ‘The importance of dignity 
as a founding value of the new Constitution cannot be overemphasised. Recognising a right to dignity 
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What distinguishes humans from other sentient beings is our capacity for reason, our ability to 
make choices informed by moral considerations of how we ought to behave. When we 
make moral choices, charting a deliberate course through our life, we act as moral agents.31  
If every individual is inherently equal, then the choices each makes as a result of reasoned 
reflection is equally worthy of respect. 32   
 
The corollary is that individuals are responsible for their life choices.33 Dignity recognises that 
as moral agents, individuals are both entitled to freedom of choice, and responsible for their 
choices. In Barkhuizen v Napier the CC accepted as much, stating that ‘[s]elf-autonomy, or 
the ability to regulate one’s own affairs, even to one’s own detriment, is the very essence of 
freedom and a vital part of dignity.’34 
 
Dignity does not, however, merely require that the state not interfere with the individual’s 
freedom of choice. It is a positive claim for those choices to be accorded proper respect.35 
As explained by Roux: ‘Human dignity is … primarily a relational concept, which has less to 
do with keeping others out than it has with being properly understood and affirmed.’36   
 
 
is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of human beings: human beings are entitled to be 
treated as worthy of respect and concern.’  The etymology of ‘dignity’ is the Latin ‘dignitas’, meaning 
‘worth’. For a discussion on dignity’s historical association with status and rank, see Waldron ‘How law 
protects dignity’ (2012) 71 Cambridge LJ 200, 212ff. 
31 Du Bois (n14),132 writes: ‘For Kant, human dignity is rooted in the capacity of humans to act 
autonomously in ethical matters, that is, their capacity to reflect critically on what is worthwhile and 
appropriate to pursue and to direct their own lives in accordance therewith, taking responsibility for 
how they do so, including the impact that they have on the lives of others.’  
32 Ferreira v Levin (n13) [49]. 
33 See O’Regan ‘The three R’s of the Constitution: responsibility, respect and rights’ 2004 Acta Juridica 
86, 88: ‘The South African Constitution asserts that human beings are morally responsible agents and it 
imposes obligations upon the State to foster the conditions of moral agency.’ See also Schachter 
‘Human dignity as a normative concept’ (1983) 77(4) American Journal of International Law 848, 850.  
34 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) [57]. The case concerned a contract that contained terms 
detrimental to one of the parties. See also Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [94]: ‘It is settled law that, 
shorn of unsightly excesses, contractual autonomy advances the constitutional values of freedom and 
dignity.’ 
35 The CC continues to emphasise that constitutional rights, including socio-economic, impose 
predominantly negative obligations, which O’Regan in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 
(CC) [47] describes as the ‘duty to respect’.  
36 Roux (n16), 189. See also Singer ‘The reliance interest in property’ (1988) 40 Stanford Law 611. See also 
Nedelsky ‘Reconceiving rights’ (n10) who argues that ‘individual’ rights should be reconceived as 
‘relational’ rights, because rights ‘construct relationships’ (at 149). See further Underkuffler ‘On property: 
an essay’ (1990) 100 Yale LJ 127.  
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Liberalism’s starting point is thus the need to respect the individual’s dignity and autonomy, 
but it is not its end point. Classic liberal philosophy is not constructed in the ‘atomistic’ image 
of the individual as the only relevant actor in the world.37 Liberalism accepts that the 
individual exists within society.38 The relational nature of dignity is underscored by the 
recognition that courts have given to the communitarian concept of Ubuntu in several 
difficult cases involving competing interests.39  
 
Despite the numerous justifications for freedom and autonomy, they are not inviolable. 
Freedom is not a licence to harm others.40 As noted by Lord Acton: ‘Liberty is not the power 
of doing what we like, but the right of being able to do what we ought.’41 
 
That being the case, the obvious difficulty lies in delimiting the proper boundaries of 
individual freedom – what range of choices may a person make in the exercise of their 
 
37 In Ferreira v Levin (n13) [49-50] Ackerman J expressly rejected an atomistic account of freedom, 
despite which his understanding has been criticised as exactly that, see Haysom ‘Dignity’ in SA 
Constitutional Law (n10), para 5.1.  
38 A recognition that is explicit in Article 2(1) of the German Constitution, which states that ‘Every person 
shall have the right to free development of his personality in so far as he does not violate the rights of 
others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law.’ The provision has been interpreted 
by the German CC as follows: ‘While freedom and individual dignity are fundamentally guaranteed, it 
cannot be overlooked that the image of man in the Grundgesetz is not that of an individual in arbitrary 
isolation but of a person in the community, to which the person is obligated in many ways.’ Quoted in 
Lubens ‘The social obligation of property ownership: a comparison of German and US Law’ (2007) 24(2) 
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 389, 402. 
39 See Mokgoro J’s definition in S v Makwanyane (n30) [308], part of which reads: ‘While it envelops the 
key values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms and 
collective unity, in its fundamental sense it denotes humanity and morality.’ See also Everfresh Market 
Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC); SAPS v Solidarity (n16) [174]; Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) [37]; City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC) [38]; Bhe v Magistrate, 
Khayelitsha 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) [143]; RAF v Mohohlo 2018 (2) SA 65 (SCA) [12]. See further the 
extensive discussion by Victor AJ in Beadica 231 CC v Trustees of the Oregon Trust [2020] ZACC 13, in 
which he analyses Ubuntu in the context of public policy and contract law. 
40 In Ferreira v Levin (n13) fn56, Ackerman quoted the following passage from Karl Popper’s Open 
Society:  "Freedom, we have seen, defeats itself, if it is unlimited. Unlimited freedom means that a strong 
man is free to bully one who is weak and to rob him of his freedom. This is why we demand that the 
State should limit freedom to a certain extent, so that everyone's freedom is protected by law. Nobody 
should be at the mercy of others, but all should have a right to be protected by the State.’ (emphasis in 
the original)  
41 From Wikipedia entry on Lord Acton, citing The Rambler (1860) 2, 146 in The American Political 
Science Review (1963) 56. This passage encapsulates Kant’s philosophy, as explained by Du Bois (n14), 
133, that ‘respect-worthy moral deliberation is not merely a matter of determining for oneself what is 
right and wrong; it is also a matter of doing so correctly.’ 
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individual freedom? The answer is encapsulated in Mill’s ‘harm principle’.42  Mill’s view was 
that freedom can legitimately be constrained when its exercise harms or threatens harm to 
others.43 Harm is not limited to positive acts, but encompasses the failure to fulfil a moral 
obligation that causes harm to another individual or to society as a whole. In Mill’s view, the 
protected sphere of individual autonomy extends to all matters of conscience, and all 
behavioural choices that affect only the individual. As soon as the individual’s actions or 
inactions harm third parties, individual autonomy must give way to social duty.44  
 
The challenge lies in giving content to the notion of ‘harm’, for that is the point at which right 
gives way to duty and the individual’s freedom may appropriately be limited. Meyerson’s 
elucidation of Mill’s harm principle is helpful. She argues that the harm must be ‘indisputably 
harmful’ or a ‘great evil’ before a fundamental right may justifiably be limited.45 She proposes 
an extended hypothetical reasonable person test, which asks whether every reasonable 
person in an open and democratic society founded on the values of freedom, dignity and 
equality, would, irrespective of their personal morality, agree that the conduct was harmful.46  
 
What, however, distinguishes reasonable people from unreasonable people? The answer lies 
in how reasonable people arrive at decisions. Reasonable people consider issues objectively, 
recognising everyone’s inherent dignity and equality, and therefore identifying the conduct 
as harmful based only on their common and shared values, rather than their own 
idiosyncratic values. If the harmfulness of the conduct is ‘intractably disputed’ by reasonable 
people, then the individual’s right to engage in that conduct should not be limited.47   
 
42 Inevitably, his principle has its critics. See eg Holtug ‘The Harm Principle’ (2002) 5(4) Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice 357; Alexander ‘The social-obligation norm in American Property Law’ (2008-2009) 94 
Cornell LR 745,754.  
43 Mill On Liberty in Collini On Liberty and other Writings (1989) 21-22: ‘The object of this Essay is to assert 
one very simple principle … [t]hat the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.’  
44 Mill On Liberty (n43), 13-15. Cf Singer (n36), 729.  
45 Meyerson Rights Limited (1997), 40. 
46 Ibid, 10-15.  
47 Meyerson (n45), 18. See also Sweezy v New Hampshire 354 US, quoted in Aleinikoff ‘Constitutional law 
in the age of balancing’ (1987) 96(5) Yale LJ 943, fn117: ‘Striking the balance implies the exercise of 
judgment. … It must be an overriding judgment founded on something much deeper and more 
justifiable than personal preference. As far as it lies within human limitations, it must be an impersonal 
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This approach reflects that adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court. In R v Butler, 48 the 
SCC similarly stated that: 
 
[A] consensus must exist among the population on these claims. They must attract the support 
of more than a simple majority of people. In a pluralistic society like ours, many different 
conceptions of the good are held by various segments of the population. The guarantees of s 2 
of the Charter protect this pluralistic diversity. However, if the holders of these different 
conceptions agree that some conduct is not good, then the respect for pluralism that underlies 
s 2 of the Charter becomes less insurmountable an objection to State action... In this sense a 
wide consensus among holders of different conceptions of the good is necessary before the 
State can intervene in the name of morality. This is also comprised in the phrase "pressing and 
substantial".’  
 
2.2.1 Dignity, freedom and property 
 
That respect for individual autonomy is a political and legal imperative, and that respect for 
individual autonomy requires respect for the individual’s private property, is a well-
established tenet of liberal political philosophy and legal theory.49 Although liberal theorists 
are widely criticised for unduly emphasising individuals’ rights without adequately 
acknowledging their social responsibilities,50 this criticism, even true, which I do not consider it 
to be, does not invalidate the claim that a society that respects individual rights and 
freedoms must necessarily respect the individual’s rights in and to property.  
 
The relationship between property and freedom is extensive. Property is both a sword and a 
shield: it enables individuals to exercise choices that are central to freedom and autonomy, 
and it provides a ‘bulwark’ against state-interference with individual autonomy.51 At the most 
essential level, property itself, rather than the rights associated with owning property, is 
necessary to satisfy basic human needs. The main impulse behind property ownership is to 
 
judgment. It must rest on fundamental presuppositions rooted in history to which widespread 
acceptance may fairly be attributed. 
48 1992 CanLII 124 (SCC) 523-524. See also Lawen Estate v Nova Scotia (n6) [86-89]:  
49 See eg Rose ‘Property as the keystone right?’ (1996) 71(3) Notre Dame LR 329; Barros (n13). See also 
Coval (n10), who argue that property is as essential for securing freedom of action as the other civil 
and political rights that are usually found in constitutional texts. 
50 See eg Singer; Nedelsky & Underkuffler (n36). See also Alexander (n42). 
51 Cf Roux & Davis ‘Property’ (n10), para 20.1, who believe property has ‘relinquished its status’ as the 
‘principal bulwark’ against state interference, and that the rights to dignity and equality now perform 
this function.  
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secure freedom from want – freedom from the hardships of poverty.52 The CC has accepted 
that ‘[t]here can be no doubt that human dignity, freedom and equality, the foundational 
values of our society, are denied those who have no food, clothing or shelter.’53 
 
Property also provides opportunity – the freedom to choose and pursue activities that fulfil 
individual aspirations. Property provides the material means for individuals to ‘pursue broadly 
their own personal development and fulfilment and their own conception of the “good 
life”’.54 Property is therefore an indispensable ‘condition for the exercise’ of freedom.55 It is 
essential for human flourishing.56 Those with property are better able to fulfil their needs and 
wants than are those without property. In states that do not have adequate social welfare 
systems, those without property lack the means to satisfy even their basic needs. By contrast, 
those with sufficient property are not only able to satisfy their material wants, they also have 
the freedom to make choices and engage in pursuits that allow greater possibility of 
individual fulfilment and self-actualisation.57 It is, in this regard, ‘capability’ and ‘freedom-
enhancing’.58 
 
From an instrumental or consequentialist perspective, property also promotes the general 
social good, since individuals who know that they will receive the fruits of their labour have 
 
52 The association between poverty and lack of freedom has long been recognised, see Mill On 
Socialism in Collini On Liberty and other Writings (1989).  
53 Government of RSA v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC)[23]. Further at [44]: ‘A society must seek to 
ensure that the basic necessities of life are provided to all if it is to be a society based on human dignity, 
freedom and equality’. For this reason, some scholars argue that the right to property, and the 
commitment to individual freedom more generally, should be construed as a positive right to claim 
certain property-entitlements from the state. See eg Liebenberg (n27). Ackerman in Ferreira v Levin 
(n13) shared Berlin’s concern that a positive obligation on states to promote freedom could be used as 
a pretext for interfering with freedom. See also Pound ‘The law of property and recent juristic thought’ 
(1939) 25 American Bar Association Journal 993, 995 who observes that historically, rulers ‘have been 
astute to justify their confiscatory activities with the public good’.  
54 Ferreira v Levin (n13) [50]. 
55 IBerlin (n14), quoted by Ackerman in Ferreira v Levin (n13) [52].  
56 Alexander (n42), 748. 
57 The significance of the constitutional right to property in Article 14 of the German Constitution was 
explained as follows by the German CC: ‘[The property guarantee], according to its historical as well as 
its present significance, is a fundamental basic right which is closely linked with personal freedom. In the 
system of the basic rights as a whole, it has the task of guaranteeing the holder of the basic right a 
sphere of freedom in the financial area and therefore enables him to determine his life autonomously.’ 
BVerfG 50, 339 (1979), quoted in Michalowski & Wood German Constitutional Law (1999),319. 
58 Sen Development as Freedom (1999); Nussbaum Women and Human Development (2000). 
52 
 
an incentive to be more productive, thereby increasing society’s wealth;59 it fosters creativity 
and entrepreneurship, which facilitates economic development.60  
 
Individuals without property are not ‘free’. Individuals with insecure property rights are 
vulnerable to the loss of their property and, consequently, their freedom.61  They are also 
vulnerable to coercion through both the conditional promise and denial of property.62 The 
constitutional right to property is important precisely in order to protect the holder from the 
loss of freedom that may arise as a result of expropriation or unjustifiable interference. The loss 
of property is likely to create hardship; reduce choice; restrict opportunity; impair dignity. It is 
for this reason that a state that wishes to expropriate property is expected to compensate 
the owner with different property that is of reasonably equal value. It is the right to 
compensation that legitimises the right to expropriation.  
 
Despite the incontestable importance of property and secure property rights, most people in 
South Africa lack sufficient property to meet their basic needs, much less what is needed to 
pursue their conception of the good life. Can the protection of property nevertheless be 
justified, notwithstanding the tremendous inequality in wealth?63 Liberal philosophers like 
Locke and Mill thought it could be, in so far as the property represented the fruits of the 
 
59 Locke (n15). See also Rose ‘Property as the keystone right’ (n49). For criticism of the view that 
contractual autonomy (as an incident of property ownership) is welfare enhancing, see Trebilcock The 
Limits of Freedom of Contract (1993).  
60 Mill On Socialism (n52), 265.  
61 For a critical analysis of the link between property and independence, see Harris Property and Justice 
(1996) 301-305. Harris argues that property today plays a minor, but nevertheless not insignificant, role in 
securing individual autonomy when compared with modern political rights.  
62 See the many examples in Reich ‘The new property’ (1964) 73(5) Yale LJ 733, especially the case of 
Flemming v Nestor regarding the loss of pension benefits (at 768). South Africans who live on communal 
land in rural areas are particularly vulnerable to coercion and the loss of their land because they do not 
have secure title. See Clark & Luwaya Communal Land Tenure 1994-2017 Land and Accountability 
Research Centre. See also Card ‘Against marriage and motherhood’ (1996) 11(3) Hypatia 1 who, 
rightly, points out that the economic consequences of divorce can also entrap propertied spouses who 
face the threat of maintenance or property claims into remaining in ‘emotionally disastrous’ marriages.  
63 This is the central question troubling leading property law theorists in SA. See especially Van der Walt, 
whose numerous works on property law and theory in South Africa include his three part review of 
property theories and debates, see ‘Unity and pluralism in property theory (1995) 1 Journal SA Law 15; 
‘Subject and society in property theory’ (1995) 2 Journal SA Law 322; ‘Rights and reforms in property 
theory’ (1995) 3 Journal of SA Law 493. 
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individual’s labour.64 Mill subscribed to Locke’s ‘theory of labour’,65 which posits that 
individuals have a moral right to property that they either created or acquired through their 
own endeavour.66  
 
Mill was nevertheless deeply concerned about the inequalities in society, and the role 
private property played in creating and sustaining inequality.67 He decried the fact that the 
main determinant of an individual’s wealth, and therefore their opportunity and autonomy, 
was the circumstance of their birth rather than their labour, and that there seemed to be an 
inverse relationship between labour and reward. The poor laboured endlessly for negligible 
reward, while the privileged were rewarded for being idle. He described impoverished 
workers who lacked independent means and were entirely dependent on wages as 
 
 [C]hained to a place, to an occupation, and to conformity with the will of an employer, and 
debarred by the accident of birth both from the enjoyments, and from the mental and moral 
advantages, which others inherit without exertion and independently from desert.68  
 
Mill thus agreed with his contemporary socialist advocates on the need for extensive social 
reform, including reform of the institution of private property. 69 He recognised that the rights 
of those fortunate enough to own property, including that acquired by their labour, were 
 
64 Locke (n15) Ch 5. See also Day ‘Locke on property’ (1966) 16(64) Philosophical Quarterly 207. 
65 See Mill Principles of Political Economy (1848 edition) Vol 1, Book 2, Ch 2. 
66 Locke’s defence of individual rights to private property was that natural law required that individuals 
use their labour to appropriate property from the natural commons, since doing so enhanced the 
value of property for both the individual and society, and that they acquired ownership over the 
property by virtue of the fact that they had expended their labour on acquiring or improving it. See 
Snyder ‘Locke on natural law and property rights’ (1986) 16(4) Canadian Journal of Philosophy 723. See 
also Barros (n13) at 40. For a more detailed analysis of Locke’s theory of private property, see Waldron 
The Right to Private Property (1988). For an analysis of Locke’s views on property in the context of 
succession, see Waldron ‘Locke’s account of inheritance and bequest’ (1981) 19(1) Journal of the 
History of Philosophy 39. Russell (n25) is of the view is that Locke’s theory is impossibly flawed because 
the sources of wealth are no longer principally the individual’s direct labour over the land and its 
resources, which Locke used as the basis for developing his theory. The essence of Locke’s theory can 
be adapted to modern fruits, viz salary, and applies equally to death benefits. 
67 See Mill On Socialism (n52), 232: ’These evils, - great poverty, and that poverty very little connected 
with desert – are the first grand failure of the existing arrangements of society.’  
68 Mill On Socialism (n52), 227. 
69 He differed from them as to the best method to achieve reform. He advocated the continued 
protection of property rights within a market economy, while they advocated expropriation of land 
and productive resources. He was nevertheless very critical of abusive practices within the market.  
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circumscribed by the obligations they owed others.70 In keeping with modern property theory 
and jurisprudence, he accepted that individuals owed a social obligation to society, which 
required that those who ‘received the protection’ of society were in turn required to shoulder 
an equitable proportion of the ‘labours and sacrifices’ required for defending society.71 To 
injure one’s property was, for example, to harm those who relied on it, ‘directly or indirectly’, 
for their support.72  
 
The recognition that property is a precondition for freedom and human dignity, but that 
property entails obligation, is thus embedded within liberal philosophy and the Constitution. 
The CC has emphasised that: 
 
The fundamental values of dignity, equality and freedom necessitate a conception of property 
that allows, on the one hand, for individual self-fulfilment in the holding of property and, on the 
other, the recognition that the holding of property also carries with it a social obligation not to 
harm the public good.73  
 
 
2.2.2 Private property and testamentary freedom 
 
Amongst the recognised ‘bundle of rights’ that the owners of property enjoy, is the right to 
dispose of property.74 The freedom to bequeath property is simply one manifestation of the 
 
70 In Principles of Political Economy (n65) Bk 5 Ch1 §6 he therefore advocated taxation of inheritance 
on a progressive scale, while cautioning that it should not be so high that people seek to avoid it by 
way of inter vivos transfers. Kant also believed in taxing wealth for redistributive purposes, see Du Bois 
(n14), 136. 
71 Mill On Liberty (n43), 75.  
72 Ibid, 80.  
73 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism: Eastern Cape 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC)[50]. 
74 Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd v SMI Trading CC 2012 (6) SA 638 (SCA); Willow Waters 
Homeowners Association (Pty) Ltd v Koka 2015 (5) SA 304 (SCA). In Harper v Crawford 2018 (1) SA 589 
(WCC) [27] the court held that ‘the ius dispossendi (sic) is so central to the concept of ownership in our 
law that it forms part of the very definition of ownership.’ Mill similarly identified the right of ‘exclusive 
disposal’ as the ‘essential element’ of private property, Principles of Political Economy Vol 1 Bk 2, Ch2 
§6. See also Honoré ‘Ownership’ in Guest (ed) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (1961). 
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right of disposal.75 Inter vivos and mortis causa dispositions are two sides of the same coin. 
The two cannot be severed without destroying existing conceptions of private property.76  
 
Some commentators and scholars have, however, argued that the institution of inheritance 
should be abolished, without simultaneously arguing that private property be abolished.77 
Their concern is that the intergenerational transmission of wealth by inheritance has 
contributed to the widening inequalities in society, allowing the already-wealthy to become 
even wealthier.78 They argue that the justifications that apply to protecting private property 
do not apply to inherited wealth, for it is ‘windfall’ wealth that the recipients have not earned 
through their own labour.79  
 
Despite the validity of concerns regarding inherited wealth,80 abolishing inheritance, without 
simultaneously abolishing inter vivos transmission of private property, and therefore private 
property as an institution, is more likely to increase rather than decrease existing inequalities 
in the concentration of wealth.81 The reason is simply that the wealthy have the financial 
wherewithal to dispose of wealth while alive. They can do so through direct gifts or through 
 
75 In Marckx v Belgium 31 ECHR (ser A) 1 (1979) [73] the European Court of Human Rights stated that 
‘[T]he right to dispose of one's property constitutes a traditional and fundamental aspect of the right of 
property.’  
76 As a right that inheres in the individual, rather than family for example. Mill’s description of the nature 
of the right enjoyed by individuals who do not have the freedom to dispose of property was a ‘life 
interest’. See Mill On Socialism (n52) 276.  
77 Orgain ‘Death comes to us all, but through inheritance the rich can get richer: inheritance and the 
Federal Estate Tax’ (2011) 4 Estate Planning and Community Property LJ 173. See also Brassington ‘On 
rights of inheritance and bequest’ (2019) 23 The Journal of Ethics 119.  
78 Their concerns are certainly pertinent in some countries. See eg Kelly ‘Millennials will become richest 
generation in American history as baby boomers transfer over their wealth.’ Forbes (26 October 2019). 
Those who propose increased redistribution through extremely high taxation trust that the state will 
redistribute the wealth honestly and fairly. See eg Wilkinson ‘Why not fund the welfare state with a 100% 
inheritance tax?’ Guardian (24 July 2017).  
79 See also Nozick The Examined Life (1989). His proposals similarly do not fully address the tax 
avoidance mechanisms available to the wealthy if inter vivos wealth transmission is permitted. 
80 In On Socialism (n52) 231, Mill was scathing of inherited privilege. He noted: ‘The most powerful of all 
the determining circumstances [of the lot of individuals] is birth. … Some are born rich without work, 
others are born to a position where they can become rich by work, the great majority are born to hard 
work and poverty throughout life, numbers to indigence.’  
81 Haslett ‘Is inheritance justified?’ (1986) 15(2) Philosophy and Public Affairs 122 accepts that inter vivos 
transmission by way of gift will also need to be abolished. He does not address other forms of wealth 
transmission, such as life insurance.  
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the creation of corporate entities or trusts.82 It is the less affluent, those who rely on their 
property as capital assets and sources of income, who cannot afford to transfer their 
property until such time as they no longer have need of it. It is they and their beneficiaries 
who rely on inheritance to transmit however much of their property they may still own at the 
time of their death. Inheritance, as a means of intergenerational wealth transfer, is therefore 
a more valuable institution for the middle and working class than for the rich.83  
 
Mill was also concerned about the inequalities that arise from intergenerational wealth 
transmission, but he distinguished between inherited wealth and land on the one hand, and 
movables and property acquired by the individual’s labour on the other. Property rights in 
land were only justifiable when they served the public interest. The rights afforded 
landowners should be determined wholly by ‘questions of general expediency.’84 Rights in 
land that did not advance the public interest were ‘unjust’.85 He similarly thought that rights 
over inherited wealth could justifiably be limited ‘on grounds of general expediency’.86  
 
His views on property that had been produced by the individual was quite different. The 
institution of private property existed to protect the rights of producers, and those who 
acquired property directly from them. It followed from this that: 
 
 
82 McMurray ‘Liberty of testation and some modern limitations thereon’ (1919-1920) 14 Illinois LR 96, 116 
noted this 100 years ago already, pointing out that little would change in the transmission of wealth 
intergenerationally if testamentary bequest was abolished.  
83 Parkins ‘A hated tax but a fair one’ The Economist (23 November 2017) notes that all income brackets 
are hostile to death taxes in Britain and the USA, but the hostility is more acute amongst ‘the poor’ (a 
term that is not defined). This is hardly surprising given that taxes have a greater impact on the less 
wealthy. The Davis Tax Committee Second Interim Report on Estate Duty for the Minister of Finance 
(2016), 18 notes that the middle class (undefined, but the report suggests it refers to deceased estates 
valued at less than R15 million) in South Africa bears an ‘excessive share’ of the tax burden, and 
recommends a significant increase in the taxation of ‘high net worth individuals’, those whose net asset 
value exceeds US$1 million. There are, however, only an estimated 40 000 to 60 000 such individuals in 
South Africa (18). The report also proposes numerous mechanisms to address the pervasive use of trusts 
to avoid or limit income tax and estate duty liability.  
84 Mill (n65) Bk 2 Ch2 §6.  
85 He acknowledged that improving the land required considerable investment, and that it could take 
a long time, if not forever, for the investment to yield a profit. As such, owners who had invested in land 
should be protected, in order to incentivise such investment.  
86 Ibid (n65) Bk 4 Ch5 §3. His proposals included setting a limit on the amount that any individual could 
inherit, and taxing inheritance at a progressive rate. By contrast he thought that taxing those who 




Nothing is implied in property but the right of each to his (or her) own faculties, to what he can 
produce by them, … together with his right to give this to any person if he chooses, and the 
right of that other to receive and enjoy it.87  
 
Mill therefore believed that individuals had an absolute right to use and dispose of property 
that they had produced, provided, once again, that they did not do so in ways that were 
harmful to others.  
  
[W]ith property in movables, and in all things the property of labor … the owner’s power both 
of use and of exclusion should be absolute, except where positive evil to others would result 
from it.88 
 
Mill’s view was that the right of bequest was thus an inherent part of private property, in so far 
as it was a right that vested in those who had either produced property, or acquired it by gift 
or inheritance from someone who had produced it. By contrast, no one enjoyed a 
concomitant right to inherit, contrary to the principles of civil law.  
 
In formulating his arguments, Mill was distinguishing between intestate and testate 
succession. He was not claiming that a testator’s nominated beneficiaries enjoyed no moral 
right to inherit. His view was rather that rights to inheritance flowed from bequest, and the 
only persons who could be said to have a right to inherit were testamentary heirs and 
legatees. Testate succession was therefore a facet of private property, while intestate 
succession was not.89 Mill did not believe that even children, much less any other relative, 
had an absolute right to inherit contrary to the wishes of the testator,90 and he thought that 
property should devolve to the state on intestacy if the deceased was only survived by 
 
87 Ibid Bk 2 Ch2 §6. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid Bk 2 Ch2 §3. I do not consider this appropriate any longer, if it was then, for rules of intestate 
succession are often premised on the presumed intention of the deceased. The Netherlands has 
deliberately done so on this basis, in order to make succession easier. See §1.5 fn37 above.  
90 Ibid Bk 2 Ch2 §4. Cf Dyde (tr) Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1896) §180. Hegel believed children had a 
right to inherit ‘family property’, and was deeply suspicious of testamentary freedom, which he felt led 




collateral rather than lineal relatives. Whether any relatives, including children, should inherit 
at all on intestacy was a political question unrelated to the institution of private property.91  
 
Given his belief that property rights could legitimately be limited to prevent a ‘positive evil’ to 
others, what would he have considered to be such in the context of succession? In Principles 
of Political Economy his view that no one could claim an inherent right to inherit in the 
absence of a positive bequest was tempered by his belief that parents had a duty to 
provide for their children and dependants.92 The duty was towards both society and children, 
and it required parents to provide children with such education and opportunities as would 
give them a proper start in life and enable them to become productive members of society. 
In On Liberty his views regarding a parent’s obligation were expressed in even more forceful 
terms. To fail to provide for a child was to commit a serious harm to both the child and 
society:  
 
[T]o bring a child into existence without a fair prospect of being able, not only to provide food 
for its body, but instruction and training for its mind, is a moral crime, both against the 
unfortunate offspring and against society; …93 
 
Mill’s view regarding freedom of testation was thus in keeping with his general views 
regarding personal autonomy — that the individual’s autonomy could legitimately be 
constrained when her choices were harmful.  
 
2.2.3 The morality of testamentary freedom 
 
Quite apart from the fact that freedom of testation is not severable from the freedom to 
dispose of property while alive, it is nevertheless worth considering why freedom of testation is 
 
91 Mill (n65) Bk 2 Ch2 §4. 
92 Ibid, §3. 
93 Mill On Liberty (n43), 105.  
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a valuable right.94 Why should property not devolve according to completely fixed rules of 
inheritance that pre-determine the identity of heirs?  
 
The answer is partly to be found in the reason freedom of testation first emerged as a 
principle of law in ancient Rome. It emerged in reaction to the perceived unfairness of the 
pre-existing ‘fixed’ rules of succession, in terms of which a paterfamilias’s agnatic family or 
members of his gens inherited in preference to his emancipated sons and married 
daughters.95 Under the default order of inheritance, his children were his natural heirs only as 
long as they remained subject to his paternal power. Once they were no longer subject to 
his paternal power, they lost their right to inherit.  
 
As originally conceived, freedom of testation was thus not understood as an expression of 
the individual’s rights to property or to disinherit family, but was instead understood to be a 
mechanism through which a testator could make choices that best served the interests of his 
family.96 Once freedom of testation emerged, individuals were under a moral duty to 
exercise their freedom, and the expectation was that they would do so for the benefit of 
their family.97  
 
94 For a discussion of its social and economic benefits, see De Waal ‘The social and economic 
foundations of the law of succession’ (1997) 8 Stell LR 162; Hirsch ‘Freedom of testation/freedom of 
contract’ (2001) 95 Minnesota LR 2080, 2187, in particular that it incentivises saving. See also Kelly 
‘Restricting testamentary freedom: ex ante v ex post justifications’ (2013) 82(3) Fordham LR 1125, 1135. 
Cf Harding ‘Charitable trusts and discrimination: two themes’ (2016) 2(1) Canadian Journal of 
Comparative and Contemporary Law 227, who does not consider the right of choice that inheres in 
testamentary freedom to be valuable in itself. Instead the value of the individual’s testamentary 
choices must be determined by reference to the reasons for and consequences of those choices. Only 
if the testator’s choices are valuable having regard to their ‘expressive and teleological aspects’ are 
they deserving of protection (at 241).  
95 Maine Ancient Law (1905) 71. 
96 Ibid, 70; Frier & McGinn A Casebook on Roman Family Law (2004), 323. Cf Zimmermann and Du Toit, 
who postulate that it developed to permit a testator to allocate land unequally amongst children, 
because the ongoing division of land as a result of children’s equal entitlement jeopardised the viability 
of agricultural landholdings, see Zimmerman ‘Compulsory Heirship in Roman Law’ in Reid, De Waal, 
Zimmerman (eds) Exploring the Law of Succession: studies national, historical and comparative (2007),  
29/30; Du Toit ‘The impact of social and economic factors on freedom of testation in Roman Law and 
Roman Dutch Law’ (1999) 10 Stell LR 232, 233. 
97 Maine (n95) 64, 70. Maine’s explanation echoes that of Cockburn CJ in Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 
5 QB 549: ‘The law of every civilized people concedes to the owner of property the right of determining 
by his last will, either in whole or in part, to whom the effects which he leaves behind him shall pass. Yet 
it is clear that, though the law leaves to the owner of property absolute freedom in this ultimate disposal 
of that of which he is thus enabled to dispose, a moral responsibility of no ordinary importance attaches 




Freedom of testation was thus intended to promote justice, not injustice. It emerged for the 
same reason the Courts of Chancery and equitable discretion emerged in 14th century 
England — to ameliorate the harsh consequences that sometimes flow from the inflexible 
application of rigid rules.98  
 
Freedom of testation is premised on the belief that it is testators who are best placed to share 
the benefit equitably. It further accepts that it is the testator’s conception of what is 
equitable that is deserving of respect. It recognises that testators may justifiably discriminate 
between their beneficiaries for any number of reasons: from the strength of their affection, to 
their desire to express appreciation, to reward or sanction, out of greater concern for the 
welfare of some, out of a belief that some are better able to provide for themselves.99 It 
recognises that most testators’ choices are reasonable and defensible.100 As was said in the 
oft-quoted judgment of Cockburn CJ in Banks v Goodfellow:101 
 
[T]he instincts, affections, and common sentiments of mankind may be safely trusted to secure, 
on the whole, a better disposition of the property of the dead, and one more accurately 
adjusted to the requirements of each particular case, than could be obtained through a 
distribution prescribed by the stereotyped and inflexible rules of a general law. 
 
Testamentary autonomy acknowledges that testators have a moral right (over the fruits of 
their own labour at least) to decide who should share in, and derive the benefits of, their 
property on their death.102 Their moral right does not derive simply from the fact that they 
own the property or created the property. It is because individuals have the capacity to 
 
98 Brady ‘Equity without equity lawyers’ 1976 Acta Juridica 125. 
99 See Mill (n65) Bk 2 Ch2 §3. See also Hirsch (n94), 2189. For an illustration of the ‘stereotypical’ case of 
responsible and attentive siblings versus an indifferent ‘wastrel’, see Phillips v James [2014] NSWCA 4.  
100 Cf De Waal ‘The law of succession and the Bill of Rights’ para 3G7: ‘Experience has shown, however, 
that the sense of justice, and even the common sense, of the individual testator or testatrix should not 
be over-rated’. 
101 (1870) LR 5 QB 549. 
102 See also McCosker v McCosker [1957] HCA 82 Kitto J [5]: ‘But even if I felt sure that I understood the 
whole situation so well that I could deal with the estate more justly than the testator dealt with it, I 
should still not feel justified in asserting that when he decided to give the respondent no more than he 
had already given him, and to leave his estate to members of the family who had been closer to him 




make morally responsible choices, and because most testators do make morally responsible 
choices. Individuals who lack mental capacity, who cannot reason and who are unable to 
act as moral agents, are in consequence denied the right to dispose of property.103 A finding 
of testamentary incapacity implies that the testator was of such unsound mind that she 
lacked the capacity to make a ‘rational, fair and just testament’.104 To completely deny 
someone the right to choose to whom to dispose of their property is therefore to deny either 
that the property is actually their private property or to deny that they had the capacity for 
morally responsible decision-making at the time they executed their will.  
 
South African law accepts that testamentary freedom is inherently a legal institution that 
serves the public interest.105 As such, the ‘golden rule’ of testate succession is to ascertain, 
and thereafter implement, the testator’s wishes.106  
 
Freedom of testation is considered one of the founding principles of the South African law of 
testate succession: a South African testator enjoys the freedom to dispose of the assets which 
form part of his or her estate upon death in any manner (s)he deems fit.107 
 
 
103 See Wills Act 7 of 1953, s4. Roman Law used the device of querela inofficiosi testamenti to void the 
terms of a testator’s will when he disinherited his natural (intestate) heirs. The supposition was that a 
testator who behaved so contrary to his duty ‘must have been mentally deranged’, see Paulus 
‘Changes in the power structure in the family in the late Roman Empire’ (1995) 70(5) Chicago-Kent LR 
1505.  
104 Banks v Goodfellow (n101). Quoted with approval in in M v Hugo (1462/2012) [2013] ZAFSHC (28 
November 2013). Leslie ‘The myth of testamentary freedom’ (1996) 38 Arizona LR 325 describes how 
courts in the USA are more likely to find that a testator lacked mental capacity by reason of undue 
influence when the testator’s choices are considered to be incompatible with their moral obligation to 
family. Some jurisdictions, of which South Africa is not one, permit courts to authorise so-called ‘statutory 
wills’ for individuals who lack mental capacity, see further Harding ‘The rise of statutory wills and the 
limits of best interests decision-making in inheritance’ (2015) 78 Modern LR 945. 
105 Bydawell v Chapman 1953 (3) SA 514 (A): ‘Roman Dutch law recognises as a matter of public 
interest, transcending the private interests of beneficiaries under a will, that effect should be given to 
the wishes of a testator, D. 29.3.5, or, as Voet states the proposition, 35.1.12, the 'interests' of the testator 
and the public interest demand that effect should be given to a testator's last wishes’. See also Lawen 
Estate v Nova Scotia (n6) [42] and authorities cited there. 
106 Robertson v Robertson’s Executors 1914 AD 503. 
107 Du Toit 'The constitutionally bound dead hand? the impact of the constitutional rights and principles 
on freedom of testation in South African Law' (2001) 12 Stell LR 222, 224. See further Du Toit 'The impact 
of social and economic factors on freedom of testation (n96); Du Toit 'The limits imposed upon freedom 
of testation by the boni mores: lessons from common law and civil (continental) legal systems' (2000) 11 
Stell LR 358. 
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Today, freedom of testation is not only a fundamental pillar of private law but is a 
constitutionally protected right.108 It is, moreover, a right that is protected by both the right to 
property and the right to dignity.109  
 
The view that s 25 protects a person's right to dispose of their assets as they wish, upon their 
death, …. is, to my mind, well held. For if the contrary were to obtain, a person's death would 
mean that the courts, and the state, would be able to infringe a person's property rights after 
he or she has passed away, unbounded by the strictures which obtain while that person is still 
alive. It would allow the state, in a way, to benefit from someone's death.110  … [N]ot to give 
due recognition to freedom of testation will, to my mind, also fly in the face of the founding 
constitutional principle of human dignity. The right to dignity allows the living, and the dying, 




Inherent in freedom of testation is that a testator has the right to select beneficiaries. This 
necessarily implies that testators have the right to choose whom to benefit and whom to 
exclude.112 The decision of whom to include or exclude is the essence of testamentary 
autonomy.113 As stated by the SCA in Harvey v Crawford: 
 
Freedom of testation, which is an important facet of the right to dignity, protects an individual’s 
right not only to unconditionally dispose of her property, but also to choose her beneficiaries as 
she wishes. … No beneficiary has a fundamental right to benefit. We are concerned here with 
free gifts to which no person has any entitlement. Benefiting a class necessarily entails 
excluding persons who do not belong to that class.114 
 
2.3 LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY AND FREEDOM OF 
TESTATION 
 
If the right to property includes the freedom to dispose of property, and the essence of 
testamentary freedom is the right to select to whom to dispose of one’s property, under what 
 
108 See BOE Trust (n5); Harvey v Crawford (n5). 
109 Ibid. See also Lawen Estate v Nova Scotia (n6). 
110 BOE Trust (n5) [26]. 
111 Ibid [27]. 
112 Oughton Tyler’s Family Provision (2ed) (1984): ‘Testamentary freedom …. involves the principle of 
disherison’. See also Beckert Inherited Wealth (2008). 
113 Harper v Crawford (n74)[31]: ‘Perhaps one needs to point out that, ordinarily, the process of 
selection of beneficiaries and the inevitable exclusion of other hopefuls is unavoidable.’  
114 Harvey v Crawford (n5) [64]. The issue before the court was whether the words ‘children’, ‘issue’, 
‘descendant’ in a testamentary trust included adopted children. The court held not, having regard to 
both the meaning of the words when the trust was created, and the legislation in force at that time. It 
further held that their exclusion was not unfair discrimination or contrary to public policy. The decision is 
currently on appeal to the CC. See also Cohen v Roetz 1992 (1) SA 629 (AD). 
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circumstances could an owner’s exercise of that right be sufficiently harmful to warrant 
limitation? This is the key question, for no reasonable person could reasonably contest that 
an individual’s freedom of property and testation may not legitimately be limited to some 
extent, to protect some family or dependants, in some circumstances. This is, however, just 
an abstract claim. The law needs content, and the particular questions are, which family or 
dependants, to what extent, in what circumstances and in what manner? The answer is 
when, to use Roscoe Pound’s turn of phrase, the testator had not made proper provision for 
the ‘natural objects of her bounty’.115 But this begs the further question – who today are the 
natural objects of the testator’s bounty such that excluding them from a Will, or failing to 
make additional provision for them, is ‘harmful’?116   
 
Civil law countries have answered these questions rather more clearly and simply than their 
common law counterparts. They continue to follow the Roman Law tradition that balances 
individual freedom and familial obligation by placing absolute limits on the testator’s ability 
to disinherit family. A testator’s intestate heirs are guaranteed a ‘compulsory portion’ of the 
estate, which is typically half what they would have received on intestacy.117 Around half the 
estate is therefore ‘reserved’ for family, while the other half is ‘reserved’ for the testator to 
exercise her freedom to bequeath her property in accordance with her personal wishes. The 
 
115 Pound (n53), 997. 
116 See also Lodin v Lodin [2017] NSWCA 327, which confirmed that the wide circle of eligible applicants 
in the family provision legislation distinguished between those who were the natural objects of the 
deceased’s affection (spouses, children, partners) and those who were not (grandchildren, former 
spouses, financial dependant).  
117 This is the case in for eg Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Germany and Sweden. Cf 
Czechoslovakia: ¾ if a minor, ¼ if a major child; Denmark: 1/8 estate for spouse, and 1/8 estate for all 
children, but only up to designated statutory maximum if deceased so stipulates – deceased may 
dispose of ¾ by will; France: up to ¾ deceased estate reserved if three children, while ¼ reserved for 
spouse but only if no descendants. See Ruggeri, Kunda, Winkler (eds) Family Law and Succession in EU 
Member States (2019).  
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protected heirs’ entitlement to inherit is not dependent on need.118 It derives exclusively from 
the familial relationship between the parties and the concept of familial obligation. 119   
 
Although the civil law approach appears to strike a reasonable accommodation between 
the interests of the individual, as a member of a family, and that of the individual’s closest 
family members, those who champion greater freedom of testation think otherwise. The 
argument has, for example, been made that testators should be free to disinherit their adult 
children who are not in financial need.120 This argument failed in the German Constitutional 
Court.121 The court held that the compulsory portion is a manifestation of family solidarity and 
intergenerational responsibility: 
 
The structural characteristics of children’s participation in the estate are an expression of family 
solidarity, which exists fundamentally and indissolvably between the testator and his or her 
children. Article 6.1 of the Basic Law protects this relationship between the testator and his or 
her children as a life-long community within which both parents and children are not only 
entitled, but indeed obliged, to take on both substantive and personal responsibility for one 
another. The right to a compulsory portion – like the right to maintenance – is linked to the 
family-law relationships between the testator and his or her children, and transfers this solidarity 
between the generations, which as a rule is founded on descent and in most cases cemented 
by family co-habitation, into the area of the law of inheritance.122 
 
The family entitled to share in the compulsory portion are usually children and spouses and 
failing them, parents.123 Almost all civilian countries extend the spousal entitlement to 
registered civil partners, but not to unregistered cohabiting partners.124 The circle of eligible 
beneficiaries is necessarily small. If it were larger, either the entitlement of existing 
 
118 Some also permit maintenance claims against the deceased estate, see eg: Austria - spouse (ibid, 
17); Belgium – spouse, children, parents (ibid, 40). German law allows a claim by children for their 
educational costs against the surviving spouse, who is not also their parent, if the spouse received an 
additional share of the deceased’s accrual, see Bürgerliches Gestzbuch [BGB] (German Civil Code), 
s1371(4). 
119 Civil law countries permit disinheritance for good cause. See the national entries in Ruggeri Family 
Law and Succession in EU Member States (n117). 
120 BVerfG 1 BvR 1644/00 & 1 BvR 188/03 (19 April 2005) [4]. 
121 Ibid. Article 14(1) of the German Basic Law protects both the right to property, of which the right of 
bequest forms part, and the right to inheritance.  
122 Ibid [73]. 
123 See Ruggeri (n117). The marital property regime of the spouses, coupled with the number of 
children, may also affect the spouse and children’s intestate share and compulsory portion, as is the 




beneficiaries would need to be reduced, or the testator’s residual freedom would largely be 
extinguished.  
 
In civil law countries it is the legislature that has identified, and ranked, the claims of family 
members, and pre-determined the proportion of the estate to which they are entitled. The 
civil law system has the benefit of clarity and simplicity, while simultaneously reducing the 
opportunity for estate-related conflict by surviving relatives.125 It balances the competing 
interests: autonomy and respect for the individual’s moral preferences, and respect for the 
relationships entered into, or created by, the testator.126  
 
Common law countries reject the compulsory portion approach on the basis that it 
constitutes too great an intrusion into freedom of testation.127 Instead, eligible persons, which 
typically encompass more persons than is the case in civil law countries, have a statutory 
right to apply for maintenance from a deceased estate, and the decision as to whether the 
testator’s choices should be set aside and maintenance awarded is left to the discretion of 
judges.128  The identity of eligible applicants varies considerably amongst jurisdictions. 
Originally, in keeping with the civil law approach, beneficiaries were restricted to spouses (in 
the narrow sense, meaning married opposite-sex partners) and children.129 Today, however, 
there is considerable variation between jurisdictions. Some still restrict eligible applicants to 
 
125 Cf the disputed will of the French singer Johnny Hallyday, who disinherited his two biological children 
contrary to French law, but who was resident in the United States, which permits disinheritance. See 
Chazan ‘France claims jurisdiction in Hallyday inheritance dispute based on rocker’s Instagram posts’ 
The Telegraph (2 June 2019). 
126 See also Glendon ‘Fixed rules and discretion in contemporary family law and succession law’ (1985-
1986) 60 Tulane LR 1165.  
127 See eg Atherton ‘New Zealand’s Testator’s Family Maintenance Act of 1900 – the Stouts, the 
Women’s Movement and Political Compromise’ (1990) 7(2) Otago LR 202 (re New Zealand); Lehmann 
‘Testamentary freedom versus testamentary duty: in search of a better balance’ 2014 Acta Juridica 9 
(re England). See also SALC (Project 22) Report on the introduction of a legitimate portion or the 
granting of a right to maintenance to the surviving spouse (1987). Cf the USA, which, although a 
common law country, entitles spouses in non-community of property states to an elective share of the 
deceased’s estate if they are not married in community of property. See Brashier (n8). 
128 See §7.3 below. 
129 See eg the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1900 (New Zealand); Inheritance (Family Provision) 
Act 1938 (England).  
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spouses,130 (including registered civil partners) and children.131 Others permit claims by a far 
wider circle of potential applicants, including unregistered domestic partners,132 
grandchildren,133 parents,134 siblings,135 stepchildren,136 financial dependants,137 persons in a 
close personal relationship138 and even caregivers.139  
 
The problem with an overly expansive circle of beneficiaries is that the broader the eligible 
circle, the less compelling the historic rationale for limiting freedom of testation becomes.140 
Discretionary limitations on testamentary freedom were originally justified on the basis that 
the individual’s property rights had to give way to the individual’s duty to family members. 
The paradigmatic case was thus that of a selfish testator who disinherited his spouse and 
children in order to prefer his ‘mistress’.141 Today, however, some jurisdictions include the very 
persons spouses and children were supposed to be protected against as eligible applicants.  
 
130 Malawi still limits claimants to spouses in the strict sense (Malawi’s Deceased Estates (Wills, 
Inheritance and Protection) Act 14 of 2011, definition of ‘immediate family’), and does not recognise 
civil partnerships.  
131 Jurisdictions that permit claims by spouses and registered partners, but not unregistered cohabiting 
partners, include: Ontario – Succession Law Reform Act RSO 1990, s57 rtw Family Law Act RSO 1990, s1 
(the definition of spouse does, however, include putative spouses); Nova Scotia – Testators’ Family 
Maintenance Act RSNS 1989, s2 definition of ‘dependant’; see also Le Blanc v Cushing 2019 NSSC 360 . 
Some Canadian provinces limit children to those who are not yet self-supporting or who cannot 
reasonably be expected to be self-supporting, such as minor or disabled children or those still in full-time 
education (see eg Alberta - Wills & Succession Act SA 2010, s72(b)(iii, iv, v). 
132 Many require a minimum period of cohabitation. Two years: Australian Capital Territory – Family 
Provision Act 1969, s7(9); England - Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, s 1(1)(a) 
(EW); British Columbia - Wills, Estates and Succession Act SBC 2009, s2(1); Saskatchewan - Dependants’ 
Relief Act SS 1996, s2(1). Three years: Alberta - Wills and Succession Act SA 2010, s72 rtw Adult 
Interdependent Relationships Act SA 2002, s3; New Zealand - Family Protection Act 1955, s4A rtw 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976. In some jurisdictions, courts can make provision for a partner in 
relationships of shorter duration if a child was born of the relationship or the survivor had made a 
substantial contribution to the other’s estate.  
133 Eg Alberta (supra); Victoria - Administration and Probate Act 1958, s90; South Australia - Inheritance 
(Family Provision) Act 1972; Western Australia - Family Provision Act 1972, s7; Northern Territory - Family 
Provision Act 1974, s7; New South Wales - Succession Act 2006, s57. 
134 Eg Ontario (n131); Northern Territory (supra); South Australia (supra); Western Australia (supra). 
135 Eg Ontario (n131); Northern Territory (n133). 
136 England (n132); New Zealand (n132); Northern Territory (n133) - if an existing financial dependant; 
New South Wales (n133) - (if ever a member of deceased’s household and ever financially 
dependent); Victoria (n133); Western Australia (n133). 
137 England (n132); New South Wales (n133).  
138 New South Wales (n133). 
139 England (n132); New South Wales (n133). 
140 The expansion has generated concern amongst some commentators in common law jurisdictions, 
see Croucher ‘How free is free: testamentary freedom and the battle between family and property’ 
(2012) 37 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 9, esp 18ff.  
141 Tyler’s Family Provision (n112), 1. See also the parliamentary debates that preceded the adoption of 
family provision legislation in England, esp those of Miss Rathbone in Hansard House of Commons 
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The real tension and conflicts that inhere in systems that permit discretionary limitations on 
freedom of testation are not between property and family, or between right and obligation, 
or between the testator and disappointed claimant. They are between family and family, 
family and friends, friends and friends. They are between persons who all had close personal 
relationships with the testator. The problem is thus not that the testator has prioritised property 
over family, but that she has prioritised some within the family, in the extended sense,142 over 
others.   
The contemporary challenge of determining when a testator’s failure to provide any or 
better provision for an eligible applicant is harmful is thus considerably greater than was the 
case when discretionary limitations on testamentary freedom were first introduced.  
The broader the circle of eligible persons, the greater the likelihood that their interests and 
rights will come into conflict and the greater the possibility that the testator’s testamentary 
choices could be wholly overridden when necessary to make provision for one or more 
eligible beneficiaries. Equally, the broader the circle, the less likely it is that there will be 
general agreement within the community that the individual’s failure to make better 
provision for one or more eligible dependants was indisputably harmful.  
2.3.1 Indisputably harmful testamentary choices 
Applying Mill’s principle of harm, a testator’s failure to make better provision for a beneficiary 
would be harmful when it is unjust.143 When will a testator’s choices be unjust? When, in 
accordance with community perceptions of right and wrong, the testator owed a specific 
Debates 20 February 1931 vol 248 cols 1635-1724 ; 27 April 1934 vol 288 cols 2015-2098 and Sir J Withers in 
22 January 1937 vol 319 cols 491-544.  
142 For convenience I am using the term ‘family’ here to refer to all those within the circle of eligible 
beneficiaries. Much has been written on the changing nature of ‘family’ over the past decades. See 
eg Clark ‘Families and domestic partnerships’ (2002) 119(3) SALJ 634; Sloth-Nielsen & Van Heerden ‘The 
constitutional family’: developments in South African child and family law 2003–2013’ (2014) 28 (1) 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 100; Glendon ‘The new family and the new property’ 
(1978-1979) 53 Tulane LR 697. 
143 Mill Utilitarianism (1879) Ch 5.  
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person a legal or moral duty of support entitling that person to support as of right. It is not 
enough that the testator owed an ‘imperfect’ obligation of ‘beneficence’ to the person, or 
that providing support will be socially expedient. It must be a ‘perfect’ obligation, one which 
creates an absolute right to support.  
 
It seems to me that this feature in the case—a right in some person, correlative to the moral 
obligation—constitutes the specific difference between justice, and generosity or beneficence. 
Justice implies something which it is not only right to do, and wrong not to do, but which some 
individual person can claim from us as his moral right. … Justice is a name for certain classes of 
moral rules, which concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore 
of more absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life; and the notion which 
we have found to be of the essence of the idea of justice, that of a right residing in an 
individual, implies and testifies to this more binding obligation.144 
 
How, however, do we reliably distinguish between choices that are unjust and those that are 
merely inexpedient? Mill’s view was that the former provokes such a sense of moral outrage 
that we decry the conduct and consider it deserving of punishment.145  Mill identified five 
forms of conduct that were, by ‘universal or widely spread opinion’, characterised as ‘Just or 
Unjust’: we behave unjustly when we violate someone’s legal rights, unless the person had 
forfeited the right or unless they should never have been given the right in the first place, in 
which case the law is a bad law that should be changed; when we withhold ‘from any 
person that to which he has a moral right’; when we fail to give someone a benefit that they 
‘deserve’, or give them one that they do not ‘deserve’; when we fail to fulfil an express or 
tacit promise, or a legitimate expectation that we created by our conduct towards them;146 
when we are inappropriately ‘partial’, favouring or preferring one person over another in 
‘matters in which favour and preference do not properly apply’.147 
 
Mill’s understanding of justice is similar to that of the CC and SCA, which use the concepts of 
‘boni mores’ and ‘public policy’ as the standards against which to test the validity of 
interference in contractual and testamentary autonomy. Courts may intervene only when 
 
144 At 29, 34/43 (Project Gutenberg page numbering). 
145 The sanction need not be legal. It can consist of community disapproval. See also Waldron ‘Rights in 
conflict’ (1989) 99(3) Ethics 503, 504.  
146 English law permits interference with a testator’s wishes in such circumstances, relying on the 
principle of ‘proprietary estoppel’. See eg Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776. 
147 Mill Utilitarianism (n143), 25/43. 
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the testator’s wishes are contrary to law, public policy or the Constitution.148 The relevant 
legal limits are the testator’s maintenance obligations towards a spouse and child.149 When, 
however, would upholding the testator’s freedom of choice be contrary to public policy? 
As explained by the CC in Barkhuizen v Napier:  
Public policy represents the legal convictions of the community; it represents those values that 
are held most dear by the society. … Public policy imports the notions of fairness, justice and 
reasonableness. Public policy would preclude the enforcement of a contractual term if its 
enforcement would be unjust or unfair. Public policy, it should be recalled "is the general sense 
of justice of the community, the boni mores, manifested in public opinion".150  
The SCA has, however, long cautioned against importing general notions of ‘fairness’ into the 
law of contract.151 Its concern is that fairness is a ‘slippery concept’, as evidenced by the 
diversity in even judges’ views regarding whether a particular contract term is fair.152 In the 
SCA’s view, a standard that requires only that a particular provision be judged ‘unfair’ before 
it can be set aside will necessarily lead to inconsistent subjective decision-making.153 As 
was stated in Bredenkamp v SA Standard Bank: 
148 Harper v Crawford (n74); Harvey v Crawford (n5). See also King v De Jager 2017 (6) SA 527 (WCC). 
The content of public policy is informed by the Constitution. There is thus no bright line between 
conduct that is contrary to public policy and that which is unconstitutional, and courts could in many 
cases decide the matter under either head. When the law in issue is the common law, and the dispute 
between private persons, courts prefer to ground their decision on public policy, as interpreted through 
the lens of the Constitution, rather than on a direct violation of the Constitution. See also Spence v BMO 
Trust Company 2016 ONCA 196. 
149 See §1.5 above. 
150 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) [28, 73] (emphasis added). 
151 See Hutchison ‘From bona fides to ubuntu: the quest for fairness in the South African law of contract’ 
2019 Acta Juridica 99. See also Wingaardt v Grobler [2015] JOL 34533 (ECG), in which the HC 
cautioned against conflating unreasonable and wrongful behaviour.  
152 Bredenkamp v South African Standard Bank Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) [74]. The CC’s view on the 
appropriateness of a general standard of fairness is more equivocal. Some CC judges have 
emphasised that fairness is a core constitutional concept, while others are sceptical of its value as a 
general standard against which to judge the lawfulness of conduct. See eg the different views in the 
minority judgments of Cameron [100] against those of Van der Westhuizen [157-160] in SAPS v Solidarity 
(n16). In arguing that fairness is a core constitutional principle, Cameron cites O’Regan in Lufuno 
Mphaphuli and Associates (Pty) Ltd v Andrews 2009 (6) BCLR 527 (CC). In this case, however, O’Regan 
was specifically discussing procedural rather than substantive fairness. Moreover, Cameron’s defence 
of fairness is predicated on the fact that it is no more open-ended than the norms of ‘reasonableness, 
proportionality, wrongfulness, negligence and public policy’, and that its substantive content will also 
‘crystallise over time’ through judicial precedent, which is an implicit acknowledgment that its core 
content has not yet crystallised. 
153 Potgieter v Potgieter 2012 (1) 637 SA (SCA)[34]: ‘In addition, the reason why our law cannot endorse 
the notion that judges may decide cases on the basis of what they regard as reasonable and fair, is 




A constitutional principle that tends to be overlooked, when generalised resort to constitutional 
values is made, is the principle of legality. Making rules of law discretionary or subject to value 
judgments may be destructive of the rule of law.154 
 
It is for this reason that the SCA has only been willing to declare contract terms contrary to 
public policy when they are so manifestly unfair that enforcing them would be 
‘unconscionable’.155  
 
One must be careful not to conclude that a contract is contrary to public policy merely 
because its terms (or some of them) offend one's individual sense of propriety and fairness... In 
the words of Lord Atkin in Fender v St John-Mildmay: "the doctrine should only be invoked in 
clear cases in which the harm … is substantially incontestable, and does not depend on the 
idiosyncratic inferences of a few judicial minds."'156 
 
In Barkhuizen, the CC refused to strike out a contract term because it was not ‘so 
unreasonable that its unfairness is manifest and therefore its enforcement … contrary to 
public policy’.157  
 
More recently, in Beadica 231 CC v Trustees of the Oregon Trust, the CC reiterated that 
courts should use their power to invalidate contract terms ‘sparingly, and only in the clearest 
of cases’.158 A court is only permitted to intervene when the term, or its enforcement, is so 
unreasonable as to be contrary to public policy. It is not permitted to intervene merely 
because the term offends the judge’s subjective sense of what is fair, reasonable or just, for 
 
experience. Reasonable people, including judges, may often differ on what is equitable and fair. The 
outcome in any particular case will thus depend on the personal idiosyncrasies of the individual judge. 
Or, as Van den Heever JA put it in Preller v Jordaan 1956 (1) SA 483 (A), 500, if judges are allowed to 
decide cases on the basis of what they regard as reasonable and fair, the criterion will no longer be the 
law but the judge.’ See also Fuller ‘The form and limits of adjudication’ (1978) 92 Harvard LR 353, 373: 
‘To demand of a court that it simply resolve such issues "fairly" is to ask the court to decide something 
about which the parties themselves could not agree and for the determination of which no standard 
exists.’ 
154 Bredenkamp (n152) [37]. 
155 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A). Courts in England also ask whether a testator’s failure to 
honour a promise was ‘unconscionable’, in the context of claims based on proprietary estoppel. See 
eg Suggitt v Suggitt [2011] EWHC 903 (Ch); Ottey v Grundy [2003] EWCA Civ 1176. 
156 Sasfin (n155), 9. The deleted phrase in the quotation is ‘to the public’. In Beadica (n39) both the 
majority and minority emphasised that it is not a requirement in our law that there be ‘harm to the 
public’ [82] & [158].  
157 Barkhuizen (n34) [67]. 
158 [2020] ZACC 13. 
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that would make the enforceability of contracts dependent on the ‘idiosyncratic inferences 
of a few judicial minds’.159  
 
In the context of testamentary freedom, courts already have the power to intervene when a 
testator fails to fulfil her legal obligations towards her spouse or child. Courts may, in addition, 
intervene when a testator’s choices are contrary to public policy.160 Testamentary choices 
that seek to give effect to the testator’s legal obligations cannot, however, offend public 
policy. Public policy, which speaks to the legal convictions of the community, requires that 
maintenance obligations be enforced.161 If, in the circumstances, enforcing those choices 
would nevertheless be ‘manifestly unjust’, it is the law that should be changed, until which 
time the testator’s choices must be enforced.162  
 
Public policy in the context of testamentary freedom is thus most relevant to the testator’s 
moral obligations. A testator’s failure to include a beneficiary in their will, or to make better 
provision for them, may be a breach of the testator’s moral duty towards that person. This 
alone would not be reason enough to intervene with the testator’s wishes. Intervention 
should be permissible only when the testator’s failure is so manifestly unjust in the 
circumstances that all reasonable people would agree that it is indisputably harmful. 
 




159 Ibid [81]. 
160 See eg Minister of Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd 2006 (4) SA 205 (C). 
161 See ST v CT (5) SA 479 (SCA), in which the court declared a term of an ante-nuptial contract, in 
which the wife waived any claim to future maintenance in the event of divorce, contrary to public 
policy. 
162 Mill Utilitarianism (n143). See O’Regan J in Mazibuko (n35) [73] that when a law exists, a claim must 
either be founded on the law or the law must be shown to be unconstitutional. An applicant cannot 
construct a claim that simply seeks to avoid the law. See also Du Toit v Greyling (78173/2014) [2016] 
ZAGPPHC 892 (23 September 2016). 
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The same principles should inform the exercise of discretionary powers by judicial or 
administrative officers who have been expressly authorised to override testators’ wishes.163 
Before overriding a testator’s autonomous choices, a discretionary decision-maker should be 
satisfied both that the deceased owed a particular beneficiary a legal or moral obligation,164 
and that the obligation is so pressing that it justifies overriding the deceased’s selection of a 
different beneficiary.165 The second step is a vital part of the enquiry. The interests of all 
affected parties must be part of the enquiry into whether the testator’s wishes are manifestly 
unjust.166  
 
What, however, is the source of the testator’s moral obligation? Is it merely that she was in a 
relationship with the person, or related to the person, or that she had displayed acts of 
kindness and generosity towards that person? Or is something more required? Must there be 
some moral blameworthiness on her part for failing to make better provision, because, for 
example, she by her conduct caused or contributed to the financial need, or because she 
expressly or tacitly promised, or created a legitimate expectation, that she would continue 
providing support even after her death?  
 
I suggest that something more is required. The current legal convictions of the community do 
not place a general duty on a testator to make posthumous provision for anyone other than 
a needy spouse or child.167 There is certainly no community consensus that a testator must in 
 
163 Canadian courts have similarly emphasised that a court may only interfere with a testator’s choices 
to correct a ‘manifest wrong’. See eg Garrett v Zwicker 1976 CanLII 1981 (NS CA), 343; Lawen Estate v 
Nova Scotia (n6) [107].  
164 See also Tyler’s Family Provision (n112), 41 who argues that the purpose of family provision should be 
to extend testators’ inter vivos maintenance obligations after death. However, he also suggests that in 
exceptional circumstances it may be appropriate to include other persons. 
165 Cf Singer (n36), who believes that ‘[w]e should encourage people to rely on relationships of mutual 
dependence by making it possible for everyone to form such relationships and by protecting those 
who are most vulnerable when those relationships end.’ Why, however, should ‘vulnerability’ create an 
entitlement to support, if the vulnerability is not attributable to the relationship or deceased partner? 
166 For a discussion on the need to balance competing interests, see Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers (n39); Weare v Ndebele 2009 (1) SA 600 (CC). 
167 See MSSA 27 of 1990 and Carelse v Estate De Vries (1906) 23 SC 532. 
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every case make provision for a non-needy child168 or even a needy cohabiting partner,169 
parent, sibling, grandchild or financial dependant.170  
 
The existence of any such general moral duty, the perception that the individual’s failure to 
make provision for such person whenever able to do so, will be one that is ‘intractably 
disputed’.171 For the duty to exist, it must be one that derives from the particular history and 
circumstances of the relationship between the testator and the eligible beneficiary. It will be 
specific to the individual and that person, and cannot be generalised across all such 
 
168 Many jurisdictions, including South Africa, do not permit claims by adult children who are not in 
financial need. See also Lawen Estate v Nova Scotia (n6), which held that legislation permitting a non-
needy adult child to claim provision from a parent’s estate is an unconstitutional infringement of the 
individual’s right to liberty under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
169 See eg Volks v Robinson 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). See also Quebec (Attorney General) v A 2013 SCC 
5; Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Walsh 2002 SCC 83; Le Blanc v Cushing(n131), which similarly held 
that laws that did not extend the consequences of marriage to unmarried partners were not 
discriminatory. Cohabiting partners generally have no right to inherit on intestacy in civil law countries, 
see eg Austria; Belgium; Czech; Estonia; Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Sweden, United Kingdom 
– all restrict the right to married or registered partners, not unregistered cohabiting partners. In some 
countries, cohabitants can inherit on intestacy provided there are no other intestate heirs, such as in 
Austria and Croatia, so they are only inheriting in preference to the state. See Ruggeri (n117).  
170 Few jurisdictions recognise duties of support towards siblings. A greater number allow claims by 
parents, but their entitlement is increasingly controversial. British Columbia for eg repealed its parental 
support obligation in 2016, although its Law Institute had recommended that it be done in 2007 already. 
See British Columbia Law Institute Report on the parental support obligation in Section 90 of the Family 
Relations Act (2007). Van Houtte & Breda ‘Maintenance of the aged by their adult children: the family 
as a residual agency in the solution of poverty in Belgium’ (1977-1978) 12 Law & Society Review 645 
argued that children’s duty of support should be abolished in Belgium, but it remains law. Most 
European countries impose duties of support on children. Those that do not include Finland, Hungary, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom, see Herlofson et al 
‘Intergenerational family responsibility and solidarity in Europe’ Norwegian Social Research (Nova) (April 
2011). Numerous US states have repealed children’s statutory duty of support, and its continued 
existence in other jurisdictions is controversial, particularly when it permits parents’ creditors to claim 
payment of maintenance-related costs, like healthcare, from adult children. See Pearson ‘Filial support 
laws in the modern era: domestic and international comparison of enforcement practices for laws 
requiring adult children to support parents’ (2013) 20(2) The Elder LJ 269; Health Care & Retirement 
Corporation of America v Pittas Pa Super Ct No 536 EDA 2011.  
171 The majority decision in Volks v Robinson (n169) has been roundly criticised by academics, see the 
minority judgment of Froneman J in Laubscher v Duplan 2017 (4) BCLR 415 (CC), esp fn74, detailing 
some of the critical commentary. Woolman & Botha ‘Limitations’ in Constitutional Law of South Africa 
2ed (2018) at 34.8(e) decried the judgment as ‘grounded both in traditional mores and rather outré 
metaphysical views about 'individual freedom'. Meyerson similarly criticised its ‘moralistic disapproval’ 
of unmarried partnerships and characterised its treatment of unmarried partners as ‘second-class 
citizens and less worthy of respect’, see ‘Who’s in and who’s out: inclusion and exclusion in the family 
law jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of South Africa 2010 (3) Constitutional Court Review 295, 
310. This is the same Meyerson who emphasised that all reasonable people must agree that conduct is 
indisputably harmful before limitation of an individual’s fundamental rights is permissible. There is, 
however, clearly considerable diversity of opinion globally and within South African society, as reflected 
in the views of the judiciary and the legislature, even if not within academia. The legislature has yet to 
adopt the recommendations of the Law Commission proposing the adoption of legislation that would 
confer many of the legal consequences of marriage on domestic partners (see SALRC (Project 118) 
Report on Domestic Partnerships (2006).  
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relationships.172 Only if the testator’s selection of her beneficiaries, or apportionment of her 
estate amongst them, provokes such a sense of moral outrage that her choices will readily 
be described as manifestly unjust by all reasonable people,173 will it be reasonable and 
justifiable to interfere with those choices.174  
 
What, however, if the individual owes obligations to more than one person, in circumstances 
in which they cannot all be fulfilled? When there is a conflict between legal rights and moral 
rights, the former must surely trump the latter. To grant a decision-maker the discretion to 
disregard the testator’s legal obligations and to instead prioritise the testator’s moral 
obligations or social obligations as and when the decision-maker considers it equitable to do 
so, is contrary to the rule of law.175  
 
But what if the conflict is only between legal and other legal obligations or between moral 
and moral obligations? On what basis should priority be given to one legal or moral 
obligation over the other? These questions do not ask why an individual should have the right 
to support any person. They do, and should, have the right to do so. The question is why they 
should be denied the right to do so. In other words, why their right to prefer one should be 
trumped by their obligation towards another. There is no clear answer to this problem.  
 
Mill acknowledged that the ‘knotty’ problem of conflicting obligations was inevitable. 
 
There exists no moral system under which there do not arise unequivocal cases of conflicting 
obligation. These are the real difficulties, the knotty points both in the theory of ethics, and in 
the conscientious guidance of personal conduct.176 
 
 
172 See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers (n39) [23], in which the CC held that courts 
deciding on the equitability of an eviction order were required to ‘balance out and reconcile the 
opposed claims in as just a manner as possible taking account of all the interests involved and the 
specific factors relevant in each particular case.’ 
173 See Lawen Estate v Nova Scotia (n6) & Meyerson (n45). 
174 See eg David v Beals Estate 2015 NSSC 288. 
175 See Beadica (n39) [81] ‘The rule of law requires that law be clear and ascertainable.’ See also 
Woolman & Botha ‘Limitations’ (n171) para 34.7: ‘Laws may not grant officials largely unfettered 
discretion to use their power as they wish’.  
176 Utilitarianism (n143), 15/43.  
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Mill’s theory of utilitarianism, which is quite distinct from that of Jeremy Bentham and the 
conventional understanding of the term,177 posits that each person should receive what they 
‘deserve’, that the individual’s ‘duty [is] to do to each according to his deserts’.178 Justice 
requires that we return ‘good for good’ and ‘evil for evil’, and that we treat all ‘equally well 
… who deserve equally well of us’.179 The return should therefore be commensurate with the 
general contribution that the person made to the individual’s well-being, or with the express 
or tacit promises made to that person. To commit a ‘breach of friendship or a breach of 
promise’ by disappointing ‘expectation’ ranked high on the scale of ‘human evils and 
wrongs’.180 To give to each his just deserts was the ‘highest abstract standard of social and 
distributive justice’.181 To wrongfully deprive someone of that which is due to them and which 
they had a reasonable expectation of receiving, Mill considered to be amongst the ‘most 
marked cases of injustice’.182   
 
The only way to resolve the problem of conflicting duties is thus by ranking the individual’s 
relationships having regard to their nature, strength, depth, duration, contribution to the 
individual’s well-being and the like. In the context of testamentary freedom, the need to 
engage in such ranking should only arise once it has already been established that the 
individual has failed to fulfil a moral obligation of support, and the question that then arises is 
whether the circumstances are such as to require that the testator’s distributive choices be 
overridden.  
 
In order to justify overriding a testator’s wishes, there must have been a positive obligation on 
the testator to make a different choice and it must be one that is so compelling that the cost 
of satisfying that obligation effectively be borne by an innocent third party, viz the testator’s 
 
177 Which Van der Westhuizen describes as ‘blunt utilitarianism’ in SAPS v Solidarity (n16) [173], meaning 
the greatest good for the greatest number. See further ‘John Stuart Mill: Ethics’ in Internet Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy <https://www.iep.utm.edu/mill-eth/>.  
178 Utilitarianism (n143), 36/43 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid 35/43. See also Raz ‘Liberating duties’ (1989) 8(1) Law and Philosophy 3, 19, who agrees that 
friendship creates duties.  
181 Mill Utilitarianism (n143) 36/43. 
182 Ibid 35/43. 
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nominated (or intestate) beneficiary.183 A testator can surely only be in breach of a moral 
duty to make (better) provision for one beneficiary if the testator’s provision for other 
beneficiaries was unjustifiably generous. Setting aside a testator’s choices, when those 
choices are reasonable and justifiable, is to commit an injustice against both the testator and 
the testator’s chosen beneficiaries. 
 
If the relationships and the obligations that arise from them are equally compelling, and the 
circumstances such that they cannot all be satisfied, hard choices must be made.184 If hard 
choices must inevitably be made, and there is nothing that objectively makes one choice 
obviously ‘just’ and the other ‘unjust’, it is surely the individual’s preference and conception 
of justice that should prevail.185   
 
The fact that a person, who is not amongst the deceased’s chosen beneficiaries, has no right 
to inherit is a reasonable justification for denying that person a share in the deceased’s 
property.186 The fact that a person, who is amongst the deceased’s chosen beneficiaries, 
may also have no right to inherit is not a reasonable justification for denying them their 
intended share of the deceased’s property. A nominated beneficiary may well have no right 
to inherit, but they do have a legitimate expectation that the deceased’s wishes will be 
upheld.  
 
As Mill wrote regarding a parent’s right to make better provision for a child than required by 
her moral obligation towards that child: 
 
 
183 See David v Beals Estate (n174). 
184 See Waldron ‘Rights in conflict’ (n145) who illustrates this point using the example of two persons 
drowning, only one of whom can be rescued. The problem of competing claims is increasingly coming 
to the fore as individuals enter into multiple overlapping relationships. See eg Mayelane v Ngwenyama 
2013 (8) BCLR 918 (CC), an estate dispute involving a surviving spouse under customary law and a 
second spouse of a putative marriage. The CC prioritised the surviving spouse’s claim to the exclusion 
of the putative spouse.  
185 Du Bois (n14), 141: ‘The reason for this is that, when no right answer is available, it is always arbitrary 
to insist on one's own particular view and therefore a denial of the ”innate equality” which Kant sees as 
an aspect of ”innate freedom”.’ 
186 Harvey v Crawford (n5); King v De Jager (n148). 
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I would not, however, be supposed to recommend that parents should never do more for their 
children than what, merely as children, they have a moral right to. In some cases it is 
imperative, in many laudable, and in all allowable, to do much more. For this, however, the 
means are afforded by the liberty of bequest. It is due, not to the children but to the parents, 
that they should have the power of showing marks of affection, of requiting services and 
sacrifices, and of bestowing their wealth according to their own preferences, or their own 
judgment of fitness.187 
 
These arguments apply with equal force to any person with whom the individual enjoyed a 




This thesis is not a critique of the existence of limitations on testamentary freedom. It is simply 
a critique of wide and unguided discretionary powers that permit third parties to override an 
individual’s testamentary autonomy in circumstances in which the individual’s choices are 
not manifestly unjust. It argues only that greater respect be accorded to the individual’s 
freedom of choice, and that her choices be overridden only when they are indisputably 
harmful. Although the grant of wide discretionary powers is intended to ensure that 
individualised justice is achieved, the wider the discretion the greater the risk that the 
decision-maker’s idiosyncratic values and conceptions of harm will determine the 
outcome.188  
 
Eighty years ago, Roscoe Pound expressed his concern at the state’s increasing 
encroachment on individuals’ rights to liberty and property, which were so intertwined that 
they had ‘for a long time’ been regarded as ‘one conception’:189 
 
From the time when men began to think about rights and formulate declarations of liberties or 
assertions of rights, they have put property and exercise of liberties in acquiring and controlling 
property along with liberty in the forefront. … It is significant that the current of thought which is 
giving up the idea of property is also giving up the idea of liberty.190  
 
 
187 Mill Principles of Political Economy (n65) Bk 2 Ch 2 §3. 
188 See Ackerman J, quoting Callins v Collins 114 S Ct 1127, 127 L Ed 435 (1994) (Blackmun J), in S v 
Makwanyane (n30) [161], in the context of the death penalty.  
189 Pound (n53), 995. 
190 Ibid, 994-995. 
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Pound wrote these words in 1939, prompted by his fear that his contemporary political and 
legal philosophers were rejecting the liberal values of the 19th century. They were ‘rejecting 
the idea of rights, making light of liberty, treating rules not as devices to maintain rights but as 
threats of exercise of state force creating duties, and so thinking of restraint rather than of 
freedom.’191  
 
The main manifestation of this legal and political shift from rights to restraint was the rise of the 
bureaucratic state, which supplanted the individual’s freedom and autonomy with ‘bureaus 
and boards and administrative agencies’, that rule by ‘discretion rather than law’, and 
which were free to impose ‘their views of expediency … in what they take to be in the 
general welfare or public interest.’192  
 
Pound, like the liberal philosophers to whose values he subscribed, was not a proponent of 
unlimited property rights. He accepted that restrictions were justified, including restrictions on 
testamentary freedom, in order to protect those who should be the ‘natural objects’ of the 
testator’s ‘bounty’.193 His concern was that the powers and liberties that the individual should 
be permitted to exercise over his property was being subjected to the ‘discretion of an 
administrative official given authority to apply an undefined standard with no principles to 
guide him and free … to determine for himself what some not legally formulated policy 
requires or makes expedient for a case in hand.’194   
 
Section 37C validates Pound’s concerns. What s37C does is deprive the individual of her right 
to dispose of her property to the natural objects of her bounty. What it does not do is limit the 





192 Ibid, 996. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid, 997. 
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Kenneth Culp Davis, in his influential writings on administrative law, argued that discretionary 
power must be carefully crafted to achieve the ‘optimum’ point between absolute rules of 
law and absolute discretion.195 It is the legislature’s responsibility to identify that point and 
formulate rules that appropriately ‘confine, structure and check’ administrative decision-
making.196  
Whatever choices a legislature makes when developing rules that restrict freedom of 
testation, or a decision-maker makes when applying those rules, one or other party will be 
adversely affected by the choice.  It will either be the nominated beneficiary if the testator’s 
wishes are not respected, or it will be the other party if the testator’s wishes are not 
overridden.  Those rules should not reduce the conflict to one between the testator and 
aggrieved beneficiary, as though the restriction is simply a financial cost to be borne by an 
impersonal estate.  Restrictions on freedom of testation that permit post hoc intervention pit 
the living against the living, not the dead against the living.    
As the next chapters seek to demonstrate, s37C is not a carefully designed limitation on 
testamentary freedom, which limits the individual’s right only to the extent required. It simply 
deprives the individual of the right to decide how her property should be divided amongst 
those naturally entitled to her bounty and transfers her right to quasi-administrative officials, 
free of the legal constraints to which testators are themselves subject. The cost of their 
intervention is inevitably borne by the persons who would otherwise have benefited – the 
member’s nominated beneficiaries or intestate heirs.   
195 Davis ‘Discretionary Justice’ (1970) 23(1) Journal of Legal Education 56, 59. 
196 Pound ‘Legislation as social function’ (1913) 18(6) American Journal of Sociology 755, 765-766 argues 
that in devising laws, the legislature must firstly identify the varied interests that arise in a given context, 
identify those in which the individual interest aligns with the social interest, since the legislature’s 
purpose is ultimately to advance the latter, and, in cases of conflict between different individual 
interests that are also social interests, select that which secures the ‘greatest number’ of interests with 






SECTION 37C’S PURPOSE & TRUSTEE POWERS 
 
Powers are not conferred in the abstract. They are intended to serve a 
particular purpose. That purpose can be discerned from the legislation that is 
the source of the power and this ordinarily places limits upon the manner in 




Section 37C has two distinct consequences. On the one hand, retirement benefits are 
removed from the estate of the member and, in the process, protected from the claims of 
creditors. On the other, control over the devolution of those benefits is placed in the hands of 
the trustees of the fund. The legislature could have made provision for either one or the other 
– they need not be conjoined. I know of no jurisdiction that has transferred the right to select 
beneficiaries to a third party while preserving creditors’ claims to those benefits, although it is 
notionally possible. There are, however, jurisdictions that have removed the benefit from the 
member’s estate in order to protect the benefit against creditors’ claims without 
simultaneously depriving members of the right to select their beneficiaries.2 Section 37C is 
unique in statutorily divesting members of control over their death benefits while transferring 
the right to select beneficiaries to third parties.  
 
Its purpose in doing so is not, however, discernible from the provisions of the Act. The 
preamble to the Act states only that it has been enacted ‘to provide for the registration, 
incorporation, regulation and dissolution of pension funds and for matters incidental thereto.’ 
 
1 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA, In Re: Ex Parte Application of President of the RSA 
2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [76]. 
2 See eg Australia, Bankruptcy Act 1966, s116(2) (Cth) and the case of Stock v NM Superannuation 
Proprietary Limited [2015] FCA 612, confirming that the benefit does not form part of the member’s 
estate. See also Malawi’s Pension Act 6 of 2011, s73. In England death benefits similarly do not form part 
of the estate, but binding nominations are rare because of the tax implications, see further Braun 
‘Pension Death Benefits: Opportunities and Pitfalls’ in Häcker & Mitchell (eds) Current Issues in 




Section 37C itself contains no explanation. It simply tells trustees what they must do, not why 
they must do it.  
 
What then is its purpose? The accepted explanation is to protect members’ dependants. This 
view finds support in the Act’s definition of ‘pension fund organisation’, which is any 
organisation established with the object of providing benefits to members upon their 
retirement or to their dependants in the event of their death.3 This definition, with its explicit 
mention of dependants, was inserted into the Act at the same time as s37C.4 The legislature’s 
purpose was thus clearly to protect dependants.  
 
Cast this broadly, its purpose undoubtedly appears to be substantially compelling. Simply 
asserting that a law is intended to protect dependants is an inadequate justification, 
however, for it does not identify the actual mischief s37C is intended to guard against.5 
Without a clearer identification of its specific objective, it is impossible to assess either 
whether the means chosen are reasonably capable of achieving that purpose, or whether 
the purpose is so compelling that it justifies the limitation.  
 
3.2 SECTION 37C’S PURPOSE 
 
3.2.1 Protection from the member? 
 
If the purpose behind s37C is to protect the member’s dependants, the question is against 
whom, from what, and why? The obvious answer is to protect dependants from the member; 
more particularly, to protect them against avoidable hardship arising from the member’s 
 
3 PFA, s1.  
4 Act 101 of 1976, s21(c). 
5 See eg Lawen Estate v Nova Scotia (Attorney General) 2019 NSSC 162 [84], in which the court held 
that the Attorney-General’s argument, that family provision legislation was intended to fulfil testators’ 
moral obligation to make adequate provision for their dependants, did not explain what its objective 
was in permitting a court to override a testator’s wishes in order to make provision for a financially 
independent, non-needy adult child. 
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failure to make appropriate or proper provision for them.6 The protection afforded in such 
cases is against a malevolent or indifferent or injudicious member, one who could have, and 
should have, made better provision through the death benefits for specific dependants, but 
failed to do so.  
 
This explanation dominates pension fund discourse.7 In his early determinations, the first 
Adjudicator variously stated that: 
 
Section 37C specifically restricts freedom of testation to ensure that no dependants are left 
without support.8  
 
The purpose of s37C is to protect dependency over the wishes of the deceased, which may be 
expressed in the nomination form or last will of the member.9   
 
[W]here there are needy dependants [a nomination] should … be ignored or given minimal 
consideration. That is precisely why section 37C was enacted, otherwise members would be 
free to dispose of their benefits in terms of their wills.10 
 
In characterising s37C’s as a deliberate restriction on members’ freedom of testation, the 
implication is that members may exercise their freedom wrongfully, by failing to make 
provision for someone they should have made provision for.  The emphasis, therefore, is on 
protecting dependants from financial hardship attributable to their complete or partial 
‘disinheritance’ by the member. Disinheritance, however, implies that the deceased has 
 
6 See eg Mahomed v Argus PF PFA/KN/00013780/2015/UM. The member nominated her younger 
daughter as the sole beneficiary of her R2.4 million benefit. She was also survived her older daughter, 
who suffered from an intellectual disability and was unable to work. The fund overrode the nomination 
and allocated the bulk of the benefit to the elder daughter (R1.8 million) to be administered in a trust 
for her benefit. Prima facie this appears to confirm that s37C is necessary to protect vulnerable 
dependants from the member. However, the mother is more likely to have nominated her younger 
daughter to provide her with the means to look after her older daughter, rather than to deprive the 
elder daughter of protection.  
7 In Fundsatwork Umbrella Pension Fund v Guarnieri (830/2018) [2019] ZASCA 78 (31 May 2019) [5], the 
SCA explained that s37C removes the allocation of death benefits from the member’s ‘unfettered 
choice’ (whether expressed in a will or nomination) for the ‘social purpose of providing some protection 
for dependants’.  See also Nevondwe ‘Death benefits and constitutionality: is the distribution of death 
benefits under the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 constitutional’? (2007) 15 Juta’s Business Law 164; Dyani 
& Mhango ‘Reflections on recent South African pension jurisprudence on death claims’ (2011) 32 ILJ 
2385. 
8 Van Vuuren v CRAF [2000] 6 BPLR 661 (PFA) [35] (emphasis added).  In Van Vuuren, the dependant 
(an estranged spouse) was not receiving financial support from the member. 
9 Sithole v ICS [2000] 4 BPLR 430 (PFA) [23] (emphasis added).  In Sithole, the dependants (spouse and 
children) were wholly financially dependent on member. 
10 Morgan v SA Druggists [2001] 4 BPLR 1886 (PFA) [25], in which he held that the trustees’ allocation of 
the greater share of the benefit to the non-needy nominee amounted to maladministration.  In 
Morgan, the dependant (a disabled adult son living in a state-subsidised care home) was partially 
financially dependent on the member. 
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excluded a person who would otherwise have inherited. The only persons who can be 
‘disinherited’ are the members’ intestate heirs, who are ordinarily their spouses and children, 
and their testate heirs.11 Yet trustees override member wishes and select beneficiaries who 
were not at any risk of becoming destitute and who were not persons capable of being 
disinherited, since they were neither the member’s testate nor intestate heirs.12 Trustees do so 
even when the member’s nominated beneficiaries are spouses and children.13  
 
In one of the few judicial decisions on s37C, Mashazi v African Products Retirement Fund,14 
the High Court, relying on these earlier Adjudicator determinations, similarly stated that: 
 
Section 37C of the Act was intended to serve a social function. It was enacted to protect 
dependency, even over the clear wishes of the deceased. This section specifically restricts 
freedom of testation in order that no dependants are left without support. Section 37C(1) 
specifically excludes the benefits from the assets in the estate of a member. Section 37C 
enjoins the trustees of the pension fund to effect an equitable discretion, taking into account a 
number of factors.  
 
Adjudicator determinations regularly cite Mashazi as authority when they explain s37C’s 
purpose.15 The problem is that Mashazi, like the earlier determinations, identifies three 
potentially-competing purposes: to ensure that no dependants are left without support, to 
protect dependency, and to grant trustees the power to distribute the benefit equitably.  
 
Dependants and dependency are not synonymous. The internal contradiction in the 
passage is apparent in Adjudicator determinations. Dependants are regularly left without 
support by the member, and in turn by the trustees. The absence of existing dependency is 
used to justify the dependant’s exclusion.16 Conversely, trustees sometimes override a 
 
11 If the member bequeathed the benefit in her will and made a contrary nomination.   
12 Kirsten v Allan Gray [2017] 3 BPLR 566 (PFA). 
13 Van Schalkwyk v MEPF [2003] 8 BPLR 5087 (PFA); Koekemoer v Macsteel [2004] 2 BPLR 5465 (PFA); 
Marais v Sasol [2017] 3 BPLR 615 (PFA). 
14 2003 (1) SA 629 (W), 632 (emphasis added), citing the Adjudicator’s earlier determinations in Sithole 
(n9) and Kipling v Unilever [2001] 8 BPLR 2368 (PFA). 
15 Adjudicator determinations regularly cite Mashazi (n14) as authority when they explain s37C’s 
purpose. See eg Berge v Alexander Forbes [2009] JOL 23698 (W), 10; Smith v MM PFA/GA/5229/2005/RM 
[5.7]; Esterhuizen v CRAF [2013] 3 BPLR 355 (PFA) [4.3]; Mohlomi v Evergreen [2014] JOL 31440 (PFA) [5.8]. 
16 See eg Segal v LRAF [2001] 1 BPLR 1519 (PFA); Legoko v Soweto [2011] 1 BPLR 101 (PFA); Naidoo v 
Coca Cola [2019] JOL 46217 (FST).  
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member’s clear wishes by including dependants who were not financially dependent on the 
member and not likely to become so.17 They do so even when the member’s nominated 
beneficiary was financially dependent on the member, or at risk of becoming so, or in 
greater financial need, than the selected beneficiary.18  
 
Recently, in Fundsatwork Umbrella Pension Fund v Guarnieri,19 the SCA, also citing Mashazi, 
explained that s37C removes the allocation of death benefits from members’ ‘unfettered 
choice (whether expressed in a will or nomination) for the social purpose of providing some 
protection for dependants.’. The SCA made no mention of dependency, but only that s37C 
was intended to protect needy dependants.  
 
Increasingly, however, the interpretation attached to the passage from Mashazi by 
Adjudicators is that s37C’s purpose is to ‘protect dependency’,20 to ‘protect those who were 
financially dependent on the member’ while she was alive,21 and ‘to ensure that those who 
were financially dependent on the member are not left destitute by his death’.22  
 
The definition of dependant is a wide one, and nowhere in the definition of dependant or in 
s37C are ‘financial dependants’ singled out for special mention. Similarly, nowhere does 
s37C enjoin trustees to ensure that dependants are not left without support or to protect 
‘dependency’. Section 37C only enjoins trustees to effect an equitable distribution amongst 
the member’s dependants and nominees. Equity requires that trustees consider factors other 
than the dependant’s financial need, or the existence and extent of financial 
dependence.23  
 
17 Williams v FFE [2001] 2 BPLR 1678 (PFA); Tsele v Bidvest [2016] 1 BPLR 146 (PFA). 
18 Ibid; Nduku v VWSA PFA/EC/14187/2007/NVC; Makume v Sentinel [2014] 2 BPLR 244 (PFA); Kirsten 
(n12). 
19 (830/2018) [2019] ZASCA 78 (31 May 2019) [5]. 
20 Mohlomi (n15) [5.8); Ramoroka v SARAF [2017] 2 BPLR 349 (PFA) [5.10].  
21 Kgapola v Fidelity [2007] JOL 20987 (PFA) [4.1]; Kouassi v Tiger Brands [2010] 2 BPLR 129 (PFA) [5.2]; 
Mitchell v Alnet [2014] JOL 31439 (PFA) [5.2]; Van Jaarsveld v OVK Aftreefonds [2015] 2 BPLR 303 (PFA) 
[5.2]; Whitcombe v Momentum [2016] 2 BPLR 290 (PFA) [5.2]. 
22 Malindi v British American Tobacco PFA/GA/4233/05/VIA; Gorrah v Metal Industries [2014] JOL 31420 
(PFA) [5.8]; Kirsten (n12). 




Rather than restricting freedom of testation to protect members’ dependants, which is s37C’s 
ostensible purpose, what it actually does is to impose a positive obligation on members to 
make however much provision, for whichever of their dependants, the trustees feel should 
have been made.24  
 
3.2.2 Protection of the fiscus? 
 
Allied to the primary purpose of protecting dependants is protecting the fiscus,25 by 
‘prioritis[ing] need and dependency in the distribution of death benefits and thereby 
reduc[ing] dependency on the state.’26 In one early determination setting aside the trustees’ 
decision, the Adjudicator said:  
 
Moreover, in accounting for the fact that James's government grant may be in jeopardy 
should too great a portion of the benefit be awarded to him, the Board has misdirected itself. 
The social desirability of reducing his dependence on the state should have been a reason to 
award a greater portion of the benefit to him.27 
 
The justification for utilising death benefits to reduce dependency on the state is that it is the 
quid pro quo for the favourable income-tax treatment the member had received from the 
state, which had enabled her to save more towards retirement than she would otherwise 
have been able to save. In TWC v Rentokil,28 for example, it was said:  
 
The aim of section 37C is to limit a pension fund member’s freedom of testation in relation to his 
pension benefits. Pension benefits accumulate favourably as a consequence of 
 
24 Section 37C is akin to family maintenance legislation in other jurisdictions, which permit courts to 
override the deceased’s will or intestacy laws when the deceased failed to make proper financial 
provision for an eligible applicant. See §7.3.  In Fundsatwork v Guarnieri (n7) [22] the SCA stated that 
s37C’s ‘established purpose is to provide maintenance to those who have need of it’. I have not come 
across any Adjudicator determinations that explain s37C’s purpose in these terms.  If this were its 
purpose, trustees would surely be required to respect the member’s wishes except to the extent that 
she had failed to provide for the dependant’s reasonable maintenance needs.   
25 Mashazi (n14). 
26 Van den Berg v Durban [2003] 3 BPLR 4518 (PFA); TWC v Rentokil [2000] 2 BPLR 216 (PFA). This view was 
also endorsed by the SCA in Fundsatwork v Guarnieri (n7) [5]. 
27 Morgan (n10) [17]. 
28  [2000] 2 BPLR 216 (PFA), 223; Martin v Beka [2000] 2 BPLR 196 (PFA), 211; Musgrave v Unisa [2000] 4 
BPLR 415 (PFA), 424. 
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advantageous tax treatment of contributions to the fund. In return the state hopes to ensure 
that there are fewer persons dependent on it for social security.  
 
 
Do these explanations withstand scrutiny? I believe not. The tax concession that members 
receive is that a proportion of their retirement contributions are tax-exempt,29 which 
considerably enhances the eventual value of their retirement savings. This is undoubtedly an 
incentive the state uses to encourage people to save towards retirement. 
 
However, the tax-savings is, for many retirees, only a deferred tax benefit. Income tax is 
levied on retirement benefits that are taken as cash lump sums. The first R500 000 is tax-
exempt.30Anything above R500 000 is taxed at a progressive rate of 18–36%.31The maximum 
tax rate of 36% is payable on so much of the retirement benefit as exceeds R1 050 000.  
 
The same tax tables apply to death benefits taken as cash lump sums. It is here that the tax-
justification argument breaks down. In most cases, the death benefit consists of both the 
member’s savings and the insured portion. The insured portion is funded by an insurance 
premium, which the fund usually deducts from the member’s contribution. The premium is 
such a small part of the member’s contributions that any tax concession on this sum is 
negligible.32 Yet income tax is also levied on the insured portion. It is only when the death 
benefit consists of the savings portion alone, which is the case with retirement annuity funds, 
that the tax-justification is plausible (though not necessarily justifiable). 
 
Tax can be avoided or reduced if the benefit is used to purchase an annuity. This applies 
both when a member uses her retirement savings to purchase an annuity, and when 
beneficiaries use the death benefit to do so. In most cases, annuities are purchased by those 
with large lump sums – in other words, the more-affluent, who would not be at risk of 
 
29 Currently the lesser of R350 000 or 27.5% of gross taxable income per annum. See Income Tax Act 58 
of 1962, s11F. The Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955, s3(2)(bA) provides that contributions in excess of this 
amount will form part of a deceased’s gross estate for estate duty purposes. 
30 This is a lifetime allowance and is reduced by any prior tax deduction the member received were she 
to have withdrawn any of her retirement benefits while alive, eg when changing employment. 
31 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, Second Schedule, s 3(b)(iii). 
32 In most funds it is between 0.5% and 2.5% of the member’s salary. See Sanlam Benchmark Survey: 
Standalone Funds Databook (2017) Q4.4A. 
87 
 
becoming dependent on the state in any event.33 They are therefore granted tax 
concessions on their contributions and on their ‘lump sum’ benefits. It is beneficiaries who 
receive smaller lump sums who overwhelmingly withdraw the benefit as cash and are taxed 
on the lump sum – in other words, poorer beneficiaries for whom the capital is too small to 
make the purchase of a lifelong annuity a meaningful choice.34  
 
The concessional tax treatment is therefore contingent on the behavioural choices of the 
member or beneficiaries. For the less affluent, the choice is often theoretical rather than real, 
because both the retirement and death benefit lump sum is too small to finance a regular 
income through the purchase of an annuity. It is they who are most likely to commute their 
benefit for cash. It is therefore the poor(er) who are most likely to suffer adverse tax-
consequences because they are poor. 
 
Compared with the taxation of death benefits, the taxation of deceased estates is 
considerably more favourable to beneficiaries. Deceased estates only pay estate duty on 
however much of the net estate exceeds R3.5 million.35 If the net estate is between R3.5 
million and R30 million, tax is levied at 20%.36 Tax increases to 25% on so much of the net 
estate that exceeds R30 million.37 Prior to 1 January 2009 death benefits did fall into the 
estate for estate duty purposes.38 The lump sum benefit would therefore have been subject 
to both income tax and estate duty. Individual life insurance proceeds, by contrast, are an 
asset in a deceased estate, so prima facie death benefit lump sums appear to attract more 
favourable tax-treatment. The opposite is true, because income tax is levied on the insured 
 
33 At July 2020 annuity rates, R1 million will buy a single life annuity of circa R5000 – R6000 p/m for a 
beneficiary aged 60 with a 5% income escalation per annum. See 
<https://www.masthead.co.za/annuity-investment-rates/>. 
34 Even when the lump sum is large enough to fund an annuity, once divided amongst multiple 
beneficiaries their individual share is likely too small to warrant purchasing an annuity. The first 
Adjudicator held that trustees are obliged to make separate allocations to each beneficiary, making 
the division of the lump sum inevitable, and the likelihood of its taxation greater. See Thema v Metal 
Industries PFA/NP/3008/2001/NJ. 
35 Act 45 of 1955, s4A(1).  
36 Ibid, First Schedule, s1. 
37 See www.sars.gov.za/TaxTypes/EstateDuty/Pages/default.aspx. 
38 Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955, s3(2)(i); Davis Tax Committee First Interim Report on Estate Duty for the 
Minister of Finance (2015), 10. 
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portion. Had income tax been levied on the savings portion only and estate duty on the 
insured portion, most of those currently paying tax on the death benefit would not have paid 
tax at all. The savings portion would probably be below the R500 000 tax-free limit, and the 
insured portion would rarely reach the R3.5 million estate-duty threshold.39  
 
Ironically, therefore, the poorer are now taxed when they would previously not have been, 
because their estates would have been below R3.5 million, even including the death benefit. 
The wealthier receive a double tax advantage if they choose to purchase annuities, for they 
pay neither income tax nor estate duty on the death benefit. 
 
Even assuming that the total amount paid by way of death benefits saves the fiscus the 
equivalent amount, the proportion saved will only be in the region of R10 billion40 out of total 
government spending of R1.58 trillion (0.006%)41 and R139 billion (7%) on social grants.42 More 
importantly, this savings is a notional savings only, for it presupposes that the beneficiaries of 
death benefits would otherwise become social grant recipients, or if they are already 
recipients, that they would cease to be recipients. That is not the case. Awards are made to 
recipients of social grants, notably minor children and old age pensioners, but the awards 
are too small to disqualify them from receipt of social grants.43 In many cases none of the 
beneficiaries are at risk of becoming dependent on social grants if their present 
circumstances remain unchanged.44 In some cases persons not at foreseeable risk of 
becoming social grant recipients are favoured over those who are at greater risk.45 Social 
grants are, in addition, only available to a very restricted circle of eligible applicants. 
Beneficiaries between the ages of 18 and 60 are ordinarily not eligible for social grants. If they 
 
39 If a death benefit was exactly R3.5 million and it was taken as a cash lump sum, tax would be R1012 
500. If the death benefit had formed part of the estate and had pushed the value of the net estate to 
R7 million, so that the whole death benefit was subject to estate duty, the tax would be R700 000. This is 
particularly unfair given that for most people, their death benefit is their most-valuable asset. The tax 
tables are available at www.sars.gov.za. 
40 RPF 57th AR 2015, Table 13. Even if the figure is higher, the combined lump sum retirement and death 
benefits paid by all retirement funds in 2017 was R120 billion. 
41 StatsSA Financial statistics of consolidated general government 2016/2017 (P9119.4), 3, Table A. 
42 SASSA AR 2016/2017, Table 2.  
43 Thene v Bidcorp (2008) PFA/GA/6863/05/LCM. 
44 Jones v National Technikon [2002] 1 BPLR 2960 (PFA); Smith v SAA [2010] 3 BPLR 330 (PFA). 
45 Eg Musgrave (n28); Nduku (n18); Makume v Sentinel (n18); Masuku v Liberty [2014] 3 BPLR 390 (PFA). 
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are eligible, by reason of disability for example, the provision made for them by way of a 
death benefit is unlikely to be so much that their income and assets will exceed the means-
testing thresholds.46 And even when it is, these beneficiaries represent a fraction of total 
beneficiaries. 
 
The tax-and-dependency justification for s37C is thus not convincing.47 It also does not inform 
trustee decision-making when allocating death benefits, or the basis on which Adjudicators 
usually intervene. If protecting the state was s37C’s true purpose, trustees’ roles would be 
much simpler: identify who amongst the eligible beneficiaries are most likely to become 
recipients of social grants and pay the death benefit to them. If there are none, trustees 
could simply follow the member’s wishes.  
 
3.2.3 Protection from creditors? 
 
Neither of the afore-going two explanation aligns with the original intention of the legislature, 
which was simply to protect dependants from the member’s creditors.48 That this was the 
original intention is apparent from the submission made by the Minister of Finance in 1976, 
when presenting the proposed amendments to the Act to Parliament:  
 
The object of a pension fund is to provide pension benefits to its members and their 
dependants. The Act does not protect the benefits from alienation and attachment, nor does 
it exclude them from the insolvent and deceased estates of members in order to ensure that 
they in fact accrue to members or their dependants. This deficiency is now being remedied.49 
 
The purpose was also explained in the preamble to the amending Act as being to provide 
for the ‘protection of pension benefits’.50 That this is both the original, and remains the actual, 
purpose behind s37C is supported by the interpretation that the SCA has attached to the 
equivalent provisions in the Government Employees Pension Law 1996. In adopting a 
 
46 See §1.7.3 above. 
47 See also Vigolo v Bostin [2005] HCA 11 [12], in which the Australian HC similarly expressed the view 
that family provision legislation was not ‘merely, or even primarily’ intended to relieve the state of the 
burden of supporting needy dependants. 
48 In Varachia v SAB [2015] 2 BPLR 310 (PFA) [5.12], the Adjudicator, unusually, expressed the same view.  
49 Financial Institutions Amendment Bill 2nd Reading Tuesday 16 March 1976 (2R, 3241). 
50 Act 101 of 1976. Section 37C was inserted by s24. 
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‘purposive’ and expansive interpretation of dependant quite at odds with the literal wording 
of the statute,51 the SCA held in Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) v Buitendag:52 
 
[T]he stated purpose of the Law is to benefit inter alia dependants of a member not his or her 
estate. In addition, … a gratuity payable to a dependant is deemed not to be property in the 
estate of the member and is accordingly protected from estate duty. 
 
More recently, in Greyling v GEPF,53 the High Court explained the purpose of the law as 
follows: 
 
In my judgment it is clear that the purpose of section 22 of the proclamation is to allow a 
member of the Pension Fund to nominate a beneficiary and that upon the death of the 
member any benefit be paid directly to such nominee without the intervention of the executor 
of the deceased's estate. In that way the benefit cannot be eroded by payment to creditors of 
the deceased's estate and [will] be utilized for the exclusive benefit of the deceased's 
dependant or nominee. That purpose is also clear from other provisions of the proclamation. 
See for example section 21 (prohibition on session and attachment of benefits). Section 23 
(benefit not an asset in the insolvent estate), and section 28 (benefit not property for purposes 
for estate duty). 
 
Protecting the member’s beneficiaries from the claims of creditors is simply a natural and 
logical extension of the restrictions that apply to the member herself during her lifetime. The 
member is herself prevented from accessing and utilising the funds for as long as she remains 
a member of the fund; her creditors are similarly prevented from doing so.54 A member is, to 
some extent, therefore protected from her own profligacy and misfortune for as long as she 
remains a member of the fund. Once she is no longer a member of the fund, should she 
choose to take her retirement savings out of the fund, she loses this protection. Her retirement 
savings form part of her estate, and her creditors can access those benefits.55 Similarly, once 
 
51 On a literal reading the definition encompassed only minor children and major children who were not 
self-supporting.  
52 [2006] 4 BPLR 284 (SCA) [6]. 
53 [2015] JOL 32876 (GP) [12], quoting from Jordaan v GEPF Case No. A565/2004 (TPD) (unreported). 
Greyling has been criticised by Jeram ‘Disposition of lump sum death benefits’ in Hanekom (ed) 
Manual on Retirement Funds and other Employee Benefits 25ed (2018), fn293.  
54 Section 37A prohibits the member from transferring, alienating, ceding, pledging or hypothecating 
her retirement benefit and prevents creditors from attaching the benefit, while s 37B provides that it will 
not form part of the member’s insolvent estate.  
55 A lump sum that is payable to a member whose estate was sequestrated while still a member does 
not form part of her insolvent estate. If she is sequestrated after her membership ceases and her lump 
sum has been paid to her, the lump sum will form part of her insolvent estate. See PFA, s37B, which 
stipulates that a benefit that is still to be paid by a fund will not form part her already-insolvent estate. 
See further Foit v Firstrand Bank 2002 (5) SA 148 (T). 
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the death benefit leaves the protective shelter of the retirement fund and becomes part of 
the beneficiary’s estate, the beneficiary’s creditors can lay claim to those benefits.  
 
A further explanation is that these changes to the Act simply harmonised the treatment of 
retirement and death benefits in public sector funds and private sector funds. The rules of 
public sector funds, which were creatures of statute, had long provided that a member was 
not free to deal with her benefit while a member of the fund, and that the benefit did not 
form part of her insolvent estate.56 However, the provisions governing the distribution of lump 
sum death benefits allowed the member greater freedom: the circle of eligible beneficiaries 
typically included spouses, minor children and step-children, financially-dependent adult 
children, parents and siblings and the member was free to alter the default order of 
preference in writing.57 The lump sum was, moreover, excluded from the deceased 
member’s estate if it was paid to one of the above beneficiaries.58  
 
The restriction on freedom of testation was thus an incidental consequence of s37C; it was 
not an inevitable consequence. It was certainly not its primary purpose. Section 37C, as 
originally worded, could have been interpreted to retain the member’s freedom of testation 
in so far as the member had nominated dependants to receive the benefit, with interference 
permitted only to the extent the member nominated non-dependent nominees to receive 
the benefit rather than dependants.59 In fact, the early determinations of the Adjudicator 
indicate that this is how s37C may have been interpreted initially, for the early determinations 
reveal a greater deference on the part of trustees to the wishes of the member than the 
Adjudicator considered permissible.60 Current determinations also demonstrate that 
members rarely prefer non-dependants over dependants. As a result, when trustees interfere 
with a member’s wishes, it is usually to include non-nominated dependants or to exclude 
 
56 See eg the Railways and Harbours Service Act 28 of 1912, ss78 & 79.  
57 Ibid, s50. 
58 Ibid, s51. 
59 Reading between the lines, this seems to be argument made in Kaplan v Professional and Executive 
RF 1998 (4) SA 1234 (W), which speaks of the history of s37C as presented by counsel but doesn’t say 
what the historical argument was. 
60 TWC v Rentokil (n26); Sithole (n9); Moir v Reef Group [2000] 6 BPLR 629 (PFA); Williams v FFE (n17). 
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(completely or virtually-so) nominated dependants, and sometimes, it is simply to effect a re-
allocation of the benefit as between the nominated dependants.61  
 
The original wording of s37C suggests that its drafters thought giving effect to s37C would be 
a pro forma mechanical exercise, a simple matter of paying the benefit to one or more 
dependants:  
 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or in the rules of a registered 
fund any benefit payable by such a fund in respect of a deceased member, shall not form 
part of the assets in the estate of such a member but shall be paid to any one or more of the 
dependants of the member, if there is such a dependant or are such dependants, or to a 
guardian or trustee for the benefit of such dependant or dependants: Provided that if such 
dependant or dependants cannot be traced by the fund concerned within a period of six 
months after the death of the member, or if no claim is received by that fund from such 
dependant or dependants within the said period, the benefit may be paid over to the estate 
of the member. 
 
The preliminary and more difficult step, the need to first allocate the death benefit as 
between dependants, was not initially mentioned, but the need for this step was recognised 
in 1980 already, when the person responsible for managing the fund was entrusted with the 
task of allocating the death benefit equitably as amongst the member’s dependants.62  
 
3.2.4 Achieving equitable outcomes? 
 
The key consideration in s37C today is not the need to protect the fiscus. It should also not be 
the perceived need to protect dependants from the member. This is an interpretive gloss 
adopted by the Adjudicator, which has informed, and led to a distortion of, its application of 
s37C. After all, implicit in the regular disregard for member’s wishes is that most individuals do 
not make appropriate choices. If that is true in relation to death benefits, then the same must 
hold true for the distributive choices that most individuals make in relation to their estate. If 
that is the case, respecting the principle of freedom of testation is surely indefensible in all 
 
61 See cases at §5.4 below. See also Brummelkamp v Babcock 4 BPLR 1811 (PFA); Ramanandh v 
Alexander Forbes PFA/KZN/19520/07/CN. 
62 Financial Institutions Amendment Act 99 of 1980, s41. 
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cases. Similarly, if individuals cannot be trusted to make appropriate distributive choices, why 
should a third party be trusted to do so?  
 
That s37C overrides a member’s freedom of testation is clear. The key consideration today, 
however, is equity. The original purpose was to protect the estate from creditors for the 
benefit of the member’s dependants. Having chosen, albeit inadvertently, to transfer 
wholesale control from the member to the trustees, trustees are enjoined to effect an 
equitable distribution. It is the equitability of the distribution that should be the key guiding 
consideration for trustees, not the need to protect dependants and the fiscus from the 
member. The perceived need to do so introduces an a priori distortion into decision-making 
by trustees and the Adjudicator, and one which results in an unnecessary disregard for the 
member’s own wishes.  
 
3.3 NATURE AND RATIONALITY OF TRUSTEES’ POWERS 
 
Section 37C does not only remove death benefits from the member’s estate, it confers wide 
discretionary powers on trustees that either permit, or require, that they ignore the laws that 
would otherwise be applicable. It does so by stating that trustees must distribute any benefit 
that becomes payable upon the death of a member to the member’s dependants and 
nominees as they deem equitable, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in 
any law. 
 
Section 37C therefore appears to supplant all other laws that would otherwise apply. It has 
been described as the supreme law, overriding all other laws ‘to the extent that they are 
contrary to’ s37C.63 It has been held to override common law,64 customary law65 and 
legislation.66  
 
63 See Jeram (n53), para 9.15.2. 
64 Makume v Cape Joint RF [2007] 2 BPLR 174 (C) [matrimonial property law]. 
65 Sithole (n9). 




Section 37C removes the death benefit from members’ estates and testamentary control. In 
this regard s37C is, potentially, a direct violation of the member’s constitutional rights to 
property and dignity. Section 37C does not explicitly deprive in-community spouses of their 
half share of the benefit or children of their right to maintenance. This is, however, its effect, in 
so far as those rights are only enforceable against property that falls into the member’s 
estate.  
 
What s37C does not explicitly require is that trustees ignore those laws when allocating death 
benefits; it does not state that those laws are irrelevant to the equitable exercise of their 
discretion. The Adjudicator has, however, done so. Trustees have been chastised for 
distributing benefits in ways that appear to give effect to the member’s wishes or matrimonial 
property law, or which prioritise the member’s biological children over children towards 
whom the member did not owe a duty of support.67  
 
May trustees safely ignore these laws? I suggest not. If trustees are exercising a public power 
when allocating death benefits, it means that they are organs of state within the meaning of 
s8 of the Constitution and bound by the rights contained in the BoR.68 It also means that their 
decisions constitute administrative action which are reviewable in terms of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act (PAJA).69 Every death benefit allocation can be set aside if it was, 
inter alia, influenced by a material error of law, was based on irrelevant considerations or 
failed to take relevant considerations into account, was taken arbitrarily or capriciously, was 
so unreasonable that it was one no reasonable person would have made, or was otherwise 
unconstitutional or unlawful.70  
 
 
67 See §5.5.1; 6.3.2 & 6.4.2 below. 
68 FC, s8(1).  
69 Act 3 of 2000. See Titi v FundsatWork [2011] JOL 28125 (ECM); Guarnieri v Fundsatwork 2018 JDR 0740 
(GP). Cf Fundsatwork v Guarnieri (n7), in which the SCA was silent on the applicability of PAJA. 
70 Act 3 of 2000, ss6(2)(d),(e)(iii),(e)(vi);(h),(i).  
95 
 
If s37C confers public power on trustees, there must, moreover, be a rational relationship 
between the power that has been conferred on them, and the purpose for which they have 
been granted that power.71 Absent a rational relationship, the section is unconstitutional.  
 
Are trustees exercising a public power? If they are, is there a rational connection between 
the wide discretionary power they have been granted and the purpose for which it has been 
granted?  
 
Trustees’ power to distribute the death benefit derives from the legislature. There must be a 
prior contractual relationship between the members and the fund, but the source of their 
power is not the contract, it is s37C. The power to choose some beneficiaries over others, and 
to determine what share of the death benefit they will receive, has profound effects for the 
successful and unsuccessful beneficiaries, both in relation to their material well-being and 
prospects and their emotional well-being.72 Those affected by their power are the 
dependants and nominees of the majority of South Africans in formal employment. The 
power they are exercising is not a power that is traditionally associated with the exercise of 
governmental power – they are exercising what is quintessentially a private power. The 
legislature has, however, seen fit to transfer that power from the member to the trustees and 
subject the trustees to onerous responsibilities when doing so.  
 
In AAA Investments v Micro Finance Regulatory Council,73 O’Regan J in her minority 
judgment identified three elements that are characteristic of the exercise of a public power: 
that ‘the rules apply generally to the public or a section of the public’; that ‘they are 
coercive in character and effect’; that ‘they are related to a clear legislative framework and 
purpose’. Her approach has recently been approved and applied by the CC in the majority 
 
71 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA, In Re: Ex Parte Application of President of the RSA 
2000 (2) SA 674 (CC); Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC). 
72 Commenting on the slow pace of some death benefit distributions, the Adjudicator commented that 
belated payment can be a matter of ‘life or death’ for the beneficiaries. This is just as true for those 
selected and not selected to share in the benefit. See OPFA Annual Report 2016/2017, 10. 
73 2007 (1) SA 343 (CC) [119]. 
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judgment in Amcu v Chamber of Mines of South Africa,74 in which the CC held that what 
appear to be private contractual arrangements, namely collective agreements entered into 
between employers and trade unions, actually involve the exercise of a public power, 
because the legislature has given the contracting parties the power to bind non-parties to 
the terms of that agreement. In Amcu, the CC found that there was a rational relationship 
between the power and the purpose for which it was granted, which is to promote effective 
collective bargaining.75  
 
Having regard to the three characteristics of public power identified by O’Regan J, trustees’ 
powers are clearly public in character: they apply to a large section of the general public; 
they are coercive in character; they are part of a clear legislative framework.  
 
The next question then is whether their power is rationally connected to the purpose for 
which it was granted? The Act contains no clear statement of s37C’s purpose. It explains the 
purposes served by retirement funds, but not how s37C in its current form relates to those 
purposes. Whichever of the three possible purposes are ultimately found to be the 
legislature’s true purpose, none satisfies the rationality requirement. Whether the purpose is to 
protect dependants from penury, to protect the fiscus from the additional drain on its 
resources, to protect dependants from the claims of creditors or to promote equitable 
outcomes, each is arguably a legitimate purpose, but none requires that the member’s 
freedom to select beneficiaries be completely extinguished.  
 
Trustees do not make choices with a view to protecting the fiscus any more than do 
members. They do not simply select the poorest and the neediest, or those who have the 
greatest potential to become a future drain on the fiscus.76 The protection against creditors’ 
claims does not require that trustees be vested with the power of selection. Members are as 
capable of making equitable distributions as are the trustees. Trustees are as capable of 
 
74 2017 (3) SA 242 (CC). 
75 See paras [43], [44], [71]. 
76 Musgrave (n28); Williams v FFE (n17); Makume v Sentinel (n18). 
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erring in their identification of dependants,77 and of making inequitable distributions, as are 
members.78  
 
The same purposes could have been achieved by preserving the member’s freedom of 
choice and instead subjecting the equitability of their decision to scrutiny. In other words, by 
limiting the member’s freedom of testation or choice, rather than by depriving the member 
of that freedom and transferring it to trustees who are entitled to substitute their view of 
equitability for that of the member.  
 
Section 37C’s primary benefit is that it places an obligation on trustees to seek out a 
member’s dependants and to investigate their personal and financial circumstances.79 In 
other words, it creates a mechanism whereby members’ choices are, in effect, subject to 
automatic review. If it was designed in a way that gave trustees the power to correct 
inequitable distributions rather than the power to make distributions, with sufficient guidance 
as to how to distinguish between them, its purpose would be both legitimate and properly 




Pension fund organisations are established with the object of providing pensions or lump sum 
payments to their members or their dependants. The provisions in the Act that preserve 
members’ savings in the fund, excluding them from members’ insolvent estates and 
 
77 In Lombard v CRAF [2003] 3 BPLR 4460 (PFA), the trustees paid the benefit to the deceased’s estate, 
having concluded he was survived by neither nominees nor dependants. The Adjudicator, however, 
held that his former wife was his legal dependant because the terms of their divorce settlement obliged 
him to pay for her medical expenses and enrol her on his medical aid, albeit that he had failed to do 
either. In Perry v Momentum PFA/WC/00002342/2013/TCM, the fund identified the mother as a nominee 
rather than a dependant and thus considered itself obliged to wait for proof that the estate was 
solvent before paying her the benefit. The adjudicator held that the mother was a future dependant 
under para (c) of the definition.  
78 I consider each of the decisions in (n18) inequitable and, in the case of Makume v Sentinel, wrong in 
law.  
79 Trustees are expected to be proactive and to conduct a ‘thorough investigation’ into both the 
existence of dependants and the extent of their dependency. See eg Zikhali v Metal Industries [2001] 
12 BPLR 2895 (PFA); Kitching v CRAF PFA/KZN/33168/2009/RM; Kouassi (n21); Thompson v SAMWU [2012] 
1 BPLR 118 (PFA). 
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preventing them from accessing those funds, are intended to ensure that members have a 
source of income when no longer in employment. The provisions protect members against 
their own profligacy or misfortune. Section 37C extends that protection to dependants, 
ensuring that the benefits remain beyond the reach of members’ creditors should they die 
while still members of the fund.  
 
Protecting dependants from creditors’ claims is a compelling reason to remove death 
benefits from the member’s estate. Removing the benefit from the member’s estate in order 
to place them beyond the reach of creditors does not, however, require that the benefit 
simultaneously be placed outside the member’s testamentary control. It certainly does not 
require that the right to select beneficiaries be transferred to the trustees of the fund and that 
they be given a wide discretion to decide how the benefit should be apportioned amongst 
the member’s beneficiaries.  
 
The breadth of their discretion is also related to the wide definition of dependant and to 
s37C’s structure, which permits trustees to exclude dependants and include non-dependants 
in their distribution if they deem it equitable to do so. The circle of eligible beneficiaries is thus 
as wide for trustees as it would have been for the member. They have, in effect, been given 
the testator’s testamentary power. The only justification for this transfer of the right to select 
beneficiaries is if members cannot be trusted to identify their dependants and apportion their 
death benefit equitably, while trustees can be trusted to do so.  
 
Section 37C’s proper operation is premised on the supposition that trustees will exercise their 
discretion equitably, having first correctly identified the member’s dependants. It 
presupposes that who qualifies as a dependant is readily and easily ascertainable. As the 
next chapter demonstrates, who qualifies as a dependant is rarely obvious from the 
definition alone, with the exception of spouses and children. It is also not clear whether there 
is an order of preference amongst dependants. If the definition is difficult to interpret and 
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apply, with the result that some persons are erroneously identified as (non)dependants, and 




DEFINING AND IDENTIFYING DEPENDANTS 
Trustees’ first task is to identify the member’s dependants1 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
‘Dependant’ is the cardinal concept in s37C. It is their possible existence that is the section’s 
raison d’être - it’s animating force. When they exist, the laws of succession, marriage and 
maintenance are displaced,2 in favour of a sui generis regime that presupposes that third 
parties, applying their mind to the specific facts of a case, will achieve more equitable 
outcomes than would have been the case had the ordinary principles of law applied. The 
entire section is premised on the supposition that trustees will correctly determine who, 
amongst the deceased’s kith and kin, is a dependant.  
On its face, the definition of dependant appears relatively straightforward. The reality is quite 
the opposite. In 2002 already, the Financial Services Board commented that: 
This section [37C] was introduced to ensure that death benefits were properly paid to 
dependants and non-dependant nominees of deceased members. With the introduction 
of the  definition of dependant in section 1 of the Act, section 37C has created many 
uncertainties.3 
Those uncertainties have not lessened with the passage of time, despite the fact that the 
current definition has been in force for almost 30 years.4 Recently the SCA, in Fundsatwork v 
1 Van Schalkwyk v MEPF [2003] 8 BPLR 5087 (PFA) [15]; Maji v Cape Joint [2004] 4 BPLR 5624 (PFA) [15]. 
2 All laws have been held to be displaced, apart from the bloedige hand principle. See Jeram 
‘Disposition of lump sum death benefits’ in Hanekom Manual on Retirement Funds and other Employee 
Benefits 25ed (2018) §9.15.2. 
3 FSB AR 2001, 22.  
4 Farlam JA’s quotation in National Director Public Prosecution v Carolus 2000 (1) SA 1127 (SCA) [36] is 
apposite: ‘Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to 
know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly.’ 
101 
Guarnieri,5 set aside the trustees’ distribution of a death benefit on the basis that their 
interpretation of the definition was contrary to its clear language and purpose. It held that 
the trustees’ interpretation involved a ‘considerable rewriting’ and ‘substantial adjustment’ of 
the definition,6 which was inconsistent with its ‘careful and deliberate’ language.7  
The SCA’s interpretation is cause for considerable concern. Its interpretation is at odds with 
how the definition has been interpreted for the past 30 years by the retirement fund industry, 
Adjudicators and commentators.8 If the SCA’s interpretation is correct, it means that those 
meant to correct trustee errors, the Adjudicators, cannot be relied upon to recognise and 
correct fundamental errors of law. If the SCA’s interpretation is wrong in law, which I believe it 
to be, it means that the second highest court in the land struggled to make sense of a 
definition that lay trustees are expected to interpret and apply correctly.  
If trustees cannot readily and with confidence accurately identify who the member’s 
dependants are, then s37C cannot fulfil its purpose of protecting dependants. Members and 
beneficiaries should also be able to determine, with reasonable confidence, who, within the 
member’s circle of family, friends and acquaintances, will be considered a dependant within 
the meaning of the Act. The Constitution’s commitment to the rule of law requires that laws 
be sufficiently clear, certain and predictable:  
[The rule of law] requires that laws must be written in a clear and accessible manner. What is 
required is reasonable certainty and not perfect lucidity. … The law must indicate with 
reasonable certainty to those who are bound by it what is required of them so that they may 
regulate their conduct accordingly.9  
Members cannot regulate their affairs properly if they do not know whether their former 
spouse, partner, parent, sibling, stepchild, foster child or another relative is an eligible 
dependant, entitling the trustees to override the member’s nomination if they deem it 
5 (830/2018) [2019] ZASCA 78 (31 May 2019). 
6 Ibid [12]. 
7 Ibid [19]. 
8 The SCA cited only a handful of cases, little academic authority, and appeared to be unaware of its 
substantial departure from Adjudicator determinations on point.  
9 Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC) [108]. 
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equitable to do so. They similarly need to know whether their acts of generosity or charity 
may render the recipient an eligible dependant. Beneficiaries similarly need to know whether 
they or others are eligible dependants within the meaning of the Act.  
In this chapter I seek to highlight some of the definitional uncertainties and complexities. It is 
not a comprehensive analysis of the meaning of dependant, which is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. My purpose is simply to show that the definition is difficult to interpret and apply, 
and that the existing complexity is unnecessary, such that it could readily be simplified in the 
way proposed in chapter eight without undermining s37C’s central purpose.  
4.2 THE DEFINITION 
The current definition, with one difference, was inserted into the Act in 1989.10 Prior to 1989, 
the only dependants protected by s37C were financial dependants.11 
Dependant means 
a) a person in respect of whom the member is legally liable for maintenance;
b) a person in respect of whom the member is not legally liable for maintenance, if such
person
(i) was, in the opinion of the board, upon the death of the member in fact
dependent upon the member for maintenance;
(ii) is the spouse of the member;
(iii) is a child of the member, including a posthumous child, an adopted child and a
child born out of wedlock;
c) a person in respect of whom the member would have become legally liable for
maintenance, had the member not died.12
The definition encompasses so-called ‘legal’, ‘factual’ and ‘future’ dependants. The three 
categories of dependant are mutually exclusive: a paragraph (a) dependant is someone 
who is owed an existing duty of support; a paragraph (b) dependant is someone who is not 
10 Financial Institutions Second Amendment Act 54 of 1989, s 20. The exception is that (b)(iii) was only 
inserted by Pension Funds Amendment Act 22 of 1996, s 1(b). 
11 Financial Institutions Amendment Act 101 of 1976, s21(a). Spouses and children who were not 
financially dependent on the member were eligible dependants only if the fund rules made specific 
provision for them. 
12 PFA, s1. 
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owed a duty of support; a paragraph (c) dependant is someone who is not (yet) owed a 
duty of support, but would probably have been owed one in the future, had the member 
remained alive. The typology is frequently used imprecisely or incorrectly. Spouses and 
children, for example, are typically referred to as legal dependants even when they might 
not be.13 If they were invariably legal dependants, their express inclusion under paragraph 
(b) would be redundant. The term ‘factual’ to describe all paragraph (b) dependants is 
similarly misleading, for spouses and children may not, in fact, have been dependent on the 
member. Some commentators therefore suggest that the term ‘non-legal’ instead be used 
for paragraph (b) dependants.14 While preferable, it may also create the misleading 
impression that spouses and children are invariably not legal dependants, when they 
frequently will be. I therefore use the term ‘financial dependant’ to refer to paragraph b(i) 
dependants, and the term ‘statutory’ to refer to paragraph b(ii) spouses and (b)(iii) children.  
One might reasonably ask whether it matters that dependants are not correctly classified, 
provided they are correctly identified as dependants. In most cases it will not make a 
difference to the outcome. Nevertheless, it matters for at least three reasons. In the first 
instance, identifying a dependant as one type of dependant when they are another is an 
error of law. If the trustees' decision is subsequently set aside because of the error, there may 
not be sufficient facts on which to identify the person as a dependant under a different 
category.15 Incorrect classification may also matter if there is an order of preference, or 
ranking, amongst dependants. If a ranking exists, spouses and children towards whom the 
member owed a legal duty of support should surely rank ahead of other dependants, 
13 Peete v SACCAWU [2016] 3 BPLR 420 (PFA); Whitcombe v Momentum [2016] 2 BPLR 290 (PFA); Marais 
v Sasol [2017] 3 BPLR 615 (PFA).  See also Van Jaarsveld v OVK Aftreefonds [2015] 2 BPLR 303 (PFA), in 
which the deceased’s minor and major children and spouse were classified as ‘legal dependants’ in 
terms of paragraph (b)(iii) and (b)(ii) respectively, which specifically apply to spouses and children who 
are not legal dependants. 
14 Nevondwe ‘Death benefits and constitutionality: is the distribution of death benefits under the 
Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 constitutional’? (2007) 15 Juta’s Business Law 164,165. 
15 In Maake v Old Mutual [2015] 1 BPLR 45 (PFA), a person whom the fund had identified as a spouse 
was held not to be such by the Adjudicator. There was insufficient evidence to establish whether she 
had been a financial dependant. See also Matlonya v Fundsatwork [2017] 2 BPLR 294 (PFA), in which 
the fund was criticised for accepting a partner’s claim that she was a spouse under customary law on 
the available evidence. In this case there was sufficient evidence to show that she was a financial 
dependant. 
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including spouses and children towards whom no duty of support was owed. Even if there is 
no ranking, it is still of concern that Adjudicators, tasked with correcting trustee errors, may 
perpetrate or perpetuate such errors, adding to the existing uncertainty and complexity, to 
the potential detriment of affected beneficiaries.16  
Dependants are not the only potential beneficiaries of a member’s death benefit. Nominees 
are also eligible beneficiaries.17 The existence of, and distinction between, nominees and 
dependants is central to s37C’s proper application. Section 37C gives the trustees a broad 
discretion to decide how the death benefit is to be shared amongst the member’s 
dependants and nominees,18 but their discretionary powers arise only if the member is 
survived by at least two beneficiaries, one of whom must be a dependant.19  
4.3 DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN NOMINEES, DEPENDANTS and NON-
DEPENDANTS 
Section 37C contemplates four different scenarios, each of which places a different duty on 
trustees: that a member is survived by neither a nominee nor a dependant; one or more 
nominees only; one dependant; at least one dependant and another beneficiary (who can 
be a nominee or dependant). The trustees’ discretionary powers arise only in the fourth 
scenario.  
If the member is survived by neither a dependant nor a nominee, the trustees must pay the 
benefit to the member’s estate.20 If a member is survived by nominees only, the trustees are 
bound by the member’s wishes. Trustees must pay the benefit to the nominee(s), in the 
16 Another example is if spouses married in community of property are entitled to share in the death 
benefit as of right. See §6.4 below. 
17 A ‘beneficiary’ is defined in PFA, s1 as ‘a nominee of a member or a dependant who is entitled to a 
benefit, as provided for in the rules of the Fund.’  
18 PFA, s37C(1)(a); Minnaar v CRAF [2015] 2 BPLR 236 (PFA). 
19 PFA, s37C(1)(bA). 
20 PFA, s37C(1)(c); Mokele v SAMWU [2002] 12 BPLR 4175 (PFA). 
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proportion stipulated by the member, provided the estate is solvent.21 The trustees have no 
equitable discretion to override the member’s wishes.22 They are bound by the wishes as 
expressed in the nomination of beneficiary form and any unallocated surplus must be paid to 
the member’s estate: for example, if the member apportioned the benefit equally between 
three nominees, one of whom has since died, the trustees cannot reapportion the benefit 
between the remaining nominees or pay the predeceased nominee’s estate. It must be paid 
to the member’s estate.23 The practical effect of s37C and testate succession are, in these 
cases, then much the same: creditors have first claim to the benefit, to the extent the assets 
in the member’s estate are insufficient to pay the member’s debts.  
However, when the member is survived by a dependant, trustees may not pay the benefit to 
the member’s estate. They must pay the full benefit to the dependant, if there is only one. If 
there are two or more dependants, they must apportion the benefit between them as they 
deem equitable.24 Similarly, if the member is survived by both dependants and nominees, 
they must also apportion the benefit between them as they deem equitable.25  
Correctly identifying the member’s dependants is thus trustees’ first and most important task. 
It is also their most difficult task. The Act contains an extensive definition of dependant, but 
none of nominee. Members are entitled (but not obliged) to nominate beneficiaries, who 
may be both dependants and non-dependants, and it is the trustees’ responsibility to 
distinguish between them. What then is the difference? Simply that a nominee is a 
nominated beneficiary who is not a dependant.26 A beneficiary cannot be both.27 Before 
trustees can correctly determine that a nominated beneficiary is a nominee, they first need 
21 PFA, s37C(1)(b). In Perry v Momentum PFA/WC/00002342/2013/TCM, the fund identified the mother as 
a nominee rather than a dependant and was waiting for proof that the estate was solvent before 
paying the benefit. The Adjudicator held that the mother was a future dependant. In Jacoby v Metal 
Industries [2017] JOL 38735 (PFA) the fund’s decision to pay the benefit to the estate rather than the 
nominees was set aside, because it had not first established whether the estate was solvent or insolvent. 
22 See Van Heerden v Fundsatwork [2017] 3 BPLR 706 (PFA) [4.5]. 
23 PPS Insurance Company v Mkhabela 2012 (3) SA 292 (SCA).  
24 PFA, s37C(1)(a) 
25 PFA, s37C(1)(bA).  
26 Nieuwenhuizen v SAB [2000] 12 BPLR 1413 (PFA) [21]; Grieseel v SARAF [2019] 3 BPLR 703 (PFA) [5.9]. 
27 Perry v Momentum (n21) [5.7]. 
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to determine that they are not a dependant. Trustees must, in addition, conduct a thorough 
investigation to determine whether the member is survived by additional dependants who 
have not been nominated. A non-nominated parent may, for example, be a dependant in 
one set of circumstances, and a non-dependant in another.28  
 
Should trustees erroneously characterise a nominated dependant as a nominee rather than 
a dependant,29 or vice versa, the error may have a material impact on the affected 
beneficiaries and third parties who have, or would otherwise have, benefited. The error could 
also prove costly to the fund. For example, if a member is survived by only one nominated 
beneficiary, and the trustees decide that the beneficiary is a nominee rather than a 
dependant, they may only pay the nominee once they have satisfied themselves the estate 
is insolvent.30 If they do so and the Adjudicator or a court were subsequently to decide that 
the beneficiary was a dependant rather than a nominee, the fund would be obliged to pay 
the benefit a second time.31  
 
Similarly, if the member died without a nominated beneficiary and the fund decided that no 
person met the definition of dependant, the fund would be obliged to pay the full benefit to 
the estate.32 Once again, the fund would be obliged to repay the benefit to a person 
subsequently held by the Adjudicator to have been a dependant.33 Conversely, if the 
member died without nominating a beneficiary, and the fund erroneously identified a 
beneficiary as a dependant and made payment to them, the member’s executor, heirs, 
legatees or creditors could have a claim against the fund.34  
 
 
28 See §4.7 below. 
29 See eg Perry v Momentum (n21); Ramoroka v SARAF [2017] 2 BPLR 349 (PFA). 
30 Eg Grieseel (n26).  
31 Eg Perry v Momentum (n21) [determination handed down before payment]. 
32 See Dobie v National Technikon [1999] 9 BPLR 29 (PFA) 19 [benefit paid to estate, although survived 
by an elderly mother who arguably a dependant, but who was fortunately also heir to the estate].  
33 Lombard v CRAF [2003] 3 BPLR 4460 (PFA); Wasserman v CRAF [2001] 6 BPLR 2160 (PFA).  
34 Swanepoel v CRAF [2001] 6 BPLR 2153 (PFA) [mother as executor son’s estate unsuccessfully 
contested fund’s identification of fiancée as a dependant]; Fourie v CRAF [2001] 2 BPLR 1580 (PFA) 
[testate heir unsuccessfully contested fund’s classification of mother as a dependant].  
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Having regard to the definition alone, can it confidently be said in each of the following 
cases that the beneficiary’s identity as a nominee or dependant or non-dependant was 
clear, certain and predictable? 
 
- A nominated cohabiting partner who was enrolled on her partner’s medical aid. She 
was believed to own a business.35  
- A nominated 24-year-old ‘former’ cohabiting partner who worked as a part-time 
model, owned a property and an annuity, both bequeathed to her by her late 
father, from which she earned an income.36  
- A nominated 77-year-old mother living in an old age home. The member was not 
supporting her financially.37  
- A nominated 62-year-old father and 51-year-old mother. The father had retired, and 
the mother had never worked. They owned their own home, were living on his 
modest pension, and both suffered unspecified chronic illnesses. The member was 
not supporting them financially.38  
- A nominated financially independent father.39  
- A non-nominated financially independent mother.40  
- A non-nominated 80-year-old mother with probable financial need.41  
- A non-nominated 81-year old mother in declining health. She lived independently, 
owned the flat she lived in, and earned a modest income on fixed deposit.42  
- A non-nominated mother in receipt of a small (probably state) pension, who claimed 
to be receiving financial support from the member.43  
 
35 Morgan v SA Druggists [2001] 4 BPLR 1886 (PFA) (nominee). 
36 Musgrave v Unisa [2000] 4 BPLR 415 (PFA) (Trustees: nominee; Adjudicator: dependant). 
37 Perry v Momentum (n21) (future dependant). 
38 Musgrave (n36) (nominee). 
39 Grieseel (n26) (nominee). 
40 Greyling v GEPF [2015] JOL 32876 (GP) (Trustees: non-dependant; HC: legal dependant). PFA did not 
apply, but definition dependant similar to s37C. 
41 Dobie (n32) (non-dependant). 
42 Wellens v Unsgaard [2002] 12 BPLR 4214 (PFA) (future dependant). 
43 Thene v Bidcorp PFA/GA/6863/05/LCM (Trustees: dependant; Adjudicator: non-dependant). 
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- A non-nominated former spouse who had renounced any claim to maintenance in 
her divorce settlement, on condition the member bought her a car, failing which he 
was obliged to pay her monthly maintenance. He had fulfilled his obligation and 
bought her a car.44  
- A non-nominated former spouse whom the member had retained on his medical aid. 
He was not obliged to do so under the divorce settlement.45  
- A non-nominated former spouse whom the member had undertaken to enrol on his 
medical aid, and to pay for her medical expenses until then. He had done neither.46  
 
It is important that funds, and members, fully understand the implications of being survived 
by a dependant, and the breadth of the concept. For example, a dependant has been 
held to include a foster child;47 an ex-spouse who had renounced any maintenance claim, 
but whom the deceased had undertaken, but failed, to enrol on a medical aid;48 a fiancée, 
even though the couple were not cohabiting and the survivor was not financially dependent 
on the deceased;49 an unborn child of the deceased’s cohabiting partner, even though the 
deceased may not have been the child’s biological father;50 a non-cohabiting fiancée, to 
whom the deceased was contributing about R1000 per month to assist with the payment of 
medical expenses, car maintenance and textbooks;51 a partner and her son who had been 
cohabiting with the deceased for approximately two months.52  
 
In each of the above cases, if the person identified as a dependant had been the member’s 
only dependant, then in the absence of a nomination of beneficiary the trustees would have 
been obliged to pay the entire benefit to that dependant, irrespective of the extent of their 
 
44 Coetzee v Toyota [2001] 5 BPLR 2007 (PFA). (Trustees: non-dependant; Adjudicator: legal 
dependant). 
45 Ibid (Trustees: non-dependant; Adjudicator: financial dependant). 
46 Lombard (n33) (Trustees: non-dependant; Adjudicator: legal dependant). 
47 Gerber v Aberdare [2010] 3 BPLR 275 (PFA). 
48 Lombard (n33) [trustees identified as non-dependant and paid to estate]. 
49 Van Zyl v Delta Motor Corporation PFA/EC/698/04/Z/CN.  
50 Koopman v Municipal Gratuity Fund [2010] 1 BPLR 100 (PFA). 
51 Van der Walt v Fugro PFA/NW/3487/2005/RM. 
52 Makume v Sentinel [2014] 2 BPLR 244 (PFA). 
109 
 
dependency, the member’s wishes as expressed in their will, or the identity and 
circumstances of the member’s intestate heirs. 
 
Since the word nominee in s37C has a technical meaning that differs from its ordinary 
meaning and given the importance of the distinction between dependants and nominees, 
its use should be reserved for nominated beneficiaries who are not dependants.  
Unfortunately, the word nominee is often used imprecisely or improperly.  In some cases 
Adjudicators refer to the nominated beneficiary as a nominee, without first explaining why 
they are not a dependant, in circumstances in which it not self-evident that the person is 
‘only’ a nominee.53  In some cases the term nominee is used in its ordinary rather than s37C-
specific sense, as a short-hand for nominated beneficiary, even though the beneficiary is 
also identified as a dependant.54  In Masuku v Liberty Provident Fund,55 the member’s adult 
daughter was characterised as a legal dependant, a factual dependant and a nominee – a 
definitional impossibility.56  
 
The incorrect usage creates confusion, even amongst Adjudicators. In Grieseel v SARAF, the 
Adjudicator states, correctly, that ‘[n]ominees are not by virtue of being nominated entitled 
to a death benefit.’57  This statement was made in circumstances in which there was a single 
beneficiary, who was identified as a non-dependant nominated beneficiary and therefore a 
nominee.  Their entitlement was therefore dependent on the solvency of the estate.58 
 
However, when Adjudicators use the term nominee incorrectly, to refer to a nominated 
dependant, without appreciating that it is incorrect, they need to find an alternate 
explanation for the difference between a ‘nominee’ who is a dependant and one who is 
 
53 Musgrave (n36). 
54 See Maji (n1) [16]; Nduku v VWSA PFA/EC/14187/2007/NVC [3]; Kgapola v Fidelity [2007] JOL 20987 
(PFA); Kitching v CRAF PFA/KZN/33168/2009/RM. 
55 [2014] 3 BPLR 390 (PFA). 
56 She was a nominated beneficiary.  She was considered a legal dependant simply because she was 
the deceased’s child, and a financial dependant because she was sharing accommodation and living 
expenses with her mother.    
57 Grieseel (n26) [5.6]. 
58 The nominated beneficiary was the member’s father, and the estate was insolvent.   
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not. In cases in which the member was survived by a nominee and a non-nominated 
dependant, Adjudicators have modified the explanation as follows: ‘[A] nominee is 
distinguishable from a dependant in that, a nominee is not entitled by virtue of having been 
nominated to the death benefit.’59   
 
Implicit in this statement is that dependants are entitled to the benefit, which is only the case 
if there is a single dependant and no nominee. The result is that, instead of engaging in a 
careful consideration of the relative circumstances of the competing beneficiaries, the fact 
that a beneficiary is a dependant or nominee serves as a proxy for equitability, for how the 
benefit should be distributed.  Nominees are frequently excluded from consideration, if there 
are dependants, because they are nominees.60 The Act, however, contains no de jure 
hierarchy of dependants over nominees, or some dependants over other dependants.  
Nevertheless, Adjudicator determinations suggest that there is a de facto hierarchy that 
favours dependants over nominees,61and, increasingly, financial dependants over other 
dependants.62  
 
The reason for this near-automatic privileging of dependants over nominees is that 
Adjudicators have repeatedly emphasised that s37C’s purpose is to protect dependants 
from hardship.63  The hardship is attributed to the member’s freedom of testation, i.e. her 
freedom to select her beneficiaries and divide her benefit as she thinks equitable.64 The 
implicit message is thus that her exclusion of the dependant was wrong, and that equitability 
favours dependants.  
 
 
59 Kirsten v Allan Gray [2017] 3 BPLR 566 (PFA) [5.7]; Matlonya (n15) [5.6]. 
60 Ibid.  See also Ackermann v LRAF [2013] 3 BPLR 295 (PFA). 
61 Van der Merwe v Southern Life [2000] 3 BPLR 321 (PFA).  Prior to 1989, nominees were only eligible 
beneficiaries in the absence of nominees.  See also Hattingh v Hattingh [2003] 4 BPLR 4539 (PFA), in 
which the trustees erroneously identified the member’s adult children as nominees and not 
dependants. This influenced their decision to award the full benefit to the surviving spouse, whom they 
identified as the only dependant. 
62 See §4.8 below. 
63 Eg Makume v Sentinel (n52); Gorrah v Metal Industries [2014] JOL 31420 (PFA) [5.8]; Kirsten (n59). 
64 Ibid. See also Musgrave (n36); Morgan (n35). 
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Despite the absence of a de jure hierarchy in s37C, dependants and nominees thus do not 
enter the circle of beneficiaries on equal terms. In the absence of strong countervailing 
considerations,65 trustees’ and Adjudicators' starting premise appears to be that the benefit 
should be awarded to the dependants, without the need for a close examination of the 
beneficiaries’ respective means and needs.66 While it might reasonably be argued that 
whether a beneficiary is a nominee or a dependant is relevant to equitability, it should not 
be dispositive of equitability. More importantly, however, it illustrates how important it is that 
trustees and Adjudicators correctly determine the beneficiary’s status as a dependant or 
nominee, given that the classification itself influences their perception of the equities. 
 In Wellens v Unsgaard, for example, the member had nominated his partner as his sole 
beneficiary.67  The trustees identified the member’s mother as a future dependant, and 
allocated half the benefit to her.  In upholding the trustees’ decision, the Adjudicator stated 
that because the member’s cohabiting partner was his nominated beneficiary, there was no 
need to consider whether she was a dependant.  The focus of enquiry was exclusively his 
non-nominated mother’s means and needs, in order to justify her inclusion as a dependant.   
There is no information, in the determination, of the partner’s relative means and needs. 
In Musgrave v Unisa,68 the member had nominated his parents, sister and partner as his 
beneficiaries.  The trustees identified the parents and sister as nominees, and simply excluded 
the partner from consideration altogether, on the basis that she and the member were 
estranged.  As a nominated beneficiary the trustees were not entitled to exclude her, unless 
they identified the parents as dependants and the partner as a nominee, which they had 
not done.  The Adjudicator thus correctly set aside the trustee decision.  The Adjudicator 
65 Eg Gowing v LRAF [2007] 2 BPLR 212 (PFA) & Karam v Amrel [2003] 9 BPLR 5098 (PFA), in which the 
members’ nomination of their sibling was upheld even though the member was survived by children 
(minor and major, respectively). 
66 Eg Hattingh v Hattingh (n61) (‘nominee’ children v spouse); Nduku (n54) (nominee mother & brother v 
husband); Makume v Sentinel (n52) (nominee sister v partner); Ackermann (n60) (nominee sister v 
husband); Masuku (n55) (nominee brother v nominated daughter).  
67 [2002] 12 BPLR 4214 (PFA). 
68 Musgrave (n36). 
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accepted the trustees’ classification of the parents as nominees, notwithstanding their age, 
limited income and medical needs. He, however, characterised the 24-year-old partner as a 
dependant.69  As such, the member’s wishes were not binding. He accordingly overrode the 
member’s wishes and allocated her a greater share than the member had wished her to 
receive.70  Had he identified her as a nominee, the member’s wishes would have been 
binding.   
These examples illustrate that whether someone is classified as a dependant or nominee 
influences the eventual decision. They also demonstrate that the classification itself depends 
in some measure upon the outcome that the trustees or Adjudicator consider equitable.  In 
these examples a case could just as reasonably be made for the opposite view – that the 
member’s partner in Wellens was his dependant and his mother a non-dependant, while the 
parents in Musgrave were dependants and the partner a nominee. The affected 
beneficiary does not always incontrovertibly fall into one category or the other. The 
classification of dependants and nominees is thus not only relevant for s37C’s proper 
operation, but also influences its equitable operation.     
IDENTIFYING DEPENDANTS: LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES 
4.4 LEGAL AND FUTURE DEPENDANTS 
For the past 20 years, paragraph (a) of the definition of dependant has been understood to 
refer to those persons to whom the member owed an inter vivos duty of support.71 In other 
words, any person the member should have been maintaining while she was alive,72 
69 They had been living apart for two months.  She was 24, a part-time photographic model, with an 
income similar to that of the sister and of the parents, and she owned a valuable inherited property 
which she was letting. The value of her property (R350 000) was then almost the average price for a 
large house in South Africa, see ’Average House Prices in South Africa: 1995-2015’ BusinessTech (17 April 
2016).  
70 Forty per cent instead of 30%. 
71 See Jeram (n2), for a detailed discussion of duties of support in the s37C context. 
72 See Maintenance Act 99 of 1998, s6(1) which obliges a maintenance officer to determine whether a 
person is ‘legally liable’ to support another. See also the Canadian case of Petrowski v Petrowski Estate 
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irrespective of whether she was doing so or not. The relevant date for determining the 
existence of the duty was understood to be the date of the member’s death.73 Paragraph 
(c) complements paragraph (a). It looks to a hypothetical future, recognising that, although
the member’s duty towards a person had not yet crystallised into an enforceable duty while 
she was alive, the circumstances suggest that the duty would probably have arisen in the 
future, had she not died.  
Inter vivos duties of support arise from multiple sources in South African law, namely common 
law;74 customary law;75 maintenance orders;76 and contractual undertakings to provide 
support.77  
Historically, the most important source was the common law, which derives from Roman and 
Roman-Dutch law.78 Under the common law, the duties are an expression of family 
obligation. They are duties that arise ‘ex pietate’, from ’natural affection’ and the 
‘dutifulness’ that family members feel, or should feel, towards one another.79 Duties grounded 
in customary law have increasingly been recognised by the courts, particularly since the 
2009 ABQB 196 [445-472], where, in determining whether a deceased father owed his son a ‘legal 
obligation’ of support while still alive, the court had to assess whether the son would have succeeded 
had he claimed maintenance from his father while the father was still alive. 
73 Wasserman (n33); Jeram (n2).  
74 Voet 25.3 esp: 25.3.14(a); 25.3.15 & 25.3.18 in Gane (tr) The Selective Voet (1955); Van Heerden et al 
Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family (1999), 249. 
75 Kewana v Santam Insurance [1993] 4 All SA 339 (TkA); Metiso v Padongelukfonds 2001 (3) SA 1142 (T); 
Maneli v Maneli [2010] JOL 25353 (GSJ); Seleka v RAF [2016] JOL 35830 (GP).  
76 Specifically, those granted in terms of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, s7. Ordinary maintenance orders 
handed down by the Maintenance Courts are based on common law and customary law duties of 
support, see Maintenance Act (n72), s2. See also Rubinstein v Rubinstein1992 (2) SA 709 (T); Santam Bpk 
v Henery [1992] All SA 2 312 (A); Van Schalkwyk v MEPF (n1); Lombard (n33); Smith v Media 24 [2017] 2 
BPLR 365 (PFA). Cf Muller v CRAF [2014] 2 BPLR 265 (PFA). 
77 Du Plessis v RAF 2004 (1) 359 SA (SCA); Odgers v De Gersigny 2007 (2) SA3 305 (SCA); MB v NB 2010 (3) 
SA 220 (GSJ); Paixão v RAF [2012] 4 All SA 262 (SCA). Cf Marais (n13) in which the Adjudicator 
interpreted the terms of a cohabitation agreement as disavowing the existence of a duty of support, 
and as limiting the possible extent of a partner’s financial dependency.  
78 Boberg’s Law of Persons (n74); Lawrie ‘The reciprocal duty of support between parent and child’ 
(1938) 55 SALJ 286. 
79 Ford v Allen 1925 TPD 5, 7. See also Barnes v Union & SWA Insurance Co Ltd 1977 (3) SA 502 (E). 
Jacobs v RAF 2019 (2) SA 275 (GP) [22] stated that duties of support between relatives ‘is one of those 
areas in which the law gives expression to the moral values of society.’  
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advent of the Constitution.80 They are based on the principle of ubuntu, which also 
encompasses the ideals of family solidarity and responsibility.81  
The circumstances under which the duty of support arises are well-established in principle, 
but difficult to apply in practice. The accepted principles are that reciprocal duties arise as 
between eligible relatives when one is in need of support and the other has the means to 
provide support.82 There are thus three distinct requirements: eligibility, need and means.  
4.4.1 Eligibility 
Under the common law and customary law, the eligible relatives are spouses, parents and 
children,83 siblings,84 grandparents and grandchildren and all further direct ascendants and 
descendants in the vertical line.85 In respect of parents and children the duty arises 
irrespective of whether the relationship is established by biology86 or adoption.87 Under the 
common law paternal grandparents did not owe a duty of support to a grandchild born out 
80 FC, s211(3) obliges courts to apply customary law when it is the applicable law. Courts could face a 
potential dilemma should a duty of support that forms part of the common law not be recognised in 
customary law. For eg, in customary law a natural father was not under an obligation to maintain a 
child born out of wedlock, since the child belonged to the mother’s guardian, see Dlamini 
‘Maintenance of minor children: the role of the courts in updating customary law to meet socio-
economic changes’ (1984) 101(2) SALJ 346, 351. While a parent’s duty of support is now confirmed in 
the Constitution and Children’s Act 38 of 2005, other differences may remain. However, should this be 
the case, courts will develop customary law in accordance with s39 of the Constitution. In Fosi v RAF 
[2007] JOL 19399 (C) [24], Dlodlo J held that he was ‘constitutionally enjoined to develop customary 
law to bring it to the same level reached by common law.’ In Seleka v RAF, the court developed 
Tswana customary law by recognising that the contemporary duty fell on daughters and not only sons, 
as was traditionally the case.  
81 See Fosi v RAF (n80); RAF v Mohohlo 2018 (2) SA 65 (SCA). 
82 Oosthuizen v Stanley 1938 AD 322. 
83 The duty also attaches to minor children, see Re Knoop (1893) 10 SC 198.  
84 Union Government (Minister of the Interior) v Warner 1916 CPD 436. 
85 Voet (n74) 25.3.5; Boberg’s Law of Persons (n74).  See also Ford v Allen (n79); Spencer v Minister of the 
Interior (1929) 50 NPD 175. 
86 A woman is regarded as the mother of a child born to her as a result of artificial insemination, while 
her husband is regarded as the father of the child, provided he consented to the insemination. No 
rights or duties arise as between the donor of the gamete and the child. See Children’s Act (n80), s40. 
Parental rights and duties arise as between commissioning parents and a child born as a result of a 
surrogacy agreement, while no such rights and duties arise as between the child and surrogate mother 
or her family, Children’s Act, s297. 
87 Children’s Act (n80), s242(3) provides that: ‘An adopted child must for all purposes be regarded as 
the child of the adoptive parent and an adoptive parent must for all purposes be regarded as the 
parent of the adoptive child.’ See also Watson v Watson 1978 (3) SA 126 (E). Whether the same holds 
true for adoptive grandparents and grandchildren is not clear.  
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of wedlock, and vice versa, but this exception was held to be unconstitutional in 2004.88 The 
duty does not extend to more distant relatives in the horizontal line, such as uncles/aunts, 
nephews/nieces, cousins.89 It also does not extend to stepfamily or in-laws.90 Under customary 
law, the duty of support may be owed to a more extensive family circle. It may, in particular, 
extend to the children of siblings – to nephews and nieces.91  
Duties of support are always contingent until such time as one relative is in need and the 
other has the means to provide support, at which juncture the duty arises automatically, by 
operation of law. However, not every relative within the circle of eligible relatives is jointly and 
severally liable to support every other relative. There is an order of obligation, such that the 
duty falls on the nearer relative first, 92 and on a more distant relative only if the nearer is 
unable to provide support.93 So, for example, a child’s duty of support arises only to the 
extent the parent’s spouse is unable to provide support;94 a grandchild’s only if and to the 
extent all the children are unable to provide support;95 a grandparent’s only if the child’s 
parents are unable to provide support,96 in which case both the paternal and maternal 
grandparents will be under a duty to support the grandchild to the extent of their respective 
means.97  A sibling’s duty to support a sibling should arise only if the sibling has no spouse, 
parent, child or grandparent able to provide support.98  
88 The exception, in so far as it applies to grandparents, was held to be unconstitutional in Petersen v 
Maintenance Officer, Simons Town 2004 (2) BCLR 205 (C). It is not clear whether a child born out of 
wedlock owes her father or paternal family a duty of support.  
89 Ford v Allen (n79). See also SS v Presiding Officer of the Children’s Court, District of Krugersdorp [2012] 
JOL 29302 (GSJ). 
90 Ibid. See also Boberg’s Law of Persons (n74). 
91 See United Building Society v Matiwane 1933 EDL 280; RAF v Mohohlo (n81). See also Submissions by 
Mr Manyosi during the parliamentary committee meeting to discuss the Reform of the Customary Law 
of Succession Bill on 01 September 2008, Parliamentary Monitoring Group. 
92 Ex Parte Pienaar 1964 (1) SA 600 (T); Barnes v Union (n79); Pillay v Pillay 2004 (4) SA 81 (SE).  
93 See eg Miller v Miller 1940 CPD 466 and the cases discussed in Boberg’s Law of Persons (n74), 273 & 
fn93. Cf Voet (n74), who says this a matter for the discretion of a ‘fair minded’ judge (25.3.11).  
94 Smit v Smit 1946 WLD 360. 
95 Barnes v Union (n79). 
96 De Klerk v Groepie (31156/2012) [2012] ZAGPJHC 205 (28 August 2012); N v B (6573/14) [2014] 
ZAWCHC 112 (19 June 2014). See also Williams v Lester Algernon [2001] 2 BPLR 1687 (PFA).  
97 Petersen v Maintenance Officer (n88). 
98See Barnes v Union (n79).  
116 
This means that to properly determine whether a legal duty of support was owed or likely to 
be owed, trustees would also need to ensure that there was no closer relative able to 
provide support.99 The duty is also shared by all relatives of that class, proportionate to their 
means. The duty thus falls on both parents,100 all children,101 or both paternal and maternal 
grandparents.102 From a practical perspective, this means that trustees should, in appropriate 
cases, investigate the financial circumstances of not only the member and surviving relative, 
but the financial circumstances of all the relatives who also owe the survivor a contingent 
duty of support, to determine whether and the extent to which the member and/or other 
relatives owed the survivor a duty of support.103 If a member is survived by a financially 
dependent step-child, partner or parent, for example, the fact that there are other relatives 
who owe the dependant a duty of support is surely relevant to the equitable distribution of 
the benefit also.104 
Amongst the additional uncertainties facing trustees today is whether the duty is 
extinguished in some circumstances. Under Roman-Dutch Law the duty of support was near 
absolute. Parents remained liable to support children whose need was attributable to their 
own profligacy or self-created misfortune,105 while children remained liable to support ‘bad 
99 See eg Williams v Lester Algernon (n96), in which the grandparents’ legal duty would have been 
contingent on the inability of the child’s parents to provide support. The grandchild was held to be a 
factual dependant. 
100 Farrel v Hankey 1921 TPD 590, 596. 
101 Fundsatwork v Guarnieri 2019 (5) SA 68 (SCA). In Norris v UKZN [2019] 3 BPLR 812 (PFA), the trustees 
classified the member’s mother as a future dependant and awarded the full benefit to her, contrary to 
the member’s wishes. The Adjudicator remitted a matter to the trustees for further investigation, 
because they had not satisfactorily investigated the financial means of either the mother or the 
member’s siblings, which was relevant to the scope of the member’s duty of support. 
102 Petersen v Maintenance Officer (n88). 
103 In Sefularo v Political Office-Bearers [2013] 2 BPLR 265 (PFA), siblings were held not to be legal 
dependants because either they, or their spouses, were employed at the time of the deceased’s 
death. While there is some information regarding the siblings’ employment status and occupation, 
there is no information regarding their spouses’ financial means, which is particularly pertinent to the 
financial need of the unemployed sibling. The fact that a person is employed does not mean they are 
not indigent, or in need – their income may be insufficient to meet their reasonable maintenance 
needs. 
104 See §5.5 fn84 below.  
105 Voet (n74) 25.3.5. 
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parents’.106 The duty was extinguished only in the same circumscribed circumstances that 
rendered an heir unworthy to inherit.107  
Today, the main ground that renders a person unworthy to inherit is if they wrongfully and 
culpably caused the decedent’s death, which is expressed in the maxim ‘de bloedige hand 
er neemt geen erffenis.’108 The principle has been applied to death benefits also. In 
Makhanya v Minister of Finance, the HC set aside the trustees’ decision to allocate a 
death benefit, payable by a government retirement fund, to the member’s widow, who 
had been convicted of murdering her husband.109 More recently, the Adjudicator 
stated that the principle applies equally to s37C death benefits.110 Section 37C, 
however, explicitly states that it applies ‘notwithstanding’ anything to the contrary in any 
other law. The Adjudicator’s justification for excluding unlawful killers, despite s37C appearing 
to override all other laws, is that it would be contrary to public policy to allow them to benefit 
from their crime, and that it is unlikely that the legislature intended s37C to override 
public policy.111 This begs the question, why does public policy not require that a 
spouse’s proprietary rights, or a minor child’s right to maintenance, be similarly respected? 
106 Ibid 25.3.8. 
107 The duty is extinguished if the relative has committed an act of ‘ingratitude’ meriting disherison, Voet 
(n74) 25.3.18. The grounds warranting disherison are set out in Justinian’s Novel 115 ‘Disinheritance for 
Just Cause’ (translated by Scott The Civil Law (1932)), which entitles a parent to disinherit a child for 
more reasons than the reverse. See also Botha ‘The duration of the duty to maintain and of a 
maintenance order’ (2008) 125(4) SALJ 715. 
108 Literally translated as ‘the bloody hand takes no inheritance’ (my translation). In South African law 
those who inherit through the unworthy heir are not debarred from inheriting. See Ex Parte Steenkamp 
1952 (1) SA 744 (T).  
109 2001 (2) SA 1251 (D). The member was also survived by a child, but the definition did not include self-
sufficient major children. The court overturned the trustees’ decision to award the benefit to the spouse 
and ordered that the benefit instead be paid to the member’s estate, of which the child was the 
intestate heir.  
110 Nel v Netcare [2018] 3 BPLR 747 (PFA); Van Rhyn v UTI [2018] 3 BPLR 777 (PFA). In Nel the murderer 
was the deceased’s stepdaughter, who, together with her two-year-old child, was living with the 
member and her mother at the time of their deaths. She and her partner, the minor child’s father, 
murdered both the member and his wife. She was excluded from consideration as a result, but the fund 
identified her minor son as the member’s sole surviving financial dependant and awarded the entire 
benefit to him. The member’s siblings contested their decision. The matter was remitted to trustees for 
further investigation into the child’s dependency. 
111 Nel v Netcare (n110)[5.8]. 
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The bloedige hand principle applies to both intentional and negligent killing.112 There is 
academic debate as to whether it should automatically apply in the latter instance also, or 
whether some element of moral blameworthiness should, in addition, be required.113 In 
England courts are entitled to relax the equivalent forfeiture rule with regard to the assets in 
the deceased’s estate when it is in the interests of justice to do so,114 while statutory tribunals 
have the authority to decide whether retirement and other social security benefits should be 
forfeited.115 Moreover, even when the rule is not relaxed, surviving dependants are entitled to 
claim maintenance from the deceased’s estate under family provision legislation.116 The only 
exception to these permitted relaxations of the forfeiture rule apply when the dependant has 
been convicted of murdering the deceased.117 
Under the established principles of duties of support in South Africa, the duty seemingly 
survives no matter how badly the member was treated by the eligible relative, provided only 
that the relative was not convicted of the member’s murder or culpable homicide. Why, 
however, should a child be liable to support a parent who had not supported the child, 
either financially or emotionally,118 or a sibling be liable to support another whose need is 
attributable to their own life choices? Conversely, why should dependants automatically be 
deprived of any right or hope of sharing in the benefit in cases of culpable homicide? 
112 See Casey v The Master 1992 (4) SA 505 (N), in which the court held that it was for parliament rather 
than the judiciary to change the rule.  
113 See eg Skeen ‘Unworthiness through negligence’ (1993) 110(3) SALJ 446, who posed the question 
with reference to the high incidence of motor vehicle accidents in South Africa. 
114 Forfeiture Act 1982, s2.  
115 Ibid, s4. 
116 Ibid, s3. See Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, which enabled a court to 
order family provision for a son convicted of his mother’s negligent killing in Land v Land [2006] EWHC 
2069 (Ch). The sad facts of Land v Land illustrate why it is sometimes in the interests of justice that 
forfeiture rules be relaxed.  
117 Ibid, s3. 
118 The question has arisen in jurisdictions in which the duty of support is statutory in origin. British 
Columbia changed its family provision legislation to preclude claims by parents in 2011, see Anderson v 
Anderson 2013 BCSC 129. In various US states children are in very limited circumstances excused from 
fulfilling their duty of support. See eg State of Connecticut v Berglund 4 Conn Cir Ct 644, 238 A2d 450 
(1967), in which a mother’s neglect of and estrangement from her son, which started when he was 
about 10 years old, was considered not to be sufficient reason to excuse him from his obligation to 
provide support, since her neglect was not ‘wilful desertion’ but due to addiction (Conn Gen Stat § 17-
326, now replaced by Conn Gen Stat 46b-219). In Pelletier v White 33 Conn Supp 769; 371 A2d 1068, a 
son was excused from supporting his father because the latter had failed to provide financial support 
to the son during his minority, when able to do so.  
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If trustees have been given discretionary powers in order to ensure that death benefits are 
distributed more equitably than would be the case if the law of succession applied, should 
that discretion not extend to overriding both the strict application of duties of support and 
the bloedige hand principle, when applying them would yield inequitable results? I would 
go so far as to argue that the inflexible nature of these rules is also open to constitutional 
challenge, although I cannot develop the argument further within the scope of this thesis. 
Suffice it to ask whether it is consonant with the individual’s right to human dignity to remain 
liable to support a relative who has abused or rejected them;119 or whether it is consonant 
with public policy to deny an unlawful killer all inheritance and maintenance rights when the 
killing occurred as a consequence of longstanding abuse at the hands of the member. 
These are important considerations given the high levels of domestic violence in South Africa, 
particularly against women and children.120   
Apart from these longstanding uncertainties, courts have recently recognised that duties of 
support can arise as between persons who fall outside the established circle of eligible 
relatives. Examples include a biological aunt and nephew whose de facto relationship for 28 
years, the duration of the child’s life, was that of mother-and-son;121 a foster parent and 
foster child, where the relationship had subsisted from the child’s infancy to the foster father’s 
death when the child was 10 years of age;122 a biological father and daughter, even after 
the daughter had been adopted by her paternal grandparents;123 same-sex and opposite-
sex life partners, where they have voluntarily undertaken duties of support towards one 
119 See Jooste v Botha 2000 (2) 199 SA (T), in which a father provided financial support to his son born 
outside his marriage, but whom he otherwise refused to acknowledge as his son. 
120 Gender based violence in South Africa (2020) Saferspaces; Gender-based violence in South Africa: 
a brief review (2016) Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation; The Optimus Study on Child 
Abuse, Violence and Neglect in South Africa (2015) Centre for Justice & Crime Prevention. 
121 RAF v Mohohlo (n81). The aunt had not adopted her nephew, so the definition of ‘descendant’ in 
the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009, s1, might 
not have applied either. This would have meant that she would not have been entitled to inherit from 
him under the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987. 
122 Fortuin v RAF 2015 (5) SA 532 (GP). 
123 JT v RAF 2015 (1) SA 609 (GJ). He continued to provide financial support and maintained a father-
daughter relationship with her.  
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another.124 These cases did not involve the distribution of death benefits, but wrongful death 
claims arising from the death of a breadwinner. They are all fact-specific and have not 
resulted in a general change to the common law. A maintenance officer, for example, 
would be hard-pressed to find that a foster parent was legally liable to support a foster child, 
or an aunt her nephew.125 Magistrates’ Courts do not have the inherent power to develop 
the common law, unlike High Courts.126 Moreover, in each of these cases, the deceased had 
in fact been financially supporting the claimant, which means they would have been eligible 
as financial dependants under s37C.127  
 
Nevertheless, what these cases do demonstrate is that the legal context within which the 
common law duties of support operate is becoming more complex. If the courts have found 
that legal duties of support can, in specific circumstances, arise between individuals who fall 
outside the family circle of eligible relatives, what should trustees do if a similar case were to 
come before them in circumstances in which the member had not been providing financial 
support? Can they simply confine themselves to pre-constitutional common law duties of 
support, regardless of judicial developments and social realities?128  
 
4.4.2 Need and Means 
 
The duty is always a ‘facultative’ one: it arises only if and to the extent that one relative is in 
need of support and the other has the means to provide support.129 As a general principle, 
 
124 Du Plessis v RAF (n77). In Paixão (n77) & Jacobs v RAF 2019 (2) SA 275 (GP) the deceased was still 
married while cohabiting with his partner [5 & 6 years respectively]. In Paixão the deceased had 
expressly assured the partner of his intention to support her and her children, and in Jacobs his partner 
and her minor children had been wholly dependent on him for the duration of their relationship.  
125 See (n121 & 122). Maintenance officers must interpret legislation in light of the spirit, purport and 
object of the BoR, but do not have the power to develop common law or customary law.   
126 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s173. 
127 The court in Jacobs v RAF (n124) held that it would be contrary to public policy to deny the 
existence of a duty of support in circumstances in which the deceased had voluntarily assumed the 
duty. The deceased and claimant were, however, father and son, and the claim was against the RAF. 
128 For eg, Hall & Sambu ‘Demography of South Africa’s Children’ in South African Child Gauge (2017) 
Child Institute, University of Cape Town, 101, state that South Africa is ‘unique in the extent of parental 
absence from children’s daily lives’; almost a quarter of African children do not live with either parent, 
and fewer than a third live with both parents. To what extent do de facto parent-child relationships 
emerge between such children and their caregivers? 
129 Oosthuizen v Stanley (n82).  See also Riches v Riches 1910 EDL 247. 
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an eligible relative is in need if they are unable to meet their reasonable maintenance needs 
from their own resources.130 Maintenance encompasses the ‘necessities of life’: 
accommodation, food, clothing and medical care.131 In addition to these basic necessities, 
the duty of support towards children includes education and even recreational activities.132  
 
The scope of the duty is said to differ depending on the ‘status’ and ‘station in life’ of the 
affected relatives.133 The duty that is owed to spouses and children is considered to be more 
extensive than that owed to other relatives, but the difference, if any, has not been 
definitively established.134 The principle difference appears to be that the scope of the duty 
owed to spouses and minor children is determined by reference to the standard of living and 
station in life of the partner or parent subject to the duty,135 while that owed to other relatives 
arises only if and to the extent that they are indigent.136 The scope of the duty, in contested 
cases, must always be decided by the courts, having regard to the above principles. There 
are no statutory formulae that apply, even in relation to the scope of a parent’s duty towards 
minor children.137  
 
Minor children are, nevertheless, usually legal dependants. Few minor children will have the 
means to provide for their own maintenance.138 In many cases major children who have not 
yet completed their education, including tertiary education, will also be.139   
 
What, however, of post-educational adult children who cannot afford to maintain 
themselves through no fault of their own, such as an inability to find employment? This is a 
question of considerable importance in South Africa, given the high unemployment rate, 
 
130 Oosthuizen v Stanley (n82); Van Vuuren v Sam 1972 (2) SA 633 (A). 
131 Ibid. See also Van Zyl (updated by Clark) ‘Maintenance’ in Family Law Service (2019), para C1. 
132 ‘Measure and quantum of support of children’ in Family Law Service, para C8 (n131). 
133 Oosthuizen v Stanley (n82); Wigham v British Traders 1963 (3) SA 151 (W). 
134 Cf the views of Boberg’s Law of Persons (n74) and Spiro Law of Parent and Child 4ed (1985), 403. 
135 Herfst v Hefst 1964 (4) SA 127.  
136 Oosthuizen v Stanley (n82); Volkenborn v Volkenborn 1946 NPD 76. 
137 Cf Canada’s Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 and New Zealand’s Child Support Act, 
1991.  
138 A successful maintenance claim nevertheless requires that the child’s maintenance needs be 
proven. See eg Mgumane v Setemane [1998] JOL 1757 (Tk).  
139 Ex Parte Pienaar 1964 1 SA 600 (T) 607; Mentz v Simpson 1990 (4) SA 455 (A).  
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particularly amongst the youth, the lack of general social assistance, and the widespread 
poverty within the country.140 There is no clear answer. There are very few reported cases 
involving maintenance claims by adult children, and those that exist are not recent.141 In 
principle the duty continues, and revives, for as long as a child is in need and the parent has 
the means to maintain them, although the standard appears to be lower than that to which 
minor children are entitled.142  
Spouses may be legal dependants, but they are not necessarily such.143 It is, as always, a 
question of need and means. Since the question of whether a duty was owed to a spouse 
almost invariably arises on the termination of the relationship, whether by death or divorce, it 
is more difficult to delineate the scope of the inter vivos duty. The Divorce Act empowers a 
court to order such maintenance as it considers just in the absence of a maintenance 
agreement between the parties.144 Courts increasingly award only rehabilitative 
maintenance.145 
The Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act entitles a spouse to reasonable maintenance from 
the deceased spouse’s estate to the extent she is in need,146 and the benchmark appears to 
be the marital standard of living.147 There is, unfortunately, very little case law on the point. In 
140 See §1.7 above. 
141 The last reported case is Gliksman v Talekinsky 1955 (4) SA 468 (W), in which the court held that a 
widowed adult daughter with six children was entitled to the necessities of life from her father, but was 
not entitled to luxuries, even though her father could afford them. 
142 Ibid. See also Botha ‘The duty to maintain’ (n107). 
143 In Masango v RAF (2014/42370) [2017] ZAGPJHC 221(3 August 2017), the HC held that the deceased 
wife had not owed her husband a legal duty of support, even though he was unemployed and she 
was the main breadwinner at the time of her death, given his employment history and prospective 
earning potential.  Cf Ndlhovu v Mr Price [2015] 3 BPLR 410 (PFA), in which the Adjudicator held that the 
spouse was the member’s only legal dependant merely because she was unemployed, without regard 
for her qualifications and prospects. 
144 Act 70 of 1979, s 7(2). 
145 For a discussion on the judiciary’s attitude to post-divorce maintenance, see Sinclair The Law of 
Marriage (1996); Clark ‘Maintenance’ in Family Law Service (n131). 
146 Act 27 of 1990, s2. See also Friedrich v Smit 2017 (4) SA 144 (SCA). 
147 Oshry v Feldman 2010 (6) SA 19 (SCA); Van Niekerk v Van Niekerk [2011] 2 All SA 635 (KZP). 
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only one case has a court been required to decide on the quantum of the claim, and the 
court awarded the full disposable estate to the surviving spouse.148  
 
The duty towards parents and siblings only arises when they are ‘indigent’. How poor must a 
parent or sibling be before they are considered indigent? There is no definitive answer. Some 
cases have equated indigence with absolute poverty – the relative must be so poor that 
they are unable to afford even the most basic necessities of life.149 The majority adopt an 
apparently less exacting standard, that of ‘comparative indigence’.150  
 
There are very few reported cases involving direct maintenance claims by parents or siblings. 
Most cases are decided in the context of wrongful death actions. The most recent reported 
decision involving a direct claim is that of Volkenborn v Volkenborn,151 in which the Court set 
aside a magistrate’s maintenance order. In Volkenborn the Court accepted that the 
appropriate threshold was ‘comparative’ rather than ‘absolute’ indigence. It also accepted 
that the ‘elderly and infirm’ mother’s basic needs far exceeded her income and that she 
went hungry ‘many a morning’.152 She had reached such a state of impecuniosity that she 
had been obliged to sell her furniture ‘bit by bit’, even though her income was 
supplemented by renting out almost every room in her house. The Court nevertheless held 
that she was not yet indigent. The reason was that she owned a capital asset, her house, 
 
148 Oshry v Feldman (n147). The affected testamentary heirs were the deceased’s adult children, and 
their argument that the surviving spouse was not in financial need, since she had adult children of her 
own able to support her, was rejected, since the duty of support rested on her husband and had been 
transmitted to his estate. Children are only liable if and to the extent one spouse, or their estate, cannot 
support the other. However, prior to her husband’s death her children were providing her with financial 
support, because her husband could no longer afford to do so fully on his means. Assuming therefore 
that her children had owed her an inter vivos duty of support whilst the husband was alive, his death 
apparently extinguished their obligation while the estate became liable for her full maintenance needs, 
subject only to the size of the available estate. If this decision is correct, the duty is in effect transmitted 
to the deceased spouse’s children rather than the surviving spouse’s children. The marriage had lasted 
for 18 years, but it was a second marriage for both spouses, entered into late in life, when the husband 
was 70 and his widow 60, and was out of community of property, presumably in order to ensure the 
assets acquired during their first marriages devolved on their own children. 
149 Smith v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd 1998 (4) SA 626 (C) 632 said that it is not enough that 
parents are so poor that they ‘have few things or nothing’, and that they must be in ‘extreme need or 
want of the basic necessities of life’. As pointed out in Jacobs v RAF 2010 (3) SA 263 (SE) [17], it will be 
very difficult for someone to prove that they have ‘less than nothing’.  
150 Oosthuizen v Stanley (n82); RAF v Mohohlo (n81). 
151 1946 NPD 76. 
152 At 77. 
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which she could realise or mortgage to provide additional income. The Court acknowledged 
that she might, in the future, having depleted her capital asset, be entitled to support, but 
considered her application to be premature.  
 
It is likely that the inclusion of future dependants in the Act is due to the Volkenborn court’s 
stringent test for even comparative indigence.  
 
4.5 STATUTORY DEPENDANTS 
 
4.5.1 Factual (Financial) 
 
The concept of factual dependant is unique to the Pension Funds Act in South African law. 
The term factual dependant is used in two senses by Adjudicators – to refer to a person who 
is only eligible because they are a factual dependant under paragraph (b)(i) of the 
definition, and to refer to any person who was financially dependent on the member, even if 
they were also a legal dependant, spouse, child or future dependant.  
 
In the first sense, by definition, no legal duty of support is owed to factual dependants. They 
are eligible only because they were ‘in fact dependent on the member for maintenance’. 
What does this mean, however? If read literally, it suggests that the recipient was not merely 
receiving monetary payments or contributions from the member, but that the member was 
providing financial assistance to the recipient, to enable them to meet their maintenance 
needs.  
 
The Adjudicator has applied this literal reading to applicants claiming to be factual 
dependants who are not the member’s cohabiting partner. The Adjudicator has attached a 
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different ‘purposive’ interpretation to the definition as it pertains to cohabiting partners, 
which is discussed below.153 
 
For the first category, Adjudicators have held that there are two essential requirements that 
are necessary to render a person a financial dependant: need on the part of the claimant, 
and the regular provision of financial support on the part of the member. The two go 
together, however, so regularity of support is indicative of the recipient’s need.154 Financial 
support that the recipient does not need to meet her maintenance needs is simply 
generosity on the part of the member.155  
 
The question of whether a claimant satisfies these two requirements rarely arises for direct 
consideration in determinations. The fact of dependency is usually self-evident, although 
there are determinations that suggest that sometimes claims of financial dependency are 
not given the consideration that they should, and applicants fail because they are unable to 
prove that they received regular contributions from the member, or that they were 
sufficiently needy.156 The need for and nature of proof is a particular problem, given that 
many recipients receive payments in cash or through methods of payments for which there is 
no record,157 and because different Adjudicators have different views on the sufficiency of 
affidavit evidence. The result is that the claims of some dependants are, arguably, too-
readily dismissed, whereas others, who might not even have been receiving financial support 




153 See §4.8 below. 
154 Govender v Alpha [2001] 4 BPLR 1843 (PFA); Govender v Alpha (2) [2001] 8 BPLR 2358 (PFA); 
Gunpath v Momentum PFA55/2019 08 October 2019 (FSB). 
155 Gunpath (n154). 
156 Makume v Sentinel (n52); Maake (n15). 
157 Many South Africans do not have bank accounts. They send and receive money using payment 
systems that allow for the cash purchase of money vouchers, which are then sent to the recipient via 
mobile phone and redeemable for cash. Most of these transfers happen via supermarkets. See eg SPAR 
‘How to send and receive money’ <https://www.spar.co.za/Services/Instant-Money#send-money>. 
158 Cf Maake (n15) with Tsele v Bidvest [2016] 1 BPLR 146 (PFA). 
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The persons who most frequently claim financial dependency, other than cohabiting 
partners, are parents and siblings. Financial support of unrelated third parties occurs more 
rarely.159 The question then is, if need is a common requirement to establish eligibility both as 
a legal and as a financial dependant, are there different thresholds of need that must be 
satisfied? After all, if the threshold of need is the same, then the fact that the recipient is 
receiving financial support is irrelevant other than as confirmation of the existence of need. 
The fact that parents have been found to be financial dependants in cases in which the 
Adjudicator has expressed doubt that they are necessarily legal dependants, suggests that 
the level of need required for financial dependence is not as great as is required for legal 
dependence.160  
 
This means, for example, that although parents may have similar financial need and both 
have a child with similar means to provide support, one will be a dependant and the other 
not. It also means that a partial financial dependant, whose need is less than a parent’s or 
sibling’s for example, could be entitled to the full death benefit if they are identified as a 
financial dependant, while the needier relative has not yet reached the higher threshold of 
need required to establish legal dependence. This, once again, is an area of uncertainty 
and inequitable treatment of potential beneficiaries.161  
 
4.5.2 Children and spouses 
 
Spouses and children are always eligible dependants, irrespective of whether they were 
owed a legal duty of support, and irrespective of whether they were financially dependent 
upon the member.  
 
 
159 See eg Govender v Alpha (n154) (mistresses’ daughter) and Gorrah (n63) (neighbour). 
160 In Jacobs v RAF 2019 (2) SA 275 (GP), a wrongful death action, the court held that it would be 
invidious to hold that a deceased son did not owe his father a legal duty of support, when he had in 
fact been supporting his needy father. 
161 I have previously made this argument in Lehmann ‘Death and Dependency: The Meaning of 
‘Dependant’ (2009) 126(4) SALJ 650.  
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The challenge for trustees is not whether spouses and children are eligible dependants, but 
whether a potential beneficiary is a spouse or child. The challenges arise because of the 
frequent absence of documentary proof of the marriage or of paternity.162 The marriage rate 
in South Africa is very low.163 Most children are in consequence born outside marriage.164 
Many birth certificates do not disclose the identity of the child’s father,165 and many children 
do not bear their father’s surname.166 Many mothers also choose not to disclose the identity 
of the father to the child.167 The majority of children do not live with in the same households 
as their fathers.168 This phenomenon is most prevalent in poorer households.169 Paternity 
disputes are common,170 even after the death of the purported father.171  
 
When the child was a financial dependant, they are eligible even if they are not the 
member’s biological child.172 When they were not, the child’s only basis for eligibility will be 
their biological relationship.173 Trustees therefore need to determine whether there is sufficient 
 
162 Eg Maake (n15). 
163 StatsSA Marriages and Divorces 2017 (PO307) records the crude rate of marriages concluded by a 
marriage officer as 2.4 per 1000 (at 2); customary marriages as 0.05 per 1000 (at 4). The data does not 
record non-registered religious or customary marriages. The former is likely to be quite small, since most 
religious marriages are ceremonial and are nevertheless solemnised by marriage officers; the principal 
exception pertains to Islamic marriages, which are regulated by Islamic Law.  
164 See StatsSA Cohort Fertility in South Africa Report No. 03-00-03 (2019), which indicates that there is 
near parity between children born within and outside marriage, but it includes women in cohabitation 
relationships in the definition of married.  
165 Cf Mthiyane v Fedsure Life [2002] 5 BPLR 3460 (PFA), where a mother was able to provide birth 
certificates reflecting the member as the father. 
166 StatsSA Recorded live births 2018 (PO305), 8, notes that almost 63% of birth certificates do not 
contain information regarding the child’s father. See eg Kgapola v Fidelity (n54); Pandlev v South 
African Authorities [2015] 3 BPLR 440 (PFA).  
167 Up to 30% of children may not know the identity of their biological fathers. See Nduna ‘Factors that 
hinder paternity disclosure to children: South African mothers’ perspectives’ (2014) 26(4) Journal of 
Feminist Family Therapy 218, 219. 
168 Hall & Sambu (n128), 101. This may simply be attributable to historic differences between the nuclear 
conception of the family that underpins common law duties of support, and the extended kinship 
relationships that are part of traditional African custom and customary law. See Dlamini (n80).  
169 Ibid. 
170 Courts can order a child to undergo a paternity test but will only do when it is in the best interests of 
the child. See Children’s Act (n80), s37; YM v LB 2010 (6) SA 338 (SCA).  
171 See M v Setshaba (A5020/2016) [2018] ZAGPJHC 602 (24 October 2018); Cele v Alexander Forbes 
[2010] 1 BPLR 35 (PFA); Kekana v Nedcor [2010] 3 BPLR 295 (PFA); Tlou v Amplats [2011] 3 BPLR 439 (PFA); 
Nsibande v Alexander Forbes [2015] 3 BPLR 423 (PFA).  
172 Cf Koopman (n50) [deceased survived by two minor children and pregnant girlfriend. Adjudicator 
awards bulk to unborn child on basis future ‘financial’ dependant when paternity disputed]. 
173 Eg Maake (n15), [Adjudicator did not accept partner’s claim regarding the paternity of the children 
or their financial dependence]. In Ngcobo v Telkom PFA/GA/6386/2005/FM the fund withdrew a child’s 
pension (not subject to s37C) when the results of a paternity test (done by member) revealed he was 
not the father. As a financial dependant, he was still eligible to share in the death benefit. 
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evidence that the child was the member’s child,174 or whether to require a paternity test.175 
These are difficult and delicate, but unavoidable, decisions facing trustees. A further 
consideration in the case of contested paternity, is, once again, the fact that biological 
parents have a paramount obligation to support their minor children.176 What weight should 
trustees attach to the moral claims of undisputed biological children, and the claims of 
children who might not be the member’s children, albeit that the member was supporting 
them as part of the household?177 
A further challenge is that adoptions under customary law are not registered, unlike their civil 
law counterparts.178 Customary adoption is a family and community-based process. The 
essential element is that the adoption be publicised within the community by way of a 
traditional ceremony.179 Children are, however, commonly raised, permanently or 
temporarily, by relatives other than their biological parents. Determining whether a child has 
been adopted or simply raised by a relative as part of her household is therefore a difficult 
enquiry.180  
A spouse is defined as follows in the Act:181 
“spouse” means a person who is the permanent life partner or spouse or civil union partner of a 
member in accordance with the Marriage Act, 1961 (Act No. 68 of 1961), the Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act, 1998 (Act No. 68 of 1997), or the Civil Union Act, 2006 (Act No. 17 of 
2006), or the tenets of a religion; 
Determining whether someone is a spouse under the Marriage Act and Civil Union Act is 
relatively uncomplicated. Each is solemnised by a state-appointed marriage officer, who 
174 By way of affidavit evidence from family and friends, eg Mthiyane (n165). In Pandlev (n166), the 
Adjudicator accepted a girlfriend’s affidavit evidence, even though paternity was contested by the 
widow. 
175 Trustees cannot order a child to undergo a paternity test, but they may refuse to include the child in 
the absence of one if there is insufficient alternate evidence.  
176 Cf Magongo v Municipal Councillors PF [2011] JOL 27010 (PFA) [Adjudicator dismissed complaint 
that minor biological child was wrongly excluded, because complaint made two years after death and 
there was no evidence of financial dependence, but without investigating truth of claimed paternity].  
177 Eg Legoko v Soweto [2011] 1 BPLR 101 (PFA) [major needy son vs minor stepson]. 
178 See Children’s Act (n80), s228, which requires the approval of a Court to finalise an adoption. 
179 See Kewana v Santam (n75); Maswanganye v Baloyi [2015] JOL 34005 (GP). 
180 See eg Maswanganye (n179).  
181 PFA, s1. 
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must register the marriage, provide the couple with an original marriage certificate, and 
transmit details of the marriage to the relevant government department for registration.182 
There will thus ordinarily be documentary proof of the marriage. Although a document does 
not prove its authenticity, courts, and therefore trustees, are entitled to accept a certificate 
as prima facie proof of the marriage,183 in the absence of countervailing evidence that it is 
fraudulent or has been obtained by fraudulent means.184  
What, however, are trustees to do in the absence of documentary proof; or when the 
authenticity, or sufficiency, of the documents provided is challenged; or when the marriage 
is alleged to be invalid for want of compliance with the substantive requirements of 
marriage?  
These questions have most often arisen in the context of customary marriages.185 The 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (RCMA)186 conditions the validity of a customary 
marriage on four requirements: that the spouses are over the age of 18; that they have both 
consented to be married under customary law; that the marriage has been negotiated and 
entered into or celebrated in accordance with customary law;187 that no spouse may enter 
into a civil marriage with a different spouse while married under customary law, or vice 
182 Marriage Act 25 of 1961, s29A; Civil Union Act 17 of 2006, s12. 
183 Civil Union Act, s12(4); RAF v Mongalo, Nkabinde v RAF [2003] 1 All SA 72 (SCA); Murabi v Murabi 
[2014] 2 All SA 644 (SCA) [14]; PSC v LPM [2013] JOL 29847 (GNP). 
184 See Nkwanyana v Mbambo [2008] 1 All SA 375 (D) in which the deceased’s partner fraudulently 
obtained a marriage certificate with the collusion of the marriage officer.  
185 The definition also encompasses religious marriages that have not been solemnised by a marriage 
officer in accordance with the Marriage Act 25 of 1961, notably Muslim marriages. Although Muslim 
marriages are not yet recognised as legal marriages for all purposes, they have been recognised as 
such for the purpose of wrongful death actions (see Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 
1999(4) SA1319 (SCA)); intestate inheritance and posthumous maintenance claims (see Daniels v 
Campbell 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC)); maintenance claims on divorce (see R v R (14770/2011) [2015] 2 ALL 
SA 352 (WCC)). Each case involved a monogamous marriage. Proposed statutory reform has yet to be 
adopted. See also Breslaw ‘Muslim marriages: are they equally married?’ 2013 De Rebus 246 for a 
discussion of other pertinent cases. See further Amien ‘South Africa’s failure to legislate on religious 
marriages leaves women vulnerable’ The Conversation (16 June 2020), for a discussion of recent 
developments.  
186 Act 120 of 1998, which commenced 15 November 2000. 
187 RCMA, s3(1)(a). In Sibiya v Palabora [2005] 6 BPLR 543 (PFA) the trustees assumed that the first 
marriage was not properly concluded under customary law; since the spouse was not a financial 
dependant, she did not share in the distribution. The Adjudicator accepted the evidence presented by 
the spouse and held that she was married under customary law. Upon further investigation the fund 
obtained evidence confirming their initial belief that she had not been married under customary law – 
a fortunate happenstance for them in the circumstances.  
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versa.188 Polygynous marriages must thus all be customary marriages. The Act places a duty 
on spouses to register their marriage, but a failure to do so does not invalidate the 
marriage.189  
 
The key substantive requirement is that the marriage have been entered into in accordance 
with customary law.190 Trustees may not rely on a person’s ipse dixit that they are married 
under customary law.191 The first Adjudicator emphasised that if the basis on which trustees 
wished to include a beneficiary was as a customary-law spouse, it was incumbent on them 
to satisfy themselves that the legal requirements of the marriage had been satisfied, and that 
the marriage was still in existence when the member died.192 As emphasised by the 
Adjudicator, this requires that trustees draw ‘legal conclusions’. It is not a ‘factual enquiry’ 
entitling them to do no more than obtain, and rely on, the statement of even the ‘local 
headman’.193  
 
Determining whether a marriage is valid under customary law requires that the trustees 
ascertain the content of customary law. As Ncgobo JA pointed out in Bhe v Magistrate, 




188 RCMA, s3(2). This means that a fund cannot rely on a marriage certificate as prima facie proof of the 
validity of the civil marriage, when another person claims to be a spouse under a prior customary 
marriage. See Maphothoma v Telkom [2016] 1 BPLR 117 (PFA).  
189 RCMA, ss4(1) & 4(9). In principle the marriage may even be registered after the death of one 
spouse, see Maloba v Dube [2010] JOL 25852 (GSJ). Some studies suggest that the practice of the DHA 
is to refuse registration unless both spouses are present, and surviving spouses are thus often obliged to 
apply to the HC to recognise the validity of the marriage and compel the DHA to register the marriage. 
See Law, Race and Gender Unit Factsheet ‘The Recognition of Customary Marriages in South Africa: 
Law, policy and practice’ (2012) University of Cape Town. Letters confirming agreement or payment of 
lobola, affidavits from family members, and letters from traditional authorities, are usually the primary 
forms of documentary evidence.  
190 RCMA, s3(1)(b). Section 1 defines customary law as the ‘customs and usages traditionally observed 
among the indigenous African peoples’ of South Africa and which form part of the culture of those 
peoples. 
191 Maubane v Municipal Gratuity Fund [2015] 3 BPLR 364 (PFA) [5.8]. 
192 See John Murphy PLA Quarterly Briefing 14/15 May 2002, para 114-116. Given the evidential 
difficulties facing trustees, the Adjudicator recommended that trustees treat the spouse as a financial 
dependant when possible. Since all monogamous or first customary marriages are now by default in 
community of property, this is not in the survivor’s interests if my argument in §6.4.1 below is correct.  
193 Ibid. 
194 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) [152]. 
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The evolving nature of indigenous law and the fact that it is unwritten have resulted in the 
difficulty of ascertaining the true indigenous law as practised in the community. This law is 
sometimes referred to as living indigenous law. Statutes, textbooks and case law, as a result 
may no longer reflect the living law. What is more, abuses of indigenous law are at times 
construed as a true reflection of indigenous law, and these abuses tend to distort the law and 
undermine its value. The difficulty is one of identifying the living indigenous law and separating 
it from its distorted version. 
Once the content of the law has been established, in other words once the requisites of a 
valid customary marriage have been determined, the trustees are expected to engage in a 
‘fact-intensive enquiry’ to determine whether those requirements have been met in the 
particular case.195  
The validity of marriages concluded under customary law is increasingly being contested, 
both before the courts196 and the Adjudicator.197 The cases demonstrate that identifying the 
requirements for validity, and establishing whether they have been satisfied, is far from 
straightforward.198 Courts and the Adjudicator have been obliged to obtain (sometimes 
conflicting) expert evidence.199 Courts have held different views on whether the traditional 
requirements of customary law must be present in every case,200 or whether some can be 
dispensed with in particular circumstances.201 Some courts emphasise that customary law is a 
‘dynamic and evolving’ system of law, one which has always responded ‘flexibly and 
pragmatically’ as the circumstances of a case dictate.202 Others are more essentialist in their 
195 Southon v Moropane [2015] JOL 33203 (GSJ). 
196 Mayelane v Ngwenyama 2013 (8) BCLR 918 (CC); Marai v Rasello [2015] JOL 34564B (FB); None v 
Tshabalala [2016] JOL 36713 (GSJ); Fungisani v Minister of Home Affairs [2017] JOL 38091 (LT). 
197 Mabetlela v Progress PF [2003] 7 BPLR 4915 (PFA); Sibiya(n187); Tshetshe v Vodacom [2005] 5 BPLR 
459 (PFA); Maphothoma v Telkom (n188).  
198 See the critique of the courts’ jurisprudence by Nhlapo ‘South Africa’s courts and lawmakers have 
failed the ideal of cultural diversity’ The Conversation 14 February 2018. See also Nkosi ‘Customary 
marriage as dealt with in Mxiki v Mbata’2015 De Rebus 67; Moore & Himonga ‘Customary marriage: is 
the law working?’ Groundup (1 March 2016). 
199 Southon v Moropane (n195); Moshidi v Kimberley-Clark [2003] 7 BPLR 4947 (PFA). 
200 Fanti v Boto [2008] 2 All SA 533 (C) (consent bride, her father or guardian, payment of lobola and 
handing over of the bride all essential requirements); Ndlovu v Mokoena [2009] JOL 23452 (GNP) 
(handing over of bride essential); Rasello v Chali [2013] JOL 30965 (FB) (handing over of bride essential).  
201 Mabuza v Mbatha 2003 (7) BCLR 743 (C) (handing over of bride can be waived). See also 
Ramoitheki v Liberty [2006] JOL 18075 (W). The SCA has recently similarly held that handing over of the 
bride is not an indispensable requirement and can be waived by the parties – see Mbungela v Mkabi 
2020 (1) SA 41 (SCA). There must, however, be sufficient evidence to establish that the requirement has 
been waived. 
202 Mabena v Letsoalo [1998] JOL 3523 (T); Mabuza v Mbatha (n210); Ramoitheki v Liberty (n201). 
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approach and more readily declare marriages invalid for want of compliance with 
traditional formalities.203  
 
Determining whether a marriage was still in existence or had been properly dissolved at the 
time of the member’s death is also challenging.204 Different requirements apply, depending 
on the alleged date of the dissolution. Prior to 1988, a subsequent civil marriage 
automatically terminated a customary marriage.205 However, if the civil marriage later 
dissolved and the husband had continued or resumed living with his customary law spouse, 
the marriage revived.206 Since 1988, a civil marriage is invalid if a spouse is already married 
under customary law.207 In respect of alleged dissolutions that occurred before the RCMA 
commenced, other than as a result of a subsequent civil marriage, trustees must determine 
whether the customary law requirements for dissolution were satisfied.208 Since the RCMA 
commenced, customary marriages can only be dissolved by a decree of divorce granted 
by the HC.209 This clear legislative requirement notwithstanding, Adjudicators have in some 
cases continued to apply customary law to determine whether the marriage has been 
properly dissolved.210  
 
The inconsistent decisions that have been handed down by the courts and the Adjudicator 
confirm the view expressed by Nhlapo, a leading scholar on customary law, that the 
requirements for the validity of customary marriages is in ‘total disarray’.211   
 
203 Fanti v Boto (n200); Ndlovu v Mokoena (n200); Rasello v Chali (n200). 
204 See Nkosi ‘The ending of a customary marriage - What happens to the ilobolo?’ 2013 De Rebus 222 
205 See the Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 1988. 
206 See eg Netshituka v Netshituka [2011] 4 All SA 63 (SCA). 
207 Ibid. See also RCMA, s3(2).  
208 See eg Thembisile v Thembisile 2002 (2) SA 209 (T); Makgwale v Khwinana [2004] 3 BPLR 5510 (T); 
Fungisani v Minister of Home Affairs (n196). 
209 RCMA, s8. See also Manyepao v Ledwaba (Case no 1368/18) [2020] ZASCA 54 (27 May 2020), in 
which a husband and wife married under customary law separated after less than a year of marriage. 
Both entered into subsequent civil marriages. On the death of the husband his second marriage was 
declared a nullity because they had not obtained a formal divorce, which meant that his first wife 
inherited his R3.5m estate, since her second marriage was also a nullity.  
210 See eg Tshetshe (n197), in which the outcome was the same since the Adjudicator held that the 
requirements for a customary law dissolution had not been satisfied.  
211 Nhlapo ‘South Africa’s courts and lawmakers have failed the ideal of cultural diversity’ The 





Even when a marriage appears to have been celebrated in accordance with customary 
traditions, such as payment of lobola and handing over of the bride, it is not necessarily valid 
under customary law.212 In Mayelane v Ngwenyama, the CC held that a second marriage 
was invalid because the first wife had not been informed of the impending marriage, which it 
found to be a prerequisite for validity under Tsonga customary law.213 The CC went further, 
however, and developed Tsonga customary law. It held that merely informing the first wife of 
the planned marriage would no longer suffice, and that her consent to the second marriage 
would hitherto be necessary.214  
 
Ascertaining the ‘true’ customary law, in these circumstances, is not merely an ‘onerous’ task 
for trustees – I suggest it is an impossible task, both for trustees and Adjudicators.215 It is one 
only a court can properly perform. No change to the definition of spouse or dependant will 
assist trustees in this regard. The changes that are necessary are to the law of marriage, 
rather than laws specific to the retirement fund industry. Fortunately, these changes may 
soon be forthcoming as a result of the proposed reforms, which may result in the introduction 
of a single statute governing civil, customary and religious marriages.216 One of the key 
proposals is that all customary marriages be registered, and that traditional leaders be 
recognised as marriage officers for the purpose of effecting such registration. If this change 
were to be introduced, determining whether a potential beneficiary is a spouse would be 
significantly easier than it is today.217 Trustees would not be called upon to perform a quasi-
 
212 Mayelane v Ngwenyama (n196)). 
213 Ibid. 
214 It is not clear what the position would be with regards to third and subsequent marriages, or whether 
the consent of second and later spouses must also be obtained. 
215 See eg Moshidi v Kimberley-Clark (n199), in which the first wife challenged the validity of a second 
marriage, in part because she had not been informed of the marriage. No consideration was given to 
this aspect of her complaint. The Adjudicator dismissed the other basis of her complaint, relying on a 
telephonic conversation with a lecturer to establish the content of ‘contemporary’ Sepedi customary 
law. The Adjudicator therefore accepted that the second marriage was valid. 
216 See SALRC Single Marriage Statute Issue Paper 35 Project 144 (2019),  
217 As noted in the SALRC Project 144 Issue Paper (n216), 29, South Africa is a party to a number of 
international instruments that mandate the registration of marriages. Documentary proof of a marriage 
is important in enabling women to secure the rights to which they are entitled as spouses.  
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judicial task for which they are ill-equipped, and the possibility that spouses may not be 
properly identified as such will be considerably reduced.  
 
4.5.3 Life Partners 
 
The potential dependant that has proven the most difficult to categorise, and which has 
yielded the greatest inconsistency in treatment, is unmarried partners. No ex lege duty of 
support arises as between unmarried partners.218 There is no concept of ‘common law’ 
marriage, even though Adjudicator determinations have used the term.219 When the 
Adjudicator’s Office began operating as from 1 January 1998, the Act contained no 
definition of ‘spouse’, which was only inserted into the Act in 2007 following the adoption of 
the Civil Union Act in 2006.220  
 
Nevertheless, in the years immediately following the establishment of the Adjudicator’s 
Office, a steady stream of cases came before the courts which incrementally extended 
certain of the financial benefits of marriage to same-sex partners.221 However, in each case it 
was only partners who had undertaken reciprocal duties of support towards one another 
who were held entitled to the financial benefits accorded to married couples.  
 
In Satchwell v President of RSA,222 the CC was at particular pains to emphasise that not all 
same-sex partners were automatically entitled to the same benefits as spouses (a spousal 
pension in this case) – only those who had undertaken reciprocal duties of support.223 
Whether they have undertaken the duty is a question of fact, to be decided having regard 
 
218 Butters v Mncora 2012 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
219 Eg Ditshabe v Sanlam [2001] 10 BPLR 2579 (PFA); Mthiyane (n165) (they may have been customary 
law wives); Brummelkamp v Babcock [2001] 4 BPLR 1811 (PFA). 
220 Act 17 of 2006. 
221 The first, Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security1998 (3) SA 312 (T), was handed down one 
month after the Adjudicator’s office became operational. See especially Satchwell v President of RSA 
2002 (9) BCLR 986 (CC); Gory v Kolver 2007 (3) BCLR 249 (CC); Du Plessis v RAF (n77). 
222 (n221). 
223 Para 24 and 34. The CC specifically amended the HC order, which had read into the definition of 
spouse the words ‘or partners in a permanent same-sex life partnership’ to instead read as ‘partners in 




to all the circumstances of their relationship.224 Facts that point towards the existence of the 
duty include: the duration and stability of the relationship; joint home ownership; joint bank 
accounts; nominating each other as the beneficiaries of life insurance and investment 
policies; appointing each other the heir of their estates; including the partner as a 
dependant on a medical aid.225 These are all factors that point towards a couple having 
made a lasting commitment to each other both emotionally and financially – who have 
expressly or tacitly assumed the same invariable financial commitments that married spouses 
undertake towards one another.  
 
Opposite sex life partners, who have always had the right to marry, have been held not to be 
similarly entitled to the benefits extended to married couples and same-sex life partners. In 
Volks NO v Robinson226 the majority of the CC rejected a life partner’s argument that the 
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act227 was unconstitutional in allowing only heterosexual 
married couples to claim maintenance from their deceased spouse’s estate, while not 
permitting heterosexual life partners who had undertaken reciprocal duties of support to do 
so.228 The majority reasoned that the MSSA statutorily extends the pre-existing marital duty of 
support, which arises automatically as an invariable consequence of marriage; cohabiting 
partners are not owed an ex lege inter vivos duty of support, and it would be anomalous to 
recognise a posthumous duty when none had existed during the life of the deceased. A 
further consideration was that opposite-sex partners have the freedom to choose whether to 
marry, and their right to dignity requires that their choice be respected.229  
 
224 The CC thought it probable on the facts that the partners had undertaken the duty of support but 
did not need to decide the matter, (para 25). 
225 Langemaat (n221), 444; Satchwell (n221) [5]. 
226 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
227 Act 27 of 1990. 
228 See [57] in particular.  The decision was applied in Du Toit v Greyling (78173/2014) [2016] ZAGPPHC 
892 (23 September 2016) and in McDonald v Young [2011] ZASCA 31, in which the SCA 
refused a heterosexual partner’s claim for maintenance since the facts clearly established that no such 
contractual agreement to provide support had been concluded between the parties (para 240). 
229 Many commentators have called for the legal recognition and protection of all domestic 
partnerships. See eg Clark ‘Families and domestic partnerships’ (2002) 119(3) SALJ 634; Goldblatt 
‘Regulating domestic partnerships: a necessary step in the development of South African family law’ 
(2003) 120(3) SALJ 610; Heaton ‘Striving for substantive gender equality in family law: selected issues’ 
(2005) 21 SAJHR 547; Heaton ‘An overview of the current legal position regarding heterosexual life 
partnerships’ 2005 THRHR 662; Kruuse ‘’Here’s to you, Mrs Robinson’: peculiarities and paragraph 29 in 
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The minority disagreed. In her minority judgment O’Regan J held that the law is 
unconstitutional, in so far as it discriminates against heterosexual life partners who have 
undertaken reciprocal duties of support and who are in financial need on the dissolution of 
the relationship.230  
However, O’Regan J also emphasised that duties of support between unmarried life partners 
arise only if voluntarily assumed by the parties. She acknowledged that there are cohabiting 
relationships that the partners do not intend to be permanent, and there are also permanent 
life partnerships in which the parties have deliberately chosen not to marry in order to avoid 
the consequences of marriage.231 As such, to visit the legal consequences of marriage on 
permanent life partners, there must be facts which clearly demonstrate that the parties have 
voluntarily undertaken those consequences. The longer the relationship, the more intertwined 
the partners' financial affairs, and the more clearly the partners have provided financial and 
emotional support to one another, the more likely it is that they will be found to have 
undertaken reciprocal duties of support. The duration of a relationship is particularly relevant, 
for the longer it endures the more likely that it will give rise to ‘patterns of dependence’.232 
Maintenance claims are, however, conditional on the deceased partner having failed to 
make equitable provision for the survivor from the deceased’s estate.233 Where such provision 
has been made, no maintenance claim will lie. In Volks, O’Regan was of the view that the 
R300 000 bequeathed to the surviving partner was ‘adequate equitable provision’.234 
determining the treatment of domestic partnerships’ (2009) 25 SAJHR 380; Sloth-Nielsen & Van Heerden 
‘The constitutional family: developments in South African child and family law 2003–2013’ (2014) 28 (1) 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 100; Bonthuys ‘A duty of support for ALL unmarried 
intimate partners Part 1: the limits of the cohabitation and marriage based models’ (2018) 21 PELJ 1. The 
SALC has similarly proposed that domestic partners obtain the same rights as married partners. See 
SALRC (Project 118) Report on Domestic Partnerships (2006) and the consequent Domestic Partnership 
Bill in GN 30663 of 14 January 2008. The legislature has not (yet) adopted its recommendations, which 
would give courts wide discretionary powers to re-allocate assets and award maintenance in the event 
of the dissolution of a domestic partnership.   
230 Satchwell (n221) [35]. 
231 Para 120 and 134. 
232 Para 133. 
233 Para 139, 
234 Para 141-142. In Oshry v Feldman (n147) a bequest of R150 000 was considered insufficient for a 75-
year-old spouse, whose additional maintenance needs were assessed at R10 000 per month. More 
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O’Regan’s view was thus that the definition of survivor in the MSSA be read as including 
permanent life partners who have undertaken reciprocal duties of support in circumstances 
in which the survivor has not received an equitable share of the deceased partner’s 
estate.235 
 
The s37C definition of spouse refers simply to permanent life partners, without reference to 
sexual orientation. Adjudicators have, appropriately, accepted that it applies to both same-
sex and opposite-sex life partners.236 It similarly does not expressly refer to life partners ‘who 
have undertaken reciprocal duties of support’. Nevertheless, I suggest that it is implicit that 
life partners are only those persons who have undertaken reciprocal duties of support.  In 
every case involving the existence of a disputed life partnership, the courts, including the CC, 
have emphasised that the essence of a life partnership is that the partners have undertaken 
reciprocal duties of support.  
 
THE DEFINITION APPLIED 
 
4.6 SPOUSES AND CHILDREN: legal or statutory dependants? 
 
Since spouses and children are always amongst the member’s dependants, identifying 
whether they are legal or statutory dependants is not strictly necessary.  In many cases it will 
not be, or should not be, important.  It may, however, be important in some circumstances.  
For example, in deciding whether members’ wishes should be overridden when they have 
excluded a spouse or child. Whether spouses and children are legal or statutory dependants 
may also be relevant to the equitable distribution of the benefit, particularly when the 
benefit is a small one and there are competing beneficiaries.   
 
 
recently the SCA in Friedrich v Smit (n146) overturned an executor’s generous maintenance provision 
because there was no evidence that the surviving spouse was unable to support herself. 
235 Para 2 of the order. See also Laubscher v Duplan 2017 (4) BCLR 415 (CC), in which the CC suggests 
that it may be appropriate to revisit the majority’s decision in Volks v Robinson (n226). 
236 In the context of wrongful death claims against the Road Accident Fund, courts are starting to hold 
that opposite-sex partners were owed a legal duty of support when the deceased had voluntarily 
undertaken to support them. See Paixão (n77); Jacobs v RAF 2019 (2) SA 275 (GP).  
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Despite the fact that spouses and children are not inevitably legal dependants, funds and 
Adjudicators almost invariably classify them as such.237 Because the classification is routine 
(and clearly incorrect with regard to spouses and adult children who are not in need of 
support), no particular value is attached to their status as such. It is not a factor that weighs in 
their favour when the competing beneficiaries are also dependants.238   
 
It does, however, operate to the detriment of nominees. In a number of determinations, the 
trustees’ decision to include a non-nominated spouse within the distribution has been justified 
on the basis that the spouse was the member’s (only) legal dependant, even though this was 
contrary to the member’s wishes,239 the spouses were estranged,240 and without any enquiry 
into the spouse’s financial circumstances relative to those of the nominated beneficiaries.241  
 
In Ackermann v Lifestyle Retirement Annuity Fund, the Adjudicator concluded, without more, 
that the deceased’s husband fell within the definition of legal dependant, without examining 
whether the deceased had owed a duty of support to him in the circumstances of the 
case.242 He may well have been a statutory rather than legal dependant.243 In Tshetshe v 
Vodacom the spouses were married for less than a year before the husband left his wife.244 
At the time of her death they were no longer living together, and neither was financially 
supporting the other. The trustees nevertheless awarded him a third of the death benefit, 
even though her parents were her nominated beneficiaries. The only explanation provided in 
 
237 Peete v SACCAWU (n13); Whitcombe (n13); Marais (n13). Cf the early determination of TWC v 
Rentokil [2000] 2 BPLR 216 (PFA) [the member’s adult children considered to be statutory and not legal 
dependants, even though they were experiencing financial hardship].  
238 Considerable weight is attached to age and minority, which by and large is indicative of a duty of 
support towards biological children. When the competing claimants are minor children, the member’s 
biological children do not, however, automatically rank ahead of other minor children. See Koopman 
(n50); Baloyi v PPWAWU PFA/NP/11689/2006/LTN [member’s children and sister’s children]. 
239 Nduku (n54); Ackermann (n60); Tshetshe (n197). 
240 Tshetshe (n197) 
241 Nduku (n54), Ackermann (n60), Tshetshe (n197). 
242 [2013] 3 BPLR 295 (PFA) [5.8].  
243 In Mashego v SATU [2007] 2 BPLR 229 (PFA), the Adjudicator simply characterised the spouse as a 
paragraph (b)(ii) (statutory) dependant, although the trustees had categorised him as a legal 
dependant. No information was provided as to his need and means. See also Ndlhovu (n143) in which 





the determination is that he was her ‘legal dependant’, although this conclusion is doubtful 
on the facts.  
 
In an inexplicable decision, in light of the clear wording of the Act and the many 
determinations confirming that spouses are always dependants, it is impossible to make 
sense of the recent decision of Naidoo v Coca Cola Shanduka Beverage Provident Fund,245 
in which the trustees paid the benefit to the member’s estate, even though she was survived 
by her estranged husband. They justified their decision on the basis that he had not been 
financially dependent on the member. The Adjudicator upheld the trustees’ decision. 
Following an appeal to the new Financial Services Tribunal (FST), the Tribunal remitted the 
matter to the Adjudicator for further enquiry into the equitability of the decision, even though 
the husband was the member’s only dependant and therefore entitled to the benefit as of 
right. The fact that the parties were estranged and in the process of obtaining a divorce, that 
the member had died from unnatural causes, and that her parents were her testamentary 
heirs, appears to have influenced the trustees’ decision, even though there was no evidence 
implicating the husband in his wife’s death.  
 
More recently, in Momentum v VR Krzus,246   the member was again survived by an estranged 
spouse. He had not nominated beneficiaries, but his siblings were his testamentary heirs. The 
trustees awarded the full benefit to the spouse, since she was his only (statutory) dependant. 
Following a complaint from the member’s sibling, the Adjudicator overturned the trustees’ 
decision and ordered that the benefit be paid to the member’s estate. The Adjudicator’s 
justification for doing so was that the spouse had not been financially dependent on him. The 
decision is again clearly incorrect in law, and in this instance was overturned on appeal to 
the FST.  
 
 
245 [2019] JOL 46217 (FST). 
246 Momentum v VR Krzus PFA 52/2019, 9 March 2020 (FSCA). 
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Had the definition expressly included parents and siblings as eligible beneficiaries, it would 
not have been necessary for the trustees and Adjudicator to reach a decision that is clearly 
wrong in law, however equitable it may be in the circumstances.   
4.7 OTHER RELATIVES: legal, financial or future dependants? 
The relatives for whom the categories of legal and future dependant are most important are 
parents, siblings, grandchildren and grandparents. They are not statutory dependants, and 
unless the member was already supporting them financially, the only basis on which they 
would be eligible to share in the death benefit is on the basis that the deceased owed them 
an existing, but unfulfilled, duty of support, or that the duty is one that would probably have 
arisen in the future. Of these relatives, it is parents who most regularly feature in Adjudicator 
determinations,247 followed by siblings.248 The high level of poverty and unemployment in 
South Africa means that many, if not most, parents and siblings are in need.249 The same is 
true of grandparents and grandchildren, but they feature more rarely in Adjudicator 
determinations. This may be because parents and siblings are more often amongst the 
member’s nominated beneficiaries. Although Adjudicators have acknowledged that both 
are potential legal dependants, they have only exceptionally held that a parent is a legal 
dependant,250 and have never done so in respect of siblings.   
The principal reason is the continued uncertainty regarding the point at which a parent or 
sibling becomes sufficiently ‘indigent’ to qualify as a legal dependant.  Some Adjudicators 
have adopted the strict test for indigency.  In Thene v Bidcorp, the Adjudicator held that ‘in 
247 Eg Musgrave (n36) Wasserman (n33) ; Fourie v CRAF (n34) ; Wellens v Unsgaard (n42); Van 
Drimmelen v CRAF PFA/GA/1227/02/KM; Van der Walt v Fugro (n51); Nduku (n54); Hamnca v Alexander 
Forbes [2011] JOL 28026 (PFA) ; Grieseel (n26); Thene (n43); Ndlhovu (n143). 
248 Eg Nduku (n54); Ackermann (n60); Gowing (n65); Sefularo (n103); Makume v Sentinel (n52); Masuku 
(n55).  
249 See §1.7 above. 
250 In Koekemoer v Macsteel [2004] 2 BPLR 5465 (PFA) the Adjudicator classified a mother as both a 
paragraph (a) legal and paragraph (b)(i) factual dependant.  
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our law to be indigent means to be in extreme need or want’,251 and thus questioned 
whether a parent in receipt of a state pension could be considered indigent. Similarly, in 
Hamnca v Alexander Forbes, the Adjudicator held that a mother was a nominee rather than 
a dependant because she was in receipt of ‘some income’ by way of a pension and was 
thus not indigent.252 
 
By contrast, in Fourie v CRAF,253 the Adjudicator held that the member’s mother was 
probably a legal dependant but that should he be wrong, she was in any event a financial 
dependant. The member had been living with his mother, but there was no mention of 
capital assets. She was in receipt of a modest private pension and belonged to a medical 
aid. In Wasserman v CRAF,254 the trustees had held that the mother was a non-dependant, 
even though her financial need was indisputable. She was elderly and infirm, and in receipt 
of a modest pension that was insufficient to cover the cost of her retirement home or 
medical expenses. Although the Adjudicator accepted that she appeared to have been 
suffering ‘medical and financial hardship’ for a considerable period of time, on the limited 
evidence he felt it was not clear that she had been owed a duty of support at the time of 
the member’s death. He was, however, satisfied that she was a future dependant. In both 
these cases there were no competing nominees or dependants, and the heir to the 
member’s estate was an unrelated third party.255 
 
In Wellens v Unsgaard Pension Fund, the member’s 83-year-old mother did have sufficient 
income to satisfy her present needs, and a capital asset in the form of immovable property, 
namely the flat in which she lived. The trustees classified her as a future dependant, and 
awarded her half the death benefit, overriding the member’s wish that the full benefit be 
paid to his cohabiting partner. The Adjudicator upheld the trustees’ decision on the basis 
 
251 PFA/GA/6863/05/LCM. She nevertheless accepted that the cohabiting partner was a factual 
dependant without any further enquiry into her existing and future financial means and prospects. 
252 Hamnca (n247) [5.5 & 5.6].  The benefit was a miniscule R26 000 and the other dependants were the 
deceased’s minor children, so the allocation nevertheless appears to be equitable.   
253 Fourie v CRAF (n34). See also Van Drimmelen v CRAF (n247). 
254 [2001] 6 BPLR 2160 (PFA). 
255 The member’s former cohabiting partner in Fourie, and broker in Wasserman.  
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that there was a ‘more than even chance’256 that the member would have become legally 
liable to maintain her in the future, in light of the high costs of medical and frail care which 
he thought it probable she would incur. No consideration was given to the fact that were the 
mother to move out of her home, it could be sold to provide additional income. Similarly, no 
consideration was given to the fact that she had a daughter, who would also be liable to 
maintain her mother to the extent she could afford to do so.257 The determination made no 
mention of the mother’s probable longevity, or of the partner’s relative means and needs.258 
 
The category of future dependant thus provides trustees and the Adjudicator with the 
opportunity to bring an eligible relative within the circle of beneficiaries even though they 
had not yet reached the level of need required to make them an existing dependant.259 It 
appears, however, that unless parents can demonstrate existing need or a very high 
probability of future need, they will not be considered future dependants.260  
 
All these cases stand in sharp contrast to that of the HC in Greyling v GEPF, 261 which held that 
the member’s financially independent mother was his legal dependant. The relevant 
legislation was the Government Employees Pension Law, which contains provisions similar to 
s37C and the definition of dependant. Its definition does not, however, include future 
dependants. There was no mention of the mother’s actual means and needs. The Court 
nevertheless held that the definition included ‘self-supporting and non-dependent’ parents, 
on the basis that parents and children owe one another a contingent duty of support, and 
that the legislature’s objective in excluding benefits from the member’s estate was to secure 
the benefit from creditors’ claims.262  
 
256 Para 16. 
257 She gave her mother R500 once a year. But no assessment was made of her means. 
258 Cf Fundsatwork v Guarnieri (n101), discussed at §4.7.1 below. 
259 In Ndlhovu (n143) & Norris v UKZN (n101) the trustees had identified surviving parents as future 
dependants.  In both the Adjudicator was not satisfied that the information clearly demonstrated that 
they were probable future dependants and remitted the matter to the trustees for further investigation. 
260 Grieseel (n26).  






An unduly restrictive approach that excludes needy parents (or siblings) on the basis that 
they are not yet sufficiently indigent is undesirable. It is more likely to operate to the detriment 
of vulnerable nominated beneficiaries and contingent dependants, undermining s37C’s 
purpose as a result.263 In almost all cases parents should be eligible dependants, even if they 
are earning an income or in receipt of a state or private pension.264 The reason is simply that 
for the overwhelming majority of South Africans, meeting even their basic maintenance 
needs is a struggle. The same holds true for siblings, given the high unemployment rate and 
the fact that working-age individuals do not qualify for state welfare grants. Most South 
Africans, and therefore most surviving relatives, are poor or struggling financially.265 Their 
poverty and vulnerability will increase with age, particularly if they do not have other 
relatives able to support them. Parents and siblings should thus in every case be included 
within the ambit of dependant. They are, after all, always contingent dependants,266 and 
although the future is uncertain, South Africa’s high unemployment and poverty makes it 
more likely than not that all eligible surviving relatives will suffer future financial hardship.   
 
Whether they ultimately share in the distribution of the death benefit is a different question, 
but their inclusion and exclusion in the distribution should rather be determined by a 
consideration of the equities, having regard to the member’s wishes, their relationship with 
the member, and all the beneficiaries’ existing and prospective needs and means. If need is 
what underpins legal duties of support, and if the legislature’s purpose is indeed to protect 
dependants from hardship, it makes little sense that the concept of dependant be 
interpreted in a way that benefits the comparatively secure and affluent to the detriment of 
 
263 See also Jeram (n2) 9.15.5.1.2.  
264 ‘Millions of South Africans retire on 20% or less of their salary’ Personal Finance (8 November 2018). 
265 Unemployment and poverty have increased significantly as a result of the economic impact of the 
Covid-19 lockdown regulations. See further Bell ‘Actuaries warn Ramaphosa of a humanitarian disaster 
to dwarf Covid-19 if restrictive lockdown is not lifted’ Daily Maverick 5 May 2020. 
266 Cf Mokele v SAMWU (n20), in which the member’s sister was held to be neither a legal nor a financial 
dependant. The benefit was as a result paid to his estate. No mention was, however, made of the 
sister’s means and needs, although her address indicates she was living in a township and had claimed 
to be financially dependent on the member.  
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the poorer or less affluent, particularly when doing so is contrary to the member’s own 
wishes.267  
 
If all parents and all siblings are automatically eligible as dependants, it will not impact the 
fiscus unduly.268 When the estate is insolvent creditors will be adversely affected, but in 
enacting s37C the legislature has already made the policy decision to protect the death 
benefit from creditors’ claims when a dependant exists; which, in the case of eligible 
relatives, depends on the point at which they cross the required threshold of ‘need’, an 
uncertain concept at best. It will be exceptional that affluent parents and siblings benefit, 
and the complexities and potential inequitability that may arise from excluding a relative 
who is facing present or future need, but is not yet quite needy enough, does not warrant 
the retention of a definition that creates such difficulties in application. 
 
4.7.1 Addendum: Fundsatwork Umbrella Pension Fund v Guarnieri 
 
The preceding discussion reflected the established interpretation of paragraph (a) and (c) of 
the definition prior to the recent decision of the SCA in Fundsatwork v Guarnieri.269 The 
backdrop to the case was that trustees allocated the largest proportion of a member’s 
death benefit to his aged mother, to the financial detriment of his spouse and children. He 
had not nominated a beneficiary. He and his spouse were separated. His children were 
young adults who were still living in the family home with their mother and were still partially 
dependent on both parents.  
 
The member’s mother died a few days prior to the trustees’ exercising their discretion, a fact 
of which they only became aware some months later, after the benefit had been paid and 
 
267 As happened for eg in Nduku (n54); Ndlhovu (n143); Kirsten (n59).  
268 See §3.2.2 above.  
269 2019 (5) SA 68 (SCA). 
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was probably no longer recoverable from the mother’s beneficiary.270 The member’s spouse 
had informed his employer of his death, but the information had not been transmitted to the 
fund. The widow was understandably upset that her mother-in-law, who was now dead, had 
been allocated the largest share of the benefit, and successfully challenged the distribution 
before both the Adjudicator and HC.271  
 
The fund took the matter on appeal, arguing that the mother had been a legal dependant, 
since the member was under a duty to support her when he died, and that their allocation 
could therefore not be impugned. The SCA disagreed. It did not, however, do so on the basis 
that she did not meet the threshold of indigence required to give rise to the duty, or that the 
allocation was one no reasonable board of trustees could reasonably have reached in the 
circumstances.272  
 
Instead, it quite unnecessarily adopted a novel interpretation of the definition, at odds with 
its established interpretation. It held that the relevant date for determining eligibility under 
paragraph (a) is the date on which the trustees exercise their discretion and allocate the 
benefit, rather than the date of the member’s death. In support of its conclusion it relied on 
the fact that paragraph (a) uses the present tense, ‘is liable’, coupled with the definition of 
member in the Act. It held that a member remains such until the full benefit has been paid, 
no matter that they have died.273 Duties of support that are owed to relatives other than 
children and spouses terminate on death, while only those owed to children and spouses 
 
270 The mother had elected to purchase an annuity, the beneficiary of which was her daughter, who 
was living in Australia.   
271 The Adjudicator’s determination is unreported, and her reasoning must be gleaned from the HC 
decision. It appears that both the Adjudicator and HC accepted that the mother was a financial 
dependant, but set the trustees’ decision aside on the basis that her death was a relevant factor that 
they should have considered when exercising their discretion. See Guarnieri v Fundsatwork 2018 JDR 
0740 (GP). 
272 See Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, s6(2)(h). See also Associated Provincial Picture 
Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223.  
273 Section 1 defines a member as ‘any member or former member … but does not include a person 
who has received all the benefits owed to them by the fund and whose membership has thereafter 
been terminated in accordance with the rules of the fund.’ On the SCA’s interpretation, since every 
person whose benefits had not yet been fully paid remained a member, the inclusion of ‘former 
member’ in the definition is meaningless. A person could only become a former member once all their 
benefits had been paid, at which point they cease to be a member as defined.  
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survive their death. Since the only relatives that the member ‘is’ still liable to support at the 
time the trustees exercise their discretion are spouses and children, the SCA held that the 
legislature had deliberately enacted paragraph (a) in order to protect spouses and children. 
It opined that limiting paragraph (a) dependants to spouses and children would not cause 
hardship, because other relatives would still be eligible if they were in fact financially 
dependent at the time of death, or if the member had owed them a future duty of support. 
Beyond this bald statement, the SCA did not consider the definition of future dependant any 
further. Whereas paragraph (a) has for the past 30 years been understood to refer to inter 
vivos duties of support, on the SCA’s reinterpretation it refers to posthumous duties of support. 
 
The SCA’s decision is understandable. The equitability of the trustees’ decision to award the 
larger share of the benefit to the dependant’s mother, in circumstances in which she was not 
a nominated beneficiary and received minimal financial support from the member, is 
questionable. Had the benefit formed part of the member’s estate, only the spouse and 
children would have inherited on intestacy or would have been entitled to claim 
maintenance from his deceased estate.  
 
Nevertheless, the SCA’s reasoning is flawed. Firstly, the definition expressly includes spouses 
and children. If paragraph (a) is specifically intended to apply to them, it is redundant. The 
only other persons towards whom a member could possibly owe a posthumous duty of 
support are former spouses, provided their divorce order entitles them to maintenance from 
the deceased’s estate.274  
 
Secondly, the SCA’s view that it was intended to apply to spouses who are owed a 
posthumous duty of support under the MSSA must be wrong. The definition of dependant 
 
274 Other contractual undertakings to provide posthumous maintenance would probably be invalid 
pacta successoria. See Volks v Robinson (n226) [136].  
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was adopted before the MSSA was enacted.275 Prior to the MSSA, spouses could not claim 
maintenance from a deceased spouse’s estate.  
 
Thirdly, the SCA fails to appreciate the complementarity between paragraphs (a) and (c). 
The eligible relatives are the same under both.276 On the one hand, it says that the member’s 
death extinguishes an existing duty of support that was already owed to a parent or sibling or 
grandchild or grandparent. On the other hand, it says that any one of these relatives, 
towards whom a duty of support would have arisen in the future, is an eligible dependant. 
The wording of the definition ‘is legally liable’ versus ‘would have become legally liable’ 
makes it clear that these are distinct bases for eligibility. A duty cannot both already be 
owed, and simultaneously be one that will only be owed in the future. Relatives towards 
whom a duty was already owed are therefore excluded, while relatives towards whom a 
duty would only arise in the future are included. It cannot have been the legislature’s 
intention to place those already owed a duty of support in a worse position than those 
towards whom a duty of support was not yet owed. 
 
It could be argued that the SCA’s decision could readily be circumvented, by identifying 
every needy relative as a future rather than existing dependant, especially since this already 
largely accords with Adjudicator practice vis a vis parents. While this may be a practical 
response to the anomaly created by the SCA decision, it should not be necessary for trustees 
to adopt disingenuous reasoning. It will also not be possible in every case. Consider the 
following hypothetical but possible scenario: a maintenance court orders a grandparent to 
provide financial support to a grandchild, but the grandparent is in breach of the 
maintenance order. The grandparent clearly owed the grandchild a legal duty of support at 
the time of her death, which on the SCA’s reasoning terminated on her death. Trustees could 
 
275 Spouses were included as statutory dependants in 1989, see Act 54 of 1989, s20. The MSSA was 
enacted by Act 27 of 1990 and commenced on 1 July 1990.  
276 The only real differences are that paragraph (a) includes former spouses obliged to pay 
maintenance in terms of their divorce order, while paragraph (c) may include fiancées. See Van Zyl v 
Delta (n49). 
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surely not characterise the grandchild as a future rather than existing legal dependant in 
these circumstances.  
The SCA also held, rather cursorily, that a person who was, initially, correctly identified as a 
dependant, ceases to be such when they die. This applies not merely to deaths that occur 
before trustees exercise their discretion, but death that occurs in the period after allocation 
and prior to payment. 277 Equally, a person who was not a dependant when the member 
died could become one in the period prior to the trustees’ allocating the benefit, or could 
cease to be one, if their circumstances changed materially for better or worse. The SCA’s 
decision introduces even more uncertainty into the practical application of s37C. Trustees 
must not only determine that the beneficiary is still alive on the date that payment is made, 
they must ensure that the beneficiaries’ respective circumstances have not changed 
materially in the intervening period. Trustees have been given 12 months to investigate the 
member’s and beneficiaries’ personal and financial circumstances precisely because 
obtaining the necessary information is time-consuming. As the SCA points out, much can 
change during that 12-month period. How, then, can trustees verify that the information is still 
accurate on the day they exercise their discretion or make payment? The expectation that 
they do so requires that trustees have perfect information at all times – which is impossible. 
The SCA’s interpretation of dependant and of the s37C process, cannot be what the 
legislature intended. It again confirms that section 37C, and the definition, are both in need 
of urgent reform.  
277 Paras 25-26. A number of Canadian jurisdictions adopt the same approach with regard to family 
provision claims. See eg Wetzel v National Trust Company 1956 CanLII 194 (SKCA); McMaster Estate (Re) 
1957 CanLII 238 (ABQB); Neyedley Estate v Neyedley 2004 SKQB 79 ; Petrowski v Petrowski (n72). Cf the 
approach adopted in British Columbia, in which claims against a deceased estate survive the death of 
the claimant, although the death of the claimant remains a relevant factor that the court must take 
into consideration in making an award. See Barker v Westminster Trust 1941 CanLii 251 (BCCA), 
discussed and applied in Currie v Estate Bowen 1989 CanLii 2690 (BCSC). See further Pelletier v Erb 
Estate 2002 BCSC 1158; Enns v Gordon Estate 2018 BCSC 705. The approach adopted in British 
Columbia is, I suggest, the preferable approach. The deceased dependant’s own dependants could 
be prejudiced by the approach adopted in Guarnieri, as appears to have been the case in De Beers v 
Hosaf, discussed in Mhango ‘Duty to Investigate Factual Dependants: A Comment on De Beers v Hosaf 
Fibre Provident Fund’ (2008) 29 Indus LJ 2439.  
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4.8 FINANCIAL DEPENDANTS AND COHABITING PARTNERS 
 
The category of dependant that receives the most sympathetic treatment from trustees and 
the Adjudicator is that of factual dependants, more specifically financial dependants.  
 
In one of his earliest determinations the first Adjudicator stated:  
 
In examining the relationship between the deceased and the claimants, the board of a fund 
should avoid unduly fettering its discretion by favouring legal dependants above factual 
dependants without a compelling justification for doing so.278 
 
Whether the first Adjudicator intended that financial dependants be favoured over legal 
dependants is not clear, but that is seemingly how the passage has been interpreted, for 
trustees and the Adjudicator today focus their enquiry almost-entirely on whether a particular 
beneficiary was financially dependent on the deceased.279 If they were, priority is given to 
their claims. If they were not, their claim is subordinated to that of financial dependants. 
Financial dependants are thus prioritised over both other dependants and nominees. It is 
Adjudicator determinations that have directed trustees to prioritise financial dependants, 
and whether they have done so has by and large become the yardstick by which 
equitability is measured.  
 
There is nothing in the wording of s37C or the definition of dependant that warrants this 
prioritisation of financial dependants. The legislature’s original concern was to protect 
financial dependants,280 but this changed in 1989, when legal and future dependants, and 
 
278 Van der Merwe v Southern Life(n61), 10 and repeated in numerous subsequent determinations, such 
as Segal v LRAF [2001] 1 BPLR 1519 (PFA), 1522.  
279 See eg Makhubele v Rand Water [2018] 1 BPLR 114 (PFA) [5.8]: ‘This Tribunal has always maintained a 
view that the litmus test in issues relating to distribution death benefits is whether or not a party was 
financially dependent on the deceased member and if by reason of his death that party stands to 
suffer financial prejudice.’ See also §3.2.1 above. 
280 The original version of s37C, inserted into the PFA by Act 101 of 1976, s21(a), limited the eligible 
beneficiaries to financial dependants and, provided the rules of the fund made provision for them, 
spouses and children. That this was the legislature’s intention was confirmed by a slight rewording of the 
section by the Financial Institutions Amendment Act 80 of 1978, s10 and by the RPF 18th Annual Report 
1976, para 20.  
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spouses as statutory dependants, were included in the definition.281 This was also when 
trustees were given the discretion to apportion the benefit between all the eligible 
beneficiaries, including nominees.282 It is thus far from clear that there is an a priori hierarchy 
in the legislative scheme that favours either dependants over nominees, or financial 
dependants over other dependants.283  
 
If there is a hierarchy, the natural order would logically be that those towards whom the 
member owes an existing duty of support would rank ahead of other dependants. The way 
the definition of dependant in the Act is structured supports this interpretation. The order of 
dependants is legal, then financial, then statutory, and then future dependants. Moreover, 
while members are still alive maintenance orders can be enforced against their retirement 
benefits. The terms of a maintenance order can oblige a fund to deduct the stipulated 
maintenance from the member’s benefit and pay it to the dependant.284 This is an exception 
to the general rule that the benefit is not capable of attachment or reduction.285 Courts can, 
however, only grant maintenance orders when one person has defaulted in their legal duty 
to maintain another.286 While the member is still alive therefore, the only dependants who 
can potentially access the member’s benefit are those whom the member is legally liable to 
maintain. It is anomalous that after the member has died, the persons towards whom she 
owed an existing and enforceable duty of support are supplanted by persons towards whom 
no duty of support was owed. This prioritisation is inherently inequitable and contrary to the 
explicit instruction given to trustees in s37C – to distribute the benefit as they deem equitable.  
 
 
281 Act 54 of 1989, s20. The amendments were made shortly after the release of the SALC (Project 22) 
Report on the introduction of a legitimate portion or the granting of a right to maintenance to the 
surviving spouse (1987). The recommendations in the report led to the adoption of the Maintenance of 
Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990. Children were only inserted as statutory dependants through the 
Pension Funds Amendment Act 22 of 1996, s1(b). 
282 Act 54 of 1989, s21. 
283 Although the definition of pension fund organisation in the Act requires that a fund must be 
established with the objective of providing benefits to members or dependants, this goes to the criteria 
it must satisfy to be registered as a fund. It does not suggest that there is an automatic hierarchy in 
favour of dependants. The definition was also inserted into the Act in 1976, when the only dependants 
were financial dependants and trustees did not have the broad discretion they have had since 1989. 
284 Section 37D(1)(d). 
285 Section 37A(1). 
286 Maintenance Act 99 of 1998, s2. 
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The inequity of automatically preferring financial dependants is exacerbated by the 
construction that the Adjudicator has attached to the concept. The wording of the Act 
clearly envisages that, but for the financial support provided by the member, the beneficiary 
would have been unable to meet their (reasonable) maintenance needs.287 This 
interpretation finds support in English jurisprudence. In Simmonds v White Brothers,288 the 
English Court of Appeal held that to be ‘dependent’ the recipient: 
[M]ust be dependent in the proper sense of that term and it is not sufficient if he was
merely deriving benefit from the earnings of the deceased; he must be to some extent
dependent upon him for the ordinary necessaries of life having regard to his class and
position in life.289
This passage was quoted with approval by the Pensions Ombudsman in Ellaway v IBC 
Pension Trustees Ltd,290 in which the tribunal stated that the mere fact that two persons were 
living together, and that one was deriving a financial benefit from the arrangement, did not 
mean that that person was necessarily dependent on the other.291  
This ‘literal interpretation’ of the Act was rejected by the first Adjudicator in one of his earliest 
determinations, Van der Merwe v Southern Life,292 in which he adopted a ‘purposive and 
contextual interpretation’ to include couples who ‘demonstrated mutual dependence and 
287 In Govender v Alpha (n154) the Adjudicator appears to accept that need is a requirement. It states 
that the beneficiary must have depended on the support to meet their maintenance needs, which 
meant also that the payments had to be regular and not merely ad hoc. 
288 [1899] 1 QB 1005. The Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, s1(3) was 
amended in 2014 to clarify that in order to qualify as a financial dependant, the deceased had to 
have been making a substantial contribution to the beneficiary’s reasonable maintenance needs.  
289 The court was interpreting the term as used in the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1897.  
290 PO 80200/1 (15 February 2011). 
291 Paragraph 81. It was also applied in Wild v Smith (1996) OPLR 129, in which the Ombudsman 
overturned the trustees’ identification of a person as a financial dependant merely because she had 
lived with the deceased for some time, during which he had paid all the household bills. The court 
upheld the tribunal’s determination. Cf the Australian decision of Faull v SCT [1999] NSWSC 1137, which 
found that a son’s payment of board and lodging to his mother made her a financial dependant, even 
though she did not need the money. The reason the court adopted a liberal interpretation was 
because it wanted to give effect to the member’s wishes and prevent the benefit from falling into his 
estate. He had nominated his mother as his beneficiary, but she was not eligible unless she could be 
brought within the statutory circle of beneficiaries. Cf SCT D14-15\135 (19 December 2014), in which a 
mother whose son lived with her, and who contributed to her expenses by buying her cigarettes, 
takeaways and petrol, was held not to be his financial dependant. He had, however, not nominated 
any beneficiaries. 
292 [2000] 3 BPLR 321 (PFA) [13-14]. 
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ran a shared and common household’.293 While the Adjudicator’s aim was to bring 
unmarried cohabiting partners within the ambit of the Act, his interpretation was described 
as doing ‘violence to the plain language’294 of the Act and set in motion a practice that 
essentially deems every cohabiting partner to be financially dependent on the other.  
 
The Adjudicator’s explanation for adopting this purposive interpretation was that the 
legislature deliberately included financial dependants in the definition in order to:  
 
… broaden the category of persons entitled to share in death benefits by including persons 
involved in relationships which the law traditionally does not accept as constituting legal 
dependancy. The provision has the progressive aim of recognising that modern society is 
tolerant of relationships besides the nuclear family arrangements sanctioned by the common 
law.295 
 
Section 37C’s history does not support this interpretation, however. The original dependants 
were financial dependants and they remained the primary dependants until 1989. It was 
only then that the definition was broadened to include legal and future dependants and 
spouses as statutory dependants. It was also only in 1989 that trustees could include 
nominees within their distribution alongside dependants. It was only in 1996 that children 
were included within the ambit of statutory dependants. The definition was thus broadened 
not to include unmarried partners, but to include those towards whom the deceased owed 
an existing or contingent legal duty of support, and to better safeguard the interests of 
spouses and children.  
 
This definitional change was undoubtedly necessary given that the unfortunate, and 
probably unintended, consequence of the legislative scheme prior to 1989 was that a 
member’s death benefit could be utilised to continue supporting a person to whom the 
deceased owed no duty of support in life, while those towards whom he did owe a duty of 
support, including his spouse and children, could continue to be deprived of support 
 
293 Ibid. 
294 De Wilzem v SARAF [2005] 2 BPLR 180 (PFA) [10]. 
295 Van der Merwe v Southern Life (n61), 13. 
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precisely because he had been in default of his duties during his lifetime. Had the member 
been fulfilling his duties, they would have qualified as financial dependants.296 The irony is 
thus that s37C could, in practice, operate as a form of legislated disinheritance of a 
member’s closest family. Injustices committed by the deceased during his lifetime would thus 
be perpetuated after death, and this was so even if the deceased tried to remedy his past 
neglect by nominating them as his beneficiaries.  
 
The real difficulty that the Adjudicator sought to address by his liberal interpretation of 
factual dependant was not that the definition did not include cohabiting partners. It was 
that the definition as worded did not encompass cohabiting life partners who were 
economically self-sufficient and thus quite capable of surviving on their own resources.297 The 
definition operated to the particular detriment of economically equal or self-sufficient same-
sex partners who, prior to the adoption of the Civil Union Act,298 could not marry and would 
not otherwise have been eligible as financial dependants, irrespective of the nature and 
duration of their relationship.299 Given the lack of social acceptance and legal recognition 
accorded same-sex partners at the time, it would have been difficult even for a financially-
dependent partner to come forward and lay claim to the benefit, particularly had the 
member not nominated them as a beneficiary. 
 
Unfortunately, in seeking to include cohabiting partners within the circle of eligible 
beneficiaries, the Adjudicator adopted an interpretation of financial dependant that 
requires only that a couple ‘ran a shared and common household’.300 Once the fact of their 
cohabitation is established, they are presumed to be financially ‘interdependent’ or 
 
296 They were, however, also entitled to consideration provided the fund rules expressly included them. 
See the definition of dependant in Act 101 of 1976, s21(a). 
297 Van der Merwe v Southern Life (n61); Muir v Mutual & Federal [2002] 9 BPLR 3864 (PFA). An example 
of a partner who was financially dependent in the literal sense, and whose dependency was 
attributable to the relationship, is Grobler v Penkoop PFA/NP/2153/2005/RM.  
298 Act 17 of 2006. 
299 See eg TWC v Rentokil (n237); Martin v Beka [2000] 2 BPLR 196 (PFA); Till v Unilever [2000] 11 BPLR 1297 
(PFA).  
300 Musgrave (n36); Swanepoel (n34); Thene (n43); Mitchell v Alnet [2014] JOL 31439 (PFA). 
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‘mutually dependent’.301 Living together, sharing expenses or simply being financially 
generous has sufficed in case after case to bring almost all cohabiting partners within the 
fold of financial dependant. No distinction is drawn between relationships of short302 and 
long duration.303 The inclusion of all cohabiting partners as ipso facto financial dependants,304 
would not be so problematic if the Adjudicator did not perceive s37C’s primary purpose as 
being to protect financial dependants,305 and that the only meaningful way to equitably 
distribute a benefit is to base the distribution on the extent of a beneficiary’s dependence.306 
The extent of a partner’s dependency is calculated by reference to the extent of the 
partner’s contribution to the common household, and the assumption is that the partner will 
be ‘financially worse off’ commensurate with the loss of that contribution.307  
 
More recently, Adjudicators have begun to conclude that cohabiting partners are for that 
reason alone also life partners, and therefore spouses, and therefore legal dependants.308  In 
none of these determinations has the Adjudicator sought to establish whether the partners 
had undertaken reciprocal duties of support towards one another.   
 
The Adjudicator’s characterisation of cohabiting partners as financial dependants and/or life 
partners results in significant legal anomalies, both with regard to the treatment of death 
benefits, and with regard to the treatment of death benefits versus the ordinary assets in the 
 
301 Van Vuuren v CRAF [2000] 6 BPLR 661 (PFA); Swanepoel (n34). Cf Van der Merwe v CRAF [2005] 5 
BPLR 463 (PFA). Dependants in Australia include those in interdependency relationships, but the 
legislation contains clear criteria and guidelines. See Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 
(Cth), s 10A; Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 1.04AAAA. 
302 Minnaar (n18) (unstated); Whitcombe (n13) (< 24 months); Marais (n13) (22 months); Kirsten (n59) (18 
months); Esterhuizen v CRAF [2013] 3 BPLR 355 (PFA) (6 months); Makume v Sentinel (n52) (2 months). 
303 Examples of comparatively long relationships include Van der Merwe v Southern Life (n61) (9 years), 
TWC v Rentokil (n237) (5 years), Mitchell v Alnet (n300) (6 years); Till v Unilever (n299) (25 years); Hlathi v 
University of Fort Hare [2009] 1 BPLR 46 (PFA) (9-year cohabitation, 17-year relationship). 
304 Unless, it seems, the deceased is also survived by a spouse. In Hubner v Tesuco [2015] 2 BPLR 208 
(PFA) the Adjudicator dismissed a complaint by a cohabiting partner, of about one year, on the basis 
that she had not demonstrated that she was in fact financially dependent on the member during his 
lifetime. The partner had supported and nursed the member through his illness. Her claim that she was a 
‘common law’ spouse was also given no consideration. However equitable the decision may be, it 
does not accord with the sympathetic treatment generally afforded cohabiting partners. 
305 Gorrah (n63) [5.3]; Winnan v MEPF PFA/KZN/12789/07/MQ [5.1]; Varachia v SAB [2015] 2 BPLR 310 
(PFA) [5.3]; Maubane (n191) [5.4].  
306 Malan v Preservation PF [2017] 2 BPLR 256 (PFA) [5.10]. 
307 See eg Kirsten (n59) & §5.5.3 below.  
308 Minnaar (n18); Whitcombe (n13); Esterhuizen (n302); Makume v Sentinel (n52). 
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member’s estate. For the purpose of a death benefit even comparatively affluent 
cohabiting partners, who are not dependent in the literal sense, are presumed to be 
financial dependants.309 Their actual need is irrelevant,310  although it remains relevant for 
other relatives and third parties claiming financial dependence.311  It means that the mere 
act of moving in with someone creates an almost immediate ‘entitlement’ to share in their 
death benefit, which may be the deceased’s most valuable property.   
 
Cohabiting partners in relationships of long duration have no right to share in their deceased 
partner’s estate. They similarly have no right to claim maintenance from the estate. In order 
to succeed in a proprietary claim, they need to prove that they and their partner had 
entered into a universal partnership.312 The requirements for establishing the existence of a 
universal partnership are onerous and success uncertain.313 In order to succeed in a 
maintenance claim, which could yield a similar outcome to a proprietary claim, same-sex 
partners must prove that they and the deceased had undertaken reciprocal duties of 
support, which is the defining characteristic of a life partnership. Opposite-sex partners have 
no such claim, even if a life partnership existed between them and the deceased.314 Need is, 
moreover, an essential requirement for a maintenance claim against a deceased estate, 
even for spouses.315 
 
 
309 Kirsten (n59). See also Minnaar (n18); Van der Merwe v Southern Life (n61); Muir (n297). 
310 Ibid. Cf Marais (n13) (cohabitation agreement interpreted as evidence of lack of need). 
311 See §4.4 & 4.5.1 above. 
312 See eg Ponelat v Schrepfer 2012 (1) SA 206 (SCA); Butters v Mncora (n218). Cf the facts of Steyn v 
Hasse 2015 (4) SA 405 (WCC), in which the claim was unsuccessful. The applicant in Steyn might well 
have been considered a financial dependant. 
313 See further Bonthuys ‘Exploring universal partnerships and putative marriages as tools for awarding 
partnership property in contemporary family law’ (2016) 19 PELJ. 
314 In Volks v Robinson (n226), the majority intimated that an opposite-sex partner would enjoy only such 
right to maintenance as the deceased had expressly undertaken to provide. O’Regan’s minority 
judgment points out that a contractual undertaking that binds the estate is an invalid pactum 
successorium. Maintenance claims by opposite-sex partners following separation have all been 
unsuccessful. See McDonald v Young (n228), Du Toit v Greyling (n228). Cf Paixão (n77), in which an 
opposite-sex partner successfully argued that a legal duty of support had arisen, but this was a loss of 
support claim against the Road Accident Fund arising from the wrongful death of the claimant’s 
partner, rather than a direct claim against the partner or his estate.  
315 Friedrich v Smit (n146). 
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It is doubtful that the legislature intended to prioritise the claims of financial dependants, as 
understood by the Adjudicator, to death benefits, while denying spouses married in 
community of property their matrimonial property rights in respect of the death benefit. It is 
also doubtful that cohabiting partners in relationships of short duration were intended to 
enjoy a virtual entitlement to the death benefit when spouses and life partners, with a 
stronger legal and moral claim, do not have the right to share in the member’s estate.316  
The result of this disparate treatment is that the level of protection afforded to similarly-
situated spouses and life partners is not determined by their personal circumstances but by 
happenstance, namely the nature of the property in issue — death benefits or ordinary 
assets. It is similarly doubtful that the legislature intends to subordinate the death benefit 
claims of legal dependants, future dependants, spouses and children to those of recent, and 
potentially short-lived, financial dependants. The automatic privileging of financial 
dependants in relation to death benefit distributions is inherently inequitable vis a vis the 
member’s other dependants, nominees and heirs.  
4.9 CONCLUSION 
The definition of dependant is broad and imprecise. It requires that trustees undertake 
extensive investigations into the personal and financial circumstances of potentially eligible 
beneficiaries, and that they thereafter make difficult findings of fact and law to determine 
who, within the member’s circle of family, friends and acquaintances, is properly speaking a 
dependant. The definitional imprecision increases the likelihood of erroneous identification. It 
also, however, gives trustees the opportunity to interpret the definition ‘purposively’ or 
literally, liberally or restrictively, to include or prioritise beneficiaries in ways that accord with 
their own sympathies and preferences. Section 37C cannot fulfil its purpose, of protecting 
316 On the limited rights of cohabiting partners and putative spouses, see also Bonthuys ‘A duty of 
support for ALL unmarried intimate partners Part 2: developing customary and common law and 
circumventing the Volks judgment’ (2018) 21 PELJ 1. 
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dependants or ensuring that the benefit is distributed equitably, if trustees fail in their first task 
– correctly identifying the member’s dependants. 
 
Equally importantly, members need to be able to identify which of their kith and kin is a 
dependant within the meaning of the Act. Members cannot regulate their financial affairs, or 
make informed testamentary or life choices, if they do not know whether their plans and 
wishes might ultimately be frustrated because they failed to make any, or better, provision for 
a person they did not realise was a ‘dependant’.317  
 
The rule of law requires that laws be rational, reasonably clear, and reasonably certain as to 
their consequences. Laws that are unclear and unpredictable violate a foundational 
principle of the rule of law: that those subject to the law be able to understand its meaning 
and its legal consequences.318 Without the necessary certainty and clarity, individuals do not 
know that the choices they make will yield the outcomes they desire.  
 
Section 37C does not satisfy these requirements. Its precise purpose is not readily discernible. 
Its rationality is doubtful. Its raison d’être is seemingly the protection of dependants. Yet, 
despite its expansive definition of dependant, the exact requisites of each category are 
unclear and difficult to apply in practice. The Adjudicator’s interpretation of the definition, 
and understanding of s37C’s purpose, has led to significant inconsistencies in the treatment 
of similarly situated dependants and beneficiaries. These inconsistencies increase the 
potential for the inequitable application of s37C at the point at which trustees exercise their 
distributive discretion.  
 
The next chapter analyses how trustees exercise their discretion, and how Adjudicators have 
influenced trustee decision-making: the factors they take into consideration, the extent to 
 
317 ‘People rely on certainty of the law in settling their affairs, in particular in making contracts or 
settlements.’ - Lord Reid ‘The judge as law maker’ (1972-1973) 12 Journal for the Society of Public Law 
Teachers 22, 23. 
318 Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC) [47]; Affordable Medicines Trust (n9) [108]. 
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which they override members’ wishes, and whether they apply s37C in ways that promote 
equitable outcomes as between beneficiaries. The chapter is the first part of the analysis of 
the nature and extent of s37C’s limitation on members’, spouses’ and children’s 
constitutional rights. Its focus is the nature of the limitation, the grant of wide discretionary 





A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF TRUSTEE DISCRETION AND ADJUDICATOR 
OVERSIGHT 
 
The allocation of death benefits must without a doubt be the most 
emotional and time-consuming task for trustees. … Section 37C in its 
present form is inflexible and does not provide sufficient guidance on 




Section 37C confers a ‘wide discretion’ on trustees to decide who, amongst the 
beneficiaries, will share in the benefit and by how much they will share.2 The only 
consideration is fairness. Despite the breadth of their discretion, trustees have frequently 
been castigated for exercising their discretion improperly.3 The second Adjudicator’s rather 
damning opinion was that ‘[m]any trustees [including attorneys] appear not to have a clue 
what discretion is’.4  
 
Such criticisms are cause for concern.5 Discretion lies at the heart of s37C. Yet the criticism 
implies that members and beneficiaries cannot trust the s37C process – that either trustees 
are too-often not equal to the task of performing their duties properly, or that the task 
required of them exceeds what can reasonably be expected of them.6  
 
1 Sanlam Benchmark Survey: Research Summary (2017), 5. 
2 Government Employees Pension Fund v Buitendag [2006] 4 BPLR 284 (SCA) [6]. 
3 See Sithole v ICS [2000] 4 BPLR 430 (PFA); Muir v Mutual & Federal [2002] 9 BPLR 3864 (PFA); Morgan v 
SA Druggists [2001] 4 BPLR 1886 (PFA); Seymour-Smith v Maxam Dantex 2008 JDR 0362 (W). 
4 OPFA AR 2004/2005, 68: ‘Now, although in our statistics we do not have a category that shows the 
number of instances in which we have had to grapple with the issue of trustee discretion in the 
complaints we have received, I can confidently say this issue has come up (directly or indirectly) in 
most of the complaints.’  
5 For members, beneficiaries and stakeholders such as government, for enacting s37C, employers, for 
establishing retirement funds that provide for the payment of approved death benefits, when those 
benefits could equally be provided by the employer directly through group life insurance, in which 
case they would not be subject to s37C and the discretionary power of trustees. 
6 See eg Broodryk v Die Meester 1991 (4) SA 825 (C), in which the court held that the Master could not 
be expected to resolve factual disputes between creditors, interested parties and the estate. See also 
Jewaskewitz v Master of the High Court, Polokwane [2013] ZAGPPHC 118 (16 May 2013) in which the 




This chapter describes and critiques how s37C operates in practice, relying on Adjudicator 
determinations to illustrate the breadth of the trustees’ discretion, the frequency with which 
trustees override members’ express or tacit wishes, the justifications they offer when doing so, 
and the extent to which Adjudicators have shaped their decision-making. It seeks to 
demonstrate that trustees do not intervene only in circumstances in which the member’s 
choices are ‘indisputably harmful’, in the sense that all reasonable people would agree that 
giving effect to the member’s wishes would be unconscionable in the particular 
circumstances.7 This chapter also provides the context for my analysis, in chapter six, of 
s37C’s impact on the rights to property, dignity and equality, which is the heart of my 
examination into the nature and extent of S37C’s limitation on constitutional rights. 
 
5.2 THE NATURE OF TRUSTEES’ EQUITABLE DISCRETION  
 
Trustees, when performing their s37C duties, have been described as administrative bodies 
wielding considerable quasi-judicial power.8 How are these various descriptions relevant to 
assessing what equitable discretion means within the context of s37C, and what it requires of 
trustees?9 Simply that the equitable discretion conferred on trustees has been conferred for 
the same purpose it is conferred on the judiciary, which is to ameliorate the harsh 
consequences that might otherwise arise from an application of rigid rules of law.10 In the 
 
officer, to adjudicate disputed maintenance claims. Are trustees better placed to do so than the 
Master? 
7 See Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A), 9, and §2.3 above. 
8 Mashazi v African Products 2003 (1) SA 629 (W); Titi v Fundsatwork [2011] JOL 28125 (ECM); Letsoalo v 
Lukhaimane 2018 JDR 0277 (GP); Guarnieri v Fundsatwork 2018 JDR 0740 (GP); Seymour-Smith (n3) [19]. 
9 Note Willis J’s complaint in Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers of the 
Newtown Urban Village [2012] JOL 29675 (GSJ) [33]: ‘The words “just and equitable” glide from the 
tongue with facility. Their precise meaning eludes easy description’. 
10 See Brady ‘Equity without equity lawyers’ 1976 Acta Juridica 125. Jonathan Law (ed) Dictionary of 
Law OUP 8ed (2015) defines ‘quasi-judicial’ as: ‘Describing a function that resembles the judicial 
function in that it involves deciding a dispute and ascertaining the facts and any relevant law, but 
differs in that it depends ultimately on the exercise of an executive discretion rather than the 
application of law.’ 
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s37C context, it is to prevent or remedy wrongs that would otherwise arise if the laws of 
testate and intestate succession were invariably applied.11  
 
As such, I believe that s37C requires that the trustees’ decision be more than a procedurally 
fair and substantively reasonable decision.12 It must be an equitable decision.13 Equitability is 
about individual justice.14 Just as reasonable people may reasonably differ on the 
reasonableness of a decision, so too may reasonable people differ on the equitability of a 
decision.15 The line between equitable and inequitable is, perhaps, somewhat easier to draw 
and the margin of discretion somewhat narrower than establishing whether a decision falls 
outside the ‘range of reasonableness’.16 For equitable decisions are just decisions, and justice 
requires that the decision renders unto each his due.17 Since trustees’ discretion only arises 
 
11 White v Vandervell Trustees Ltd (No 2) [1974] EWCA Civ 7: ‘Every unjust decision is a reproach to the 
law or to the Judge who administers it. If the law should be in danger of doing injustice, then equity 
should be called in to remedy it. Equity was introduced to mitigate the rigour of the law.’  
12 As required under PAJA, especially ss3 and 6(2)(h).  
13 The fact that the two are not synonymous is apparent from the bases on which tribunals can 
intervene in trustee decisions in England and Australia. In the former they may do so if the decision was 
procedurally unfair or substantively unreasonable. They may not, however, intervene because they 
consider it unfair. See Edge v Pensions Ombudsman [1999] 4 All ER 546 (CA). In Australia, trustees may 
only intervene if they consider the decision substantively unfair or unreasonable. See Superannuation 
(Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993, s14(2). A decision that excludes a financially self-supporting child 
may be reasonable but unfair when assessed against the contributions the child made to the parent’s 
welfare. A decision that excludes a financially needy child may be fair but unreasonable when 
assessed against the parent’s ability to provide support and the absence of competing beneficiaries. 
14 As explained by Satchwell J in Botha v Botha 2009 (3) SA 89 (W) [46] ‘What is thought to be a "just" 
order in the context of the Divorce Act must contain a moral component of what is thought to be 
"right" and "fair". Fairness envisages that the order is "appropriate" as between the parties and when 
measured against all the factors specified in section 7(2) and those others which a court decides 
should also be taken into account. What is "appropriate" brings one back full circle to the moral 
consideration that the order must be “deserved”. Of course, any "just" order must be "well founded" on 
fact and reflect relevant and proper legal principles.’ See also Froneman J in Beadica 231 CC v 
Trustees of the Oregon Trust [2020] ZACC 13 [173, 293]: ‘Public policy takes into consideration the 
necessity to do simple justice between individuals and is informed by the concept of ubuntu’. 
15 See Brand ‘The role of good faith, equity and fairness in the South African Law of contract’ (2009) 
126(1) SALJ 71, who provides examples of cases in which judges reached opposite conclusions as to 
the reasonableness of standard suretyship contracts. One example involved the same judge, who 
concluded in one case that it was reasonable and in another that it was unreasonable. Cf Koekemoer 
v Sanlam [2015] 1 BPLR 25 (PFA) [5.6]: ‘It is no coincidence that the first and second respondents’ 
allocations are virtually the same. It would have been an anomaly if the two boards relying on the 
same information and applying the same principles were to come to two diametrically opposing 
conclusions.’ 
16 In Graham v MEPF PFA/EC/10/98/JM [22] the Adjudicator upheld the trustees’ decision on the basis 
that if fell within the ‘range of reasonable’ decisions. In Schleicher v SARAF [2002] 7 BPLR 3677 (PFA) [14] 
the decision was upheld on the basis that it was not so ‘illegitimate’ that a reasonable board of trustees 
could not have reached it.  
17 See Van Zyl ‘The significance of the concepts of justice and equity in law and legal thought’ (1988) 
105(2) SALJ 272, fn4 quoting Ulpian’s three fundamental principles of law: Juris praecepta sunt haec: 
honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere.  
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when there are competing beneficiaries, it must strive to be just as between the 
beneficiaries.18 Each beneficiary should receive their ‘just deserts’, what they are entitled to 
as of moral right.19  
 
How, however, does one determine what is morally right, other than by one’s own, intuitive 
sense of fairness?20 Trustee decisions must be based on something other than their own 
subjective preferences, otherwise s37C would simply entail that their subjective view of the 
equities is substituted for the member’s.21 
 
The answer is that their decision must be informed by, and align with, generally-accepted 
conceptions of fairness.22 Trustees must be conformist, not maverick – unless the generally-
accepted conception is inequitable, in which case they should explain why they think that 
this is so and why their conception is more equitable.23 Courts have consistently held that the 
only way to arrive at an equitable decision is for the decision-maker to objectively consider 
all relevant facts,24 to do so in accordance with established legal principle,25 and to carefully 
balance the parties’ competing interests.26  
 
18 See also Botha v Botha (n14).  
19 See Media Workers Association of South Arica v Press Corporation of South Africa Ltd ('Perskor') 1992 
(4) SA 791 (A) 795, explaining that judicial discretion involves a ‘value judgment as to what is right, 
reasonable, fair and equitable.’ See also Sidumo v Rustenberg Platinum Mines [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) 
[61-64]. See further Brady ‘Equity without equity lawyers’ 1976 Acta Juridica 125 for a discussion of the 
origins of equitable discretion. 
20 See Kennedy ‘Equitable remedies and principled discretion: the Michigan experience’ (1997) 74(4) 
University of Detroit Mercy LR 609: ‘All writers on the subject of equity, regardless of their philosophical 
persuasion, agree that the terms "equity" and "equitable" are difficult to define. A decision that rests 
solely on "equity" is an analytically naked, and analytically suspect, decision. It is a decision that rests on 
nothing more than the judge's subjective feelings of what is fair under the circumstances.’ 
21 See Numsa v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd 1996 (4) SA 577 (A), with regard to the assessment of the 
fairness of dismissals. 
22 See Tataryn v Tataryn Estate [1994] 2 SCR 807, 18 on relying on community standards in deciding on 
the existence and scope of a moral obligation to provide support. See also Lord Denning: ‘Justice is the 
solution that the majority of right-minded people would consider fair’, quoted in Stephens The 
Jurisprudence of Lord Denning: A study in legal history Vol 3 (2009), 2. See also Ch 2.3. 
23 See also Parkinson ‘Constitutional Law and the limits of discretion in Family Law’ (2016) 44 Federal LR 
49. 
24 See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) [23 & 30]. 
25 See Baloyi v Ellerine [2005] 7 BPLR 606 (PFA), in which the second Adjudicator quoted from the English 
case of Sharp v Wakefield (1891) AC 173 (at 179) in explaining how trustees were expected to exercise 
their discretion: ‘“Discretion” means when it is said that something must be done within the discretion of 
the authorities, that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not 
according to private opinion: according to law and not humour. It is to be, not arbitrary, vague and 




Do trustees exercise their discretion in accordance with these principles? What are the 
relevant factors and established legal principles that should inform their discretion, and do 
they successfully balance the competing interests of the affected beneficiaries? 
 
5.3 THE RELEVANT FACTORS 
 
Given the absence of legislative guidance, the first Adjudicator stepped into the void and 
identified a ‘basket of factors’ that he considered relevant when deciding on an equitable 
allocation of benefits.27 The factors, coupled with Adjudicator determinations, are the only 
guidelines available to trustees, and Adjudicators do expect trustees to be ‘guided’ by 
them.28  
 
The relevant factors are:29  
- the age of the beneficiaries 
- their relationship with the deceased 
- the extent of their dependency 
- their respective financial affairs  
- their future earning potential and prospects  
- the wishes of the deceased  
- the amount available for distribution. 
 
embody the ‘inner morality of law’: generality, prospectivity, clarity, stability, consistency, feasibility, 
constancy, prospectivity and congruence and so on whose observance is bound up with the basics of 
legal craftsmanship’.  
26 See Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) [712-713]; Sidumo (n19) [64]; Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers (n24) [23&30]. See also Johannesburg Housing Corporation 
(n9) [39-50] and the cases discussed therein.  
27 Van der Merwe v Southern Life [2000] 3 BPLR 321 (PFA) [8]. 
28 Although determinations do not constitute formal precedent, as acknowledged by the second 
Adjudicator (see Ngalwana ‘A large hole is filled’ (Book Review) Today’s Trustee (July/September 2010) 
they nevertheless constitute a form of quasi-precedent for trustees, for some Adjudicators, albeit 
incorrectly, consider them to be binding on all funds and not merely on the parties to the dispute. See 
OPFA AR 2008/2009, discussing the determination in Barnard v Municipal Gratuity Fund 
PFA/GA/24186/2008/SM, in which the Adjudicator rejected the fund’s argument that its determinations 
do not constitute binding precedent. The Adjudicator misconstrued the meaning of s30O, on which it 
relied for this view.  
29 Van der Merwe v Southern Life (n27); Musgrave v Unisa [2000] 4 BPLR 415 (PFA); Ruiters v Telkom 




These seven factors can, I suggest, more helpfully be grouped into three heads: the wishes of 
the deceased; the beneficiary’s relationship with the deceased; and the financial 
circumstances of the beneficiary. The seventh factor, the amount of the death benefit, is not 
routinely mentioned as a relevant factor.30 Factors three to five all speak to the beneficiary’s 
financial circumstances.  
 
The Adjudicator has stated that all these factors are always relevant to the determination of 
what is equitable, but that they do not represent a closed list.31 The trustees must discern 
what other factors are relevant on the specifics of a case.  
 
These factors only tell trustees what they should consider. They do not tell them what the 
relative importance of each factor is.32 It is how individuals weigh the evidence, what they 
consider more, or less, important in the circumstances, that informs their sense of what is 
equitable.33 The weight to attach to each factor is, Adjudicators have emphasised, the 
trustees’ prerogative.34 They have been assured that it is their sense of the equities that 
matters, provided only that they have applied their minds properly. Despite these 
assurances, the early Adjudicators readily overrode and substituted their decisions for the 
trustees’, on the basis that the trustees had either not considered all the relevant factors or 
 
30 The first six factors are referred to in almost every determination, while the last factor receives 
sporadic mention, even when it is highly relevant. It was identified as important in Masoabi v CRAF 
PFA/FS/6859/06/CN and Uys v Private Security Unreported PFA/WE/11138/2006/LN and Bolsiki v Private 
Sector PFA/EC/10538/2006/LN but was seemingly considered irrelevant in Baloyi v PPWAWU 
PFA/NP/11689/2006/LTN.  
31 Ruiters (n29). 
32 Glendon ‘Fixed rules and discretion in contemporary family law and succession law’ (1985-1986) 60 
Tulane LR 1165, 1196: ‘A list of factors with no indication of relative weight and no over-arching 
guideline other than the vague admonition to be fair is virtually the same as providing no factors.’  
33 These same concerns have been made in England regarding the absence of guidelines to assist 
courts weight the relative importance of the factors they are expected to consider when deciding 
family provision claims against deceased estates. See Ilott v The Blue Cross [2017] UKSC 17 [61]. 
34 Jordaan v Protektor [2001] 2 BPLR 1593 (PFA) 1597. See also Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs & Tourism 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) [49], in which the CC confirmed that the 




had not applied their minds properly.35 When doing so Adjudicators were clearly animated 
by their own sense of the equities.36 Adjudicator perceptions of what is equitable, having 
regard to these factors, have thus been influential in shaping trustee decision-making. Have 
they, however, consistently guided trustees towards outcomes that are objectively 
equitable?  
 
In the section that follows, I consider the equitability of trustees’ allocative choices and 
Adjudicator determinations in a selection of cases. The cases were selected because they 
demonstrate how often members’ reasonable wishes are overridden, in circumstances in 
which the trustees’ or Adjudicators’ choices are not obviously more equitable, and are 
arguably less equitable, than those of the member; how often decisions are taken on the 
basis of incomplete information; and how the principles laid down by the Adjudicators are 
often inconsistent. These are not the only pertinent cases, but space constraints do not 
permit an analysis of all such cases.   
 
5.4 A SELECTION OF CASES37  
 
As the cases will show, most disputes involve spouses and cohabiting partners, either as 
complainants or respondents. This is equally true of other jurisdictions.38 In my critique of the 
selected cases I first provide a synopsis of the stated facts, evaluate whether the decision 
was based on a consideration of all the relevant facts, and then try to discern what principle 
 
35 As Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 509 observes, the opportunity to decide that a factor, or fact, 
was relevant or irrelevant gives a reviewing body considerable scope to intervene if it is so inclined. 
36 See eg TWC v Rentokil [2000] 2 BPLR 216 (PFA); Morgan (n3); Magwaza v BB Cereals [2002] 1 BPLR 
2978 (PFA), in which the Adjudicator’s sense of the equities led him to conclude that the trustees had 
not applied their minds properly when deciding to divide the benefit in equal portions amongst the 
dependent children, given the large differences in their ages.  
37 Adjudicator determinations are usually short. When I use phrases and expressions as they appear in 
the determinations, I do not cite the relevant page or paragraph unless they are a statement of 
principle. I round the value of the death benefit and allocations. 
38 See §7.3.4 below. 
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trustees are likely to extract from each determination.39 In each of the selected cases, the 
member’s wishes were overridden.  
 
Since trustees performing their s37C duties are organs of state, bound by the BoR, they should 
surely intervene to override the member’s wishes only when there is a compelling reason to 
do so. Their intervention should, therefore, be limited to those instances in which the 
member’s choice is manifestly unjust. As discussed in chapter two, whether the member’s 
choices are manifestly unjust should be determined by reference to the legal and moral 
convictions of the community. It should, therefore, firstly be determined by reference to the 
member’s existing legal obligations and the outcome that would have resulted had the 
death benefit formed part of the member’s estate. If trustees intervene in circumstances in 
which the member’s choice was not manifestly unjust, is their own decision not arguably 
unconstitutional? If trustees fail to take into consideration the existence and scope of 
members’ legal obligations towards a particular beneficiary, are they not failing to consider 
factors relevant to the exercise of their discretion?  
 
Even if s37C does provide trustees with the discretion to substitute their judgment for that of 
the member even when the member’s own wishes were not unreasonable or inequitable, 
are trustee decisions any the more reasonable or equitable than the member’s? Are trustees 
correcting injustices perpetrated by the member, or simply committing their own injustices, 
based on their subjective sense of what is equitable?   
 
5.4.1 Competing claimants: spouses and partners 
 
 
39 In almost every determination Adjudicators explain that the only grounds of review are whether 
trustees considered all relevant factors, ignored irrelevant factors, and did not fetter their discretion. See 
eg Van Schalkwyk v MEPF [2003] 8 BPLR 5087 (PFA) [14] and the determinations cited in this chapter. 
Trustees’ undue respect for member nominations has been characterised as a fettering of their 
discretion, as has their failure to consider relevant factors. See eg Williams v FFE [2001] 2 BPLR 1678 
(PFA); Nayager v Tesuco [2013] 2 BPLR 224 (PFA). 
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5.4.1.1 Van Vuuren v Central Retirement Annuity Fund  
 
In Van Vuuren,40 the member had nominated his cohabiting partner of two years as the sole 
beneficiary of his modest, R203 000, death benefit. He was also survived by his widow (the 
complainant) of almost 30 years, to whom he was married out of community of property and 
against whom he had initiated divorce proceedings, and two adult children, a medical 
doctor and qualified psychologist respectively. The trustees divided the benefit 50/50 
between the partner and widow. 
  
Their reasons for including the widow in the distribution was that she was in financial need, 
that the marriage had been a very long one, and that she had made tremendous financial 
and other contributions to the marriage and raising the children. Their reasons for including 
the partner was that she and the deceased had been financially inter-dependent for 2½ 
years, had bought a house together, she was experiencing greater financial difficulty than 
the widow, she was the only nominated beneficiary and she was the sole heir to his estate, 
which was insolvent. In deciding to divide the benefit equally, they also took into 
consideration that the deceased and widow were married out of community of property. 
They thus thought it unlikely that she would share in his pension interest on divorce.  
 
The Adjudicator upheld the widow’s complaint and set aside the trustees’ decision. He 
varied their allocation, awarding 67% to the widow and 33% to the partner. His reasons were 
that the trustees had failed to consider a material fact, which was that the partner had 
received R23 000 under a different policy; that the widow would probably have obtained a 
redistribution order on divorce, entitling her to share in the deceased’s pension interest;41 that 
the widow was 53-years-of-age, in a temporary job earning R4300 per month, with no 
medical aid or pension scheme, while the partner was age 45, in a permanent job earning 
R5700 per month, with medical aid and a pension scheme. He thus concluded that the 
 
40 [2000] 6 BPLR 661 (PFA). 
41 Courts may grant a redistribution order when spouses had entered into a marriage out of community 
of property prior to 1 November 1984, which is when the accrual system was introduced. See 
Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984, s2 rtw Divorce Act 70 of 1979, s7(3). 
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partner’s financial circumstances were ‘far more favourable’ than those of the wife.42 He also 
felt that the long duration of the marriage, during which the wife had made ‘immense 
contributions’, both financial and other, to raising the children, was deserving of special 
recognition.  
 
The Adjudicator nevertheless held that although nominations are ‘important but not 
decisive’, ‘the wishes of the deceased are clear, and some recognition must be given 
thereto’.43 In this case, the Adjudicator understood ‘some recognition’ to mean an 
entitlement to share in the benefit. The ‘poor relationship’ between the deceased and his 
children, who were in any event self-sufficient, justified their exclusion.  
 
The determination suggests that it is inequitable not to make reasonable provision for a 
financially-needy surviving spouse of a marriage of long duration, even though she was not 
financially dependent on the deceased at the time of death, even though they were 
estranged and even though she had adult children who appeared financially able to 
support her. A nominated cohabiting partner should, nevertheless, also be included in the 
distribution.  
 
In this case the deceased appears to have made no provision for his widow, so s37C did 
perform an ameliorating function. The outcome aligns with other protections for the widow, 
viz the possible redistribution order on divorce and potential maintenance claim against the 
 
42 Although their salaries were similar, her job was a permanent one, and she was a member of a 
medical aid and pension fund. She had also been the beneficiary of a life policy worth R22 000. No 
mention was made of the fact that the widow’s assets and liabilities were roughly equal, while the 
partner’s liabilities exceeded her assets (R315 000 v R192 000). The widow’s temporary employment was 
with the Western Cape Education Department, and she was also registered with Health Professions 
Council SA, and that her qualification (not mentioned) was the source of her (modest) part-time 
income; there was no further mention of her qualifications or employment history. There was no 
mention of the partner’s qualifications, the nature of her current occupation or employment history. All 
these factors are relevant to the parties’ future prospects. There was also no mention of the size of the 
deceased’s estate. 
43 Para 36. 
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estate, had the death benefit formed part of the estate.44 The duration of the marriage and 
widow’s direct and indirect contributions were highly relevant to the scope of the 
deceased’s moral obligation. The decision accords with the legal convictions of the 
community, as reflected in contemporary legislation and case law, which prioritises the 
interests of spouses over unmarried partners.45 In a number of recent cases the courts have 
affirmed the rights that a spouse enjoys on intestacy, to the exclusion of putative spouses, 
even though the latter believed that their marriage was properly celebrated in accordance 
with either civil or customary law.46   
 
Was the trustee allocation so unreasonable that it was one no reasonable person could have 
made, warranting Adjudicator intervention? The R22 000 did not materially improve the 
partner’s financial circumstances on the facts. They awarded the widow half the benefit, 
notwithstanding their incorrect legal premise. The Adjudicator’s re-allocation appears to 
have been informed by his sense of the equities and the appropriate weight to be attached 
to the relevant factors. 
 
5.4.1.2 Van Schalkwyk v Mine Employees Pension Fund  
 
In Van Schalkwyk,47 the benefit was again a very modest R204 000. The member was survived 
by his ex-wife, a minor son, two adult children and his cohabiting partner. He and his ex-wife 
had been married for 24 years and had cohabited for a further two years after their divorce. 
He was obliged, under the divorce agreement, to pay maintenance of R1000 to his former 
wife, who was also a dependant on his medical aid. She was his only nominated beneficiary. 
He had been cohabiting with his new partner, who was still married but estranged from her 
husband, for about 18 months prior to his death. She had lived with the deceased in 
 
44 Had his estate been solvent, she would have been entitled to maintenance under the Maintenance 
of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 (MSSA), which would have taken priority over the cohabiting 
partner’s entitlement as the testamentary heir.  
45 See Volks v Robinson 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC).  
46 See Mayelane v Ngwenyama 2013 (8) BCLR 918 (CC); Manyepao v Ledwaba (Case no 1368/18) 
[2020] ZASCA 54 (27 May 2020).  
47 [2003] 8 BPLR 5087 (PFA). 
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accommodation subsided by his employer. The financial circumstances of his ex-wife and 
cohabiting partner were similarly disadvantageous, although it appears that his partner was 
marginally better-off.48 His two major children had waived any entitlement to the benefit, in 
the expectation that their portion be allocated to their mother. The minor son was 
unemployed and had had to give up his studies. His ex-wife was in a new cohabitation 
relationship.  
 
The trustees allocated 50% of the benefit to the cohabiting partner, 30% to the ex-wife, and 
20% to the minor son. In justifying their allocation, the trustees highlighted the following: there 
was no indication that the cohabitation relationship between the deceased and partner 
would not have continued, and there was even some indication that they might possibly 
have been contemplating marriage; a cohabiting partner was constitutionally entitled to the 
same treatment as a de jure spouse;49 they were not obliged to allocate so much of the 
benefit to the ex-wife as was required to replace the value of the maintenance she had 
been receiving.  
 
In upholding the trustees’ decision, the Adjudicator dismissed the nomination as ‘superfluous’ 
on the basis that the ex-wife qualified as a dependant regardless of the nomination. The 50% 
allocation to the partner was the minimum equitable amount given her status as a de facto 
surviving spouse. Had any share been allocated to the adult children, it would most 
equitably have been made by reducing the 30% allocated to the ex-wife.  
 
Unlike the Van Vuuren determination, no apparent weight was attached to the duration of 
the marriage or the former spouse’s contributions to the household and raising the children.  
 
48 The ex-wife earned R500 p/m selling jewellery. The partner was unemployed, living with family but 
received R700 p/m from an unstated source. The ex-wife claimed the partner received R3000 monthly 
rental on a plot but could not substantiate the claim, and the partner claimed that the rental was paid 
to her husband. The ex-wife had inherited about R19 000 from the deceased’s estate. She was his sole 
testamentary heir.  
49 This view was doubtless informed by earlier Adjudicator determinations. See Van der Merwe v 
Southern Life (n27), Musgrave (n29). It was decided before Volks v Robinson (n45). 
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There was no mention of the spouse and partner’s assets and liabilities; no mention of their 
respective qualifications and employment histories; no mention of the marital regime of the 
partner and her husband, and what she might therefore be entitled to on divorce; no 
mention of the adult children’s ages, occupations, means or ability to support their mother. 
There was similarly no mention of the terms of the divorce order, and whether the member 
had expressly bound his estate to continue paying maintenance.50 If he had, she would have 
been entitled to maintenance from his estate, but no mention is made of the value of that 
estate. His cohabiting partner would have had no such claim.  
 
The determination suggests that a cohabitation relationship of short duration is more 
important than a marriage of long duration that has already terminated through divorce. The 
deceased’s wishes, the nature and duration of the relationship with, and ongoing 
maintenance obligation towards, the ex-wife and minor child, are less important than the 
existence of a cohabitation relationship. There is no need to carefully consider the parties’ 
future prospects. Adult children can safely be excluded from consideration where they have 
waived their entitlement and there is no evidence to suggest that they are not self-
supporting.  
 
In this case s37C does not appear to have performed an ameliorating function. The 
deceased’s wish to make provision for his former wife of a marriage of long duration was 
neither unreasonable nor inequitable. It was far from manifestly unjust. The ex-wife had 
contributed to the marriage just as much as the wife in Van Vuuren had. She was in financial 
need. She was financially dependent on the deceased, who was under a legal obligation to 
continue maintaining her. The trustees assumed that the cohabitation relationship would be 
permanent simply because there was no evidence to suggest that it would not be. The only 
difference between Van Vuuren and Van Schalkwyk was that in one the parties were not yet 
 
50 Although the Divorce Act s7(3) provides that a court may award maintenance until the death or 
remarriage, and although divorce orders typically replicate that language, the obligation is personal to 
the payor-spouse and terminates should they die prior to the payee’s death, unless the settlement 
agreement clearly indicates that the payor intended to bind their deceased estate. See Hodges v 
Coubrough 1991 (3) SA 58 (D); Kruger  v Goss 2010 (2) SA 507 (SCA); Els v Jagga 2016 (6) SA 554 (FB).  
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divorced, in the other they were. In all other respects they are virtually identical, except that 
the children in Van Vuuren appeared to be better able to provide financial support to their 
mother. The member’s wishes were not manifestly unjust. The member was not exercising his 
testamentary freedom capriciously, without regard for his moral or legal obligations. The 
choices he made reflected his legal and moral obligations towards his former spouse and 
minor son, since she now became wholly responsible for her son’s maintenance needs.  
 
In this case the trustees and Adjudicator did not respect the member’s wishes; did not 
respect the legal claim that the former wife and minor child might have had against his 
estate; were indifferent to the moral obligations that arise from a marriage of long duration; 
sought to protect a partner who was still married and, therefore, legally entitled to seek 
maintenance from her husband, and who enjoyed no right to maintenance from the 
member’s estate. His cohabiting partner was not financially dependent on him for any 
reason attributable to the relationship, or as a result of any contribution she had made. His 
moral obligation towards her was surely considerably less than that owed his former wife and 
his son. 
 
Neither the trustees nor the Adjudicator provide a satisfactory justification for an allocation 
that appears, in consequence, to be an unreasonable and unjustifiable limitation of the 
member’s testamentary freedom.  
 
5.4.1.3 Muller v Central Retirement Annuity Fund  
 
In Muller,51 the Adjudicator upheld the trustees’ decision to award 32% of a R230 000 benefit 
to the deceased’s 62-year-old ex-wife, to whom he was obliged to pay maintenance of 
R850 per month. The deceased was also survived by two adult, self-supporting children, and 
his 60-year-old surviving spouse of a seven-and-a-half-year marriage. His widow was his only 
 
51 [2014] 2 BPLR 265 (PFA). 
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nominated beneficiary. The trustees’ reasoning in this case appears to have been the 
opposite to that of the Adjudicator in Van Schalkwyk: that the 32% award to the ex-wife was 
the minimum to which she was entitled, given the deceased’s ongoing maintenance 
obligation towards her.52  
 
However, there was no detailed consideration of the surviving spouse’s financial 
circumstances other than that she was employed,53 or of her assets/liabilities, nature of 
employment, or whether she too had children. There was also no mention of his sons’ 
personal and financial circumstances or whether they were able to support their mother.  
 
This determination, contrary to Van Schalkwyk, suggests that the existence of a maintenance 
order is sufficient to entitle an ex-wife to one-third share of a modest death benefit, 
notwithstanding: the deceased’s wishes, that they were divorced for 15 years, that the 
deceased was also survived by two adult self-supporting sons who could possibly help 
maintain the ex-wife, that he was married to his surviving spouse for seven-and-a-half years, 
and that the financial and personal circumstances of the surviving spouse, and consequently 
her future prospects, were unknown, other than that she was employed. There was once 
again, as in Van Schalkwyk above, no mention of whether the member had agreed that his 
maintenance obligation would survive his death.  
 
There is nothing on the facts that suggests the deceased’s nomination was either inequitable 
or unreasonable. His legal and moral obligation to his surviving spouse, given her age and 
the duration of the marriage, was surely greater than the moral obligation he owed his ex-
wife, particularly since she had two adult sons who could potentially support her.54 In Kruger 
NO v Goss,55 the SCA recognised that the maintenance claims of a former spouse could 
 
52 See [3.3]. 
53 She was also bequeathed a usufruct on the deceased’s house and the residue of his estate, but the 
bulk of the assets were bequeathed to the children and grandchildren. However, the estate was 
embroiled in a legal dispute and the identity of the eventual beneficiaries was uncertain.  
54 Accepted as a relevant consideration in Ruiters (n29) and McLean v Aunde PFA/KZN/6204/05/NS.  
55 2010 (2) SA 507 (SCA). 
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potentially compete with those of a surviving spouse and minor child, which is amongst the 
reasons it held that the obligation terminates on the payor’s death, in the absence of a clear 
intention to the contrary. This determination is difficult to reconcile with that of Van 
Schalkwyk. There a nominated ex-wife in a marriage of longer duration, entitled to a higher 
sum by way of monthly maintenance, with a minor son she still had to support, was allocated 
a similar share, but a smaller sum, than a non-nominated spouse in a marriage that was of 
similar duration, but which had dissolved some 15 years before the member’s death.  
 
5.4.2 Competing claimants: children and spouses/partners 
 
5.4.2.1 Williams v FFE Minerals South Africa Pension Fund (1) 
 
In Williams,56 the member’s only nominated beneficiary was his surviving spouse. The member 
was also survived by three adult children, aged 28, 26 and 25. The trustees awarded the full 
R149 000 benefit to the spouse. 
 
The factors the trustees considered important were that the spouse worked as a secretary, 
earning an annual income of R78 000. They had been married for three years, although she 
had moved out of the common home two months before his death because of marital 
difficulties. The spouse was the sole testamentary heir, but the estate was insolvent. The three 
children had returned to England with their mother, following their parent’s divorce 20 years 
earlier. Their contact with their father was sporadic, and he had never fulfilled his 
maintenance obligation towards them. Each child was employed, earning £22000, £9000 & 
£8500 per year respectively.57 The trustees also noted that they had respected (‘abided by’) 
the deceased’s last wishes.  
 
 
56 [2001] 2 BPLR 1678 (PFA). 
57 Exchange rate on 1 Jan 1999 = 9.9791, therefore roughly R220 000, R90 000 and R85 000 then. 
Adjusted for inflation, this would be roughly R657 000, R268 000 and R253 000 today.  
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The Adjudicator set aside the trustees’ decision and allocated the children and spouse 25% 
each of the benefit, on the basis that the trustees had failed to consider a material fact, and 
that they had fettered their discretion. The Adjudicator discovered that the spouse had been 
paid the sum of R 800 000 under a separate life policy,58 of which the trustees weren’t aware 
when they allocated 100% of the benefit to her. The Adjudicator considered this payment a 
material fact since, relative to her income, it ‘considerably enhance[d] her financial status 
and future earning potential’. The trustees’ statement, that they had ‘abided by’ the 
deceased’s nomination, was taken as evidence that they had both ‘over-emphasised’ its 
importance and ‘rigidly’ followed it.59 Although the Adjudicator accepted that the children 
did not have a right to share in the death benefit simply because the deceased had failed 
to pay maintenance, he felt the fact they would not be able to claim from the estate, given 
that it was insolvent, was a relevant factor.60 In summary he concluded that he would ideally 
have liked the children to receive the full death benefit, but that ‘some recognition’ had to 
be given to the fact that the spouse was his only nominated beneficiary.  
 
There was no mention of the spouse’s age; the marital regime; the beneficiaries’ respective 
assets and liabilities, qualifications, employment history and future prospects, other than that 
the spouse was employed as a secretary.  
 
The determination suggests that where a spouse receives a significant financial benefit from 
the member’s death relative to her existing financial position, it is inequitable to exclude 
adult, self-supporting, largely-estranged children from sharing in the benefit, notwithstanding 
that they were not financially-dependent on the member and that that they were not 
 
58 R800 000 in July 1998 (date of death) is roughly equal to R2.5 million in mid-2019, and R78 000 about 
R241 000. Calculations done using: <https://inflationcalc.co.za/>. 
59 See [19]. 
60 Cf Minnaar v CRAF [2015] 2 BPLR 236 (PFA), in which the trustees awarded 50% of a modest death 
benefit to the deceased’s partner, notwithstanding that he was in arrear with his maintenance 
obligations towards his student daughter, notwithstanding that his partner was not financially 
dependent on him at the time of his death and that she earned a monthly income of almost R30 000. 
The decisive factor for the trustees was that his daughter had just completed a degree in chartered 
management accounting, which they believed meant her future prospects were considerably better 
than the partner’s.  
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nominated beneficiaries, and notwithstanding that the benefit is unlikely to be sufficient to 
meet the spouse’s full maintenance needs for the remainder of her lifetime.61   
 
The deceased’s nomination was not unreasonable, much less manifestly unjust. The trustees’ 
decision to abide by it was therefore also not inequitable or unreasonable. The children 
would have had no claim as creditors against the estate, since their maintenance claims 
had long since prescribed. They would similarly not have succeeded in claiming 
maintenance in the absence of existing financial need. The Adjudicator’s intervention was 
based on his subjective sense of fairness. If s37C’s purpose is also to prevent dependants from 
becoming reliant on state support, paying a portion of the benefit to self-supporting adults 
who live abroad is directly contrary to that purpose.  
 
5.4.2.2 Segal v Lifestyle Retirement Annuity Fund  
 
In Segal,62 the deceased had wanted his surviving spouse and the three adult children of his 
first marriage to share equally in his modest death benefit, of R177 000. The trustees overrode 
the nomination and awarded the full amount to the spouse. The only relevant fact that was 
mentioned was that the widow ‘was not working at the time’ of the member’s death, while 
the children were self-supporting adults. Once again, there was no mention of the respective 
ages of the beneficiaries; duration of the marriage; marital regime; estate size and 
beneficiaries’ employment histories and future prospects; assets and liabilities. The 
Adjudicator accepted the trustees’ reasoning that the widow was the member’s only factual 
dependant, and that the children were younger and better able to secure their own futures.  
 
This decision suggests that a 100% allocation to a spouse is equitable even when it overrides 
the deceased’s wish to include his adult children, and even when there is no other 
information on which to form an opinion as to the reasonableness or equitability of either the 
 
61 Cf Whitcombe v Momentum [2016] 2 BPLR 290 (PFA); Marais v Sasol [2017] 3 BPLR 615 (PFA). 
62 [2001] 1 BPLR 1519 (PFA). Cf Van Jaarsveld v OVK Aftreefonds [2015] 2 BPLR 303 (PFA), which on similar 
facts was remitted for re-investigation. 
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member’s wishes or the trustees’ allocation. The treatment of the member’s nominated adult 
children stands in stark contrast to the treatment of the member’s non-nominated adult 
children in Williams.  
5.4.2.3 Selomo v The Personal Provident Fund 
In Selomo,63 the member had carefully apportioned his death benefit of R325 000 between 
his spouse (53), minor child (10) and four adult children (23, 26, 30, 31), possibly of a previous 
marriage. He had allocated 20% to his spouse, 10% to each of his adult children, and 40% to 
his youngest daughter. The trustees overrode the nomination and allocated each adult 
child’s share to the surviving spouse. The only reason given by the trustees was that the 
spouse and minor child were the only persons who were living with, and thus being financially 
supported by, the deceased, while the children were all employed and self-supporting. 
Once again, no further facts were given. 
This determination again suggests that it is equitable to disregard a deceased’s nomination 
of adult self-supporting children when the deceased is survived by a spouse and minor child 
who were financially dependent on him, even in the absence of any other information as to 
the spouse’s financial circumstance. The decision may well have been equitable in the 
circumstances, but in the absence of additional information the Adjudicator could not have 
made a proper assessment of the equities. The deceased’s wishes, in wishing to make some 
modest provision for all his children, were entirely reasonable. The facts are not sufficient to 
suggest that, in the particular circumstances, the trustees’ intervened to prevent a manifest 
injustice.   




Compare the determinations discussed above to that of the HC in Hattingh.64 The deceased 
had nominated his three adult children as his only beneficiaries, but the fund overrode the 
nomination and awarded the full benefit, of R138 000, to his surviving spouse of a six-year-
marriage. The trustees, again, based their decision on the fact that the children were all 
financially independent adults, albeit with very modest means and incomes, while the wife 
was unemployed and financially dependent on the deceased. The wife was, however, 
receiving a spousal pension (R4 200) and had been paid R180 000 under a separate group 
life policy.  
 
In upholding the trustees’ decision, the Adjudicator agreed with their view that the widow’s 
future earning-prospects were virtually ‘nil’ on account of her ‘advanced’ age (51), the fact 
that she was white and had only ever worked as a post office cashier. The Adjudicator also 
accepted that her age meant it likely she would soon face decreasing health and 
increasing medical expenses.  
 
The HC overturned the decision on appeal, on the basis that there was no indication that the 
deceased had not made adequate financial provision for his spouse. On the contrary, the 
widow was the recipient of a pension and the proceeds of other policies. The trustees’ and 
Adjudicator’s conclusions as to her future earning potential and likely medical expenses 
were pure surmise.  
 
The focus of the HC enquiry was on the surviving spouse’s means rather than the children’s 
means. The HC’s view was that if s37C is supposed to restrict freedom of testation in order to 
ensure that no dependants are left without support, allocating the benefit to the widow did 
not achieve that purpose, since she had been left with adequate support. The HC thus held 
 
64 [2006] JOL 17709 (C). 
179 
 
that the ‘only equitable distribution’ was that the benefit be shared equally between the 
children,65 in accordance with the deceased’s wishes.  
 
5.4.2.5 Ellis v Mine Employees Pension Fund 
 
In Ellis,66 the affected children were the deceased’s three minor children, who had been 
living with him, his second wife and his stepson at the time of his death. The member and his 
former spouse had divorced about five years previously. He had remarried at some stage 
during the intervening five years. His minor children were his only nominated beneficiaries 
and his only testamentary heirs. His gross death benefit was about R2.2 million. The trustees 
used 50% of the gross death benefit to purchase the surviving spouse a lifetime pension. This 
pension was discretionary, because the deceased had not notified the fund of his marriage 
as was required under the fund rules. Tax and the former wife’s pension interest was then 
deducted from the remaining 50%, leaving a lump sum of only R700 000 for distribution. Of 
this remainder, the widow was awarded 35%, two children 20% each and the third, 25%. The 
surviving spouse was employed as an assistant manager at a BP Garage. There is no mention 
of the widow’s age, means or needs. It is not clear what the deceased’s children inherited 
from the estate, other than R50 000 cash. There is also no information as to their ages, or their 
mother’s means and ability to provide support.  
 
This determination suggests that surviving spouses are entitled to priority consideration, 
notwithstanding that the deceased is survived by minor children who are his nominated 
beneficiaries, and the absence of clear evidence showing that the spouse’s needs are 
demonstrably greater than the children’s.  
 
The trustees’ distribution not only overrode the member’s wishes, but, in doing so, appear to 
have given no consideration to the scope of the deceased’s relative legal obligation 
 
65 See [20]. 
66 [2014] 1 BPLR 36 (PFA). 
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towards his children versus his surviving spouse. The trustees awarded a discretionary pension 
to the spouse, utilising half the gross benefit to do so, and then awarded her the largest single 
share of the remaining lump sum. They did so notwithstanding the relatively short duration of 
the marriage, which must have been less than five years; notwithstanding the deceased’s 
primary legal and moral obligation towards his minor children;67 and notwithstanding the fact 
that the surviving spouse was gainfully employed. However inequitable the trustees’ original 
decision, it could not be corrected by the Adjudicator because the complainant was the 
surviving spouse, not the children.68 Section 37C thus operated to the clear detriment of the 
deceased’s minor children. Had the death benefit formed part of the estate, it is doubtful 
that the surviving spouse would have been awarded so large a share by way of 
maintenance. Her needs would almost certainly have been more closely interrogated. Far 
from performing an ameliorating function, s37C effectively empowered the trustees to 
partially ‘disinherit’ the deceased’s minor dependent children, the very situation that it is 
supposed to help guard against.69  
  
5.4.3 Competing claimants: relatives and children/partners/spouses 
 
 
67 See also Baloyi v PPWAWU (n30), in which the trustees were berated for awarding the deceased’s 
three minor children 90% of the death benefit, of R73 000, and allocating only 10% to the deceased’s 
financially dependent sister, since she had four children of her own to support. The matter was remitted 
to the trustees to do a proper investigation into the extent of the three children’s dependency. If they 
had any maintenance needs, which they likely would have, those needs should enjoy priority over the 
competing claims of nephews and nieces.  
68 Cf Jordaan (n34). The deceased was similarly survived by three minor children of a first marriage, 
aged 13, 15 and 18, who were living with their mother. He was also survived by his second spouse of a 
2-year-marriage, their 2-year-old child and 8-year-old stepson. His wife was his only nominated 
beneficiary, while the three children of his first marriage were his only testamentary heirs. Their mother 
was a successful businesswoman and owned valuable property, though her exact means are not 
stated. The spouse, though younger, was unemployed, in a ‘dire financial’ situation and had returned 
to live with family. The deceased was killed in a car accident that severely injured the 2-year-old and 
the stepson, who were both still receiving treatment. The trustees awarded 30% of the benefit to the 
three oldest children, and the remaining 70% to the surviving spouse. The benefit was R355 000. The sum 
awarded to the three children (R110 000) was a little less than that required to fulfil the deceased’s 
monthly maintenance obligation towards them for roughly five years, until the youngest turned 18. No 
mention was made of the surviving spouse’s prior employment history and likely future prospects, other 
than the observation that she was younger and still able to establish herself. No information was 
provided as to the value of the deceased’s estate that he had bequeathed to his oldest children.  
69 Cf Van Zelser v Sanlam [2003] 2 BPLR 4420 (PFA) (greater portion awarded to minor child, overriding 
deceased’s desired allocation to cohabiting partner).  
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5.4.3.1 Musgrave v Unisa Retirement Fund 
 
In Musgrave,70 the trustees overrode the member’s nomination, that his (possibly estranged) 
partner be allocated 30% of the benefit, and awarded the full benefit to the member’s other 
nominated beneficiaries, his parents and sister. The Adjudicator in turn overrode both the 
trustees’ decision and allocated the 24-year old partner 40% of the benefit (of an unstated 
amount), even though the parents’ and sister’s existing financial circumstances were 
significantly worse than those of the partner.  
 
The partner earned a monthly income in the region of R5000, principally from part-time 
modelling and the rental she earned on a townhouse, worth R350 000, that she had inherited 
from her father. In contrast, the deceased’s parents, aged 62 and 51, had a joint income of 
only R4500 per month, in the form of the father’s pension. They, too, owned a house, on 
which they had an outstanding bond of R20 000. They were said to suffer from ‘unspecified 
chronic illnesses. The sister’s age and income were similar to the partner’s, but she had no 
assets and no mention was made of her future prospects.  
 
The Adjudicator attached less weight to the member’s wishes than to the apparent practice, 
within the pension funds industry, of awarding surviving spouses 50% of the benefit, and his 
view that cohabiting partners are entitled to the same treatment as surviving spouses. The 
Adjudicator nevertheless reduced this to 40% on the basis that she was ‘not entirely without 
resources.’71  
 
The determination suggests that cohabiting partners are entitled to the greater share of the 
death benefit when the competing beneficiaries are parents and siblings, irrespective of the 
member’s wishes and the beneficiaries’ relative means and needs. This is another instance in 
 
70 [2000] 4 BPLR 415 (PFA). 
71 At 429. 
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which the member’s allocation, which was entirely fair and reasonable, was overridden on 
questionable grounds.  
 
5.4.3.2 Nduku v VWSA Provident Fund  
 
In Nduku,72 the member’s nominated beneficiaries included her brother, age 30, whom she 
wished to receive 30% of her benefit, and her mother. Her brother was intellectually disabled 
and was receiving a state grant. The member had completed the nomination about six 
years prior to her death, and prior to her marriage. The trustees identified the mother, brother 
and a niece as financial dependants. They identified her husband as her primary 
dependant, and allocated 76% of the benefit to him, while allocating 6% (R20 000) to the 
brother and 9% (R30 000) each to the mother and niece. The husband and deceased had 
bought a house together, and he wished to use the death benefit to pay the outstanding 
loan amount. There was no further information as to the deceased’s estate, if any, or the 
spouse’s age, duration of the marriage, means, employment history or future prospects. 
 
The only basis on which the deceased’s nomination appears to have been overridden was 
that, since she was married, her spouse was automatically her ‘primary dependant’ and thus 
entitled to the largest share of the benefit. There is nothing on the facts to suggest that the 
deceased’s nomination was inequitable, notwithstanding her subsequent marriage. This 
determination again suggests that a surviving spouse is always entitled to priority 
consideration, irrespective of need and however compelling the competing claims of the 
other dependants.73 This once again does not accord with established legal principle. In the 
 
72 PFA/EC/14187/2007/NVC. 
73 Cf Koekemoer v Macsteel [2004] 2 BPLR 5465 (PFA), in which the deceased’s only nominated 
beneficiary, the complainant, was her 26-year-old husband of an 18-month marriage. He worked as a 
panel beater earning a modest salary (R3000 p/m). The trustees overrode the nomination, which had 
been completed after the marriage, and awarded his unemployed mother 50% of the R288 000 
benefit, on the basis that her age (46) and race (white) meant it would be difficult for her to find 
employment in the future. The mother was living with her son, and no mention was made of his means 
and ability to support his mother. The deceased had been providing her with R500 a month, which she 
claimed was her only source of income although her monthly expenditure was R2300. The only 
distinguishing feature was that the mother was the deceased’s sole testamentary heir, but the estate 
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absence of proven need, the surviving spouse would not have succeeded in overturning the 
deceased’s wishes by way of a maintenance claim against the estate. 
 
5.4.3.3 Masuku v Liberty Provident Fund  
 
In Masuku,74 the member had nominated her brother (63) and daughter (36) as equal 
beneficiaries of her R1.2 million benefit. She had done so 12 years prior to her death, when 
her brother was aged 51 and her daughter 24. The trustees allocated 90% of the benefit to 
the daughter, and 10% to the brother. They justified their decision on the basis that the 
brother was not a financial dependant, while the daughter, who was employed, was a 
financial dependant because she was living together with the deceased and sharing 
household expenses. There was no mention of the daughter’s income, qualifications, nature 
of her employment, or of the brother’s financial circumstances. There was also no mention of 
the deceased’s estate, of which the daughter was probably the sole heir. The Adjudicator 
upheld the trustees’ decision, praising them for departing from the nomination on the basis 
that it demonstrated that they had applied their minds to the allocation.  
 
The determination suggests that no consideration should be given to a nominated sibling 
who is not a financial dependant when the deceased is survived by a child. No investigation 
need be done to determine the sibling’s financial circumstances if the sibling was not 
financially dependent on the deceased at the time of death. No consideration needs to be 
given to the fact that the sibling may have been or become a legal or future dependant. 
The relative means and needs of the child and sibling are irrelevant.75  
 
There is nothing to suggest that the deceased’s nomination was inequitable. On the 
available facts is appears unlikely that her daughter would have succeeded in claiming 
 
was insolvent. Based on her age the member’s estate would at best have been very modest, had it not 
been insolvent.  
74 [2014] 3 BPLR 390 (PFA). 
75 Cf Gowing v LRAF [2007] 2 BPLR 212 (PFA), but the circumstances were exceptional.  
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maintenance from her mother’s estate, given that there is no indication that her mother was 
under a legal duty to maintain her. Given the frequency with which siblings are nominated 
beneficiaries, seeking to make provision for an elderly sibling is not ‘indisputably harmful’, 
such that honouring the deceased’s wishes would be unconscionable in the circumstances. 
 
5.4.3.4 Makume v Sentinel Mining Industry Retirement Fund  
 
In Makume,76 the member had nominated his mother and, failing her, his sister, as his 
beneficiaries, only nine months before he died. His mother predeceased him. The trustees 
overrode his nomination and awarded 60% of the R212 000 benefit to his cohabiting partner, 
20% to her son and 20% to his sister. The trustees did so notwithstanding: that the partner had 
also received a spousal pension following his death; that she was ‘gainfully’ employed by the 
South African Police Service; that she and the deceased had been cohabiting for only two 
months prior to his death; and even though they acknowledged that the deceased had 
owed his partner neither a legal nor a moral duty of support.  
 
The Adjudicator dismissed the sister’s complaint on the basis that she had not demonstrated 
financial need or financial dependency. The Adjudicator discounted the sister’s claim that 
the deceased had been providing her with financial support, since on her evidence she 
earned an income of R3 500 per month while her expenses were only R1 200 per month. The 
sister’s financial information was highly implausible, yet it was accepted at face value, 
despite the real possibility that she may have found it difficult to complete the 
documentation or to provide documentation in support of her claim.  
  
The determination suggests that the mere fact of cohabitation, however brief, and 
irrespective of need, entitles the cohabiting partner to greater consideration than a 
nominated sibling whose means and prospects appear to be appreciably poorer. There is 
 
76 [2014] 2 BPLR 244 (PFA). 
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nothing on the facts that justifies the trustees’ overriding the deceased’s wishes. Had the 
benefit formed part of the estate, the sister’s claim would have been unassailable by the 
cohabiting partner. His sister was both his nominated beneficiary and she would have 
inherited on intestacy. Our courts do not yet recognise maintenance claims by unmarried 
opposite-sex partners, but if they did, it is highly unlikely that a court would have found that 
the couple had entered into a life partnership in which they had undertaken reciprocal 
duties of support. The partner was appreciably more financially secure than the nominated 
sister. Can it plausibly be claimed that there is community consensus that his failure to 
nominate his partner was indisputably harmful, entitling the trustees to override his wishes? 
That is highly doubtful. It is the member’s wishes, rather than that of the trustees, that accords 
with the legal convictions of the community.  
 
5.4.4 Interim conclusion 
 
Determinations do shape trustee decision-making – as the Adjudicators expect them to.77 To 
the extent that determinations lay down principles, they are not equitable principles. 
Nominated beneficiaries rarely receive equitable consideration by trustees, even when they 
are amongst the deceased’s closest relatives who are owed a contingent duty of support 
and towards whom the deceased felt a clear moral obligation. The deceased’s wishes are 
overridden without any consideration as to whether those wishes were reasonable and 
equitable. No consideration is given to the interplay between the relevant factors and the 
appropriate weight to accord to each in the specific circumstances. Broad, but conflicting, 
principles now serve as a substitute for careful consideration and evaluation of the factors. 
Most significantly, trustees do not seek to limit their intervention to those circumstances in 
which the member’s wishes were so indisputably harmful that giving effect to them would be 
manifestly unjust. Instead they intervene as a matter of course, with scant regard for either 
 
77 OPFA AR 2008/2009. See Ruiters (n29) (explicit guidelines on the relevance of age), but cf Robinson v 




the members’ rights or obligations: the constitutionally protected right to select their 
beneficiaries, and the legal or moral obligation they owed the respective beneficiaries. On 
the basis of the available evidence, it appears rather that it is the trustees’ (or Adjudicators’) 
interventions that constitute an unreasonable and unjustifiable limitation of the member’s 
testamentary freedom. 
 
5.5 A GENERAL ANALYSIS OF ADJUDICATOR DETERMINATIONS 
 
The Adjudicator has provided the trustees with a checklist of factors. The factors are, 
however, incommensurable – there is no natural order of priority among them. They are 
supposed to be considered holistically, with no single one decisive to the outcome. The 
weight to attach to the factors is said to be the trustees’ prerogative.78 However, for the 
factors to function as more than a checklist,79 there must be a starting point or guiding 
principle, a lens as it were, through which to identify and order the pertinent facts. For 
example, should the deceased and her view of her relationships, as evidenced by her 
wishes, be the starting point, or should the beneficiaries and their needs be the starting 
point? Are some relationships more important than others? Are the claims of surviving 
spouses more deserving of recognition than those of self-supporting children?80 
 
 
78 Van Schalkwyk (n39); Jordaan (n34). 
79 See Parkinson (n23), 65, noting (with concern) that courts appear to be using the factors as a check-
list in Australian cases involving the division of property on divorce, because while they set out the facts 
in some detail, they don’t explain how the facts translate into their award. 
80 The determinations discussed in the previous section suggest that they are. See also De Klerk v 
Fundsatwork PFA/GA/13722/2007/CMS: the trustees awarded the full benefit to the surviving spouse of 
a 4-month marriage and 18-month relationship. The member’s adult children complained, alleging that 
they and the spouse earned similar incomes and were thus similarly situated financially. Without any 
further information as to their respective financial positions, the Adjudicator dismissed their complaint. 
The spouse was held to be partially financially dependent (presumably by virtue of the fact that they 
lived together). In the circumstances, it would clearly have been equitable to include the children. 
After all, under the law intestate succession, they would have shared in the benefit, and the member 
had not nominated a beneficiary. However, the fact that including them would have been equitable 
does not mean that excluding them was necessarily inequitable. Many individuals choose to benefit a 
spouse over children; some the reverse; and many nominate both. There is thus nothing to assist trustees 
balance competing claims in such cases. No particular consideration was given to the nature and 
duration of the relationships, eg, or to the possible moral claims of the children. 
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The factors do not only lack a starting point, they are also incomplete. Without a starting 
point or guiding principle, how can they discern what other facts are relevant and what 
weight to accord to them?81 For example, is estrangement, or lack thereof, between a 
deceased and spouse relevant to assessing a cohabiting partner’s claim?82 Is the 
deceased’s marital regime relevant?83 Is the existence of others able to provide a 
beneficiary with financial support relevant?84 Is the degree of emotional and financial 
support the beneficiary provided to the deceased relevant? Is the deceased’s conduct 
towards the beneficiary relevant, and vice versa? Is estrangement and lack of contact85 or 
separation due to marital difficulties86 relevant? Are cultural considerations relevant?87 
 
When decision-makers are statutorily vested with broad discretionary powers, relevance must 
be determined having regard to the purpose of the statutory provision.88 The purpose behind 
 
81 The current Adjudicator has expressed concern at the extent to which trustees ‘misdirect themselves 
by considering irrelevant information’ in s37C decision-making. See OPFA AR 2014/2015,11. See also 
Ngcukaitobi ‘The recognition of error of fact as a ground for judicial review in South African 
administrative law’ 2013 Advocate 30, who is also of the view that identifying relevant facts is 
straightforward, 33. 
82 See eg Van Vuuren v CRAF [2000] 6 BPLR 661 (PFA); Hubner v Tesuco [2015] 2 BPLR 208 (PFA); Mofana 
v MEPF [2015] 3 BPLR 372 (PFA). 
83 The Adjudicator and courts have said not. See §6.3 below.  
84 Some determinations say it is, some say it is not, and others make no mention of it even though it 
appears relevant. In Nayager (n39), the Adjudicator held that trustees had improperly excluded the 
deceased’s stepchildren and improperly included the deceased’s biological daughter because they 
took into consideration that the stepchildren’s biological father was still alive and well able to support 
them, which the Adjudicator held was irrelevant to the equities. This is clearly wrong. In Strydom v SARAF 
PFA/GA/11378/2006/VPM, the fact that a widow aged 60 did not have children of her own to support 
her was considered relevant. See also Ruiters (n29) and McLean v Aunde (n54), where parental claims 
were dismissed on the basis that they had adult children capable of supporting them. In others it 
receives no consideration, even when it is potentially relevant. See eg Whitcombe (n61), in which a 
deceased partner in a relationship of short duration, who professed to be wholly dependent on the 
deceased, was awarded the greater share of the death benefit, even though the facts indicate she 
had adult children. No apparent consideration was given to their means and ability to support her by 
the trustees. If they did have the means, the trustees’ decision effectively transferred the cost of 
supporting her from her children to the deceased’s children. See also Owen v Metal & Engineering 
Industry Bargaining Council [2016] 1 BPLR 136 (PFA).  
85 Compare Williams v FFE (n39) and Khulu v Mangxola PFA/GA/8012/2006/SM, which considered it 
irrelevant to both major and minor children’s claims, with Oosthuizen v Mercedes Benz [2000] 3 BPLR 287 
(PFA) and Karam v Amrel [2003] 9 BPLR 5098 (PFA), which did consider it relevant. 
86 Dickson v ABSA Fund [2001] 6 BPLR 2062 (PFA) simply said not, but the husband was the nominated 
beneficiary. Bester v CRAF [2003] 11 BPLR 5253 (PFA) also said not but discussed the reasons behind the 
estrangement, since the complainant was the non-nominated widow in an (abusive) relationship of 
long-standing.  
87 See eg Sithole (n3), in which the trustees paid a benefit to the deceased’s mother rather than spouse 
and children in the belief that they were acting in accordance with customary law. 
88 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South 
Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) [76]. See also Tower Hamlets London Borough Council v Chetnik 
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s37C, in the Adjudicator’s view, is to restrict freedom of testation to ensure that no 
dependant is left without support, thereby reducing the financial demands on the state.89 If 
the Adjudicator’s view regarding the purpose is correct (which I do not believe it to be), how 
do the relevant factors form the bridge between s37C’s purpose and the need for 
equitability in allocations? The relationship between the factors and s37C’s ostensible 
purpose has never been explained. This is arguably because there is no relationship. The 
general purpose and the specific factors pull in opposite directions. The former speaks to the 
public interest, the latter to the interests of beneficiaries. A decision can only be ‘equitable’ 
inter partes. The public interest simply does not help determine what is equitable as between 
the parties. If beneficiaries’ interests are assessed through the lens of the public interest, the 
enquiry is not about equity but about expediency. Trustees must inevitably select and prefer 
some beneficiaries over others, and they will almost always all be ‘deserving’ beneficiaries.90 
That is the essential difficulty facing trustees.91  
In the next section, I analyse Adjudicator determinations to see how the relevant factors are 
applied in practice, what weight is accorded to the different factors, and what broad 
principles, if any, emerge from the determinations. The aim is to establish whether 
Adjudicator determinations lay down clear guidelines for trustees, and whether those 
guidelines do promote the equitable allocation of death benefits.  
5.5.1 The deceased’s wishes 
Developments Ltd [1988] 1 All ER 961 and Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 
40.  
89 See eg Morgan (n3). See also Mashazi (n8). 
90 See University of Pretoria v Du Preeze [2016] JOL 35014 (GP) [13]. See also South Australia Law Reform 
Institute Distinguishing between the Deserving and the Undeserving: Family Provision Laws in South 
Australia Report 9 (2017) on the difficulty courts face in distinguishing between deserving and 
undeserving claimants seeking provision from a deceased estate.  
91 See MEPF v Murphy 2003 JDR 0005 (W) [39], quoting Isaiah Berlin on the inevitability of sacrifice when 
making choices: ‘How do we choose between possibilities? What and how much must we sacrifice to 
what? There is, it seems to me, no clear reply. … So we must engage in what are called tradeoffs – 
rules, values, principles must yield to each other in varying degrees and specific situations.’  
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If a starting point or guiding principle is needed to provide direction in trustee decision-
making, the obvious one is the wishes of the deceased.92 After all, the reason freedom of 
testation exists in law is not to permit individuals to disinherit their dependent relatives at will. It 
is to allow the testator to override the default rules of intestate succession to allow for more 
nuanced dispositions to kith and kin, taking account of both their needs and her relative 
affection. 93 The very fact that freedom of testation is recognised as a fundamental principle 
of law therefore suggests that good reason should exist before a deceased’s wishes are 
overridden – notwithstanding that death benefits do not form part of the deceased’s estate. 
A nomination of beneficiaries is no less an expression of a deceased’s considered wishes 
than is a last will and testament.94 This is not, however, the view of Adjudicators. Consider the 
following statements that Adjudicators have made apropos the deceased’s nomination: 
 
- The deceased’s view is ‘largely irrelevant’;95 
- It serves ‘merely as a guide’;96 
- It ‘is an important factor but not a decisive one’.97 
- ‘At very best, it is only one of a number of relevant considerations to be taken into 
account.’98 
- ‘The wishes of the deceased are clear … and some recognition must be given 
thereto’;99 
- ‘[W]here there are needy dependants it should be ignored or given minimal 
consideration’.100 
- ‘Ignoring’ this ‘highly relevant’ factor is ‘an improper exercise of discretion’.101 
 
92 Whether express (in a will or nomination) or tacit (in accordance with the rules of intestate 
succession). Intestacy laws are modelled on the presumed intention of the deceased. See Law 
Commission of England and Wales Intestacy and family provision claims on death (Consultation Paper 
No 191, 2009) para 1.38. 
93 Maine Ancient Law (1905), 72. See also Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549. 
94 Nomination forms are referred to as ‘will-subsititutes’ in the USA. See Braun ‘Pension Death Benefits: 
Opportunities and Pitfalls’ in Häcker & Mitchell (eds) Current Issues in Succession Law (2016), 194. 
95 Morgan (n3) [16]. 
96 Mashazi (n8), 632. See also Ruiters (n29) [12]; Ackermann v LRAF [2013] 3 BPLR 295 (PFA) [5.8]; Kirsten v 
Allan Gray [2017] 3 BPLR 566 (PFA) [5.7]. 
97 Van Vuuren (n82). See also Moir v Reef Group [2000] 6 BPLR 629 (PFA), 640. 
98 Bester v CRAF (n86) [13]. 
99 Kipling v Unilever [2001] 8 BPLR 2368 (PFA) [21]. See also Williams v FFE (n39) [21]. 
100 Morgan (n3) [25]. 
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- The ‘nomination is superfluous’ (apropos dependants).102
- The ‘board’s decision to divert from the nomination form … is an indication that the
board actually applied its mind to the allocation and had not rubber stamped the
nomination’.103
- ‘[W]here possible, [trustees) should take cognisance of the intention manifested in the
nomination.’104
What principle are trustees expected to discern from these inconsistent statements? After all, 
a nomination cannot be superfluous, even in respect of dependants, if it is a relevant 
consideration. If it is to serve as a guide to trustees, it is more than merely a relevant 
consideration. Similarly, if some recognition must be given to the member’s wishes, it is surely 
more than a guide? These are not linguistic quibbles. Some statements are clearly 
contradictory. The predominant message, however, is that the wishes of the deceased are of 
little consequence.105   
Trustees routinely override the member’s wishes.106 The reason they do so is not, I suggest, 
because they are satisfied that the deceased’s allocation is inequitable, or that theirs’ is the 
more equitable. It is that they are more likely to be found to have exercised their discretion 
improperly if they are perceived as having ‘followed’ the nomination. In a number of 
determinations handed down in the formative years of the Adjudicator, trustee decisions 
were set aside on the basis that they had been so ‘unduly’ or ‘overly’ influenced107 or 
101 Schleicher (n16) [25]. 
102 Van Schalkwyk (n39), 16. See also Maji v Cape Joint [2004] 4 BPLR 5624 (PFA), 5625; Kgapola v 
Fidelity [2007] JOL 20987 (PFA) [4.4]. 
103 Masuku v Liberty [2014] 3 BPLR 390 (PFA) [5.4]. See also Moshidi v Kimberley-Clark [2003] 7 BPLR 4947 
(PFA) [24]. 
104 Gowing (n75) [10.5]. 
105 Cf Paxton v Sentinel [2014] 2 BPLR 290 (PFA) and Chibi v Eqstra [2017] 2 BPLR 215 (PFA), in which the 
Adjudicators drew adverse inferences from the fact that the complainants were not nominated 
beneficiaries, to support their finding that they were not a cohabiting partner and fiancé as they had 
respectively claimed.  
106 See Annexure 3 below.  
107 Kipling (n99); Morgan (n3). 
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‘blinded’ by the nomination,108that they had failed to give proper consideration to other 
relevant factors.  
With one exception, I have found no decision that has been set aside on the basis that they 
failed to attach too little weight to the nomination.109 The explicit message to trustees was 
thus not that they were entitled to attach such weight to the nomination as they thought fair 
in the circumstances, but that in amongst the basket of relevant factors, the wishes of the 
deceased is of tangential significance. Trustees have acted in accordance with that 
message. The problem is not only that trustees do, and are expected to, override the 
deceased’s wishes. It is also that there is no consistent principle that they should follow when 
deciding what distribution would be more equitable than that of the deceased.  
The trustees’ decision to override the deceased’s wishes has been a frequent source of 
complaint to the Adjudicator. Many beneficiaries are understandably aggrieved when they 
discover that the trustees have the power to override the deceased’s wishes, given that 
S37C is such a radical departure from the fundamental principle of freedom of testation.110 It 
is the individuals who would otherwise have benefited, the member’s nominated 
beneficiaries or intestate heirs, who have the most cause to feel aggrieved.  
In view of the above, is respect for the deceased’s perception of the equities not the more 
appropriate course of action, especially since the deceased’s knowledge of the 
beneficiaries and their individual circumstances will almost inevitably be better than that of 
the trustees,111 unless circumstances have changed materially between the date of 
108 Williams v FFE (n39). 
109 Gowing (n75). 
110 See Jones v National Technikon [2002] 1 BPLR 2960 (PFA), in which a widow’s rage that trustees could 
override her husband’s wishes, and the combative stance she consequently adopted towards trustees, 
led the Adjudicator to make a costs order against her. The decision is somewhat unfair, I suggest, 
because s37C’s existence was largely unknown before the Adjudicator’s Office was established and 
started handing down determinations.  
111 As was stated in Banks v Goodfellow (n93). See also Carusi-Lees v Carusi [2017] NSWSC 590 [104], 
quoting Stott v Cook (1960) 33 ALJR 447: ‘There is, in my opinion, no reason for thinking that justice is 
better served by the application of abstract principles of fairness than by acceptance of the judgment 
of a competent testator whose knowledge of the virtues and failings of the members of his family 
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nomination and date of death.112 The starting premise must be to treat the nomination with 
due respect.113 The rules of the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) appear to 
accept that this is the correct approach, for they expressly allow the trustees to pay the 
benefit in accordance with the member’s wishes, ‘notwithstanding anything to the contrary’ 
contained in any other law.114 The wishes of employees in the public sector are thus 
accorded a degree of respect that is denied their counterparts in the private sector. There is 
no justification for such discordant treatment.  
In 2004, a Task Team appointed by the South African Treasury recommended that 
nominations be binding on trustees, unless there are ‘compelling reasons’ for trustees to 
override the nomination.115 The Task Team also proposed that in the absence of nominated 
beneficiaries, the benefit should devolve in accordance with the member’s will.116 In a similar 
equips him for the responsibility of disposing of his estate in far better measure than can be afforded to 
a Court by a few pages of affidavits sworn after his death and which only too frequently provide but an 
incomplete and shallow reflection of family relations and characteristics. All this is, of course, subject to 
the proviso that an order may be made if it appears that the testator has failed to discharge a duty to 
make provision for the maintenance, education or advancement of his widow or children. But it must 
appear, firstly, that such a duty existed and, secondly, that it has not been discharged.’ See eg Malindi 
v British American Tobacco PFA/GA/4233/05/VIA. The deceased had nominated his four minor children 
in equal shares, stipulating that the benefit be paid into a trust and to whom the income should be 
paid in respect of each child (his two wives and mother, since she was caring for one child). The 
trustees overrode the nomination to include the member’s two spouses, the mothers of the children. 
The determination provides no information as to their financial circumstances, other than that they 
were financially dependent on the deceased. Given his specific directions, the deceased obviously 
believed he was making choices that were in the best interests of his children. 
112 De Beer v Nissan PFA/GA/5557/2005/SM (the member had nominated his sister nine years before he 
died and before he entered a relationship with his cohabiting partner); Govender v Santam 
PFA/GA/6041/05/LCM (subsequent marriage). A change in circumstances is an established reason in 
Australia and England for overriding the deceased’s nomination, particularly when the trustees believe 
that it no longer reflects the true intention of the member. See D v Kier Group Pension Scheme 
(PO11670, 15 June 2017), Childs-Hopkins v Electronic Data Systems (PO K006633). 
113 As is the case in England. See Braun (n94) para 5.1.1.1. See also Hercberg v Wolverhampton City 
Council (82431-82835, 10 November 2011) [5], in which fund documentation stated that trustees would 
‘normally’ pay a death benefit to the nominated beneficiaries unless they considered it inappropriate 
in the circumstances. See further Dudley v Chubb Security (M00489, 24 March 2004) in which the 
Ombudsman held that the trustees’ decision to pay the nominated beneficiary, the member’s brother, 
rather than his cohabiting partner was not perverse since the nomination was the only indication they 
had of the member’s wishes, even though the nomination had been made nine years previously, prior 
to his relationship. In Williamson v Zurich Financial Services UK Pension Trustee Limited (N00119, 11 
October 2005) [26], the Ombudsman stated that he thought trustees should first consider payment to a 
spouse and children and thereafter to the nominated beneficiaries, before considering other eligible 
beneficiaries. For Australia see Faull v SCT [1999] NSWSC 1137 [23], in which the court held that ‘the 
deceased’s wishes should be given great weight’. 
114 Government Employees Pension Law 1996, s22(2).  
115 National Treasury Retirement Fund Reform: a discussion paper (December 2004) para 3.18.3.1 & 
Annexure 3 para 3.4.1.4.  
116 Paragraph 3.16.5.3.  
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vein, a previous English Pensions Ombudsman called for a change in the rules of, and the 
law governing, the payment of death benefits in England and Wales, to remove trustee 
discretion so that the benefit either be allocated according to the member’s wishes or the 
rules of intestate succession.117 As he correctly remarked, ‘[f]or the trustees to reach their 
decision is hard enough. Explaining that decision to the parties is even harder’.118  
The countervailing arguments, which is a view that is held by many within the retirement fund 
industry, is that s37C does perform an important social function.119 While this is undoubtedly 
so,120 s37C has also been applied in circumstances in which the trustees’ allocation is less 
equitable than either the member’s preferred allocation,121 or than would have been the 
case had the rules of intestate succession applied.122 In most, however, their decision is 
neither obviously more nor less equitable than the deceased’s.123 Both their preference, and 
that of the deceased, fall within the range of reasonable decisions.124  
If s37C exists to allow trustees to override a member’s wishes when those wishes are 
inequitable rather than when they are equitable, trustees should be expected to justify why 
their wishes are more equitable than the deceased’s. The fact that they have departed from 
it should not be taken as evidence that they have properly applied their minds, and that 
their decision is per se more equitable than that of the member herself.  
117 Without incurring adverse tax consequences, which is the reason most funds do not permit binding 
nominations. See Pensions Ombudsman Annual Reports (PO AR) 2002-2003, 6 and 2005-2006, 5.  
118 PO AR 2005-2006, 17. See also Jones v The Barclays Bank UK Retirement Fund (N00036, 13 April 2005) 
[32]. 
119 See National Treasury Retirement Fund Reform(n115), para 3.18.1. 
120 See eg Bakumeni v Old Mutual [2001] 2 BPLR 1573 (PFA); Diergaardt v KWV s [2001] 11 BPLR 2703 
(PFA); Kruger v CRAF [2002] 7 BPLR 3643 (PFA); Phashe v Metro Group [2003] 9 BPLR 5123 (PFA); Tlou v 
Amplats [2011] 3 BPLR 439 (PFA);  Coetzee v CRAF [2007] JOL 20902 (PFA); Monoko v Firestone [2007] 
JOL 20414 (PFA) All involved cases in which the deceased had not included a minor child, or 
dependent spouse, in the nomination.  
121 See Ellis (n66), Nduku v VWSA PFA/EC/14187/2007/NVC and Makume v Sentinel [2014] 2 BPLR 244 
(PFA). See also Marais (n61) [overridden to detriment of children in favour of cohabiting partner]; Tsele v 
Bidvest [2016] 1 BPLR 146 (PFA) [overridden to detriment of minor child in favour of apparently self-
supporting adult brothers who had falsely claimed dependency]. 
122 See Whitcombe (n61) and Cafun v Alexander Forbes [2017] JOL 38730 (PFA).  
123 See eg Kitching v CRAF PFA/KZN/33168/2009/RM; Brummelkamp v Babcock [2001] 4 BPLR 1811 (PFA); 
Koekemoer v Macsteel (n73); Schoeman v Rentmeester [2003] 9 BPLR 5145 (PFA); Winnan v MEPF 
PFA/KZN/12789/07/MQ.  
124 As a former English Pensions Ombudsman (PO) noted, ‘Given that range of discretion, there is 
unlikely to be only one answer that is to be regarded as “right” with all others being wrong’. See PO AR 
2005-2006, 17. 
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5.5.2 The beneficiary’s relationship with the deceased 
The relationship between the member and the beneficiary should be an important 
consideration when assessing the equities. It is, after all, only the existence of that relationship 
which entitles the beneficiary to consideration in the first place. Once the fact of the 
relationship has been established in identifying the beneficiary as a dependant or nominee, 
other aspects of the relationship should become relevant to the trustees’ exercise of their 
discretion. Yet the ‘relationship’ factor has received little attention as a self-standing factor 
and has been accorded little weight by trustees and Adjudicators. It is not even clear what is 
meant by the phrase ‘the relationship with the member’? Does it refer to the nature of the 
relationship, for example a parent-child relationship; or to the state of the relationship, which 
goes to the degree of affection and closeness between the member and individual 
beneficiaries?125 Does it even include the duration of the relationship?126  
Dissatisfaction with the trustee distributions appears to be almost inevitable whenever the 
family composition is other than the conventional nuclear family. Disputes are common 
whenever the circle of beneficiaries encompasses step-families, blended families,127 multiple 
families or partners,128 unmarried partners,129 extended family members (nephews and 
nieces),130 and unrelated nominees.131  
125 See eg Oosthuizen v Mercedes (n85) and Karam (n85), which did attach importance to the close 
relationship between a mother and son and two sisters respectively in weighing up the competing 
claims of the deceased’s children.  
126 The nature and duration of the relationship is identified as a relevant factor in many statutes 
governing the provision of maintenance from a deceased estate. South Africa: MSSA 27 of 1990; 
Australia: Family Provision Act 1969 (ACT), s8; Succession Act 2006 (NSW), s60(2). England: Inheritance 
(Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, s3(3). Canada: Wills and Succession Act SA 2010 (AB), 
s93.  
127 Jordaan (n34); Olivier v CRAF PFA/GA/4378/2005/ZC; Visser v CRAF PFA/WE/16057/07/KM; Fouche v 
CRAF PFA/GA/11993/2007/EMD; Legoko v Soweto [2011] 1 BPLR 101 (PFA); Ngele v Online PF 
PFA/GP/00001755/2013/TN; Van Jaarsveld v OVK Aftreefonds (n62); Owen (n84). 
128 Bakumeni (n120); Esterhuizen v CRAF [2013] 3 BPLR 355 (PFA) [ex-fiance of 9 years, the sole nominee; 
wife (of one year, from whom separated but not divorced); current cohabiting partner (of 6 months]. 
129 See eg Van Schalkwyk (n39); Minnaar (n60); Whitcombe(n61); Cafun (n122); Marais (n61); Kirsten 
(n96); Hubner (n82); De Wilzem v SARAF [2005] 2 BPLR 180 (PFA); Van der Merwe v CRAF [2005] 5 BPLR 
463 (PFA); Mitchell v Alnet [2014] JOL 31439 (PFA).  




Complaints about inequitable allocations are not simply about money; in most cases they 
are about relationships.132 Complainants are understandably aggrieved when they feel that 
their relationship with the deceased has not been accorded the appropriate recognition 
and respect. It is the fact, or their perception, that the nature of another beneficiary’s 
relationship with the deceased was of less significance than their own that informs many 
complaints. Their perception of the relative importance of the contested relationship is 
informed both by subjective and objective factors: their personal feelings, but also the nature 
and history of their relationship, the duration of the relationship, and the deceased’s view of 
the relationship (as evidenced by the deceased’s wishes).133  
 
Having identified the deceased’s relationship with the beneficiary as a relevant factor, some 
content should be given to it if it is to assist trustees in their decision-making. In many cases 
there is a natural alignment between the wishes of the deceased and the relationship 
between the parties. One such example is the relationship between a parent and child. 
Parents frequently include even their self-supporting adult children amongst their nominated 
beneficiaries. Sometimes they do so to the exclusion of their spouse or partner, but when they 
do so it is usually only when this relationship is of relatively short duration. The significance of 
the relationship between a parent and child is affirmed by the law of succession of almost 
every country: children are included amongst the intestate heirs of deceased parents.134 In 
many countries, children are entitled to a statutory share of their parent’s estate and cannot 
 
131 Kruger v CRAF (n120); Khulu (n85); Gorrah v Metal Industries [2014] JOL 31420 (PFA). 
132 For a further example, see Smith v SAA [2010] 3 BPLR 330 (PFA). 
133 Unless a complaint is entirely mercenary, I believe all complaints are animated by this 
concatenation of circumstances. However, they are more explicitly stated in some determinations. See 
eg Berge v Alexander Forbes [2009] JOL 23698 (W) esp [11] [daughter v estranged spouse]; Hattingh v 
Hattingh [2003] 4 BPLR 4539 (PFA), esp [10] [children v surviving spouse who remarried three months 
after member’s death]; Whitcombe (n61), esp [3.2] & [3.11] [children v cohabiting partner of short 
duration]; Makume (n121) [sister v cohabiting partner of very short duration]. 
134 Reid, De Waal, Zimmermann (eds) Comparative Succession Law Vol 2: Intestate Succession (2015); 
Van Erp ‘New developments in succession law’ (2007) 11(3) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 1; 




be completely disinherited.135 A recent investigation into the reform of the law of intestate 
succession by the Law Reform Commission for England and Wales confirmed that most 
parents would like their children to inherit a portion of their estates.136 The question that had 
informed the enquiry was whether the law of intestate succession in England should be 
changed, such that a surviving spouse would inherit the entire estate to the exclusion of the 
deceased’s children. The law, in other words, recognises the special significance of the 
parent-child relationship. The relationship explains, and justifies, why it is that adult children 
are often also nominated beneficiaries.  
 
Conversely, parents are also included in many nominations, even when the member is 
survived by a spouse or partner and children.137 The relationship is, after all, not a one-way 
relationship. The duty a child feels towards, or legally owes, a parent is also recognised in 
many legal systems,138 and is particularly significant in customary law.139 Relationships differ in 
form and substance – it is, however, usually the qualitative aspects of a relationship, the 
value that the deceased places on that relationship, that informs the wishes of the 
deceased. Estrangement or lack of close contact has thus sometimes been held to justify 
excluding an eligible beneficiary from consideration.140 In others, it has been considered 
irrelevant.141 The duration of the relationship, and the fact that the beneficiary and member 
 
135 Comparative Succession Law (n134).  See also Ruggeri, Kunda, Winkler (eds) Family Law and 
Succession in EU Member States (2019). 
136 See §7.3.6 below. 
137 Musgrave (n29); Ruiters (n29); Sithole (n3); Masoabi (n30); Chittenden v Estcourt Butchery [2001] 5 
BPLR 2001 (PFA); Van der Walt v Fugro PFA/NW/3487/2005/RM; Sesinyi v Amplats 
PFA/GA/6587/2006/LTN; Phahlane v Sasol PFA/KZN/2182/2006/NVC. 
138 Aboderin ‘Conditionality and ‘limits’ of filial obligation’ Working Paper Number WP205 (January 2005, 
Oxford Institute of Ageing) <http:www.ageing.ox.ac.uk>; Moskowitz ‘Adult children & indigent parents: 
intergenerational duties of support in international perspective’ (2002-2003) 86 Marquette LR 401; 
Rickles-Jordan ‘Filial responsibility: a survey across time and oceans’ (2007-2008) 9 Marquette Elder’s 
Adviser 183; Klaus ‘Why do adult children support their parents?’ (2009) 40(2) Journal of Comparative 
Family Studies 227; Herlofson et al ‘Intergenerational family responsibility and solidarity in Europe’ 
Norwegian Social Research (Nova) (April 2011)  
<http://www.multilinks-project.eu/uploads/papers/0000/0038/herlofson_deliverable.pdf.> 
139 Fosi v RAF [2007] JOL 19399 (C); RAF v Mohohlo 2018 (2) SA 65 (SCA). 
140 Moir (n97); Karam (n85) [estranged son vs nominated sister, neither of whom was financially 
dependent]. 
141 Williams v FFE (n39); Khulu (n85). 
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enjoyed a close and mutually supportive relationship, is rarely accorded similar 
importance.142  
 
Adjudicator determinations suggest that once the fact of a relationship has been 
established, little further significance is attached to the nature and status of a relationship. In 
one of the earliest and most influential determinations,143 Van Der Merwe v Southern Life 
Association,144 the Adjudicator stated that when considering the relationship between the 
beneficiaries and the deceased, the trustees should not favour legal dependants over 
financial dependants unless they have a compelling reason for doing so. Absent a 
compelling justification, doing so would amount to fettering their discretion.145 The passage 
was handed down in the context of a complaint concerning the trustees’ decision to 
allocate the deceased’s cohabiting partner of 9 years a one-third share of the benefit, with 
the balance allocated to his two adult children. The facts suggest that the decision was 
entirely equitable. The passage has, however, had a considerable influence in shaping 
trustee decision-making. It is recited in numerous determinations as part of the justification 
offered by funds for including or favouring financial dependants above other 
beneficiaries.146  
 
The duration of the relationship, which is generally recognised as one of the most important 
considerations when evaluating the existence and scope of a deceased’s moral obligation 
towards a beneficiary, particularly a spouse or partner, appears to play a very small part in 
trustee decision-making. In Chittenden v Estcourt Bakery,147 the Adjudicator held that the 
duration of a relationship is not relevant to the fact of dependency, but at most to the extent 
 
142 Khulu (n85). Cf TWC v Rentokil (n36), but this was in the context of an intimate same-sex relationship 
at a time when same-sex relationships did not enjoy legal recognition and protection; Karam (n85), but 
the deceased’s estrangement from her son, who was a major and self-supporting, was as important as 
the deceased’s close relationship with her sister.  
143 It has been described as setting out the ‘most important principles’ governing allocation of death 
benefits under s37C - Olivier et al Understanding Social Security Law (2009), 192.  
144 [2000] 3 BPLR 321 (PFA).  
145 Repeated in Segal (n62) apropos a spouse.  
146 Cafun (n122); Marais (n61); Mokhema (n130); Malan v Preservation PF [2017] 2 BPLR 256 (PFA).  
147 [2001] 5 BPLR 2001 (PFA). 
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of dependency. The CC by contrast has recognised that duration is important, for the longer 
a relationship, the more likely it is to give rise to ‘patterns of dependence’.148 Duration is 
relevant both to creating dependency and to the extent of dependency.149 Its importance 
as a relevant factor is recognised in claims under the Divorce Act150 and the Maintenance of 
Surviving Spouses Act.151 The duration of a relationship is not only relevant to determining the 
existence and degree of dependency. It is also relevant to equity. A relationship of five 
months is not the same as one of five years; one of five years is not the same as one of fifty 
years. Decisions that do not factor in these differences cannot be equitable decisions.  
 
Despite the importance of the nature and duration of the beneficiary’s relationship with the 
deceased, it receives almost no meaningful consideration from trustees or the Adjudicator. 
Instead it is the actual or presumed financial circumstances of one or all the parties that 
usually proves to be the decisive factor.  
 
The principle laid down in Van Der Merwe v Southern Life152 explains, in part, why trustee 
decisions, and Adjudicator determinations, have become reductive, focusing almost 
exclusively on financial considerations to the near exclusion of non-financial considerations. 
The deceased persons’ wishes and the tangible and intangible aspects of their relationships 
with their various beneficiaries, pales into insignificance against the fact of dependency.  
 
5.5.3 Financial circumstances  
 
 
148 Volks v Robinson (n45) [127, 133] O’Regan J. 
149 See also Yemchuk v Yemchuk 2005 BCCA 406 (Canada) [67], and the important role that duration 
plays in creating a ‘merger over time’ of both the financial and non-financial aspects of a marriage. 
The duration is highly relevant to determining the appropriate quantum of a maintenance award. See 
further §7.3.3 below. 
150 70 of 1979, s7(2). 
151 Act 27 of 1990, s3. See also Oshry v Feldman 2010 (6) SA 19 (SCA). It is specifically mentioned in family 
provision legislation abroad, eg: Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, s3(2)(a) 
(EW); Wills and Succession Act SA 2010 (AB), s93; Rogerson & Thompson Spousal Support Advisory 




The deceased’s wishes are a reflection of the ties that bound the deceased and the 
beneficiary – a mirror into the deceased’s subjective feelings and lived relationship with the 
beneficiary. Nominated beneficiaries are not strangers.153 They are persons who mattered to 
the deceased, which is why the deceased wants the beneficiary to derive a financial 
advantage in the event of her death. In almost every case, the benefit would make a 
significant difference to the beneficiary’s lifestyle, opportunities and future prospects. In 
almost every reported case, trustees override her wishes and award all, or a greater share, to 
a different beneficiary. Trustees justify their decision on the basis of the included beneficiary’s 
actual or presumed future ‘financial dependency’ on the deceased, or, conversely, on the 
basis that the excluded beneficiary was not financially dependent on the deceased.154 Their 
reasoning is summed up in the following quotation: 
 
It is an established principle that the litmus test in terms of section 37C of the Act is whether or not a 
beneficiary or a dependant was financially dependent on the deceased member at the time of 
his/her demise.155 
 
Consider the following trustee decisions by way of illustration:  
 
- A woman nominates her sister as the beneficiary of her R 350 000 benefit. She 
bequeaths an immovable property and a car to her 68- year-old husband, and the residue 
of her estate to her two sisters. There is no further financial information regarding either the 
husband or sister’s means and needs. The trustees award the full death benefit to the 
husband on the basis that the sister was not a financial dependant.156  
 
 
153 Of the hundreds of death-benefit determinations I have read, I have not come across one in which 
the deceased had nominated a stranger. In just a few the deceased had nominated her estate, but 
her heirs and legatees were similarly not strangers.  
154 See eg Ackermann (n96), Kirsten (n96), Van der Walt v Fugro (n137).  
155 Kirsten (n96) [5.11]. See also Winnan (n123) [5.1]; [5.3]; Varachia v SAB [2015] 2 BPLR 310 (PFA) [5.3]; 
Maubane v Municipal Gratuity Fund [2015] 3 BPLR 364 (PFA) [5.4]. See further Makhubele v Rand Water 
[2018] 1 BPLR 114 (PFA) [5.8]: ‘This Tribunal has always maintained a view that the litmus test in issues 
relating to distribution death benefits [sic] is whether or not a party was financially dependent on the 
deceased member and if by reason of his death that party stands to suffer financial prejudice.’ 
156 Ackermann (n96). The Adjudicator upheld the allocation. 
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- A man nominates his best friend as the beneficiary of his R77 000 death benefit. She is 
aged 45, works as an administrator, and has had a close platonic friendship with the 
deceased for many years. Nothing further is known about her financial circumstances, other 
than that she appears to be significantly poorer than that of the successful beneficiary. The 
trustees award the benefit to his cohabiting partner of 18 months. She is 29 years of age, 
owns two properties from which she derives rental income, has a total income of R720 000 
per annum, and has monthly expenses of R54 000. The fact that she and the deceased 
cohabited and contributed to household expenses is sufficient to establish her as his financial 
dependant.157  
  
In each of these decisions, the nominated beneficiary was excluded because they were not 
financially dependent on the deceased. The fact that their means may have been less, and 
their need greater, than the supposed financial dependant was simply not considered 
relevant by either the trustees or the Adjudicator. In not one of these determinations was any 
meaningful consideration given to the deceased’s wishes, the nature of the relationship with 
the excluded beneficiary, the beneficiaries’ respective ages, incomes, qualifications, 
occupation, assets or future prospects.158  
 
There are other determinations in which Adjudicators have emphasised that trustees must not 
only establish the fact of dependency, but the extent of that dependency:  
 
In actual fact, the most important consideration is the extent of such [financial] dependency 
as this is the only factor that can ensure an equitable allocation of the death benefit.159 
 
In these determinations Adjudicators adopt the position that when trustees allocate a share 
of the benefit to a financial dependant contrary to, or greater than, the wishes of the 
deceased, the amount they allocate should not exceed the extent of the recipient’s actual 
 
157 Kirsten (n96). The Adjudicator upheld the allocation.  
158 Van Drimmelen v CRAF PFA/GA/1227/02/KM is an exception, in which the parties’ comparative 
financial circumstances were set out in some detail.  
159 Malan (n146) [5.10]. 
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dependency. The maximum sum they award should thus be what the dependant requires to 
replace the support they had been receiving from the deceased. While these 
determinations seek to cap the claims of non-nominated dependants, the focus of concern 
remains the financial dependant.160  
 
Contrast the following cases with the previous cases: 
 
- A father nominates his two adult children as the beneficiaries of his R4m benefit. The 
fund uses R3m to purchase his 50-year-old cohabiting partner (of unknown duration, 
unknown occupation, unknown qualifications and unknown means) a monthly pension of 
R14 000. The fund then pays his former wife a lump sum of R735 000 to satisfy his maintenance 
obligation towards her. The balance of R268 000 is paid to his children in equal shares.161 
- A father nominates his two adult sons (ages 34 and 37) as the beneficiaries of a R267 
000 retirement annuity policy, and his unemployed cohabiting partner (age 60) of 14 years as 
the beneficiary of a different policy of R343 000. The trustees of different funds consolidate 
the policies, and award 60% to the partner, 30% to her 7-year-old grandson who shared their 
household, and 10% (R61 000) to his two sons. His will entitles his cohabiting partner to 
continue living in his house for two years following his death.162  
 
- A father dies without nominating beneficiaries for his R6.8 million death benefit. He 
bequeaths his comparatively modest estate of R1.5 million to his three children (aged 31, 25 
and 15). The trustees allocate R3 million of the death benefit to his 51-year-old cohabiting 
partner of 22 months; R1 215 000 to his 15-year old daughter; and R887 000 to his two sons. 
The trustees arrive at these figures by first establishing the extent of the partner and 
daughter’s ‘financial dependency’ (R2 315 000 and R1 100 000 respectively), assigning an 
 
160 Cf D v Kier Group Pension Scheme (n112), in which the trustees of an English fund divided the benefit 
equally between a cohabiting partner of 30 years and the deceased’s three adult children, albeit that 
the partner was the only nominated beneficiary and the children were not in financial need.  
161 Marais (n61).  
162 Malan (n146). 
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arbitrary value to the children’s status as legal dependants (R115 000) and dividing the 
‘surplus’ of R 3 million amongst the four beneficiaries (R767 000 each).163  
 
- Again, a father dies without nominating a beneficiary. The trustees allocate 80% of his 
R1.1million benefit to his unemployed 49-year-old cohabiting partner of either 3 or 6 years; 
8.3% to her 15-year-old daughter who had shared their household for approximately one 
year; 4.8% to his 29-year-old daughter; 3.4% to his 25-year-old son and 3.4% to his 30-year-old 
son (all of whom appeared to be studying). He was still obliged to pay maintenance for his 
two youngest children but did so irregularly. His partner received maintenance from the 
father of her child, but it was insufficient to meet her full maintenance needs.164  
 
In each of these cases the Adjudicator remitted the matter to the trustees for 
reconsideration. The direction given to them was that the financial dependants’ allocation 
should not exceed the extent of their actual dependency. Prima facie, this approach 
appears more equitable than that in which the whole or greater part of a benefit is awarded 
to a non-nominated financial dependant, without proper regard for their actual financial 
needs, to the detriment of those who would otherwise have benefited.  
 
However, two further considerations flow from the trustees’ focus on financial dependency: 
first, whether it is possible to calculate the extent of dependency; secondly, whether it is 
equitable that financial dependency be the decisive factor in trustee decision-making?  
 
5.5.3.1 Calculating dependency 
 
It is extremely difficult to calculate existing and future dependency. It is particularly difficult in 
South Africa, given the extreme inequalities that exist within society. In Australia and England, 
for example, there are widely available estimates of the average cost of raising a child to the 
 
163 Whitcombe (n61).  
164 Cafun (n122). 
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age of majority,165 and trustees know that beneficiaries have access to national health 
services. Primary and secondary education is free in England. In South Africa, by contrast, 
there is extreme variation in the costs of education, access to private health care, type and 
cost of accommodation, general standards of living and prospects of employment. There is 
no meaningful ‘average’ to any of these costs.166 The specific inputs required to calculate a 
beneficiary’s maintenance needs are difficult to obtain. And using a beneficiary’s existing 
standard of living to calculate future maintenance needs is often not appropriate. In some, 
equity requires that the trustees endeavour to improve a beneficiary’s present standard.167 In 
others, there is no justification for seeking to maintain that standard at the expense of the 
nominated or intestate beneficiaries.168  
 
In practice, allocations are usually based on ‘guesswork’ and ‘gut feeling’,169 sometimes on 
actuarial calculation, and occasionally an awkward combination of both. The specific sums 
awarded reflect that determining the extent of dependency is not simply a matter of 
dispassionate calculation.  
 
Consider the following illustrations: 
- The Adjudicator sets aside a decision of the trustees on the basis that they have failed 
to properly consider a dependent daughter’s maintenance needs. The Adjudicator accepts 
that the sum of R165 000 is required to satisfy those needs. The sum has been calculated 
based on the daughter’s current expenses and the cost of tertiary education. The daughter 
had received R109 000 from an endowment policy taken out by the deceased. The shortfall 
 
165 Hirsch ‘The Cost of a Child in 2018’ Child Poverty Action Group (August 2018) (England). Saunders & 
Bedford ‘New estimates of the costs of children’ Family Matters 100 (May 2018) (Australian Institute of 
Family Studies, Australian Government). 
166 See the estimate in How much does it really cost to raise a child in South Africa Financial Planning 
Institute, which suggests R9 000 per month. This figure cannot assist trustees when they need to distribute 
a benefit amongst multiple dependants when the deceased did not earn R9 000 per month and the 
death benefit will similarly not yield a monthly income close to that amount.  
167 See in this regard the important observation in RAF v Mohohlo (n139) [22] that it is inconsistent with 
our constitutional values to limit the quantum of a wrongful death award to only the bare sum needed 
to keep the dependant ‘in the same deprived circumstances as she was forced to endure for most of 
her life.’ 
168 Whitcombe (n61), Marais (n61). 
169 Southern Insurance Association Ltd v Bailey [1984] 1 All SA 360 (A). 
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was thus R56 000. The deceased’s death benefit was R83 000, and the trustees had allocated 
her R33 000. There was thus still a shortfall of R23 000. The Adjudicator berates the trustees for 
not having awarded her the full sum she requires. The daughter is 16 and lives with her 
mother, who is employed by a firm of attorneys. The trustees had awarded the balance of 
R50 000 to the deceased’s widow and their two children, aged 3 and 5. The widow had 
received R770 000 (later discovered to be R613 000) from other policies. This is the only 
financial benefit they will receive, for the deceased’s estate is insolvent. With no information 
as to the widow’s means and prospects, the Adjudicator is satisfied that the sum received by 
the widow is ‘substantial’ and more than adequate to cater for the existing and future 
maintenance needs of the widow and children.170 The Adjudicator rejected the trustees’ 
submission that the lump sum would not be sufficient to cover the widow’s household costs, 
which she now bore alone, and that it could legitimately assume that the amount needed to 
provide for the children’s future maintenance was greater on account of their young age.171  
- One year later, the Adjudicator holds that the sum of R800 000 allocated to meet the
educational needs of a 12-year old child is not ‘unduly generous’ given the duration of his 
maintenance needs and ever-rising educational costs.172  
The disparate decisions indicate the extent to which decisions are based on the trustees’ (or 
Adjudicators’) subjective valuation of both the dependant’s needs and of the value of 
money. One thinks the sum of R770 000 is a substantial sum for three dependants, including 
two very young children. Another thinks the sum of R800 000 is not unduly generous for one 
child’s future educational needs.  
170 Robinson v CRAF (n77). 
171 Cf Ruiters (n29), which adopted the opposite view. See also Malawi’s Deceased Estates (Wills, 
Inheritance and Protection) Act 14 of 2011, s17(1)(e), which explicitly provides that younger children 
should receive a greater share of an intestate estate than their older siblings, unless the interests of the 
children require otherwise. 
172 Van Zelser (n69) [26]. Cf Williams v FFE (n39), in which R800 000 was considered a substantial sum for 
the widowed dependant. 
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One factor that does receive explicit mention in numerous determinations is the beneficiary’s 
age. In the case of minor children, the presumption is that the younger the child, the greater 
her future dependency on the deceased.173 Even this principle, as seen in the discussion 
above, has not been consistently applied.174 In the case of adults, the supposition is usually 
that the older the adult, the more likely she is to become dependent,175 to remain 
dependent176 or to become increasingly dependent as a result of reduced employment 
opportunities and/or increased medical expenses.177  
Age-related presumptions work to the particular detriment of the deceased’s adult children. 
They are regularly excluded from consideration because they are thought to be ‘more able 
to secure their own future’ than are the deceased’s other financial dependants, even when 
the determination is devoid of any further information regarding their respective financial 
circumstances.178  
There are also decisions in which funds base their assessment of means and needs on 
actuarial calculation. In Dickson v ABSA Group Pension Fund,179 the method of calculation 
used by the fund, and accepted by the Adjudicator, was to combine the household income 
prior to the deceased’s death, and then to assign that income in the ratio of 2 parts for each 
parent and 1 part for each child. This division works on the assumption that each parent 
utilises and needs an equal share of the household income, and that it is twice that of each 
child. So, for example, in a household consisting of two parents and one child and a total 
income of R3 000, each parent’s share would be R1 200, and the child’s share would be 
R600. Although this method of calculation is still used, the Dickson-division reveals its flaws. 
173 Magwaza (n36); Ruiters (n29); Sefularo v Political Office-Bearers [2013] 2 BPLR 265 (PFA); Mavovana v 
BP [2017] 2 BPLR 304 (PFA). In Mavovana, the deceased’s three minor children each had different 
mothers. The benefit was apportioned only on the basis of the children’s ages, without regard to the 
respective mothers’ means and ability to support her child.  
174 Robinson v CRAF (n77). 
175 Wellens v Unsgaard [2002] 12 BPLR 4214 (PFA); Koekemoer v Macsteel (n73). 
176 Whitcombe (n61). 
177 Hattingh (n133). Unless the younger adult is dependent by reason of a disability, in which case the 
younger they are the longer the duration of their dependency. See eg Taljaard v Corporate Selection 
[2016] 2 BPLR 271 (PFA). 
178 Segal (n62); De Klerk v Fundsatwork (n80). 
179 [2001] 6 BPLR 2062 (PFA). 
206 
 
The dependants in this case were the deceased’s husband, her nominated beneficiary, and 
their very young daughter. The joint household income prior to the member’s death was 
roughly R4 000. The husband’s share of the former household income was thus calculated as 
R1 577 and the child’s as R788, giving a combined total of R2 366. The income needs of the 
household following his wife’s death were then presumed to shrink from the previous total 
household income of R4 000 to R2 366. Since the household income after her death was 
greater than R2 366 (but less than R4 000), the trustees concluded that the income 
exceeded the expenses. On this basis they justified allocating none of the benefit to the 
husband since he had no future maintenance needs. The lump sum was thus wholly 
allocated to the daughter, to be held in trust.180 Notwithstanding the obvious flaws in this 
methodology, which fails to appreciate that fixed household expenses, like accommodation 
costs, may not diminish or be capable of ready reduction after the death of a contributing 
adult, the Adjudicator accepted the fund’s methodology.  
 
Funds continue to use the-share-of-household-income methodology but have adjusted it to 
take account of the fact that fixed household costs will remain the same after the 
deceased’s death. The new methodology therefore assigns one part of the household 
income to the deceased, three parts to the main dependant (usually the surviving spouse or 
partner) and one part per child (if any). In the recent decision of Kirsten v Allan Gray,181 the 
fund used this methodology to calculate the capital sum required to provide the cohabiting 
partner with the same level of financial support she had been receiving from the deceased. 
Since she was 29, and their combined household income was R1.47 million, her supposed 
loss, over the remainder of her lifetime, was assessed at R8 million! The partner in her 
 
180 The father would have access to the trust for her maintenance and educational needs, and 
payment would be at the discretion of the trustees. The second Adjudicator was extremely critical of 
the practice of paying minors’ benefits to trusts or beneficiary funds as a matter of course, since it is 
part of parents’ rights and responsibilities to administer their children’s property. Trustees were only 
permitted to do so if there was good reason to believe the parent incapable of administering the 
child’s benefit. See eg Baloyi v Ellerine (n25); Ramanyelo v Mine Workers [2005] 1 BPLR 67 (PFA); Malatjie 
v Idwala [2005] 1 BPLR 45 (PFA). In Mafifi v Orion PFA/MP/11299/2006/LTN, on the other hand, trustees 
were berated for paying a minor’s portion to a parent who subsequently squandered it on himself 
instead of using it to maintain his children. It is not clear how trustees are able to ascertain how 
responsible a parent is likely to be in advance. 
181 Kirsten (n96). See also Kew v Allan Gray [2017] 3 BPLR 545 (PFA). 
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submission to the fund had stated that the deceased’s contribution to her living expenses 
was R10 000 a month – not the R30 000 the fund notionally assigned to her.182 No attempt 
was made to ascertain whether she was in need of such support, or whether her 
expenditure, of R54 000 per month, was reasonable.183 This decision is no more grounded in 
her reality, either present or future, than are the decisions that were made on ‘gut feel’. 
Based on this calculation the trustees justified their decision to award the full lump sum, 
R78 000, to the partner rather than to the poorer nominated beneficiary, for whom the sum 
might have made an appreciable difference. 
In Whitcombe v Momentum Provident Preservation Fund,184 the fund assessed the present 
value of the 51-year-old cohabiting partner’s future maintenance needs as R2 315 000, while 
his 15-year-old daughter’s future maintenance needs were assessed as R 1 110 000 – a sum 
the trustees considered ‘generous’, because it made provision for an additional two years 
living expenses following her predicted graduation from university. His sons, since they were 
self-supporting adults, had no maintenance needs. The Adjudicator explained that the 
‘value placed on dependency’ should be determined by considering the dependant’s 
monthly expenses, income, future earning capacity, and the amount of financial support 
provided by the member.185 The facts suggest that the partner was considered to have been 
wholly dependent on the deceased for all her maintenance needs, and that the R2.3 million 
lump sum was calculated to meet those needs over her projected lifespan.  
The disparity in the assessed maintenance needs of different dependants confirms that it is 
impossible to assess an individual’s future maintenance needs with any degree of accuracy. 
182 R 147 000 (combined salary of R750 000 + R720 00)/4 x 3 = R 1 102 500 – R 720 000 = R382 500 p/a 
(R31 875).  
183 Cf Friedrich v Smit 2017 (4) SA 144 (SCA), in which the SCA set aside the executor’s decision to award 
the surviving spouse over half of the deceased’s R8 million estate to meet her maintenance needs. The 
executor, the Master, the court of first instance and the full bench on appeal had all accepted that she 
was entitled to maintenance under the MSSA, although they were unable to decide on the quantum 
because she furnished no evidence of her actual income and expenditure. The SCA rejected her 
claim, on the basis that she had not provided any proof that she was in need. What was required was 
that she demonstrate that she was ‘unable to make ends meet’ – and to furnish documentary 
evidence in support of her claim.  
184 [2016] 2 BPLR 290 (PFA). 
185 Para 5.14. 
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The calculators are built on assumption, and if those assumptions are flawed, the result will be 
flawed. The major flaws in these calculators is to suppose that the dependant was a 
beneficiary of the deceased’s income to the extent assumed; that the beneficiary required 
that support to meet her maintenance needs; that the deceased would have continued to 
provide that support for the whole of the beneficiary’s lifetime; and that the beneficiary 
would have continued needing that support for the duration of her lifetime.  
 
How can it be equitable that a partner, married or unmarried, in a relationship of short 
duration is considered entitled to however much of the lump sum is needed to satisfy her 
maintenance needs for the rest of her lifetime? What the calculators really do is to draw 
attention to financial considerations and distract attention from the non-financial 
consideration. The focus of concern is money, not fairness. 
 
5.5.3.2 Calculating equitability 
 
The calculator used in Kirsten v Allan Gray approximates the loss of support calculations used 
in dependants’ actions for wrongful death.186 Given the wholly different contexts, the 
methodology is unsuited to s37C distributions. Trustees are required to divide a fixed sum 
amongst a number of eligible beneficiaries, having regard to financial and non-financial 
considerations. The purpose of s37C is not to compensate a beneficiary for the maintenance 
‘loss’ they have sustained. Moreover, courts assessing damages for wrongful death 
acknowledge that precise calculation is impossible because the future is uncertain.187 They 
recognise that the assessed loss is only a starting point and should be adjusted to account for 
some of the vagaries of life. As was said in Hodges v Coubrough, ‘[t]he calculation of the 
 
186 Boberg ‘Fact and fantasy in the assessment of damages for wrongful death’ (1963) 80(4) SALJ 538. 




amount is guesswork, however, once contingencies like the person's death, remarriage and 
changing circumstances necessarily enter the reckoning’.188 
 
Contingencies, in the wrongful death context, are generally used by courts to reduce a 
wrongful death award rather than to increase the sum awarded. Courts do so because the 
‘vicissitudes of life’ make it impossible to accurately calculate future financial loss.189 The 
further in time one projects, the more speculative the loss becomes. As such, in deciding 
what sum it would be equitable to award, courts ‘try to steer a course between generosity at 
the expense of the defendant and niggardliness at the expense of the [plaintiff].’190  
 
What relevance does future uncertainty have for s37C decision-making? Simply this – that 
the principle that informs a court’s award of damages is also fairness. Courts have a wide 
discretion to decide on the amount that they consider to be fair and equitable in the 
circumstances of a case.191 It is considerations of equity that cause them to depart from strict 
mathematical calculations. If fairness between the parties is the ultimate consideration, s37C 
distributions should also factor in future uncertainty when balancing the interests of 
competing beneficiaries, particularly non-nominated financial dependants and nominated 
non-financial dependants.  
 
In prioritising the existing, and therefore presumed future, needs of financial dependants, as 
though their need will remain constant over their lifetimes, trustees fail to consider that the 
fortunes of all beneficiaries are uncertain. Their decisions are not based on probability, or 
even reasonable possibility, but on assumption. They assume, for example, that a cohabiting 
partner, of even short duration, would have remained a financial dependant for the duration 
 
188 (n187), 65. For criticism and a comparative discussion of remarriage as a contingency, see Van der 
Nest & Nienaber ‘The good, the bad and the ugly: contingency deductions for remarriage in the light 
of Ongevallekommissaris v Santam’ (2001) 26(2) Journal for Juridical Science 23. 
189 Southern Insurance v Bailey (n169), 372. 
190 Ibid, 366. For criticism of the practice of using contingencies at all in the assessment of damages for 
wrongful death, see Boberg ‘The assessment of damages for death’ (1972) 89(2) SALJ 147. 
191 Deductions for contingencies is based on ‘subjective impression or estimation rather than objective 
calculation’, see Shield Insurance Company Ltd v Booysen 1979 (3) SA 953 (AD), 965. 
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of her lifetime. They factor in neither the possibility, which is closer to probability, that the 
relationship may well have ceased before then; or that the partner may still enter another 
relationship in the future; or that the partner may improve her fortune by her own 
endeavours. Conversely, they assume that a child is safeguarded against future misfortune – 
that their path will follow a predictable pattern in which they will complete schooling and 
then tertiary education, enter the labour market, and become permanently and sufficiently 
self-supporting.  
 
The fallacy of these assumptions is illustrated by the case of Cafun v Alexander Forbes 
Preservation Fund.192 The trustees awarded R1 million of the deceased’s R1.14 million death 
benefit to his 49-year-old cohabiting partner of three years and her 16-year-old daughter. 
They awarded the balance to the deceased’s three children aged 25, 28 and 30. The 
deceased had been unemployed for some years and had thus been defaulting on his 
obligation to pay for their tertiary studies. He had nevertheless provided support as and when 
he could. The trustees justified their allocation on the basis that his children were not 
financially dependent on him, while his partner and her daughter were, notwithstanding the 
fact that the daughter’s father was paying maintenance towards her support. In setting 
aside the trustees’ decision, the Adjudicator pointed to the uncertain state of the economy, 
the high unemployment rate and the fact that even graduates struggle to find work. The 
deceased’s own daughter had had to return to university to obtain a different qualification, 
because she had been unable to find work for two years after obtaining her first degree. The 
Adjudicator also felt that the cohabiting partner, although unemployed, was ‘presumably 
qualified’ and thus able to re-enter the labour market at age 49.  
 
Cafun is a rare determination in recognising that the future is uncertain for all beneficiaries. 
Notwithstanding this recognition, the pivotal issue in Cafun remained the extent of the 
partner’s dependency rather than equity. The Adjudicator remitted the matter to the trustees 
for a proper investigation into the extent of the partner’s and her daughter’s dependency on 
 
192 [2017] JOL 38730 (PFA).  
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the deceased. In Whitcombe, the Adjudicator stated that the trustees would have been 
entitled to award the full lump sum to the deceased’s partner, and thus nothing to the 
children, had the partner’s maintenance needs exceeded the death benefit.193 Financial 
dependency continues to take centre stage, even though it is impossible to calculate the 
extent of such dependency with any degree of accuracy, and even though it alone cannot 
determine what is equitable. Why it is thought more equitable to secure a financial 
dependant’s ‘good fortune’ (in finding someone willing and able to support them) than to 
safeguard another dependant, or nominee, against the possibility of future misfortune, has 
yet to be explained. 
 
The prioritisation of ‘financial dependency’ focuses on the present, ignores the past, and 
presumes that the present is a mirror into the future. Consequently equity, which lies at the 
heart of discretionary decision-making, has been replaced by convenience. It is far more 
difficult to make, and justify, decisions that are based on contested claims to fairness that 
require decision-makers to weigh incommensurable factors like wishes and relationship, than 
it is to make decisions based on one seemingly simple determination: whether someone was, 
or, more rarely, was likely to become, a financial dependant.  
 
Courts in South Africa, as elsewhere, recognise that the financial circumstance of the parties 
is only one of the factors relevant to fair and equitable distributions of property.194 Trustees 




Adjudicator determinations have played a significant role in shaping trustee decision-
making. Despite the hundreds of death-benefit determinations that have been handed 
 
193 Whitcombe (n61) [5.15]. 
194 Botha v Botha (n14); Re Harrison (Deceased) Thomson v Harrison [1962] NZLR 6; White v White [2001] 
1 All ER 1. 
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down, they do not, collectively, contain a set of principles that are ‘clear, consistent,195 
certain and predictable’196 enough to guide trustees towards achieving consistently-
equitable allocations of death benefits. As recently stated by the CC in Beadica 231 CC v 
Trustees of the Oregon Trust, ‘The rule of law requires that the law be clear and 
ascertainable’.197  
 
Some broad principles have become established principles. Unfortunately, they prove the 
truth of the proposition that ‘[d]ecisions can be “consistently wrong and consistently 
unjust”’.198 They include the following:  
 
- That a spouse married in community of property ‘loses’ her entitlement to share in even 
the member’s savings portion of the benefit;199  
- That the wishes of the deceased should be given little weight; 
- That legal obligations, and the enduring relationships from which they arise, are not more 
important than factual dependence; 
- That the extent of dependency is the most important consideration; 
- That cohabitation, however brief, is enough to establish a partner as either a financial 
dependant, an interdependent, or a spouse, irrespective of need.  
 
These broad principles are not equitable, and do not provide meaningful guidance. Trustees 
need comprehensive and just guidelines. Those guidelines are best provided by the 
 
195 On the importance of consistency as an essential element of fairness, see Dawood v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC) [47]; Johannesburg Housing Corporation (n9) [28]. For cases from 
other jurisdictions that make the same point, see White v White (n194), 16; Merchandise Transport Ltd v 
British Transport Commission [1961] 3 All ER 495, 507 (England); Drake v Minister for Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs (No 2) [1979] AATA 179 (Australia); Altus Group Limited v Calgary (City) 2015 ABCA 86 
(Canada). See further Bosch ‘Consistency as an element of fairness in dismissal’ (2014) 35 Industrial LJ 
Juta 898; Lord Reid ‘The judge as law maker’ (1972-1973) 12 Journal for the Society of Public Law 
Teachers 22,3.  
196 De Kock v Van Rooyen [2006] 2 All SA 227 (SCA) [18]. 
197 [2020] ZACC 13 [81]. 
198 Johnson ‘Should ‘inconsistency’ of administrative decisions give rise to judicial review?’ (2013) 72 
AIAL Forum 50,57 quoting Nevistic v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 51 FLR 325, 335 
(Deane J). 
199 See §6.4 below, for a discussion on s37C’s impact on spouses married in community of property. 
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legislature, not the Adjudicators.200 The purpose of guidelines is to prevent idiosyncratic, 
arbitrary and capricious decision-making201 without stultifying discretion. The challenge is 
formulating guidelines that achieve this purpose. Judges are often loath to provide judicial 
guidelines in matters ‘involving an infinite variety of circumstance’,202 for they do not wish to 
usurp a lower court’s authority or restrict its ability to meet the exigencies of a case.203 Some 
judges do consider it their responsibility to provide guidelines, but they consider it such 
because they are judges of the highest appellate courts.204 Trustees are not junior judges 
capable of exercising their discretion unguided, and Adjudicators are similarly not senior 
judges equipped to provide the necessary guidance.  
Senior judges have themselves expressed a need for legislative guidance. In a recent 
decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court for instance, involving a maintenance claim 
against a deceased estate by an adult child, Lady Hale lamented the ‘unsatisfactory state 
of the present law’, which provides no guidance as to the factors the courts must consider 
when distinguishing between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ claimants.205 She considers the 
need for guidelines to be particularly acute given the ‘wide range of public opinion’ that 
exists regarding whether adult children should be entitled to share in their parents’ deceased 
estate, and that the same diversity of views likely exists amongst judges.206 Lady Hale 
expressed this view even though the applicable legislation contains a more extensive list of 
relevant factors than that provided by the first Adjudicator.207  
200 Canada has adopted mandatory child-support guidelines and non-binding spousal support 
guidelines. See Yemchuk v Yemchuk (n149) [62]; Rogerson & Thompson Spousal Support Advisory 
Guidelines 2008 Presented to: Family, Children and Youth Section, Department of Justice Canada (July 
2008). The Law Commission of England and Wales (LCEW) has proposed the adoption of property 
division guidelines to promote consistency in the awards made by divorce courts across the country. 
See LCEW Report on Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements (Law Com No 343, 2014). 
201 White v White (n194), quoting Bridge (ed) Family Law Towards the Millennium: Essays for P M Bromley 
(1997), 393. 
202 Beaumont v Beaumont 1987 (1) SA 967 (A) 990 G-H, which was approved in Bezuidenhout v 
Bezuidenhout 2005 (2) SA 187 (SCA).  
203 Ibid. See also Johannesburg Housing Corporation (n9) [28 – 30].  
204 White v White (n194) (Lord Cooke); Piglowska v Piglowska [1999] UKHL 27 (Lord Hoffmann). 
205 Ilott v The Blue Cross [2017] UKSC 17 [66]. 
206 Para [58].  
207 See the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, s3. 
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When allocating death benefits, trustees already have the benefit of the factors identified by 
the Adjudicator. Any attempt at reforming s37C by simply enacting the same factors in 
legislative form will thus provide trustees with no more guidance than they have received to 
date. The greater complexity and potentially ‘pernicious effects’ of s37C decision-making,208 
and the even greater diversity of opinion amongst trustees and Adjudicators, makes the 
need for comprehensive guidelines imperative.  
 
The legislature ultimately bears the responsibility for any flaws that inhere in s37C as well as 
those that are attributable to its application by trustees and Adjudicators. As O’Regan J 
remarked in Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs,209 it is ‘the legislature that [must] take care 
when legislation is drafted to limit the risk of an unconstitutional exercise of the discretionary 





208 See Nkabinde J’s minority judgment in Helen Suzman Foundation v President of the Republic of 
South Africa 2015 (2) SA 1 (CC) [182]: ‘…any power that can have pernicious effects should be better 
and more extensively circumscribed to the person tasked with administering that power’. 











        
Scholars and industry actors appear to accept, without question, that s37C is constitutional. 
Only one article on the subject has been published. The author, Lufuno Nevondwe, an 
assistant Adjudicator at the time of publication, had no hesitation in concluding that s37C’s 
limitation on freedom of testation is constitutional.1 The article does not so much question, as 
conclude, that s37C is constitutional.2 If no one has yet questioned its constitutionality, is it 
because the answer is self-evidently that it is constitutional?3  
 
I propose that if it is constitutional, it is not self-evidently so. It merits far closer constitutional 
scrutiny than it has received to date. Section 37C takes power away from the member and 
gives that power to the trustees. Both the taking and the giving require scrutiny. The taking 
implicates members’ rights to property and dignity, spouses’ rights to property and equality 
and minor children’s rights to parental care. The giving arguably violates the legislature’s 
obligation to provide guidance to administrative officials entrusted with broad discretionary 
power.  
 
1 Nevondwe ‘Death benefits and constitutionality’ 2007(15) Juta’s Business Law 164. 
2 Manamela ‘Chasing away the ghost in death benefits: a closer look at section 37C of the Pension 
Funds Act 24 of 1956’ (2005) 17 SA Mercantile LJ 276 similarly accepts that s37C is constitutional. 
3 The High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal have also not expressed any concern when s37C 
matters have come before them. Most have instead been rather dismissive of the beneficiary’s 
complaint, though none placed s37C’s constitutionality in issue. See Kaplan v Professional and 
Executive Retirement Fund 1999 (3) SA 798 (SCA); Mashazi v African Products 2003 (1) SA 629 (W); Berge 
v Alexander Forbes [2009] JOL 23698 (W). Cf Hattingh v Murphy [2006] JOL 17709 (C), which was more 





O’Regan identifies ‘respect, responsibility and rights’ as the building blocks of the 
Constitution.4 Section 37C is about responsibility and rights. Respect is the missing ingredient. 
It respects neither the member’s right, nor her responsibility, to make provision for family. It 
does not respect her right to have reasonable preferences amongst beneficiaries. It does not 
respect spouses’ proprietary rights, or children’s maintenance rights. It gives the trustees 
nearly unconstrained power in the expectation that they will do a better job of distributing 
the benefit fairly than will the member.  
If s37C’s impact on constitutional rights is as significant as I believe it to be, why has no court 
or commentator expressed similar concerns? There are, I believe, a number of inter-related 
reasons.  
First, there has been no prior analysis of the legal nature of death benefits and whether they 
are property in the hands of the member, or whether they are deserving of protection as 
constitutional property. They are simply accepted as being non-disposable assets because 
s37C explicitly provides that they will not form part of the member’s estate. The curtailment of 
the member’s property rights is not obviously extraordinary because the member’s retirement 
savings also do not form part of the member’s estate while the member is alive, but are 
instead part of the assets of the fund.5 The insured portion of the benefit only materialises 
after the member’s death. Both components are then aggregated into a single death 
benefit which becomes payable to the member’s dependants and nominees. Since the very 
purpose for which the pension fund organisation was created was as a vehicle to provide 
retirement and death benefits for members and their dependants, s37C appears to do no 
more than facilitate that purpose.  
4 O’Regan ‘The three R’s of the Constitution: responsibility, respect and rights’ 2004 Acta Juridica 86. 
5 See §6.3.1 below. 
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Secondly, I believe that the regularity with which trustees override members’ wishes is not 
generally known. There is no prior research that has sought to analyse s37C determinations to 
the extent undertaken in this dissertation.6 There is therefore little appreciation of s37C’s 
actual impact on testamentary freedom. Allied to this is s37C’s oft-stated purpose: to restrict 
the member’s testamentary freedom to ensure that no dependants are left without support. 
Implicit in this explanation of s37C’s purpose is that when trustees intervene, they are doing so 
to correct the members’ failure to make proper provision for dependants. This immediately 
suggests that s37C, both in its design and operation, is a reasonable and justifiable limitation 
of members’ testamentary freedom.  
Section 37C is thus simply accepted as being a socially desirable limitation on a member’s 
testamentary freedom. The gain, the protection of dependants, is seen as significant; the 
cost, the restriction of the member’s freedom of testation, is seen as limited, since freedom of 
testation is not unbridled in any event and the limitation applies to death benefits only. The 
member in principle retains their testamentary freedom in respect of their ordinary assets. 
Because the focus is inevitably on the member’s testamentary freedom, no consideration 
has been given to its impact on spouses’ and children’s constitutional rights.  
In this chapter, I consider s37C’s constitutional implications more deeply, focusing on: the 
legislature’s failure to provide guidelines to trustees; whether s37C limits a member’s right to 
property, and whether the limitation affects both the member’s savings portion and insured 
portion; whether s37C deprives spouses married in community of property of their 
matrimonial property rights vis a vis the death benefit, and whether the limitation affects both 
the savings portion and the insured portion; the extent of s37C’s impact on spouses’ and 
children’s varied rights to equality, dignity and parental care; and, finally, s37C’s impact on 
the member’s right to dignity.  
6 See Annexure 3 below, which contains a table of cases that illustrates how regularly trustees override 
members’ wishes. 
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6.2 THE RULE OF LAW AND THE LACK OF LEGISLATIVE GUIDANCE 
The complete absence of any guiding criteria is amongst s37C’s most striking features.7 The 
absence of legislative guidance has proven disconcerting to the retirement fund industry. 
Trustees want greater guidance.8 Many are not comfortable with the vague instruction to do 
with another’s property what they think is fair.9 How is it possible, one might reasonably ask, 
that a legislature could strip an individual of one of their most personal rights, the right to 
choose who amongst their loved ones will share in their bounty after their death, and transfer 
so intimate a right to a stranger – and do so without providing that stranger with any 
meaningful direction? Given recent Constitutional Court (CC) jurisprudence emphasising 
that the legislature is constitutionally obliged to provide sufficient guidance to public officials 
exercising wide discretionary powers,10 it is difficult to imagine that s37C would pass 
constitutional muster.  
The first decision on point, Dawood v Minister Home Affairs,11 contains the most 
comprehensive explanation of why the grant of such wide powers may be constitutionally 
problematic. In Dawood, the CC struck down sections of the Aliens Control Act for conferring 
overly-broad discretionary powers on immigration officials who were given the authority to 
issue extensions of temporary residence permits to foreign spouses, of South African citizens 
or permanent residents, applying for permanent residence in South Africa, but without any 
7 Cf the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, s7(2) and the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990, s3. The 
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, s3 (UK), contains an extensive list of factors 
courts are required to consider when making a family provision order from a deceased estate. See 
further Succession Act 2006 (NSW), which contains a list of 15 criteria the court must consider, and 
which permits the court to consider any other relevant factor; Deceased Estates (Wills, Inheritance and 
Protection) Act 14 of 2011, s17, which lays down principles that should guide the courts when exercising 
their power to distribute a deceased’s intestate estate. All these factors are no less relevant to a 
distribution of death benefits.  
8 Dobie v National Technikon [1999] 9 BPLR 29 (PFA) 19. 
9 Ladouce & Swanepoel ‘Allocation of death benefits – quo vadis’ Sanlam Benchmark Survey 2017: 
Research Summary, 17. Fifty percent of trustees surveyed feel that s37C needs reform because of the 
lack of guidance, Standalone Summary, Q12.6, 59. 
10 Amongst others Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC); Janse van Rensburg v 
Minister of Trade and Industry 2001 (1) SA (CC) 29; Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2006 
(3) SA 247 (CC).
11 Dawood (n10).
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guidance as to when it would be appropriate for them to approve or refuse an
extension.12 If the extension was refused, the foreign spouse was required to leave the 
country, preventing them from fulfilling their marital obligations towards one another and 
impairing their right to dignity.  
The CC’s reasoning in Dawood is particularly relevant to s37C. The nature of the power and 
its impact on affected individuals is similar. The Aliens Control Act, like the Pension Funds Act, 
did not provide even cursory criteria to assist officials when exercising their discretion. The 
legislation thus authorised officials to make decisions that would impair fundamental 
constitutional rights, without circumscribing their authority to ensure that it was only exercised 
in circumstances justifying the impairment. The CC emphasised that when a statute confers 
broad discretionary powers, the legislature should at least identify the factors the decision-
maker should take into consideration.13 The failure to identify the relevant factors may be 
excusable in a few limited instances – when the missing criteria are ‘indisputably obvious’, or 
‘so numerous and varied that it is inappropriate or impossible for the legislature to identify 
them in advance’, or the decision-maker possesses sufficient expertise in relation to the 
decision rendering guidance unnecessary.14 None of these exceptions applied in Dawood, 
particularly since the discretion was vested in administrative officials ‘untrained in law’, who 
had neither the knowledge, skill nor time to consider the constitutional implications of every 
decision they made.  
The concerns raised in Dawood apply foursquare to s37C. The factors trustees are required to 
consider are not indisputably obvious. If they were, it would not have been necessary for the 
first Adjudicator to identify them. The factors he identified are those that are invariably 
relevant, they are not an exhaustive list. But how should trustees discern which of the 
additional facts are relevant? The factors relevant to their decision may well be so numerous 
as to make it difficult to enumerate in legislation, but other jurisdictions have succeeded in 
12 Act 96 of 1991. The facts were a little more complicated. 
13 Paragraph 47. See also Affordable Medicines Trust (n10) [121]. 
14 Paragraph 53. 
220 
providing a more comprehensive set of criteria.15 Moreover, despite the lack of guidance, 
trustees, most of whom are similarly ‘untrained in law’, are required to fathom what it means 
to exercise their discretion ‘equitably’, when even judges trained in law have struggled to do 
so.16  
Dawood raises further concerns pertinent to s37C. The first is that conferring such broad 
discretionary powers places an ‘unduly onerous burden’ on the decision-maker.17 The 
second is that those affected by the decision have nothing against which to judge whether 
it was properly taken.18 The result is that improper exercises of discretion are more likely to ‘go 
unchallenged and unremedied’.19 The existence of administrative law remedies for those 
aggrieved by a decision thus does not relieve the legislature of its obligation to provide 
guidelines that ‘limit the risk’ of unconstitutional exercises of discretionary power.20  
That s37C places an onerous burden on trustees was acknowledged in one of the earliest 
Adjudicator determinations.21 Trustees nevertheless face potential personal liability for 
exercising their discretion improperly.22 By contrast, administrative officials23 and judicial 
officers24 exercising the same powers, with the benefit of greater knowledge and expertise, 
enjoy immunity from personal liability. What of the concern that erroneous or inequitable 
decisions may go uncorrected? Aggrieved beneficiaries do have two potential avenues of 
redress. They can institute proceedings in the High Court or lodge a complaint with the 
15 See (n7). 
16 See the appeal from Willis J for ‘clear, certain, implementable guidelines’ to assist judges determine 
whether granting an eviction order would be ‘just and equitable’ Willis J in Johannesburg Housing 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers of the Newtown Urban Village [2012] JOL 29675 (GSJ) [28]. 
17 Paragraph 50. 
18 Paragraph 47. 
19 Paragraph 50. 
20 Paragraph 48. 
21 Dobie (n8), 36. See also University of Pretoria v Du Preeze [2016] JOL 35014 (GP) [13]. 
22 PFA, s7F; Sithole v ICS [2000] 4 BPLR 430 (PFA); Morgan v SA Druggists [2001] 4 BPLR 1886 (PFA).  
23 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, s10A. 
24 See Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority of SA 2006 (1) SA 
461 (SCA) for a helpful discussion of judicial immunity. See in particular para 17 quoting Voet, whose 
explanation for why judicial immunity is important applies four-square to trustees: ‘It would be a bad 
business with judges, especially lower judges who have no skill in law, if in so widespread a science of 
law and practice, such a variety of views, and such a crowd of cases which will not brook but sweep 
aside delay, they should be held personally liable to the risk of individual suits, when their unfair 
judgment springs not from fraud, but from mistake, lack of knowledge or [lack of skill].’  
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Adjudicator.25 Beneficiaries rarely approach the High Court directly. There are only a handful 
of reported High Court decisions, all of which were handed down after the Adjudicator’s 
office was established.26 Alternatively, they can lodge a complaint with the Adjudicator, and 
if dissatisfied with the Adjudicator’s determination they can appeal to the High Court.27 
Thousands of complaints have been lodged with the Adjudicator since inception, confirming 
that there was clear need for a more accessible and affordable alternative to litigation.28 
However, in the absence of proper guidelines there is little concrete evidence that 
beneficiaries can base their complaint on. Amongst the most common complaints is that the 
trustees did not adhere to the deceased’s wishes.29 The lack of guidelines, and the fact that 
beneficiaries are not privy to all the facts that informed the trustees’ decision, means that this 
is often the only concrete ground on which to base a complaint. As seen in the previous 
chapter, the Adjudicator does not consider this a legitimate basis for complaint. Therefore, if 
it is the only basis for their complaint it is unlikely to succeed.  
Another common complaint is that a beneficiary is not an eligible dependant, meaning that 
the trustees made an error of fact or law. The complaint also seldom succeeds, given the 
wide definition of dependant, its inherent complexities and the Adjudicator’s generous 
interpretation of financial dependence.30 The final ground of complaint is that the decision is 
not equitable in the circumstances of the case. This is the form of complaint most likely to 
succeed. When decisions are set aside it is usually on the basis that the trustees failed to 
properly apply their minds to the relevant facts. The Adjudicator then either substitutes its 
decision for that of the trustees or, more often, remits it to them for reconsideration. What the 
25 PFA, ss30A and 30H.  
26 See eg cases (n3). This suggests that the Adjudicator’s criteria have at least given beneficiaries some 
principles against which to test trustee decisions, confirming how vulnerable they were to arbitrary 
decision-making in the decade prior to its establishment when s37C and the definition of dependant 
were amended, thereby broadening the trustees’ discretion and responsibility considerably.  
27 PFA, s30P. Meyer v Iscor 2003 (2) SA 715 (SCA) held that it was an appeal in the wide sense. Hattingh 
v Murphy (n3) exercised its wide appeal powers to set aside the decision of the trustees, which the 
Adjudicator had upheld, to give effect to the member’s nomination of his children as beneficiaries.  
28 OPFA AR 2016/2017 indicates that 7501 were received in that period alone. 
29 See §5.5.1 above and Annexure 3 below. 
30 Which has influenced retirement fund practice also. See University of Pretoria v Du Preeze (n21) for an 
example of Adjudicator ‘overreach’ in ordering a fund to recognise a financial dependant as a 
spouse. 
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Adjudicator cannot do, however, is revisit the decision and effect a wholly new distribution 
merely because it considers the distribution unjust. It can only consider the complaint. It can 
thus at most remedy an injustice towards the complainant, but not one towards the other 
beneficiaries.31 All the Adjudicator can do, if the complainant benefited from an inequitable 
distribution, is dismiss the complaint. Should a disappointed beneficiary take the 
determination on appeal, the High Court is empowered to consider the original complaint 
de novo. It has wide appeal powers and can substitute its judgment for that of the 
Adjudicator. It steps into the Adjudicator’s shoes, not those of the trustees. It too cannot 
revisit the original distribution except to the extent the complaint allows it to.  
When deciding complaints, Adjudicators display varying levels of deference towards trustee 
decision-making. For the most part, Adjudicators apply the grounds of common law review.32 
Adjudicators have yet to apply PAJA and engage in a direct merits review, even though 
trustees’ s37C decision are considered administrative action.33 Once again, in the absence 
of guidelines, both courts and the Adjudicators are simply not equipped to engage in a 
meaningful merits review. There is nothing against which they can test the equitability of the 
decision except their subjective sense of fairness, albeit one informed by the relevant 
factors.34  
31 For decisions I consider manifestly unfair on the available facts, see eg Nduku v VWSA 
PFA/EC/14187/2007/NVC; Ellis v MEPF [2014] 1 BPLR 36 (PFA); Makume v Sentinel [2014] 2 BPLR 244 (PFA). 
32 In Euijen v Nedcor PFA/GA/27/98 the Adjudicator accepted the fund’s argument that it only had 
review and not appeal powers (the matter did not concern s37C). See further Jeram ‘Disposition of 
lump sum death benefits in terms of section 37C: an analysis of the case law’ in Hanekom (ed) Manual 
on Retirement Funds and other Employee Benefits 25ed (2018). 
33 In his earliest determinations the Adjudicator did appear to engage in merits review, although he did 
not explicitly identify it as such. He nevertheless readily substituted his judgment of the equities for that 
of the trustees. See eg TWC v Rentokil [2000] 2 BPLR 216 (PFA);  
Musgrave v Unisa [2000] 4 BPLR 415 (PFA); Morgan (n22); Williams v FFE [2001] 2 BPLR 1678 (PFA). In 
Schleicher v SARAF [2002] 7 BPLR 3677 (PFA) he reconsidered the appropriateness of merits review. This 
was shortly after PAJA came into effect. The standard basis on which most decisions are now set aside 
is that trustees did not correctly identify the relevant factors.  
34 Cf the Australian Superannuation Complaints Tribunal’s (SCT) powers. The only basis on which it may 
intervene in trustee decisions is if it is satisfied that the decision was not a fair and reasonable one. See 
Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth), s14(2). The SCT formulated a set of 
comprehensive guidelines to assist trustees. See SCT Key Considerations that apply to death benefit 
claims (2006).  
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Trustees have specifically been empowered to make decisions that override the member’s 
legal obligations, even against the member’s wishes. They do not even have to recognise 
the primacy of the duty of support when it is owed to minor and wholly dependent 
children.35 They do not have to consider the implications that their decision might have for 
the beneficiary’s fundamental rights, including the rights to dignity, equality and property. 
They are permitted to prefer a beneficiary towards whom the member owed neither a legal 
nor a moral duty of support, even when doing so overrides the member’s wishes to benefit 
someone towards whom he owed at least a moral duty of support.36  
The trustees’ decisions may well be justifiable and reasonable on the facts of a case. But they 
are making decisions with potentially life-altering consequences for the affected 
beneficiaries. As has been emphasised on numerous occasions by the CC, the greater the 
potential repercussions of a decision for those affected by it, the greater the need for 
direction. In the words of Goldstone J: 
…it is inappropriate that the [decision-maker] should be able to exercise an unfettered and 
unguided discretion in situations so fraught with potentially prejudicial and irreversible 
consequences to [those] who may be affected.37 
6.3 THE MEMBER’S RIGHT TO PROPERTY 
6.3.1 The components of lump sum death benefits 
Lump sum death benefits commonly consist of two parts: the savings portion and the insured 
portion.38 The savings portion derives from of the member’s contributions to the fund. The 
35 See eg Ellis (n31); University of Pretoria v Du Preeze (n21), in which the deceased had nominated his 
children as his beneficiaries, a son aged 17 and a 19-year old mentally disabled daughter. The value of 
the full death benefit is not stated, but the fund awarded R1.3m to the deceased’s intimate but non-
cohabiting partner of 12 years. It did so on the basis that she was a partial financial dependant 
because he had provided her with occasional financial assistance after her business failed and she 
was placed under debt review. Even though they had maintained separate homes, kept their assets 
and estates strictly separate, were financially independent, and had no intention of marrying, the 
Adjudicator upheld the partner’s complaint that she was entitled to a spousal pension from the fund. 
The Adjudicator’s determination was set aside on appeal. 
36 Makume v Sentinel (n31). 
37 Janse van Rensburg (n10) [29].  
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contribution is usually directly paid to the fund by the member’s employer, and forms part of 
the member’s overall remuneration package. Many occupational retirement funds promise 
to pay an additional sum, the insured portion, should the member die before retirement 
while still in the service of the employer. This additional sum is usually expressed as a multiple 
of the member’s annual salary and it is often the larger share of the death benefit.39 The 
obligation to pay this additional sum rests on the fund, but it is not usually funded directly by 
member contributions. Instead, most funds insure themselves against the obligation to pay by 
taking out group life insurance on behalf of their members. The premiums payable under this 
insurance policy are funded by the member, whether as a deduction from the contributions 
paid to the fund or as a separate deduction from the member’s salary. Members may be 
permitted to select the multiple of salary that will be paid out under the insurance portion on 
their death.40  
 
In some funds, the member’s death benefit consists only of the savings portion. These funds 
do not provide additional insured benefits.41 In those that do, the death benefit sometimes 
consists only of the insured benefit.42 The amount payable as a death benefit may, however, 
never be less than the savings portion.43 In most funds, the death benefit consists of both the 
savings portion and the additional insured portion.44  
 
Even though the member, directly or indirectly, funds her own savings portion and the 
premium on her life insurance policy, she does not legally own her accumulated savings, 
and she is not the owner-holder of the life insurance policy.45 The contributions constitute an 
 
38 See Jeram (n32) §9.15.4.3. 
39 Savings accumulate and grow over time. The younger the member, the greater the value the insured 
portion will be relative to the savings portion. The average insured portion was 3.33 the member’s 
annual salary in 2017 – Sanlam Benchmark Survey: Standalone Summary (2017), Q5.1A. 
40 Benchmark Survey (n39) Q5.1.A. 
41 Ibid. Only 1.2% of funds provided no insured benefit in 2017.  
42 Sanlam Benchmark Survey: Stand-alone Funds Databook (2014), Q5.6. See eg Pii v Grain Industry 
Provident Fund PFA/FS/10812/2006/PM, discussed in Jeram (n32) §9.15.4.3, which illustrates the 
importance of clearly defining the benefit. 
43 Sections 14A and 14B of the Act. 
44 Jeram (n32) §9.15.4.3; Sanlam Benchmark Survey (2014) (n42) Q5.6 indicates that 60.5% of funds paid 
both, as part of the death benefit. 
45 PFA, ss5(1)(a) and (b). 
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asset of the fund. In Tek Corporation v Lorentz,46 the SCA held that it is the fund, rather than 
the member or employer, who ’owns its assets in the fullest sense of the word “owns”’.47  
 
The fund’s duty to pay the savings portion arises only when the member exits the fund, which, 
in occupational funds, they are only allowed to do when they stop working for the employer 
that made their membership of the fund a mandatory condition of their employment. With 
regards to the insured portion, the insurer is under a contractual obligation to pay the 
proceeds of the policy to the fund on the death of the member, while the fund is under an 
obligation to pay the proceeds to the member’s beneficiaries or estate under the rules of the 
fund and s37C of the Act.48  
 
When the member dies, the savings portion and any additional insured portion is 
aggregated into a single lump sum that becomes payable by the fund. It is this aggregated 
lump sum that is subject to s37C of the Act. Can either one or both the components of the 
death benefit be characterised as ‘property’, to which the provisions of s25 of the 
Constitution apply? If the answer is yes, are they property only in the hands of the member, 
or also in the hands of spouses to whom members are married in community of property or 
subject to the accrual system? 
 
6.3.2 The savings portion as ‘property’ 
 
The Constitutional Court (CC) has not had occasion to decide whether a member’s rights to 
her savings portion constitutes ‘property’ in the constitutional sense. It has, however, 
recognised that personal rights to performance, whether founded in contract or in unjustified 
enrichment, can constitute property, without laying down, as a general principle, that they 
 
46 1999 (4) SA 884 (SCA). 
47 Para 15. See also Mostert v Old Mutual Life Assurance Co (SA) Ltd 2001 (4) SA 159 (SCA) [49-50].  




will do so in all cases.49 The CC has to date recognised real rights in corporeal property, 
personal rights in incorporeal property,50 and so-called ‘new property’ to be constitutionally 
protected property.51 I consider it a given that it will include a member’s savings portion 
within the ambit of constitutionally protected property.  
 
However, in its recent judgment, Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive 
Council,52 the majority of the CC stated that ‘]each decision on whether to protect a 
particular property interest or not rests on some assumption as to why it merits, or does not 
merit, constitutional protection’. The CC thought it important that the reasons a particular 
interest is treated as property within the meaning of s25 of the Constitution, be clearly 
articulated.  
 
At common law there can be little doubt that members’ accumulated savings are private 
property in the hands of the member.53 Even though the fund is a universitas with legal 
personality separate from its members,54 and even though it is said to be both the legal and 
beneficial owner of its assets,55 it receives, holds and invests the contributions only for the 
benefit of its members.56 The reason it is important that funds have separate legal personality 
is to shield members from predatory employers who would otherwise have access to their 
benefits.57 Retirement funds started out life as trusts, and they retain some of the hallmarks of 
a trust.58 The management board of the fund is still referred to as the trustees of the fund. The 
 
49 National Credit Regulator (NCR) v Opperman 2013 (2) BCLR 170 (CC). 
50 In NCR v Opperman (n49), the claim was for repayment of a loan. Van der Walt ‘Constitutional 
Property’ 2013 Annual Survey of SA Law 224, reads Opperman as laying down a general principle that 
the Court recognises contractual rights for claims sounding in money as property.  
51 NCR v Oppermann (n49); First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 
768 (CC); Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism: Eastern Cape 2015 (9) BCLR 1052 (CC). 
52 (n51) [39]. 
53 For a discussion of promised pensions in the context of a defined benefit fund as giving rise to 
property rights, even though the members do not ‘own’ the property, see Nobles ‘Pensions as Property’ 
(1994) 14 Legal Studies 345. 
54 Mostert (n47) [49]. See also Mercedes Benz v Mdyogolo 1997 (2) SA 748 (E). 
55 Mostert (n47) [47]. 
56 Mostert (n47) [49], and as appears from the definition of pension fund organisation in PFA, s1.  
57 Mostert (n47) [13].  
58 They were not trusts in the English law sense, in which trustees are the legal owners of the fund 
property while members are the beneficial owners, but were nevertheless recognisably trusts in which a 
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trustees owe fiduciary duties towards the members.59 The fund does not own and utilise its 
assets for its own benefit. It does so only for the benefit of its members, and their 
beneficiaries.60  
In defined contribution funds, the fund is funded entirely by contributions received by or on 
behalf of its members. These contributions are either paid to the fund directly by the 
member, or they are paid by, or supplemented by, the employer. In both cases they form 
part of the members’ overall remuneration package. For convenience, they will be referred 
to as the member contributions, even if they are paid by the employer in respect of the 
member. All contributions are credited to a member’s account in the fund.61 In defined 
contribution funds, a member’s eventual retirement benefit consists almost entirely of the 
invested value of that member’s contributions paid to the fund.62 The same sum is payable 
irrespective of whether the member retires, resigns or is retrenched. Whether the contributions 
are funded wholly by the member or partly by the employer, the accumulated contributions 
today form part of the minimum benefit to which a member is statutorily entitled.  
Even prior to the adoption of the Act in 1956, or the introduction of the minimum benefit 
provisions in 2001, a member’s entitlement to be refunded her own contributions had long 
founder (the employer) created the fund with the object of providing retirement and death benefits to 
the members and their beneficiaries, in which the trust property consisted of the contributions made to 
the fund, over which trustees exercised control and in which they were subject to fiduciary duties. In the 
United Kingdom funds are generally still constituted as trusts, as are many in Australia, in which members 
hold a beneficial interest. See Braun ‘Pension death benefits: opportunities and pitfalls’ in Häcker & 
Mitchell (eds) Current Issues in Succession Law (2016); Hill ‘The true nature of a member’s interest in a 
superannuation fund’ (2002) 5 Journal of Australian Taxation 1.  
59 PFA, s7C(f), inserted by Act 45 of 2013. PPWAWU v CEPPWAWU 2008 (2) SA 351 (W). Prior to s37C’s 
amendment there was some uncertainty as to whether trustees owed fiduciary duties to the fund only 
or also to its members. See Marumoagae ‘Do boards of trustees of South African retirement funds owe 
fiduciary duties to both the funds and fund members? The debate continues’ (2012) 15 PELJ 569.  
60 Ex Parte Trans-African Staff Pension Fund 1959 (2) SA 23 (W) 27 held that the only persons who have a 
beneficial interest in the fund are its members, not the employer, albeit that the trustees own the ‘bare 
dominium’ of the assets. Although the SCA in Mostert (n47) [50] compared its view to that of Trans-
African, the purpose of both judgments was to deny the employer and its creditors a claim based on 
their supposed beneficial interest or ownership of the fund’s assets.  
61 PFA, s14A & 14B, inserted by Act 39 of 2001. 
62 An employer can, when establishing the fund, undertake to pay members an additional sum if fund 
returns fall below a stipulated percentage, as was the case in Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v 
Germiston Municipal Retirement Fund 2017 (6) BCLR 750 (CC). 
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been accepted. In Simon NO v Wiehman,63 the HC characterised the defendant’s right to 
reclaim his contributions from the fund as the only asset in his estate. In Administrator, Cape 
Province v Xabanisa,64 a member, who had been dismissed for misconduct, was held 
entitled to the return of his own contributions. The court dismissed the contention that the 
member was not entitled to the return of his contributions in the absence of a rule providing 
for reimbursement, holding that the fund rules had to expressly provide for forfeiture of 
contributions, otherwise reimbursement was required.65  
 
Prior to the adoption of the minimum benefit provisions, the obligation to return employer 
contributions depended on the individual fund rules. The rules could provide for the forfeiture 
of the employer’s contributions in certain circumstances. Nevertheless, Fraser v Durban 
Corporation Provident Fund,66 a defined contribution fund, illustrates that long before the 
enactment of the Pension Funds Act, individual fund rules already contained provisions 
entitling members to payment of both their own and their employer’s contributions when 
they exited the fund for any reason, including the death of the member. Employer 
contributions were then already recognised as part of the member’s remuneration, to which 
they were, in the ordinary course, entitled upon leaving the fund.67  
 
The distinction between employee and employer contributions is no longer relevant, for the 
rules of the fund may no longer disentitle employees to the employer’s contributions if they 
 
63 1938 CPD 400. 
64 1940 EDL 198. 
65 The fund was a public fund governed by statute rather than rules. Cf Whitnall v EP Guardian 
Company 1930 EDL 172, in which the court held that the fund rules did not entitle the member to any 
pension as a result of his retrenchment after many years of service but before reaching retirement age. 
Members made no contributions towards their retirement. The court held that the pension promised 
under the rules was not a form of deferred pay. It described the fund rules as ‘unusual and unscientific’, 
in failing to make some provision for employees who were retrenched prior to retirement, whether in the 
form of the return of contributions or payment of a gratuity or some other form of compensation, (at 
182-183). See further PFA, s30D for the circumstances under which a fund may lawfully make 
deductions from a member’s retirement benefits.  
66 (1922) 43 NPD 231.  
67 Courts have also recognised that defined pension benefits create rights in the hands of the member. 
In Mokoena v Administrator, Transvaal 1988 (4) SA 912 (W) (917D-E), Goldstone J held that the summary 
dismissal of an employee without a hearing was unlawful because it deprived her of her right to the 
pension to which she had been contributing for 15 years, but which was only payable if she was still in 
the employer’s service at age 60. Although she was entitled to the return of her own contributions, this 
was ‘cold comfort’ given the lifetime nature of the pension and the ravages of inflation.  
229 
 
were paid to the fund for the benefit of the individual member.68 Both now form part of the 
minimum benefit to which a member is entitled in terms of the Act, which may never be less 
than the invested value of the contributions made by or on behalf of the member, less 
reasonable expenses.69  
 
Defined contribution retirement funds are therefore essentially long-term savings vehicles, in 
which the saving is ring-fenced for the specific purpose of providing members with an 
income during their retirement. While they are members of the fund, their savings are 
protected from both the member and third parties, and will not fall into a member’s insolvent 
estate.70 Members are, nevertheless, allowed to claim payment of their savings portion 
should they resign, be retrenched or dismissed prior to retirement.71 Although the member 
does not technically own her own savings once they have been paid to the fund,72 the 
member has a contractual and statutory right to be paid her savings.73 It is simply that her 
right to enforce payment crystallises (matures) on her resignation, retrenchment, retirement 
 
68 Cf Canada, in which an employee is always entitled to her own contributions but not to employer 
contributions until they have vested. The rules of the fund will determine when that is. The rules will 
similarly determine whether her own contributions can be returned as a cash lump sum or must take the 
form of a pension. See Government of Canada Digest of Benefit Entitlement Principles Chapter 5 – 
Section 3. 
69 PFA, s14B (1). The invested value consists of the total contributions plus fund return. The fund returns 
may, however, be ‘smoothed’, which means that the full fund return does not vest in the member 
immediately when it is earned. Instead, only a proportion vests immediately, while a proportion is held 
back and will vest on a future date to be determined by the fund. The purpose behind smoothing is to 
provide the member with some protection against poor or negative market returns. The fund then uses 
the reserves to provide the members with a higher return than they would otherwise have received 
from their market-returns alone. Smoothing therefore protects the member against some of the 
volatility, and consequent losses, that usually occurs when investing in the market.  
70 PFA, ss 37A & 37B. Section 37D contains limited exceptions. 
71 National Treasury has proposed the compulsory preservation of retirement savings, but their initiatives 
have failed to date due to opposition from labour unions. Employees are nevertheless encouraged to 
preserve their savings, and recently published regulations require funds to establish default preservation 
portfolios. See National Treasury Strengthening Retirement Savings (14 May 2012); Final default 
regulations in GN 41064 (25 August 2017). 
72 PFA, s5(1). Whether the member would own the accumulated contributions absent s5 is not clear. In 
Fraser (n66), Tatham J expressed the view that a lump sum paid to a fund by an employer and placed 
to the credit of the member ‘belonged’ to the member and not to the fund. See further Van Meerten & 
Borsje ‘Pension rights and entitlement conversion (‘Invaren’): lessons from a Dutch perspective with 
regard to the implications of the EU Charter’ (2016) 18(1) European Journal of Social Security 46, 54, 
who are of the view that one of the advantages of the conversion from defined benefit (DB) to defined 
contribution (DC) funds in the EU means that members now ‘unambiguously’ own the assets in the 
fund, which in turn means that their ‘property rights are now clear’.  
73 That the rules constitute a contract between the member and the fund was confirmed in Coetzee v 
Moreesburgse Koringboere Koöperatief Bpk [1997] 9 BLLR 1167 (LC) and Shell & BP South Africa 
Petroleum Refineries (Pty) Ltd v Murphy [2000] JOL 6373 (D).  
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or death. The member’s benefits are in all cases an integral part of the member’s overall 
remuneration package, for which reason they are commonly described as ‘deferred pay’.74  
 
The member’s rights to be paid her savings portion or other benefits predates the Act. The 
Act simply confirms that the benefit payable to the member may not be less than the 
member’s savings. If the rules of the fund promise benefits in excess of the savings portion, 
the fund is obliged to provide those benefits as well.75  
 
A member’s right to payment of her savings portion, or any additional benefit promised in 
the rules of the fund,76 is a vested right.77 It is an existing right to claim future performance.78 It 
is not a contingent or conditional right, because there is no uncertainty about whether 
payment is or will become due to the member. The only uncertainty is when it will become 
due. Rights are, by definition, vested.79 As explained by Selke J in In Re Allen Trust:80 
 
The question of whether rights are vested or not arises most frequently in relation to rights 
conferred by will, and when employed in that relation the expression ‘vested right’ usually 
denotes a right whose actual enjoyment, although it may be deferred, is not dependent upon 
any contingency. Normally, though not invariably, such a right is transmissible on death. 
 
The word ‘vested’ is used in contractual and statutory settings to distinguish rights, in the 
proper sense, from protected interests, such as contingent interests, which are often referred 
 
74 Atkinson v Southern Field [2000] 4 BPLR 367 (PFA). See also Younghusband v Decca Contractors 
[2000] 1 BPLR 88 (PFA) 105, approved by the High Court in Resa Pension Fund v Pension Funds 
Adjudicator [2000] 4 BPLR 355 (C) [15]. 
75 See eg Crossley v Union Government (1921) 42 NPD 114. 
76 See the somewhat confusing discussion of benefits versus rights, and vested versus conditional rights, 
in Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Grobler [2007] 1 BPLR 1 (SCA) [10ff]. Its essential conclusions are the 
same, viz that a member has a right to accumulated benefits. This was apropos a DB Fund. 
77 On the nature of vested rights, and the difference between vested and contingent, see further: 
Jewish Colonial Trust Ltd v Estate Nathan 1940 AD 175; Stern and Ruskin v Appleson 1951 (3) SA 800 (W); 
Cowen ‘Vested and contingent rights’ (1949) 66(4) SALJ 404; Hutchison ‘Isolating the pactum 
successorium’ (1983) 100(2) SALJ 221, 228; Van Zyl ‘The theory of judicial practice’ 1889 Cape LJ 135, 
150-151.  
78 Dies cedit versus dies venit in Latin. English law uses the terms vested in interest and vested in 
possession. When a right has vested, and the holder is entitled to enjoyment, the right is both dies cedit 
et venit. See Cowen (n77) 412. 
79 Austin’s view is that it is ‘tautologous or superfluous’ to speak of ‘vested’ rights, because a right is, by 
definition, vested. Austin Lectures on Jurisprudence quoted in Cowen (n77), 407. 
80 1941 NPD 147, 156. 
231 
 
to as ‘rights’ because they attract a measure of legal recognition and protection.81 
Contingent interests, or rights, are rights-in-the-making. They lie on the spectrum between a 
hope, or spes, and a (vested) right. They are conditional rights, in that the right will come into 
fruition on the happening of an uncertain future event. The right must, however, already be 
in bud or in blossom, so to speak. A person cannot be said to have a contingent interest in a 
fruit if the tree has not yet been planted, or while it stands dormant. As was said by Millin J in 
Stern & Ruskin v Appleson:82 
 
The term “contingent interest” is used in contradistinction to a vested interest. It is 
something which may ripen into a vested interest on the happening of an event, but it 
must be such that the happening of the event, without more, gives the vested interest. 
A person cannot be said to have a contingent interest in something which another 
may or may not choose to give him in the future.83  
 
The argument that a member does not enjoy an existing, or vested, right to her savings 
portion is therefore incorrect.84 It is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the right 
enjoyed by the member. The member’s right to claim payment of her vested retirement 
benefit is an asset in her estate.85 That rights are assets has long been recognised. It matters 
not that the member will only be able to enforce her right at a future date. The distinction 
between rights that are immediately enforceable, and rights that are enforceable only in the 
future, has long been recognised. Provided that they are, or will with certainty become, 
enforceable, they are rights.  
 
Older authorities used the terms dies cedit and dies venit to distinguish between rights that 
have vested, and those that have not. In 1889 already, while describing what property fell 
 
81 Cowen (n77) 408; Hutchison (n77).  
82 (n77). 
83 Ibid. It is clear, from Cowen’s explanation, that a number of conditions may need to be satisfied 
before the right vests. It nevertheless remains a contingent right. The important point is that its fruition 
must not be subject to someone else’s discretion or power. 
84 The South African Law Commission in its original investigation into the sharing of pension benefits on 
divorce concluded that a member’s interest is more than a mere spes, and that it is a personal, albeit 
conditional, right. See SALC (Project 41) Report on the investigation into the possibility of making 
provision for a divorced woman to share in the pension benefits of her former husband (1986) (‘1986 
Report’) para 3.4 & 3.6.  
85 This is also the position in the USA, where courts have accepted that ‘pension rights constitute a 
current asset that the individual has a contractual right to receive’, albeit that payment may only be 
due in the future. See Brinig ‘Marital property’ 2016 International Survey of Family Law 509, 521.  
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into an insolvent estate, CH van Zyl included the vested right (dies cedit) to receive future 
payment (dies venit) of a salary or pension: 
 
A person may have a future right to a thing, but he cannot claim it until after the lapse of a 
certain time or event or as it is technically called the dies cedit and the dies venit. If he has the 
dies cedit, that is if his right to the thing has already vested though his claim to its use and 
possession is postponed, he can do with that right what he pleases, subject to the conditions of 
the dies venit, and whatever rights he has are vested also in his creditors, upon insolvency, or in 
execution. If it is doubtful whether the right can be described as a movable or immovable 
thing, then obtain a special order of the Court to arrest the thing, or the right to it, as for 
instance usufruct, or a fideicommissum present or future; a pension or salary …86 
 
If it is necessary for personal proprietary rights to be vested rights before they meet the 
constitutional conception of property,87 then members rights to their savings portion clearly 
meets this requirement.88 Members are entitled to receive payment of whatever benefits 
they have been promised in terms of the rules of their retirement fund.89 Those benefits are 
funded either wholly or in part by contributions paid by the member. The essence of a 
defined contribution fund is that members fund their own retirement benefits, whether 
directly or indirectly.90 As the SCA stated in Tek Corporation,91 in the context of defined 
contribution schemes, ‘members are entitled to whatever the fruits (be they sweet or bitter) 
of the investment of their defined contributions may prove to be’.  
 
It is little wonder then that commentators and courts, in South Africa and abroad, accept 
that the member’s right to a retirement benefit funded by her own and her employer’s 
contributions constitutes property in the hands of the member.92 In Atkinson v Southern Field 
 
86 Van Zyl ‘Theory of judicial practice’ (n77). 
87 Cowen (n77), 416, uses the term ‘proprietary rights’ in his article to refer to personal rights which have 
a monetary value. He says that ordinarily, for a right to be a proprietary right, it must satisfy three 
requirements. However, none is an absolute requirement. He accepts, as do others, that some rights 
are proprietary even though the holder may lack one or all of the following powers: transferability inter 
vivos; transmissibility on death to heirs and legatees; availability to satisfy claims of creditors.  
88 Moseneke DCJ raised vesting as an issue in Shoprite Checkers (n51), but he did so in the context of 
‘new property’ only. He accepted that rights considered property under common law would fall within 
the scope of constitutional property. 
89 Tek Corporation (n46). 
90 Directly, as part of their cost of employment, or indirectly, through contributions made on their behalf 
by their employers. However structured, the contribution is still part and parcel of remuneration. For the 
ways in which DC versus DB funds are funded, see Tek Corporation (n46) [4-5].  
91 (n46) [5]. 
92 Atkinson (n74); Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2005), at 25.3(b). The issue is less 
obvious in respect of state pension benefits, particularly when the scheme is not directly funded by the 
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Staff Defined Contribution Pension Fund, the Adjudicator stated that ‘[p]ension benefits as 
well as additional benefits like withdrawal benefits … are deferred pay and therefore 
property. This is more so in the case of a defined contribution fund, which is a different animal 
from the defined benefit fund…’.93  
 
In the context of a defined benefit fund, in Younghusband v Decca Contractors (SA) Pension 
Fund, the Adjudicator similarly stated that ‘pension rights amount to deferred pay, rather 
than gratuities’, and that ‘they are part of the remuneration which labour receives for 
services rendered’.94 The benefits to which members are entitled are often their most 
valuable property, as the Adjudicator observed in Sligo v Shell Southern Africa Pension 
Fund:95 ‘Pension rights build up over a period of years and represent the most significant 
property entitlements of a vulnerable sector of society.’96  
 
In National Credit Regulator v Opperman,97 the CC accepted that an individual’s right to 
payment of a monetary sum, whether based on contract or unjustified enrichment, was 
protected by the constitutional property clause. In reaching this conclusion, the CC 
reasoned that the fact that the claim was an asset in the individual’s estate, had monetary 
value and could be disposed of or transferred by the individual, pointed towards its status as 
property.98  
 
individual’s contributions. See Müller v Austria (1975) 3 DR 25 and R v Secretary of Pensions ex parte 
Carlson [2005] UKHL 37 para 12, which questioned the analogy between private contributory funds and 
public contributory funds. Cf BverfG 53, 257 (289) (1978), in which the German Constitutional Court 
accepted that even state pension benefits are constitutionally protected property, particularly since 
they are funded by contributions from the pensioner. See further Carss-Frisk The right to property: a 
guide to the implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights Human Rights Handbook No. 4 (2001, Directorate General of Human Rights Council of Europe). 
93 (n74) [45].  
94 [2000] 1 BPLR 88 (PFA), 105, approved by the HC in Resa Pension Fund (n74). Conversely, when the 
contributions paid to the fund exceed the benefit promised to the member and therefore generate an 
amount that is ‘surplus’ to the fund’s obligation, the members are nevertheless entitled to share in this 
surplus unless the rules of the fund allow the surplus to be used to reduce or suspend the employer’s 
obligation to pay contributions for a period of time. See the discussion of contribution holidays in Tek 
Corporation (n46).  
95 [1999] 11 BPLR 299 (PFA), 309. 
96 The determination was overturned on appeal in Shell v Sligo [1999] JOL 5043 (C), but the correctness 
of this statement was not in issue.  
97 (n49).  




The right to payment of the savings portion is not an asset in the member’s estate until it has 
accrued; it cannot be disposed of or transferred. It does, however, have monetary value. 
The reason that it is not a freely disposable asset is only because of the provisions of the 
PFA.99 But for those provisions, it would be a disposable asset. Once the savings portion has 
been paid to the member, it does become a disposable asset. As such, the member’s 
inability to deal with the portion while a member of the fund does not point towards it not 
being property; after all, it is these very restrictions that require justification for limiting the 
member’s right to property. Cowen describes proprietary rights as those which have a 
monetary value. He identifies the following three characteristics as typical of proprietary 
rights, while emphasising that a right may nevertheless be proprietary even absent some of 
the characteristics: that it can be transferred during the life of the holder; that it can be 
transmitted to the holder’s heirs or legatees on her death; that it is available to the holder’s 
creditors.100 By way of example, he identifies a usufruct as a proprietary right that cannot be 
transmitted to the holder’s heirs or legatees, and a government employee’s right to a 
pension as one that could not be disposed of inter vivos in terms of the legislation then in 
force.101 But for s37C, lump sum death benefits would be freely transmissible.  
 
The savings portion in private retirement funds is not ‘new property’ in the sense understood 
by Charles Reich and about which Moseneke ACJ expressed concern in Shoprite 
Checkers.102 It is not a social welfare benefit granted by the state, nor is it dependent upon 
the largesse of the state. It is also not a revocable benefit. It is instead a contractual right, 
often of significant monetary value, which lies against a private actor. It is incorporeal 
 
99 PFA, s37A & s37B. 
100 Cowen (n77), 416. 
101 Union Government Service Act 32 of 1936, s76.  
102 (n51) [103 ff]. See further the Adjudicator’s discussion of new property in Atkinson (n74). Cf Sonnekus 
‘Pensioenverwagtings en onderhoud na egskeiding in versorgingsregtelike in plaas van 
vermoenregtelike konteks’ 1989 TSAR 202, who applies Reich’s conception of new property to private 
pension rights.  
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property of the type that falls squarely within modern day conceptions of private property.103 
Cowen, in 1949, used the already-accepted phrase ‘rights of a proprietary nature’ to 
describe rights ‘which have a money value’.104 Certain pension entitlements may well 
constitute ‘new property’, such as when they form part of social welfare payments by the 
state and are viewed as a form of largesse, even though the recipient has contributed to 
funding the welfare programme through contributions levied by way of taxation. It is ‘new 
property’ that is a site of contestation, and which requires careful scrutiny to determine 
whether they fall within the constitutional conception of property.105  
 
The fund’s obligation to pay the member her savings portion would have existed 
independently of the Pension Funds Act. But for s5 of the Act, it is the member who would 
have owned her own contributions, and perhaps even those of the employer.106 After all, to 
the extent that a fund is a purpose-specific savings vehicle, savings held by the fund are 
similar to savings in a bank, or to a collective investment scheme.107 It is the Pension Funds 
Act that places ownership and control in the hands of the fund, subject to a statutory 
obligation to pay the member her savings portion. The loss of ownership and control is 
intended to be temporary and is only in order to protect the member from dissipating her 
savings before retirement. The member’s benefits are not a gratuitous addition to a 
member’s salary, to be bestowed at the beneficence of an employer. They are part and 
parcel of income the member has already earned.108 As early as 1910, a pension promised 
to an employee after retirement was already understood to mean ‘remuneration for past 
 
103 In Peacock v Peacock 1956 (3) SA 136 (A), Hoexter JA recognised contractual rights to possession of 
a farm as an asset that fell into the joint estate. 
104 Cowen (n77). 
105 See especially Moseneke ACJ’s minority decision in Shoprite Checkers (n51) [108ff]. 
106 Fraser (n66); Van Meerten (n72).  
107 See Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002, ss 2 & 70(1)(i), which recognise that the 
assets under management are the assets of the investor and owned by the investor.  
108 The ECJ has also emphasised that benefits promised under occupational retirement schemes form 
part of an employee’s remuneration, to which the principle of equal pay for equal work thus applies. 
See Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1990] ECR I-1889 and Directive 2006/54/EC 
of the European Parliament and Council of 5 July 2006. See also Thomson v NHS Pension Scheme 
(K00472, 22 May 2002). 
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services’ and ‘deferred payment of salary – something that has been earned’.109 This was 
said in the context of a post-employment promise by an employer to pay a former employee 
a stipulated annual sum as a pension, which the court held created an obligation on the 
employer to pay the pension for the duration of the retired employee’s lifetime. The promise 
was not part of the employment contract and the employee had not been a member of a 
retirement fund. If a post-employment promise can create a binding obligation that will 
endure for the lifetime of a former employee, the rights of members who have effectively 
funded their own retirement benefit must enjoy even greater recognition and protection.  
That the member’s accumulated savings is a right in and to property is further confirmed by 
the fact that prior to 1976 and the introduction of s37C, the member’s accumulated savings, 
when payable in the form of a lump sum on the death of the member, did constitute 
property in the estate of the member.110 Absent s37C, this lump sum would today still be 
property in the member’s estate and would have devolved in accordance with the law of 
succession. The lump sum was also considered to be property for which the member was 
liable to pay estate duty, and it remained property in the member’s estate, for this purpose 
only, until 2008.111  
109 Faustmann v GA Fichardt 1910 ORC 18, 21. Leyds v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1929 TPD 148, 
153 accepted that ’… the word 'pension' usually implies a payment in respect of services rendered or 
work done’, but held that the intention of the legislature in the instant case was not to reward the 
appellant for work done but to compensate public officials for the loss of office they had suffered as a 
result of the Anglo-Boer War. S v Commissioner of Taxes 1959 (3) SA 455 (SR) [458F–G]: ‘Although 
pensions may take different forms the essential of a pension – to my mind – is that it is a money 
payment usually of periodic sums which the ex-employee receives not as an earning from existing 
service but after the termination thereof and in consideration or in respect of or as a reward for past 
service.’  
110 As appears from the speech of the Minister of Finance when proposing the introduction of ss37A & 
37C to Parliament. See Financial Institutions Amendment Bill 2nd Reading Tuesday 16 March 1976 (2R, 
3241). See also S v Commissioner of Taxes (n109), in which the employer promised to pay a fixed 
pension for a fixed period and if the employee died before or after retirement the unpaid portion of the 
pension would be paid to the employee’s estate as a lump sum.  
111 See Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955, s3(2)(i), inserted by Act 60 of 2008, s2(1)(a). See also GEPF Pension 




During life, absent s37A and earlier legislation to the same effect,112 both the member’s 
pension and any lump sum payable by the fund, even in excess of savings, would similarly 
have been property in a member’s estate and as such transferable or capable of 
attachment by creditors.113  
 
6.3.3 The insured portion as ‘property’ 
 
Although there is little doubt that the member’s right to her savings portion is constitutionally 
protected property, it is less clear that the insured portion is also property in the hands of the 
member. The reason for this uncertainty is two-fold. First, since this portion is only payable on 
death, s37C inevitably applies. The member thus has no right to determine who the ultimate 
beneficiaries will be. Secondly, the fund’s obligation to pay the benefit is secured by a group 
life ‘fund policy’ between the fund and insurer.114 The fund is the owner of the policy, and the 
beneficiary is also the fund.115 The life insured is that of the member. Fund rules usually make 
their obligation to pay conditional on the insurer recognising the claim.116 Any property right 
that arises from the policy thus appears on the face of it to be exclusively that of the fund 
against the insurer rather than the member against either the fund or the insurer. Is it 
nevertheless possible that the member too, has acquired a constitutionally protected right to 
property vis a vis the insured portion? 
 
The difficulties facing members is that they neither own the policy, nor do they have vested 
rights in or to payment of the insured portion. The right to receive payment of the proceeds 
cannot be a vested right, since payment is conditional/contingent on the member dying 
 
112 See eg Schierhout v Union Government 1926 AD 286, applying s71 of the Public Service Act 27 of 
1923; Swanepoel v South African Railways1935 OPD 2 and Hewitt v Hewitt 1927 CPD 183, applying s21 
of Act 24 of 1925 
113 Foit v FirstRand Bank 2002 (5) SA 148 (T) notes that s 37A changes the common law, but only to the 
limited extent stated therein. Therefore, once the benefit has been paid out, it does form part of the 
former member’s estate and is liable to attachment, set-off etcetera. See also Estate Barry v Barry 1928 
WLD 250; Pick v Insolvent Estate of Neylan (20 CTR 475) reported in Index and Annual Digest (1910) 27(4) 
SALJ 18 & 192.  
114 As defined in the Long-Term Insurance Act 52 of 1988, s1. 
115 Reinecke & Nienaber ‘A suggested template for beneficiary nominations’ (2009) 21 SA Mercantile LJ 
1, 13 are critical of the general practice of describing policyholders as ‘owners’ of the policy. 
116 See eg Consolidated Rules of the University of Cape Town Retirement Fund, rule 6.8(1). 
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while in service. Currie and De Waal suggest that for a ‘right to constitute property, it must be 
a vested right’.117  
 
I suggest that whatever rights the member and beneficiaries have against the fund is an 
extension of the rights they have, or would have had, against the insurer directly. Had the 
benefit been secured by an individual life policy, the member would have been the holder, 
or owner, of the policy.118 What are the nature of the rights acquired under individual life 
policies, and are they comparable to the rights the member acquires against the fund in 
respect of the insured portion?  
 
Individual life policies come in different forms.119 The one which matches the group life cover 
most closely is a ‘term’ life policy, which is payable only if the insured dies during a specific 
period.120 It is the ‘original’ form of life insurance, dating as far back as the 17th century.121 
Under prevailing case law, individual life insurance is regarded as a stipulatio alteri for the 
benefit of a third party.122 The nominated beneficiaries, if any, acquire only a spes until such 
time as the member dies.123 The reason is that the nomination is freely revocable until the 
insured’s death, at which time it becomes an offer to the beneficiary, which the beneficiary 
(or trustees in an insolvent estate) is free to accept or reject. Upon acceptance, a binding 
contract comes into existence between the beneficiary and the insurer.124  
 
 
117 Bill of Rights Handbook (n92) para 25.3. The interpretation of vested is somewhat confusing, since it 
conflates vested with accrued.  
118 PPS Insurance Company v Mkhabela 2012 (3) SA 292 (SCA) [2]. 
119 Van Niekerk ‘The nature of life insurance contracts: a matter of death or life’ (2007) 19 SA Mercantile 
LJ 302.  
120 For a discussion of the different types (term, whole-life, pure endowment and life endowment), see 
Van Niekerk (n119). 
121 Havenga ‘The classification of life insurance contracts (Part 1)’ (1994) 27 De Jure 213. 
122 Wessels v De Jager 2000 (4) SA 924 (SCA); Pieterse v Shrosbree; Shrosbree v Love 2005 (1) SA 309 
(SCA); Oshry v Feldman 2010 (6) SA 19 (SCA). 
123 Shrosbree (n122); PPS Insurance v Mkhabela (n118). Cf Reinecke & Nienaber (n115), who would 
prefer to conceptualise it as a contingent interest. For an interesting historical discussion on the nature 
of a beneficiary’s right in Canada and the USA, which has long-since been resolved by legislative 
enactment in those jurisdictions, see Taylor ‘Beneficiaries of Life Insurance Policies’ (1944) 22 Canadian 
Bar Review 509. 
124 Shrosbree (n122).  
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The nature of the beneficiary’s right after the insured’s death but prior to acceptance is best-
characterised as a contingent right.125 Upon the beneficiaries’ acceptance of the benefit, 
they acquire a vested right to the proceeds.126 Absent a nominated beneficiary, the 
proceeds vest in the policy-holder’s estate.127 The estate is in all cases the default 
beneficiary. The member, through her estate, therefore always has a contingent right to the 
proceeds.128  
Life insurance contracts thus create personal rights of a proprietary and non-proprietary 
nature. The holder’s rights, as owner, encompass both. The right to nominate beneficiaries, 
cede or assign the policy, are personal rights of a non-proprietary nature. The contingent 
right to the proceeds is a proprietary right.  
Group life policies were first devised in the late 19th century in the USA, and quickly gained 
popularity.129 An important feature of group life policies in the USA from their inception,130 
and more recently elsewhere,131 is that even though the member/insured is not a party to the 
contract, both the member and her beneficiaries have standing to sue the insurer directly, 
125 Warricker v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd 2003 (6) SA 272 (W) [11]. Cf Reinecke & Nienaber 
(n115), who identify three possible ways to explain the nature of a beneficiary’s right to acceptance. 
The approach they prefer is that beneficiaries have contingent rights from the moment of nomination. 
Their right is then subject to two conditions: a resolutive condition, that the holder does not revoke the 
nomination; a suspensive condition, that they accept the nomination. The problem with this approach 
is that it does not assist in deciding whose rights take preference in cases of possible conflict. The better 
view is that it is a spes until death, then contingent, then vested (post acceptance).  
126 PPS Insurance v Mkhabela (n118); Wood-Bodley ‘Life policies and marriages in community of 
property – who owns the proceeds on the insured’s death: Danielz v De Wet (2010) 127(2) SALJ 224. In 
the cases discussed by Wood-Bodley, the estate of the deceased or insolvent insured tried to claim the 
proceeds, despite there being a nominated beneficiary who had accepted the benefit. In each case, 
they correctly failed in their attempt. 
127 Reinecke & Nienaber (n115) describe the policyholder as the ‘principal beneficiary’ (absent a 
nomination, of course).  
128 Even when dealing with the cession of a life policy, the cedent is considered to have a contingent 
reversionary right. See eg Barclays Bank v Riverside Dried Fruit Co (Pty) Ltd 1949 (1) SA 937 (C). 
129 Hanft ‘Group life insurance: its legal aspects’ (1935) 2 Law & Contemporary Problems 70. 
130 Hanft (n129), 85.  
131 Members’ and beneficiaries’ standing to enforce the contract has received statutory recognition in, 
for eg, Canada and England. See Insurance Act RSA 2000, ss665, 671; Insurance Act RSBC 2012, ss64, 
70; Insurance Act RSO 1990, ss195, 201 (Canada). I have not surveyed other provinces. For England, see 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, prior to which even the beneficiaries of individual life 
insurance did not have standing to sue because of the courts’ strict interpretation of the privity of 
contract requirement. See eg Beswick v Beswick [1967] UKHL 2. The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 
Act applies also to group insurance in the absence of an express provision to the contrary. See Merkin 
(ed) Insurance Law: An Introduction (2013), 19. 
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because group policies are accepted as constituting contracts for the benefit of third 
parties.  
In South Africa the nature of a member's and beneficiary’s interest in a group life policy 
has not generated much discussion or litigation. In one of the few cases on point, Sage Life v 
Van der Merwe,132 the court held that a group life policy was not a stipulatio alteri 
between the fund and the insurer for the benefit of a third party. The result was that only 
the fund had standing to enforce the policy against the insurer.133 However, on the facts 
of the case the insurance policy expressly stated that members and beneficiaries enjoyed 
no rights under the policy, and that only the fund had standing to sue the insurer.134 
Even if the fund policy does not meet the legal requirements for a stipulatio alteri, its raison 
d’être is to provide benefits to the fund’s members. Its sole purpose is to fund, in whole or in 
part, ‘the liability of a fund to provide benefits to its members in terms of its rules’.135 The 
benefit to the member is that it provides life insurance over the member’s life more cheaply 
than she would otherwise be able to obtain it.136 The fund policy is simply a life policy over a 
group of individuals rather than a life policy in respect of a single individual. Individual life 
insurance is expensive.137 The cost places it beyond the reach of many, if not the majority, of 
132 2001 (2) SA 166 (W). The specific issue before the court was whether the member had standing to 
sue the insurer directly. The court held not, because there was no contractual privity between the 
member and the insurer. The court held that an essential requirement for a contract to constitute a 
stipulatio alteri was that the insurer and policy holder must have intended that the third-party member 
become a party to the contract upon acceptance, such that it be enforceable by the third party (at 
169). The court cited no authority for this proposition.  
133 Cf Refrigerated Trucking (Pty) Ltd v Zive 1996 (2) SA 361 (T), which suggests that members, 
beneficiaries or the estate could sue the insurer directly, and do not need to rely on the fund to do so, 
unless the policy stipulates that only the fund has standing to enforce the policy.  
134 Cf Havemann v ABSA Group Life Scheme [2008] JOL 22132 (E), in which a disability policy was silent 
on the issue of standing, but the court held that there was no privity of contract between the insurer 
and the employee, and that the contract was not a stipulatio alteri for the benefit of the employee. As 
such, the employee was not entitled to sue the insurer directly.  
135 Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1988, s1 definition of ‘fund policy’. This is precisely the reason courts in 
the USA recognised that members and beneficiaries have direct standing to sue. See Hanft (n129), 85. 
136 Hanft (n129), 90.  
137 Numerous online life insurance calculators are available. See eg 
<https://www.oldmutual.co.za/personal/life-insurance/> — the cost of cover for a 48-year old female 
non-smoker who earns R500 000 p/a is in the region of R800 p/m. Under the University of Cape Town’s 
group life cover, the cost is unrelated to the employee’s age and gender. The comparable cost 
(assuming it is six times the employee’s annual salary of R500 000p/a) is approximately half that, at R392 
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fund members. The origin of, and rationale behind, group life insurance was simply to provide 
affordable life insurance.138 The rules of the fund, moreover, often clearly differentiate 
between the member’s savings portion and insured portion, and clearly link the insured 
portion to the payment of premiums by or on behalf of the member. Members may also 
retain some control over the value and the cost of the benefit. They may be given the right 
to increase or decrease the amount of the benefit and the premium paid by, or in respect of 
the member, will be increased or reduced accordingly. The insured portion only becomes 
payable on the member’s death, and the benefit will ultimately accrue to the member’s 
dependants, nominees or estate. The benefit is not part of the minimum benefits that a fund 
is statutorily obliged to pay its members; nevertheless, when it does form part of the benefit 
as per the fund’s rules, the fund is under a contractual obligation to pay the insured 
portion.139  
 
In the context of group life, the member’s estate is again the contingent beneficiary. The 
member’s right is not dependent on the exercise of the trustees’ discretion in her favour; 
absent dependants or nominees, the benefit will automatically vest in the estate on the 
member’s death.140 Absent dependants, even with a nominee, the benefit vests in the estate 
if it is insolvent. The member’s estate is therefore the contingent beneficiary until the member 
dies. Upon the member’s death, the nominees or dependants acquire variable rights. Prior to 
the member’s death a nominee enjoys no more than a spes, since her nomination is freely 
revocable. If the member is survived by nominees only, on the member’s death they acquire 
a contingent right to receive whatever proportion of the benefit the member has wished 
them; the contingency is that the estate is solvent. If the estate is solvent, the nominee’s right 
is a vested right. The nature of a dependant’s rights is variable. If there is only one 
 
p/m (the cost of cover is 0.943 the member’s annual salary, and it provides six times the employee’s 
annual salary) – see www.uctrf.co.za/uctrf/contributions (as at 1 March 2019).  
138 Hanft (n129).  
139 Cf the Adjudicator’s view that ‘[i]t is debatable whether an entitlement to death benefits under 
section 37C arises ex contractu, or whether it is quasi contractual arising ex lege’, in Dobie (n8), 36.  
140 PFA, s37C(1)(c). 
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dependant, that dependant enjoys a vested right from the moment the member dies.141 If 
there is more than one dependant, then as an undifferentiated group they have a vested 
right.142 As individuals within the group they have no more than a spes, for they acquire rights 
only when the trustees exercise their discretion in a particular beneficiary’s favour. The same 
holds true when the group consists of nominees and dependants. 
 
The Administration of Estates Act includes any contingent interest in property within its 
definition of property,143 as does the Trust Property Control Act.144 The Estate Duty Act deems 
the proceeds of a life insurance policy to be property in the estate of the insured if the 
proceeds are payable to, or will be utilised for the benefit of, the insured’s relatives or 
financial dependants.145 Prior to the 2008 amendment to the Estate Duty Act, lump sums 
payable by retirement funds were similarly deemed property in the estate of the member.146 
Lump sums commuted for cash still incur income tax if they exceed the free withdrawal 
limit.147 When the member leaves the fund, the insured portion usually falls away. Should the 
member die while in service, the savings portion and the insured portion are aggregated into 
a single lump sum for tax purposes, and in terms of s37C. But for s37C, the insured portion 
would have devolved according to the laws of succession or contract.  
 
In Shoprite Checkers,148 the CC interpreted the meaning of constitutional property through 
the lens of the fundamental rights, and values, to freedom, dignity and equality. Property, for 
the purpose of s25 of the Constitution, is property that the court feels is deserving of 
protection, having regard to the Constitution’s fundamental values. Fundamental values are 
important in determining the outer boundaries of the right and whether rights not hitherto 
 
141 Since the trustees are obliged to pay the full benefit to that dependant in terms of PFA, s37C(1)(a). 
142 PFA, s37C(1)(a) & (bA). 
143 Act 66 of 1965, s1. 
144 Act 57 of 1988, s1. 
145 Act 45 of 1955, s3(3)(a)(ii). 
146 Ibid, s 3(3)(a)bis, which was introduced into the Estate Duty Act by the Revenue Laws Amendment 
Act 81 of 1965, s2(1)(b) and removed by Revenue Laws Amendment Act 60 of 2008, s2(1)(b).  
147 See Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, Second Schedule ‘Computation of Gross Income derived by way of 






recognised as private property rights should be included within the scope of the 
constitutional conception of property.  
 
6.3.4 Interim Conclusion 
 
Fund rules that promise to pay an additional sum of money on the death of the member 
create binding and enforceable obligations. The obligation ‘vests’ on the death of the 
member, albeit that the identity of the appropriate beneficiary has not yet been established. 
The obligation creates enforceable contractual and statutory rights that have value. Its value 
is that it will make financial provision for the member’s beneficiaries. The member is under a 
common law and statutory obligation to make provision for certain beneficiaries. The 
member’s ability to do so through the means provided by the benefit is intimately connected 
to the member’s dignity and freedom.  
 
There can be little doubt that whether viewed simply as part of the lump sum payable by the 
fund, or whether treated separately, it too is property in the constitutional sense in the hands 
of the member. 
 
As Cowen points out, although contingent rights are not actually rights at all, the expression 
serves a useful purpose.149 It identifies those interests which, although not yet rights, are 
nevertheless considered worthy of recognition and protection. The law protects contingent 
interests in various ways – for example, by protecting the holder should the other party 
deliberately frustrate the fulfilment of a condition.150 A spouse’s claim to share in a member’s 
pension interest was inserted into the Divorce Act in 1989 because the Law Commission 
concluded that members had, at least, a contingent right to their benefits.151  
 
 
149 (n77), 408. 
150 The doctrine of fictional fulfilment applies in such a case. For further examples, see Cowen (n77) 
fn17.  
151 SALC (Project 41) 1986 Report (n84) para 3.3.  
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6.4 A SPOUSE’S RIGHT TO PROPERTY 
 
In Adjudicator determinations in which the deceased is survived by a spouse, the marital 
regime is rarely mentioned.152 It is not considered a relevant consideration.153 The Adjudicator 
has consistently stated that marriage in community of property does not entitle a spouse to 
50% of the death benefit.154 This is also the position of the High Court.155 When funds have 
appeared to award a surviving spouse 50% of the death benefit only on the basis of their 
marriage in community of property, they have been castigated for doing so.156 Is the 
Adjudicator’s view correct?157  
 
The question is of material importance for most surviving spouses. The default marital regime 
for monogamous marriages is that they are marriages in community of property,158 and this is 
the regime that applies to most marriages. When spouses marry out of community of 
property, the accrual system similarly applies by default unless expressly excluded by ante-
nuptial contract.159 Would surviving spouses under both regimes not have had an automatic 
right to share in the death benefit in the absence of s37C? If the answer is yes, then s37C 
 
152 Cf Van Vuuren v CRAF [2000] 6 BPLR 661 (PFA), but here the fund relied on the spouses’ marriage out 
of community of property to justify their award.  
153 See eg Watney v Metal Industries [2017] 2 BPLR 408 (PFA), in which the fund made no allocation to 
the surviving spouse and made no mention of the marital regime. Although it was remitted to the 
trustees for reinvestigation, the Adjudicator’s concern went to a different issue.  
154 Brummelkamp v Babcock [2001] 4 BPLR 1811 (PFA); Ditshabe v Sanlam [2001] 10 BPLR 2579 (PFA); 
Khaba v Wizard [2007] JOL 20346 (PFA). 
155 Makume v Cape Joint RF [2007] JOL 19999 (C). 
156 Khadi v Univen (unreported), discussed in OPFA AR 2013/2014, 12. 
157 In Marais v Sasol [2017] 3 BPLR 615 (PFA), the Adjudicator reasoned that just as a spouse cannot 
expect to receive 50% of the death benefit merely because they had been married in community of 
property, so a life partner cannot expect to receive a greater share than the extent of her actual 
financial dependency. 
158 Hahlo The South African Law of Husband and Wife 5ed (1985). Once limited to marriages concluded 
in terms of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961, the default regime now applies to civil unions concluded in 
terms of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 and customary law marriages concluded in terms of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 came into force. Although s7(1) of the Customary 
Marriages Act limits in community regimes to monogamous marriages concluded after the Act’s 
commencement, it has been declared unconstitutional. Since Gumede v President of the Republic of 
South Africa 2009 (3) BCLR 243 (CC) monogamous customary marriages concluded before the Act are 
also in community. Polygynous marriages have different consequences, depending on whether the first 
marriage was concluded before or after the Act commenced. If after, the first marriage is in 
community and subsequent marriages are out of community (without accrual). See Ngwenyama v 
Mayelane [2012] 3 All SA 408 (SCA), confirmed by the CC in Mayelane v Ngwenyama 2013 (8) BCLR 
918 (CC). If before the Act, an interim sui generis regime created by the CC applies pending the 
adoption of legislation, in which no one marriage is in community. See Ramuhovhi v President of the 
Republic of South Africa  2018 (2) SA 1 (CC).  
159 Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984, s2. 
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does not merely limit the member’s right to property but that of the spouse also. The question 
is of greater importance for spouses married in community of property, however. Marriage in 
community of property does not merely establish entitlements as between the spouses, as is 
the case with the accrual system. It also makes them jointly liable for all the debts of the 
estate. The death benefit is insulated from creditors’ claims, but the surviving spouse is not. 
The surviving spouse thus remains liable for the deceased’s debts, with no automatic 
entitlement to any share of the benefit.160 The fact that a spouse receives less than the 50% 
to which she would have been entitled does not mean the outcome is necessarily 
inequitable. Had the marriage terminated in divorce, there are instances in which the 
deceased might well have succeeded in obtaining an order for forfeiture of the benefits of 
the marriage.161 Nevertheless, this does not address the constitutionality of s37C’s override of 
all other laws, including matrimonial property law.  
 
If the savings portion is accepted as constituting property in the hands of the member, 
should it not, by operation of law, form part of the joint estate of spouses married in 
community of property?162 The prevailing view is that it does not form part of the joint estate 
under the common law, and only does so to the extent provided for in the Divorce Act.163 
This is not, however, the universal view, and there are a minority that have doubted its 
correctness.164 I share the minority view. At a minimum, the surviving spouse should, by virtue 
of her marital regime, be entitled to half the savings portion as of right. Why, then, are most 
commentators and courts of the view that it forms part of the joint estate only on divorce? 
The reason lies in their interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Divorce Act, coupled 
 
160 See Brummelkamp (n154), 1815; Makume v Sentinel (n31) [40]. 
161 See eg Ditshabe (n154), given the short duration of the marriage. 
162 In the USA, absent legislation to the contrary, vested pension rights are generally considered an 
asset in the joint estate. See Brinig (n85), 521-522.  
163 Old Mutual Life Assurance Company (SA) Limited v Swemmer [2004] 4 BPLR 5581 (SCA); Ndaba v 
Ndaba [2017] 1 BPLR 39 (SCA). See also Sempapalele v Sempapalele 2001 (2) SA 306 (O); Maharaj v 
Maharaj 2002 (2) SA 648 (D); Elesang v PPC Lime Ltd 2007 (6) SA 328 (NC); Kirchner v Kirchner 2009 (4) 
SA 448. See further Marumoagae ‘Can a non-member spouse protect his or her interest in the member 
spouse’s accrued pension benefits before divorce’ 2016 Obiter 212. 
164 De Kock v Jacobson 1999 (4) SA 346 (W) 348; Chiloane v Chiloane [2007] JOL 20607 (T), 12. See also 
Marumoagae ‘A non-member spouse’s entitlement to the member’s pension interest’ (2014) 17 PELJ 
2488. Cf Van Zyl ‘Pension interest by spouses on divorce' 1985 De Rebus 343; Van Aswegen 'The 
protection of a spouse's right to share in the joint estate or accrual' 1987 De Rebus 59.  
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with their understanding of the nature of retirement benefits. In the discussion that follows I 
seek to demonstrate that their understanding is based on an incorrect interpretation of the 
Divorce Act, and of the authorities upon which they rely in support of their conclusion. 
 
6.4.1 The savings portion  
 
Section 7(7) of the Divorce Act provides that in an action for divorce, the pension interest of 
spouses shall be ‘deemed’ to be part of spouses’ assets. Pension interest is in turn defined to 
mean the benefits to which a member would be entitled had she resigned from the fund on 
the date of her divorce. Section 7(7) was only inserted into the Divorce Act in 1989. In Old 
Mutual v Swemmer,165 the leading case on the nature and effect of s7(7), the Supreme Court 
of Appeal stated that ‘it appeared’ that a member’s pension interest had not, prior to 1989, 
formed part of the member’s estate or the joint estate. The court acknowledged that the law 
prior to 1989 was uncertain in this regard.166 Whatever the position prior to 1989, the court 
held that the effect of s7(7) was possibly to create, and certainly to limit, a spouse’s 
entitlement on divorce to sharing in only the member’s pension interest, as defined. The court 
therefore accepted that a member’s pension interest is only part of the joint estate by virtue 
of the ‘deeming’ provision in s7(7), and that it was not a ‘real asset open to division’ but a 
notional asset created by the legislature.167 If the retirement benefit exceeds the pension 
interest, the spouse is not entitled to that additional benefit.168 On the other hand, once the 
pension interest and any additional benefit has been paid to the member spouse, the 
 
165 Old Mutual v Swemmer (n163) [17]. 
166 Ibid.  
167 Para 18, quoting from the SALC (Project 41) Report on the division of pension benefits on divorce 
(1995) (‘1995 Report’). This passage was in turn quoted with approval in Ndaba (n163) [10]. 
168 The particular problem in Old Mutual v Swemmer (n163) was that the divorce order entitled the 
applicant to claim payment of the proceeds of retirement annuity policies which had been taken out 
by her ex-husband and she was entitled to do so at the earliest date on which the husband would 
have been entitled to do so, namely on his 55th birthday. Her husband remained the actual holder of 
the policies. The SCA held that the divorce order was unenforceable in that it entitled her to benefits in 
excess of her ‘pension interest’, which was, by definition, fixed as at the date of divorce, and could not 
include future contributions and investment returns. The SCA further held that only the holder of the 
retirement annuity was entitled to anticipate the contractually agreed maturity date, which was his 
retirement date.  
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benefit as a whole does form part of the joint estate.169 Should the member and spouse 
divorce after the benefit has accrued to the member, the spouse will be entitled to half of 
the benefit by virtue of the marriage in community of property — s7(7) of the Divorce Act is 
then irrelevant.170  
 
The proposition that a member’s ‘pension interest’ does not naturally form part of the joint 
estate has been repeated so often that it seems as though it must self-evidently be true. 
Some courts have gone so far as to state that the pension interest does not even 
automatically form part of the joint estate by virtue of the deeming provision in s7(7), but that 
it only becomes so when the divorce court expressly includes it as an asset in the joint estate 
for the purpose of dividing the estate.171 Absent its inclusion in the order, the spouse has been 
held to be disentitled to a share in the pension interest.172 The context in which the 
application, and construction, of s7(7) and s7(8) often arises is when a spouse seeks to have 
the original divorce order amended, in order to obtain a share of the pension interest. Many 
such applications have been unsuccessful.173 The courts failed to appreciate that s7(8) of the 
Act, which empowered the court to make an order instructing the fund to pay the spouse 
her half-share on the date the right accrued to the member, was not required to establish 
the spouse’s right (to bring it into existence). It was inserted only to ensure that the spouse 
could enforce her right as against the fund directly, if the member personally could not 
afford to satisfy the spouse’s monetary claim using other assets.174 There were courts that held 
that the pension interest automatically formed part of the joint estate on divorce,175 but none 
went so far as to conclude that it formed part of the joint estate outside divorce.176  
 
169 De Kock v Jacobson (n164); Elesang (n163); Eskom v Krugel [2011] 3 BPLR 309 (SCA).  
170 Eskom v Krugel (n169); GEPF v Naidoo 2006 (6) SA 304 (SCA); Harris v Motor Industry [2014] JOL 31423 
(PFA). 
171 Sempapalele (n163); DML v LJL (ZAFSHC) unreported case no 3981/2010 of 25 April 2013.  
172 Sempapalele (n163); DML v LJL (n171) and further cases discussed in Marumoagae (n164). 
173 Sempapalele (n163); DML v LJL (n171).  
174 SALC (Project 112) Report on the Sharing of Pension Benefits (1999), para 1.4. 
175 Maharaj (n163); Chiloane (n164); Motsetse v Motsetse [2015] JOL 32959 (FB). 
176 Some have called for such recognition. See Marumoagae (n164). Some courts have come close to 
doing so, such as Clark v Clark 1949 (3) SA 226 (D) and Chiloane (n164). In Chiloane, Raulinga AJ used 
the analogy of two athletes competing in the Comrades marathon to highlight the artificiality of the 
distinction between accrued and unaccrued pension interests: an accrued pension interest is like an 
athlete who completes the race just seconds ahead of the cut-off time while her unaccrued 
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In its recent decision Ndaba v Ndaba,177 the Supreme Court of Appeal accepted that a 
pension interest only forms part of the joint estate by virtue of the Divorce Act but rejected 
the way in which the Divorce Act has been interpreted by high courts. Ndaba held that the 
effect of s7(7) of the Divorce Act is that a member’s pension interest does automatically form 
part of the joint estate on divorce. The court stated that ‘the section creates a fiction that a 
pension interest of a party becomes an integral part of the joint estate upon divorce which is 
to be shared between the parties.’178 The court emphasised that the effect of s7(7) is that the 
pension automatically forms part of the joint estate on divorce, without the need for a court 
order specifically awarding a share of the pension interest to the spouse. This means that 
where the divorce order does not specifically award half the joint estate to the spouse, 
and/or fails to mention the pension interest separately, the spouse nevertheless has a claim 
to the pension interest. To the extent that a fund can only act upon an order of court, the 
necessary order can be granted subsequent to the divorce, and the spouse is not 
prejudiced because of shortcomings in the original order.179 In light of Ndaba, divorcing 
spouses married in community of property, who do not wish their spouse to share in the 
pension interest, will specifically need to apply for an order for forfeiture of benefits.180  
Is the view that a member’s pension interest only forms part of the joint estate in the context 
of divorce the correct view? If it is correct, it means that a spouse whose marriage is 
dissolved by divorce enjoys greater rights than a spouse whose marriage is dissolved by 
counterpart reaches the same point just seconds after the cut-off time. Despite having run ‘the same 
distance at almost the same time’, the former receives a reward that is denied the latter. The analogy is 
apt. It makes no sense that a widowed spouse has fewer rights than a divorced spouse. 
177 (n163). 
178 Para 26. The specific issue in Ndaba was whether a spouse’s entitlement was dependent on the 
court order specifying that the pension interest be divided. Some decisions, such as Sempapalele 
(n163), had held that absent a specific instruction in the order, the pension interest did not form part of 
the joint estate. The result was that when a court simply ordered the division of the joint estate, the 
spouse was held not to be entitled to share in the pension interest. Ndaba held that this was an 
incorrect interpretation of s7(7) of the Act. 
179 For an example of such prejudice, see Lubbe v CRAF [2015] JOL 32839 (PFA).  
180 Divorce Act 70 of 1979, s9. See Human v Human [1999] JOL 4959 (E) and JW v SW 2011 (1) SA 545 
(GNP). Whether the member will be able to do so subsequent to the divorce is not clear. See Van Zyl v 
Van der Merwe 1986 (2) SA 152 (NC).  
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death.181 On the other hand, if the view is incorrect, it means that the treatment of death 
benefits in terms of s37C limits not only the member’s proprietary rights, but also the spouse’s 
right to property. 
 
Why have the courts and commentators so consistently concluded that a member’s 
retirement benefits, or any portion thereof, did not form part of the joint estate prior to 1989, 
and would still not do so but for the Divorce Act? At a minimum, the amount claimable as a 
‘pension interest’ on divorce should similarly be claimable on death. After all, a pension 
interest as defined in the Divorce Act is, in essence, the member’s savings portion in a 
defined contribution fund.  
 
For a member’s pension interest not to form part of the joint estate, there must be something 
singular about the pension interest that distinguishes it from the property that otherwise forms 
part of the joint estate. After all, a joint estate consists of all the assets and liabilities of the 
spouses, whether acquired before or during the marriage.182 The Matrimonial Property Act 
lists specific exclusions, and a member’s retirement benefit is not amongst the exclusions.183 
What then is that singularity that leads so many to exclude the savings portion? Few 
commentators or courts provide an explanation, simply restating, as an article of faith, that 
prior to 1989 the retirement benefits did not form part of the joint estate.184  
 
The original explanation may have been that incorporeal rights were not considered 
property, in either the member’s or the joint estate. In their Law of Persons contribution to the 
1984 Annual Survey, Sinclair and Kaganas state that ‘pension and retirement benefits are not 
 
181 It was precisely to remedy this anomaly that the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 
was enacted, see Hodges v Coubrough 1991 (3) SA 58 (D). As an example of an unsuccessful 
maintenance claim see Glazer v Glazer 1963 (4) SA 694 (A) 707, described as inequitable by Hahlo ‘The 
Sad Demise of the Family Maintenance Bill 1969’ (1971) 88(2) SALJ 201, 202.  
182 Hahlo Husband and Wife (n158), 157-158, quoted with approval in De Kock v Jacobson (n164), 
Elesang (n163), JW v SW (n180). 
183 Act 88 of 1984, s15. 
184 Sempapalele (n163); Maharaj (n163).  
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yet classified as property’.185 Later in the same contribution they welcome the decision in 
Mathee NO v Koen,186 in which the court held that the value of a house which had been 
bought by the husband, but which had not yet been transferred into his name, did form part 
of the joint estate. Prior to transfer of ownership the house itself was not yet an asset in the 
joint estate. The husband, however, enjoyed a contractual right to claim transfer on 
payment of the final instalment. The house had increased significantly in value between the 
date of purchase and the date of divorce. The husband’s incorporeal right was thus a 
valuable asset, and Sinclair and Kaganas observed that the court’s recognition that the 
incorporeal right was an asset in the joint estate ‘augured’ well for the future.187  
 
If the view until then had been that pension and retirement benefits did not constitute 
property in the joint estate because they were incorporeal rights, the view is clearly without 
merit. Incorporeal rights had long prior to the decision in Mathee been recognised as 
constituting assets in an individual’s estate, and in the joint estate.188 In Peacock v Peacock 
NO,189 the AD held that ‘contractual rights are property in the (deceased) joint estate’, 
confirming a long line of previous provincial decisions on point.190 The only difference 
between the contractual right in Mathee and Peacock, and that in relation to retirement 
benefits, is that the former involved a contractual right to immovable property, while the 
latter involves a contractual and statutory right to a movable, namely money.  
 
The generally accepted explanation today is that until the member’s right to the benefit has 
accrued to the member, it is not an asset in her estate, and therefore cannot be an asset in 
the joint estate.191 It is for this reason that the legislature is thought to have inserted the 
 
185 Sinclair & Kaganas ‘Law of Persons’ 1984 Annual Survey 85, 96. They welcomed the proposed 
amendment to the Divorce Act allowing spouses to claim a share of the other’s pension interest and 
recommended that in the interim courts use their discretion to make an adjustment in favour of a 
spouse who does not yet have direct claim to pension interest. 
186 1984 (2) SA 543 (C).  
187 (n185) 110. 
188 Cowen (n77) 418, clearly considers incorporeal rights to be proprietary rights in the estate. See 
further the cases cited in Peacock v Peacock (n103), some dating back to 1909.  
189 (n103). 
190 Ibid 140 -141. 
191 De Kock v Jacobson (n164) 348 H-I; Old Mutual v Swemmer (n163) [17]. 
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reference to pension interest in the Divorce Act, which, by virtue of the s 7(7) ‘deeming’ 
provision, is a notional asset specially created to permit its division on divorce. Where did the 
view, that a pension interest is a notional rather than real asset, originate? It is attributed to 
the Law Commission report that originally recommended that the Divorce Act be amended 
to make specific reference to pension interest (1986 report).192  
 
The Law Commission in its 1986 report did not, however, conclude that a member’s pension 
interest was not an asset in her estate. The Commission merely stated that this was the view 
of those who considered the member’s pension interest to be nothing more than a bare 
expectation, given the fact that the eventual value of the pension and the date on which it 
would become payable was uncertain.193 The Commission disagreed with this view, and 
instead concluded that both the member and her dependants did have personal rights 
against the fund, albeit that the right was ‘frozen’ until such time as the ‘de-freezing 
contingency’, in the form of the member’s retirement, resignation or death, occurred.194 The 
Commission concluded that the member enjoyed a conditional right to her pension 
interest.195 It was not certain, however, whether the member’s conditional right formed an 
asset in the member’s estate because the question had not been ‘answered categorically 
by the courts.’196 It found that the practice of courts was that a member’s right to her 
pension interest was typically disregarded in the division of the joint estate.197 The probable 
reason was that it was not an ‘economically realisable’ asset,198 rather than that it was not an 
 
192 SALC (Project 41) 1986 Report (n84) para 3.3, which was relied on in De Kock v Jacobson (n164) 348 
H-I and Old Mutual v Swemmer (n163) [17]. 
193 Ibid, para 3.3.  
194 Ibid, paras 3.4 & 3.6. 
195 Ibid.  
196 Ibid, para 3.11. 
197 Ibid, para 3.16. In its preliminary working paper, the Commission stated the question of whether 
pension benefits formed an asset in the joint estate had never been answered by the courts because it 
was ‘generally accepted that the wife is entitled to pension benefits only if she has the status of “wife of 
the member” upon payment of the benefits’. It is clear, however, that what was under discussion was a 
pension in the strict sense. The investigation was conducted at a time when the benefit promised by 
most funds was a monthly pension for life rather than a lump sum. See SALC (Project 41) Investigation 
into the possibility of making provision for a divorced woman to share in the pension benefits of her 
former husband (1984) (‘1984 Report’) para 3.1.3. 
198 The view expressed by the majority of those who submitted comments to the Commission during its 
investigation. See para 5.5 of the 1984 Report (n197). 
252 
asset. In 1980 a government committee had concluded that ‘a person’s accrued frozen 
pension interest is often his most valuable possession – worth more than even his house’.199  
It was only a decade later that the Law Commission reasoned, incorrectly in my view, that a 
pension interest was not an asset in the member’s estate because the member enjoyed ‘at 
best a personal conditional right’.200 It was in its subsequent 1995 report that the Commission 
for the first time expressed the view that a ‘pension interest is not a real asset open to 
division’.201  
Why a personal conditional right cannot be an asset in one’s estate, and why a pension 
interest is not a real asset, was not explained by the Commission. No court has yet 
interrogated the correctness of this conclusion. Were the question to come before the courts 
in the context of a surviving spouse’s entitlement following the death of the member, I am of 
the view that the court would conclude that the Commission’s conclusion in its 1995 report is 
wrong, as a matter of law. If by ‘accrue’ is meant the date on which the benefit becomes 
payable, the view that it does not accrue before the date of retirement or death is correct. If 
by accrue is meant that the right does not yet exist, the view is clearly incorrect. Whatever 
the intended meaning of accrue, the member does not acquire her rights when the right 
accrues. The date on which it ‘accrues’ is merely the date on which payment becomes due. 
Prior to that date, the right is already an asset in the member’s estate.  
As explained above,202 a member has a vested and enforceable right to be paid her savings 
portion when she ceases to be an active member of the fund for any reason. Her right exists 
throughout her membership of the fund. Her right is an asset in her estate.203 Her right is, 
199 Quoted in the 1984 Report (n197), 1.  
200 SALC (Project 41) Investigation into the possibility of making provision for a divorced woman to share 
in the pension benefits of her former husband: Matters relating to the Divorce Amendment Act 7 of 
1989 (1993) para 1.1.  
201 SALC (Project 41) 1995 Report (n167) para 4.1.2.  
202 See §6.3 above. 
203 See Joint Municipal PF v Grobler (n76), which also confirms members’ entitlement to ‘established’, 
i.e. accumulated, benefits in the context of a DB fund.
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however, only enforceable at the date on which she retires or on which her membership of 
the fund ceases if prior to retirement. Her membership automatically ceases when she dies. 
Her marriage is similarly dissolved by her death.204 At the moment of her death her existing 
right to the savings portion accrues. At that moment the joint estate is dissolved. The two 
occur simultaneously. Her right accrues on her death, not after her death. The savings portion 
was already an existing asset in her estate prior to death. The practical difficulties 
occasioned by claiming a half share on divorce, while the member is still an active member 
of the fund, do not arise. The Divorce Act was therefore only ever necessary to deal with 
those practical difficulties, which do not occur on death. Just as Burne NO v Commissioner 
for Inland Revenue205considered it ‘irreconcilable in logic’ that a member could be liable for 
income tax on the lump sum while alive, but that the obligation could be extinguished by 
s37C, so too it is illogical that a spouse’s rights are contingent on the member remaining 
alive, and that they are automatically extinguished on the member’s death by virtue of the 
operation of s37C.206 
 
The Law Commission, furthermore, understands s37C to mean that a surviving spouse, 
irrespective of marital regime, has a right to share in a member’s death benefits.207 It has thus 
proposed that s 7(7) of the Divorce Act be repealed and a new statutory regime be 
adopted granting all spouses a right to share the pension interest on divorce. It believes all 
surviving spouses enjoy an entitlement to share in the member’s death benefits, and that 
s7(7)’s purpose is to equalise the rights of divorcing spouses and surviving spouses.  
 
A further explanation is that it is difficult to calculate the present value of a retirement benefit 
on divorce.208 This was the principle reason that the Divorce Act, when adopted in 1979, did 
not originally entitle a spouse to claim a share of the member’s full retirement benefit on 
 
204 YG v Executor Estate Late CGM 2013 (4) SA 387 (WCC). 
205 1999 (3) SA 876 (D). 
206 Ibid, 882. 
207 SALC (Project 112) Discussion Paper 77 (1998), para 2.2.4 & 4.1.5. 
208 Ibid. See also Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Martinus [2007] 1 BPLR 94 (W), which illustrates the 
valuation difficulties that can arise, albeit in a non-divorce context.  
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divorce, but limited her entitlement to the ‘pension interest’, as defined.209 Valuation, 
however, is a problem of practice and implementation, and does not relate to the legal 
question of whether a member’s retirement benefit forms part of the joint estate. It is a 
problem specific to dissolution of marriage by divorce. It is also a problem encountered 
mainly in defined benefit funds, rather than defined contribution funds.210 Even in a defined 
benefit fund, the valuation difficulties do not arise on the member’s death, for there is no 
possibility of future service, contributions and accumulation or the forfeiture of benefits on 
withdrawal – the aspects in rules that complicate the valuation of a benefit prior to 
retirement. 
 
The South African Law Commission accepted in its 1999 report on the ‘Sharing of Pension 
Benefits’ that, in defined contribution funds, the division of a retirement benefit is a ‘relatively 
simple exercise because the value of the benefits are readily ascertainable at any time.’211 
The introduction of the concept of ‘pension interest’ in 1989 was, in any event, in order to 
address the valuation difficulties. The definition did not remove all the practical difficulties, 
which is why the 1999 SALC report contained detailed methodology for the valuation of a 
benefit in a defined benefit fund. The 1999 proposals were never adopted. The pension funds 
industry and legal practitioners found them complicated and confusing.212 The report was 
authored in 1999, before the legislature introduced the ‘minimum benefit’ provisions into the 
Act.213 Whatever the merits of the historic explanation for excluding retirement benefits from 
the joint estate, which were always doubtful with respect to defined contribution funds, they 
no longer have any force in relation to either type of fund. While valuation may remain a 
 
209 Keyser ‘Law of Persons and Family Law’ 1989 Annual Survey of South African Law 1, 3. 
210 See also Bonavich ‘Allocation of private pension benefits as marital property in Illinois divorce 
proceedings’ (1979) 29 De Paul LR 1. He made the point, in the context of DB funds, that whether a 
pension benefit constitutes property in a member’s estate depends on the particular rules of each 
fund.  
211 SALC (Project 112) Report on the Sharing of Pension Benefits (1999) para 4.8. 
212 Ibid para 4.5 & Annexure A of the report. 
213 Sections 14A&14B were inserted in 2001. 
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practical difficulty in defined benefit funds, the member’s entitlement to an ‘established’, or 
vested benefit, is incontestable.214  
Part of the conceptual difficulties regarding whether the member’s benefit constitutes an 
asset in the joint estate may be linguistic and may stem from the use of the words ‘deem’ 
and ‘accrue’ and ‘pension interest’. Because the Divorce Act ‘deemed’ the pension interest 
to be part of the joint estate on divorce, the SCA has held that this necessarily implies that 
the interest would otherwise not form part of the joint estate.215 It is therefore, in the words of 
the SCA, a notional or fictitious asset rather than a real asset in the joint estate.216 However, 
the use of the word ‘deem’ does not always imply artifice. As the SCA pointed out in Mostert 
NO v Old Mutual,217 the word ‘can be used to convey that something is what it in fact is not; 
but it can also be used in the sense of “considered” or “regarded’’’. If understood in the 
latter sense, the deeming provision is merely confirmatory, inserted into the Act to remove 
any doubt about whether retirement benefits form part of the joint estate. The fact that the 
Act then limits the spouse’s entitlement to the ‘pension interest’ was to simplify the valuation 
process at a time when defined benefit funds were common and the valuation of the 
benefit inherently more complex.218 It is difficult to understand how an asset can be 
accepted as forming part of the member’s estate and yet be held not to fall within the joint 
estate. The better view must be that the asset should be specifically excluded, by either the 
parties or the law, for it not to form part of the joint estate. 
The word accrue is similarly used in different senses. In analysing the meaning of the word in 
the context of the Estate Duty Act, the SCA, in Commissioner, SARS v Frith’s Estate,219 clarified 
that on the one hand, it denotes that someone is ‘entitled to’ something, on the other that 
someone has ‘actually received’ something. The sense in which it is most commonly used in 
214 Joint Municipal PF v Grobler (n76). 
215 Old Mutual v Swemmer (n163) [18-19]; Ndaba (n163) [26]. 
216 Ibid. 
217 (n47). 
218 SALC Discussion Paper 77, para 1.2 – 1.3. See also Old Mutual v Swemmer (n163) [18]; Chiloane 
(n164), 14.  
219 2001 (2) SA 261 (SCA) [5-7]. 
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law, particularly revenue law, is the former.220 Amongst the examples given to explain the 
nuance is ‘alimony which is due but not yet paid’ and ‘interest which has been earned but 
not yet paid or payable’.221 In this context, accrued rights are synonymous with vested rights, 
and the terms are often used interchangeably. In Marshall v Union Government,222 the court 
was required to interpret the meaning of the phrase ‘accruing rights’ in the South Africa Act 
1909, which contained a provision guaranteeing public servants their ‘existing and accruing 
rights’ following the transition to a British Colony. The court held that accruing rights meant 
‘legal rights, rights which, though they had not yet accrued, would in the ordinary course of 
events be claimable when they had accrued’.223 In this context accrued rights are vested 
rights which are not yet payable.224 This is the sense in which accrued is used in relation to 
retirement benefits.225  
The term ‘pension interest’ was also introduced at a time when pensions, in the strict sense, 
were commonly the main benefit promised by a fund.226 In defined benefit funds in 
particular, the member would probably have become entitled to a monthly pension on 
retirement. Were the member to die while in service, a reduced pension would become 
payable to the surviving spouse and/or dependent children. This was at a time when the 
member was typically the husband, and the spouse a wife. The eventual pension was 
calculated according to a formula, based on the member’s length of service and average 
salary during his final year of employment. Some pension fund rules also contained forfeiture 
provisions. Typically, in such cases, if a member were to resign prior to retirement, she would 
forfeit whatever contributions the employer had made to the fund, although she would 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid [6], quoting from Black’s Law Dictionary. 
222 1917 TPD 371.  
223 Ibid, 376. 
224 The retirement fund industry also understands the word ‘accrue’, as used in s7(8) of the Divorce Act 
70 of 1979, to mean ‘becomes due and payable’. See SALC (Project 41) 1995 Report (n167), 33. This is 
also the sense in which the word is used in the PFA. See inter alia ss1 (definition of fund return) and 14B 
(valuation of defined benefit). 
225 In Income Tax Case No. 1642 60 SATC 541, the court held that a spouse’s 50% share of the pension 
interest, awarded to her in terms of a divorce order, accrued to her as at the date of divorce, even 
though it was only payable when her husband withdrew from the fund, which he did only a year later. 
Since her right had accrued, she rather than her husband was liable for tax on her share of the benefit.  
226 A pension is an ‘annual payment for life given in recognition for past services’, Faustmann v GA 
Fichardt (n109).  
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remain entitled to her own contributions. It is little wonder, then, that valuation presented real 
difficulties prior to the ‘pension interest’ formulation. In the pension context, any lump sum 
that was payable by the fund would be of relatively little value when compared to the value 
of the pension. The spouse’s entitlement to share in the member’s pension would, on the 
member’s death, have been realised through the spouse’s separate entitlement to a 
pension. Spouses enjoyed this entitlement irrespective of their marital regime. The spouse’s 
right to a separate pension was clearly contingent/conditional on her husband dying while 
they were still married.227 What, however, of the member’s right to his promised pension, 
which could only be calculated if the member remained in service until retirement?  
In these instances, the member’s right to a pension would only vest on his retirement. Until 
then, his right to his final pension was contingent on his remaining in service until retirement. 
Because his prior right to his, and possibly his employer’s, accumulated savings was 
supplanted by his right to a pension, his right to his own savings was not recognised as a 
vested right but was similarly viewed as a contingent right. However, his right to his own 
accumulated savings, and his employer’s contributions absent a forfeiture clause, had 
already vested. He was entitled to payment of those vested rights if he was retrenched, 
resigned or was dismissed. This was a vested right to a capital payment. On his retirement, his 
right to the capital payment was extinguished, and was replaced with a right to an income 
for life. The change occurred with his prior agreement. The term ‘pension interest’ is naturally 
associated with the promise of a ‘final pension payment’, which may have contributed to 
the confusion. In-house pensions were more common in 1979 than they are now, since 
defined benefit funds have largely been replaced by defined contribution funds. 
Much of the confusion, therefore, stems from longstanding terminological imprecision.228 The 
use of the term ‘pension fund organisation’ in the Pensions Fund Act, when it includes 
organisations that do not provide pensions, and do not compel their members to purchase 
227 Kroon v Kroon 1986 (4) SA 616 (E). 
228 For a discussion on the different meanings of the word ‘vested’, see Jewish Colonial Trust (n77). 
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pensions with their lump sum payment even on retirement, contributes to the linguistic 
confusion.  
I suggest therefore that retirement benefits do form part of the joint estate by operation of 
law, albeit that a spouse’s entitlement when the marriage is dissolved by divorce is limited to 
claiming her half share of the pension interest. When the marriage is dissolved by death, the 
full retirement benefit should form part of the joint estate, even if it exceeds the pension 
interest. It is, however, doubtful that it will exceed the pension interest in defined contribution 
funds, given that the pension interest is, essentially, the value of the accumulated 
contributions.  
6.4.2 The insured portion 
I have argued that the member’s interest in the insured portion of the death benefit is 
constitutionally protected property. The member has a direct interest in the devolution of 
that property — in who the ultimate beneficiaries will be. It serves the same purpose as term-
life insurance, which is usually to protect the member’s dependent family in the event of her 
untimely death. Unlike the member’s savings portion, the member does not have a vested 
right to the proceeds. The member’s right is a contingent right. A question that remains 
unanswered is what rights, if any, a surviving spouse has to those proceeds. Do the proceeds 
that are payable under individual life policies automatically fall into the member and 
spouse’s joint estate if they were married in community of property and the member had not 
nominated a beneficiary?229   
The prevailing view, amongst academic commentators, is that the proceeds do form part of 
the joint estate of a policy holder who has insured her own life, in the absence of a valid 
229 In community of property states in the USA, they do form part of the community assets on the death 
of the insured. See McKnight ‘Texas community property law: conservative attitudes, reluctant change’ 
(1993) 56 Law and Contemporary Problems 71. For a discussion of inconsistent judicial decisions on 
whether the policy proceeds form part of the holder’s estate, see Wood-Bodley (n126).  
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nomination to the contrary.230 If the nomination is valid, the spouse is considered to be 
entitled to an adjustment of the joint estate in her favour, if the nomination has been made 
without the necessary spousal consent.231  
 
Case law, however, casts doubt on the correctness of these propositions. The principal cases 
in point have all arisen in the context of wives who have been convicted of the unlawful 
killing of their husbands. In Nell v Nell,232 the court held that the spouse was not entitled to the 
life insurance proceeds, even though it held that she was otherwise entitled to her half share 
of the joint estate.233 The court did not explain the basis of its exclusion of the proceeds, or 
why the joint estate did not include the proceeds as an automatic consequence of the 
marriage. In Leeb v Leeb,234 the court similarly held that the spouse was not entitled to the 
policy proceeds, once again without considering whether the proceeds formed part of the 
joint estate. The court, however, doubted that a murderous spouse was entitled to her half 
share of the joint estate as of right, and held that it was competent to order that she forfeit 
the benefits of the marriage, in order to prevent her profiting from her own crime.  
 
The only case to deal directly with the question of whether the proceeds of life insurance 
policies fall into the joint estate is Danielz NO v De Wet.235 In this case, a murderous spouse 
 
230 Wood-Bodley (n126); Henckert ‘The life assurance policy, beneficiary clauses and marriage: a few 
aspects’ 1994 TSAR 513; Van Niekerk ‘Life insurance beneficiaries’ (Part 1) (2007) 15 Journal of Business 
Law 110; Van Niekerk ‘Life insurance beneficiaries’ (Part 2) (2007) 15 Journal of Business Law 144. See 
also Long-Term Insurance Ombud Final Determination CR274 (October 2009) in which the spouses had 
affected a ‘joint life’ policy, payable on the death of the first dying. The Ombudsman held that the 
spouses were joint owners of the policy, and that the survivor was therefore entitled to half the 
proceeds, while the estate was entitled to the other half. The same should apply if they are joint owners 
by their marriage in community of property. See further Van den Berg v Van den Berg [2004] JOL 12404 
(T) [10-11], in which the court accepted that insurance policies normally form part of the joint estate, 
unless the proceeds are compensation for non-patrimonial loss.  
231 Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984, s15(9)(b). Spousal consent is only required where the policy was 
taken out, and the nomination made, during the marriage. See Long-Term Insurance Ombud Final 
Determination CR298 (March 2011). No such consent is required where the policy was taken out, and 
the nomination made, prior to the marriage. See Hees v Southern Life Assoc Ltd [2000] JOL 5928 (W) – 
the reason is that the ‘alienation’ occurred prior to the marriage, and the joint estate is also liable for 
debts incurred prior to the marriage. Under ordinary contractual principles the nomination should be 
valid and not require ratification, since the policy is a stipulatio alteri concluded before the marriage.  
232 [1976] 4 All SA 11 (T). 
233 On the basis that her entitlement to half the joint estate arose by virtue of the marriage, and that it 
was not a benefit she was deriving from her crime – the bloedige hand principle did thus not apply. 
234 [1999] 2 All SA 588 (N). 
235 2009 (6) SA 42 (C).  
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was the nominated beneficiary of the policy. Traverso J held that public policy required that 
she forfeit her contractual right to the proceeds, 236 which is in keeping with the bloedige 
hand principle in the law of succession.237 Since her nomination as beneficiary was 
ineffective, the policy proceeds automatically fell into the deceased’s estate, as the 
contingent beneficiary. As an alternate ground on which to lay claim to a share of the policy 
proceeds, the spouse argued that the proceeds were an asset in the joint estate, and that 
she was therefore entitled to half by virtue of her marriage in community of property. Traverso 
J rejected her claim on this basis also. Rather than holding that public policy requires that a 
murderous spouse forfeit the benefits of the marriage, Traverso J instead held that the 
proceeds of life insurance policies do not form part of spouses’ joint estate, but only ever 
form part of the deceased’s separate estate. Traverso J’s reasoning was that death 
automatically terminates marriage and brings the joint estate to an end, while the right to 
the proceeds arises only after the death of the insured policy holder. As such, since the asset 
(the proceeds) only came into existence after the marriage had been terminated, it could 
not fall into a non-existent joint estate.238  
 
Traverso J is quite correct in asserting that prior to the holder’s death, the proceeds did not 
form part of the joint estate. What fell into the joint estate was, at most, the policy itself.239 
However, the joint estate was the default beneficiary. The joint estate had a ‘contingent 
right’ to the proceeds (as discussed in the previous section). The moment the policy holder 
died, absent a valid nomination, that right vests. The right does not arise after the holder’s 
death. It arises at the same time as the holder’s death.240 The estate’s position is quite distinct 
 
236 Paragraph 33.  
237 As a result of which she also forfeited her right to inherit from her husband’s estate. See para 37.  
238 Paragraph 43.  
239 See Wood-Bodley (n126), 227 and his discussion of the conflicting case authority on point. The 
language of ownership creates confusion. The policy is simply a contract setting out the rights and 
duties of the parties. The rights in the policies may be exercisable by one spouse alone, or they may 
require consent or joint decision-making (eg nominating a beneficiary or changing the nomination). 
This is a pure personal right. The rights in the policy may also entitle one spouse, or both via the estate, 
to receive the proceeds. This also a contractual right, but it is proprietary in nature. The right may also 
include the right to surrender the policy and obtain its surrender value. This too is a contractual right 
that is proprietary in nature. This too may be exercisable by only one or both spouses, but either way, 
since it is a right to payment of money, the money so paid must be part of joint estate.  
240 See also Madore-Ogilvie v Ogilvie Estate 232 OAC 152 (Canada) [29]. 
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from that of the nominated beneficiary, who are usually thought to enjoy no more than a 
spes to the proceeds prior to the insured’s death.241 While it may be correct that a 
nominated beneficiary must ‘accept’ the benefit, viz the right to the proceeds, before 
becoming entitled to payment, the same is hardly true for the member’s estate. In the 
absence of any nomination, the beneficiary is automatically the estate. The contract is not, 
in these circumstances, a contract for the benefit of a third party. It is not a stipulatio alteri 
that requires acceptance. It is a contract that is essentially for one’s own benefit, i.e. one’s 
estate. That estate is the joint estate. Death triggers both the termination of the marriage with 
the resultant dissolution of the joint estate, and the right to payment of the proceeds. Death 
and vesting are simultaneous events. They occur concurrently not sequentially, and there is 
no basis for introducing an artificial sequencing into these events.  
In reaching her decision, Traverso J appears to have ignored the views of the majority of 
commentators and established practice, and possible public policy arguments for depriving 
the spouse of her share of the joint estate.242 The decision in Danielz has been criticised by 
academic commentators.243 It would be highly inequitable if the actions of a murderous 
spouse could resonate so far beyond the confines of the case, to the clear detriment of 
innocent spouses who are thereby, for no fault of their own, deprived of the benefits of their 
marriage.   
The proceeds of individual life insurance policies are a protected asset in terms of the Long-
Term Insurance Act.244 As such, the proceeds cannot be used to pay the debts of a policy 
holder when she is survived by a spouse, child, step-child or parents to whom the proceeds 
241 See Henckert (n230) at fn11, who suggests that provided the insurance policy does not expressly 
contain a clause stating that the beneficiary acquires no rights, the beneficiary will be entitled to 
‘accept’ the benefit before the insured’s death and will then acquire a contingent right to the 
proceeds. The right is contingent on the holder not revoking the nomination prior to the insured’s death. 
Reinecke & Nienaber (n115) take it even further. They are of the view that the nominated beneficiary 
acquires a contingent right immediately, which is conditional on non-revocation and acceptance. 
242 Wood-Bodley (n126); Leeb v Leeb (n234); Bonthuys ‘The rule that a spouse cannot forfeit at divorce 
what he or she has contributed to the marriage: an argument for change’ (2014) 131(2) SALJ 439. 
243 Wood-Bodley (n126). 
244 Act 52 of 1998. 
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devolve on her death.245 If the conclusion in Danielz is correct, it means that a spouse must 
either be the nominated beneficiary, a testate or an intestate heir in order to enjoy the 
protection afforded by the Long-Term Insurance Act. If the policy proceeds fall into the 
separate estate of the deceased, and the deceased has bequeathed her entire estate to 
third parties, the survivor will have no claim to share in the proceeds, and no part of the 
proceeds will be protected against creditors. Since a spouse’s claim ranks behind those of 
creditors under the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act,246 she will enjoy no protection 
whatsoever.  
 
The decision in Danielz is, in addition, inconsistent with the requirement that a spouse, 
married in community of property, requires the consent of the other spouse if she wishes to 
nominate a third-party as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy taken out during the 
existence of the marriage.247 It also makes no sense that the value of a spouse’s retirement 
benefit and the surrender value of life insurance policies can be taken into account in 
valuing their separate estates when married out of community of property, for the purpose of 
making a redistribution order, but that they are excluded from community assets.248  
 
If the view that the proceeds of individual life insurance policies fall into the joint estate in the 
absence of a nominated beneficiary is correct, would the same hold true for proceeds 
payable under group life insurance? The answer is that they would, but for s37C. To the 
extent, therefore, that the lump sum consists, in whole or in part, of the proceeds of a group 
life policy, the effect of s37C is again to deprive a spouse married in community of property 




245 Ibid, ss63(1) and (3).  
246 Act 27 of 1990. 
247 See discussion (n231). 
248 See Bezuidenhout v Bezuidenhout 2005 (2) SA 187 (SCA), where these were included amongst assets 
listed by each spouse. 
249 See Jenkins v Denel [2003] 10 BPLR 5210 (PFA), where the savings portion funded the pension, and 
the insurance portion funded the lump sum. 
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The Pensions Fund Act infringes some spouses’ right to equality250 and, in doing so, their right 
to dignity.251 Section 9 provides that ‘[e]veryone is equal before the law and has the right to 
equal protection and benefit of the law’. Section 10 in turn provides that ‘[e]veryone has 
inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected’.  
 
How does s37C violate these fundamental constitutional guarantees? It does so by treating 
divorcing and widowed spouses differently, to the potential detriment of the latter.252 The 
Divorce Act entitles a spouse, married in community of property or with the accrual system, 
to share in the member’s pension interest on divorce.253 As the SCA confirmed in Ndaba,254 
divorcing spouses have a right to share in the pension interest automatically, by operation of 
law. However, should the member die while in service, s37C apparently extinguishes 
widowed spouses’ rights. This is how s37C has been interpreted by the Adjudicator.255 
Similarly, had the divorce or death occurred after retirement, the retirement lump sum would 
already have fallen into the member’s estate or the joint estate, and the parties’ matrimonial 
regime would have determined the spouse’s right to share in the benefit.  
 
In Minister of Communications v Ngewu256 the CC declared the Post Office retirement fund 
rules unconstitutional for not permitting a divorced spouse immediate access to her pension 
interest, in contrast to her rights under the Pension Funds Act and Government Employees 
 
250 FC, s9. 
251 FC, s10. On the relationship between equality and dignity, see Dawood (n10) [35]; Cowen ‘Can 
dignity guide South Africa’s equality jurisprudence’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 34; Ackerman ‘Equality and non-
discrimination: some analytical thoughts’ (2006) 22 SAJHR 597. 
252 See eg Sarrahwitz v Maritz  2015 (4) SA 491 (CC), in which provisions of the Alienation of Land Act 68 
of 1971 were declared an unconstitutional violation of s9(1) because they protected only one class of 
vulnerable home buyers, viz instalment buyers, and did not protect other equally vulnerable buyers 
who paid in a lump sum or who made annual payments only. 
253 See §6.3.2 above. 
254 (n163). 
255 Sakildien v Cape Municipal PF PFA/WE/6643/05/CN, and cases (n154). 
256 2014 (3) BCLR 364 (CC).  
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Pensions Law.257 The CC held that the differentiation was irrational, and a violation of s9(1)’s 
promise of equality before the law, and the equal protection and benefit of the law. The CC 
emphasised that the spouse’s inability to access the pension interest was causing her great 
hardship. The hardship a surviving spouse will suffer is no less than that of a divorcing spouse.  
What is the justification then for depriving a spouse to the property to which she is otherwise 
entitled by the law of marriage? It is presumably that the death benefit will be utilised to 
support the member’s dependants, including the spouse. The death benefit is usually also 
larger than the savings portion, so the sum she is allocated by the trustees may well still be 
equal to or greater than the 50% pension interest to which she would have been entitled on 
divorce. There is, however, no assurance that she will receive the share to which she would 
otherwise have been entitled as of right. Is this rational or irrational differentiation?  
There is no rational connection between the difference in treatment and s37C’s purpose of 
protecting the member’s dependants. Consider the following examples. Imagine that a 
member’s accumulated retirement benefit, or savings portion, was R 3 million. The entire sum 
was accumulated during the marriage. In the first example, the member and spouse 
divorce, upon which the spouse becomes entitled to half the member’s pension interest. The 
day after the divorce, the member dies. The spouse has received her half share, and only the 
member’s half share is available for distribution to the member’s dependants. It may be 
supposed that the spouse will fall out of the circle of dependants following the divorce, but 
that is not necessarily the case. The member’s dependants may still include the spouse, if a 
maintenance order was awarded in her favour.258 In the second example, the member and 
spouse are still married when the member dies. They may even be in the process of 
divorcing. If happily married, or if divorce proceedings have been instituted but not yet 
finalised, the spouse immediately loses her right to share in the member’s savings portion. The 
257 The PFA does not automatically apply to public funds. See PFA, s4A. 
258 Lombard v CRAF [2003] 3 BPLR 4460 (PFA); Muller v CRAF [2014] 2 BPLR 265 (PFA). 
265 
 
entire savings portion, the full R3 million, can potentially be distributed amongst the 
member’s other dependants, to the exclusion of the spouse.  
 
The arbitrariness of the differential treatment between the position of a spouse whose 
marriage is terminated by divorce versus death is illustrated by YG v Executor, Estate Late 
CGM259 and Ex Parte Meyer NO: In re Meyer v Meyer.260 In both cases spouses had instituted 
divorce proceedings. Before the divorce was granted, one died. The courts in both cases 
held that the marriage had been terminated by death; as such, they could not continue 
with the divorce proceedings, with the executor of the deceased estate standing in for the 
deceased. Litis contestatio was irrelevant, because a marriage terminates automatically on 
the death of one spouse. A spouse can claim pension interest as part of a divorce claim, but 
she loses her claim the moment her spouse dies.261  
 
The only possible justification for the difference in treatment is that following a divorce, the 
member is still alive, and still earning occupational income with which to support her 
dependants.262 The supposition may therefore be that her day to day ability to continue 
providing support for her dependants is unchanged. The same is not true after her death, 
when the death benefit may be the only source of future income for her dependants.  
 
However, as the cases above show, whether the supposition is true depends on how long the 
member survives following a divorce. Even in those cases in which it is true, it is an 
inadequate justification. It effectively transfers part of the member’s obligation to support her 
 
259 2013 (4) SA 387 (WCC). 
260 1962 (2) SA 688 (D), discussed and approved by Heaton ‘Family Law’ 2013 Annual Survey of South 
African Law 425.  
261 As happened in Sakildien (n255). Divorce proceedings were underway, and the fund 
acknowledged that had it been finalised, the spouse would have received 50% of the member’s 
savings portion. As it was, the fund awarded her 10% of the death benefit. 
262 See Hodges v Coubrough 1991 (3) SA 58 (D), 305, in explaining why maintenance orders terminate 
on the death of the payor spouse, absent an express agreement to the contrary: ‘Maintenance is 
payable by and large from the income of the party paying it, and its rate is normally fixed in relation to 
that. But the income of most people consists mainly of what they earn by working, which stops as soon 
as they die.’ The impact on the member’s heirs, should the deceased estate become liable for the 
maintenance until the recipient’s death, is likely to be considerable. 
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dependants onto her spouse — an act ‘tantamount to expropriation’.263 It sanctions the 
unequal treatment of a class of spouses, those suffering a bereavement, in order to protect 
the member’s dependants, to whom the spouse may not be related, and with whom the 
spouse may have no relationship. A spouse whose marriage has been dissolved by death 
has fewer rights, and less protection, than a spouse whose marriage has been dissolved by 
divorce.  
Section 37C does protect spouses’ who have no proprietary claim on the member’s death, 
namely those married out of community of property. However, had the benefit formed part 
of the estate, all spouses, irrespective of marital regime, would have had a potential 
maintenance claim against the death benefit under the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses 
Act (MSSA).264 The disparity in treatment becomes even more pronounced when one 
considers that s37C effectively extinguishes many spouses’ statutory right to maintenance. It 
does so because death benefits are many members’ only, or most valuable, asset. Section 
37C therefore has a doubly negative effect on a sub-set of spouses: their existing property 
right is extinguished, and there is no further estate from which to claim maintenance. The 
right to maintenance created by the MSSA is thus the preserve of spouses whose partners 
had accumulated a meaningful estate.  
It may be argued that the MSSA goes too far in protecting surviving spouses at the expense 
of the member’s other dependants and designated heirs. It appears to give the surviving 
spouse a right to maintenance,265 provided only that she can prove that her own means are 
insufficient to meet her reasonable maintenance needs.266 It does not appear to afford 
263 Madore-Ogilvie v Ogilvie Estate (n240).  
264 Act 27 of 1990. 
265 Oshry v Feldman (n122).   
266 See Friedrich v Smit 2017 (4) SA 144 (SCA), in which the spouse’s claim failed because she did not 
provide evidence that she was in need of maintenance. The Master, HC and HCA had all, however, 
accepted that she was entitled to maintenance although they were unable to determine the amount. 
The SCA rejected their view and held that proof of need is a condition to entitlement. The determinants 
of need have not been properly canvassed by the courts. 
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courts a discretion, to order such maintenance as they consider equitable.267 In preferring a 
surviving spouse’s right in this fashion, it provides a greater entitlement to surviving spouses 
than it does to divorced spouses, although the legislature’s intention had been to equalise 
the rights of surviving spouses with those of their divorcing counterparts. While the MSSA may 
well cause injustice in its operation such that it too should be revisited, its existence highlights 
the disparities in legal recognition and protection accorded one set of surviving spouses over 
others.  
 
Section 37C thus deprives spouses of any proprietary right to share in the benefit that they 
would have enjoyed by virtue of the marriage. It deprives all spouses of their right to claim 
maintenance from the deceased estate, to the extent that there is no longer any, or 
sufficient, estate from which to claim. The impact that s37C thus has on a large proportion of 
widowed spouses is not mere differentiation. This is unfair discrimination. To the extent that 
she receives a smaller share of the death benefit than she otherwise would have, her right 
has been subordinated in the interests of the member’s other dependants.  
 
This subordination of a sub-set of spouses’ rights impairs not only their right to equality, but 
their right to dignity. It is not only their economic rights and interests that are impaired. They 
are effectively told that neither they as individuals, nor their marriage to the member, are 
deserving of the same respect accorded to other spouses and other marriages.268 That goes 
to the heart of dignity. They are being treated ‘differently in a way which impairs their 
 
267 MSSA, s2(1). See also Van Niekerk v Van Niekerk [2011] 2 All SA 635 (KZP), which appears to accept 
that a young spouse is entitled to such support as will enable her to maintain her marital standard of 
living, provided only that the estate is large enough to accommodate her full claim. The role played by 
the duration of the marriage, the spouse’s prospective means and ability to earn her own income and 
the like are not mentioned as relevant considerations.  
268 See Mayelane v Ngwenyama (n158) [80-81]. See eg Pandlev v South African Authorities [2015] 3 
BPLR 440 (PFA), in which the deceased was survived by his widow and their minor daughter aged 14. 
His death benefit was R 406 000. He was also survived by two girlfriends and four minor children not born 
of his marriage. His widow and daughter were allocated 30% of the benefit. The widow complained to 
the Adjudicator, seeking 50% of the benefit as the member’s wife (which was dismissed). Amongst her 




fundamental dignity as human beings’.269 They become, on the member’s death, mere 




Section 37C also impairs children’s rights. Children do not have proprietary rights to share in a 
parent’s estate. They do, however, have a right to claim maintenance from the estate if they 
were dependent on the deceased. The law prioritises children’s rights, particularly minor 
children.270 The courts have long accepted that needy children, both minor and major, have 
a common law right to claim maintenance from a deceased estate.271 The rights of minor 
children now enjoy statutory recognition and protection.  
 
Section 28 of the Constitution explicitly entitles every minor child to ‘family care or parental 
care’,272 and confirms that ‘the child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every 
matter concerning the child.’273 Trustees and Adjudicators are bound to protect, promote, 
fulfil and respect children’s rights under s28 of the Constitution. They are, moreover, obliged 
to consider international law when interpreting the BoR.274 
 
The Children’s Act275 and the Maintenance Act276 seek to give effect to children’s 
constitutional rights. The Children’s Act places an obligation on each parent to contribute to 
the child’s maintenance;277 it recognises that children have a right to be treated fairly and 
equitably in any decision that affects them;278 and it seeks to give effect to South Africa’s 
 
269 Harksen v Lane 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC) [46]. 
270 As it does in most jurisdictions. See as one example the statutory protection of children’s inheritance 
rights in Zambia, and the vigilant role courts are expected to play in securing their rights, discussed in 
Himonga ‘Protecting the minor children’s inheritance rights’ 2001 International Survey of Family Law 457.  
271 Carelse v Estate De Vries (1906) 23 SC 532. 
272 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (FC), s28(1)(b). Section 28 applies to children below 
the age of 18 only, see s28(3).  
273 Section 28(2). 
274 FC, s39(1)(b). 
275 Act 38 of 2005. The Act defines a child as a person below the age of 18 (s1).  
276 Act 99 of 1998. 
277 Section 18(2)(d). 
278 Section 6(2)(c). 
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international obligations.279 The Children’s Act recognises that it is parents who have a duty 
to support their children.280 Parents are a child’s biological or adoptive parents.281 A non-
parent who voluntarily cares for a child is subject to certain parental responsibilities, but those 
responsibilities do not establish an ongoing legal duty of support.282  
The Maintenance Act only applies in circumstances in which one person is under a legal duty 
to support another.283 Any one of a member’s legal dependants would thus be entitled to 
claim maintenance under the Act while the relative who owes them a duty of support is 
alive.284 Were a maintenance order to be granted, a retirement fund would be obliged to 
give effect to that order if directed to do so by the court.285 A court is, moreover, obliged to 
issue a direction to the fund when the member has been convicted of defaulting on an 
existing maintenance order. When a fund is obliged to give effect to both a maintenance 
order and an order requiring that the fund pay a divorced spouse’s pension interest, priority 
must be given to the maintenance order if the benefit is insufficient to satisfy both claims.286  
Any person legally entitled to be maintained may apply to court for a maintenance order, 
but the Act singles out minor children for special mention. The preamble to the Act 
recognises that children enjoy special protection under international law. It specifically 
279 Section 2(c). The preamble to the Act identifies the main international instruments as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child, the UN Declaration 
and Convention on the Rights of the Child, and in the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child. 
280 Section 18(2)(d). 
281 Section 1, definition of ‘parent’, which expressly excludes biological parents who are such only 
because they donated gametes for the purpose of artificial insemination. The law is incrementally 
recognising that parent-child relationships can arise in circumstances other than through birth and 
adoption (both in terms of the Children’s Act or customary law). Those instances are rare but should be 
recognised and protected where they exist. See eg RAF v Mohohlo 2018 (2) SA 65 (SCA).  
282 Section 32(1). The parental responsibility to protect the child from maltreatment and neglect may of 
course require the caregiver to provide for the child while in their care, but it cannot establish an 
ongoing and indefinite duty of support. See also MB v NB 2010 (3) SA 220 (GSJ), in which an obligation 
to contribute towards school fees was based on the defendant’s promise to do so in circumstances in 
which the defendant had held himself out to be the child’s father and the mother and child’s reliance 
on that promise was reasonable.  
283 Section 2. 
284 There are conflicting decisions on whether maintenance courts have jurisdiction to order executors 
to pay maintenance for minor children from deceased estates. Cf NB v Maintenance Officer, 
Butterworth 2014 (6) SA 116 (ECM) and Du Toit  v Thomas  2016 (4) SA 571 (WCC). 
285 Sections 16 (2) and 31. 
286 PFA, ss 37D(1)(d) and (3)(b). 
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acknowledges that the state has given priority to fulfilling the rights of children. It makes 
special mention of the state’s obligations, under the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 287 to secure children’s right to maintenance that is adequate for their physical, mental, 
spiritual, moral and social development,288 while acknowledging that South Africa is ‘possibly’ 
falling short in this regard.289 The Convention obliges states to take ‘all appropriate legislative, 
administrative, and other measures’ to secure the implementation of children’s rights,290 and 
requires that the bests interests of the child be the paramount consideration in all matters 
affecting the child.291 Coincidentally, the year the Convention was adopted by the General 
Assembly, 1989, was the same year the definition of dependant was changed in the Pension 
Funds Act, to include, amongst others, persons the deceased was legally liable to maintain. 
Previously, the only dependants entitled to share in the death benefit were the deceased’s 
financial dependants. Prior to 1989, a child whom a parent was legally liable to maintain, but 
was not maintaining, would not have been entitled to share in the death benefit, unless the 
fund rules made specific provision for that child.292  
 
Despite the legislature’s remedying this potential inequity through its amended definition, 
and despite the international, constitutional and other legislative recognition given to the 
singular rights of the child, no special mention has been made of their rights in Adjudicator 
determinations. This is not to say that trustees and the Adjudicator do not in practice prioritise 
the interests of minor children. They do.293 The primacy of parental obligations to minor 
 
287 The Convention was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General 
Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989 and entered into force on 2 September 1990. South 
Africa signed the Convention in 1993 and ratified it on 16 June 1995.  
288 See Art 27.  
289 The preamble also envisages that the Act will be a temporary measure, pending the reform of the 
entire maintenance system. In Bannatyne v Bannatyne 2003 (2) SA 323 (CC) [26-27], the CC observed 
that the maintenance system was still not functioning efficiently, a state of affairs which undermines the 
rule of law. See also ‘Maintenance courts fail SA’s children’ Mail & Guardian 4 June 2015. 
290 Article 4. 
291 Article 3. 
292 For the original definition and all subsequent iterations, see: Act 101 of 1976, s 21(a); Act 80 of 1978, s 
10(b); Act 51 of 1988, s3 (did not come into effect); Act 54 of 1989, s 20; Act 22 of 1996, s1(b). The one 
difference between the 1989 and current definitions is that children were not included amongst the 
paragraph (b) statutory dependants. They were only included as such in the 1996 amendment. 
Interestingly, the 1988 amendment which did not come into operation included children as statutory 
dependants but not spouses.  
293 See eg Kipling v Unilever [2001] 8 BPLR 2368 (PFA); Phashe v Metro Group [2003] 9 BPLR 5123 (PFA). 
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children does not receive special mention, however. Instead, the Adjudicator’s stated 
position is that trustees should not, as a matter of course, prioritise legal dependants over 
financial dependants.294 No specific exception is made for minor children. Trustees and the 
Adjudicator appear to interpret s37C as overriding even the constitutional commitment 
made to children. The result, in some instances, is that the trustee decisions prioritise 
beneficiaries towards whom the deceased did not owe a legal duty of support, ahead of 
the deceased’s minor children to whom she owed a paramount duty of support, both legally 
and morally.295  
 
By way of example, the Adjudicator has upheld the decision of trustees to award a larger 
share of a death benefit to the unborn child of a cohabiting partner rather than to the 
deceased’s minor children.296 They did so in circumstances in which the deceased may not 
have been the biological father, and thus under no legal duty to maintain the child.297 The 
Adjudicator approved the trustees’ reasoning that legal dependants have no greater 
entitlement than factual dependants, and that what mattered was that the unborn child 
would have become a financial dependent in the future, even though the Act clearly 
applies only to existing financial dependants.  
 
Similarly, the Adjudicator dismissed a complaint brought on behalf of a minor child on the 
basis that the child, about 8 years old, had not been financially dependent on the 
deceased. The circumstances were that the child was born of a cohabitation relationship, 
the surviving spouse had alerted the trustees to the child’s existence, but they had been 
unable to trace the mother. The trustees had nevertheless allocated a share to the child. 
They retained the child’s share for about a year before deciding to pay it to the surviving 
 
294 See §3.2.1 & 4.8 above. 
295 The Children’s Act places an obligation on parents to ‘contribute to the maintenance of their 
children’ (n277). It does not condition their duty to do so on the existence of a legal duty to support 
their children, which arises only if the children need support. The Maintenance Act, however, applies 
only in circumstances in which a legal duty of support is owed. It is of course only in very exceptional 
circumstances that minor children will not need financial support.  
296 Koopman v Municipal Gratuity Fund [2010] 1 BPLR 100 (PFA). 
297 The minor children’s mother disputed the paternity of the unborn child, but no mention was made of 
either the ss 36 (presumption of paternity) or 37 (paternity testing) in the Children’s Act.  
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spouse. It was shortly thereafter that the child’s mother came forward to lodge a claim on 
behalf of the child. Her argument, that the trustees should have retained the child’s share 
instead of paying it to the surviving spouse, was summarily dismissed, only on the basis that 
the child had not been financially dependent on the deceased. No mention was made of 
the child’s best interests, the deceased’s paramount duty of support towards the child, or, 
conversely, what steps funds should take in such circumstances to protect children’s rights.  
 
The Adjudicator has also berated trustees for allocating 90% of a tiny benefit to the 
deceased’s three minor children, without first investigating whether they had been financially 
dependent on the deceased, while allocating only 10% to the deceased’s sister, who had 
four minor children of her own to support, and 0% to the deceased’s mother.298 The 
relevance of their actual financial dependence on the deceased is not clear. What matters 
is whether he should have been supporting them. His obligation to support them before all 
others was seemingly irrelevant and trustees were not entitled to assume, despite the 
circumstances, that they were in any need of future support.299  
 
The Adjudicator has also accepted the equitability of a trustee decision that awarded 75% of 
a benefit to a surviving spouse and only 25% to the deceased’s three minor children of a first 
marriage, his nominated beneficiaries, who were living with him, and financially dependent 
on him.300 They did so even though the surviving spouse was not obviously in need and the 
deceased did not have a large separate estate to provide for the children’s maintenance 
needs. It is significant too that 50% of the gross death benefit was used to purchase the 
spouse a pension for life, with only the remainder, after tax and other deductions, shared 
 
298 Khoza v Metal Industries [2012] 1 BPLR 47 (PFA). 
299 Baloyi v PPWAWU PFA/NP/11689/2006/LTN. The benefit was R73 800. Cf Gowing v LRAF [2007] 2 BPLR 
212 (PFA), where the deceased had nominated his sister as the beneficiary of his small benefit, despite 
which the trustees allocated the sum to his minor children. The trustees’ decision was set aside because 
the deceased had made ample provision for his children. It is extremely improbable that this was so in 
Baloyi, given the deceased’s means and the extent to which his other family members were also 
dependent upon him. 
300 Ellis v MEPF (n31). The spouse was the complainant, so the Adjudicator would not have been able to 
set aside the trustee decision to benefit the children. The trustees’ decision was consequently upheld, 
but apart from mentioning that the deceased had been under a legal duty to support his children, the 
primacy of that obligation was not mentioned. The message to trustees was thus that their decision was 
equitable in the circumstances. 
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between the spouse and children. It is significant because the spouse was not entitled to the 
pension as of right in terms of the fund rules. The deceased had not notified the fund in 
writing that he had a spouse, to whom he had been married for less than five years (the 
exact duration is not stated). As such, the decision to award the spouse a pension was within 
the discretion of the trustees, which they exercised in her favour, even though there is some 
suggestion that she and the deceased may have been estranged.301 Once again, had the 
death benefit been part of the estate, the children’s right to maintenance would have been 
prioritised over that of other dependants, with the exception of the surviving spouse. Under 
the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act, a spouse’s claim ranks equally with a child’s 
claim. If their claims compete, both must be reduced proportionately, which is not what 
occurred in this case. In this instance, therefore, s37C worked to the benefit of a spouse and 
to the clear detriment of the deceased’s minor children.302  
 
 Section 37C appears to give trustees the freedom to prioritise the needs of other 
dependants over the rights of the member’s children. It is not clear to what extent the 
equitability of trustee decision-making should be informed by, and is subordinate to, 
children’s rights to be treated fairly and equitably in all decisions that affect them. The 
paramountcy principle, which requires that the best interests of the child be the primary 
consideration in all matters affecting the child, does not assist trustees when the competing 
beneficiaries include children who are not the member’s biological or adopted children. 
When trustees and the Adjudicator fail to recognise the primacy of a parent’s duty to 
support a child, they are simultaneously failing to acknowledge the primacy of the 
relationship between a parent and child.303 This not only affects children’s rights to parental 
 
301 See [4.1.17]. 
302 There is again no mention of the spouses’ marital regime. 
303 The legal rights and responsibilities that arise from the parent-child relationship transcend the 
financial. They pertain to the child’s emotional and psychological development and well-being. The UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child recognises this in various places: the preamble, which recognises 
that ‘the family is the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and 
well-being of all its members and particularly children’; Art 7, which provides that children have the 
right to know, and be cared for, by their parents; Art 9, which recognises the right not to be separated 
from parents, and to maintain contact with parents if they are separated; Art 18, which emphasises 
that parents are primarily responsible for the upbringing and development of the child. 
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support – it also impairs their right to dignity, by failing to recognise and acknowledge the 
importance of the relationship from the perspective of the child. 
 
6.6 THE MEMBER’S RIGHT TO DIGNITY 
 
The right to dignity occupies centre stage in the Constitution. The CC has repeatedly 
emphasised that the right to dignity (and life) is the ‘most important’ of all the Constitutional 
rights, that it is the ‘source’ of all the specific rights in the Bill of Rights, and that it is not only a 
fundamental constitutional value but also a ‘justiciable and enforceable right that must be 
respected and protected’.304 
 
Section 37C clearly limits a member’s freedom of testation. In so doing, it infringes the 
member’s right to property. The infringement is not limited to the right to property, however. It 
also limits the member’s right to dignity. .305 Numerous cases have recognised that limiting an 
individual’s freedom of testation is a separate violation of both the right to property and the 
right to dignity.306 
 
The right to make bequests, or to dispose of property, in the abstract is part of one’s 
proprietary right. The right to make specific bequests to individuals of one’s choosing as an 
expression of love, affection, appreciation or even obligation, is central to dignity.307 It is a 
particular violation of a member’s dignity when her wishes are discounted, and her wishes 
are not only entirely reasonable and in conformity with the wishes of many, if not most 
 
304 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) [144]; Dawood (n10) [35]; Mayelane v Ngwenyama 
(n158)[68]. 
305 Mayelane v Ngwenyama (n158) [73]: ‘[T]he right to dignity includes the right bearer's entitlement to 
make choices and to take decisions that affect his or her life - the more significant the decision, the 
greater the entitlement. Autonomy and control over one's personal circumstances is a fundamental 
aspect of human dignity.’ 
306 BOE Trust Ltd 2013 (3) SA 236 (SCA); Harper v Crawford 2018 (1) SA 589 (WCC); King v De Jager 2017 
(6) SA 527 (WCC); Harvey v Crawford 2019 (2) SA 153 (SCA).  
307 Harvey v Crawford (n306). 
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people, but are also consistent with the legal and moral obligations she owed to family 
members in life.308  
In the context of freedom of testation, the right to property and the right to dignity are 
intertwined. Individuals use their testamentary power to benefit people or causes they hold 
dear. The association between the right to property, as expressed in the individual’s freedom 
of testation, and the right to dignity, has been most clearly acknowledged in the SCA 
decision in BOE Trust Ltd.309 The High Court had held only that freedom of testation in South 
Africa is protected by the constitutional right to property,310 and that the right to dispose of 
property after death is a natural extension of the owner’s right to dispose of property in life; it 
is a necessary and inevitable incident of ownership.311 On appeal, the SCA extended the 
ambit of constitutional protection, holding that freedom of testation was protected both by 
the right to property and the right to dignity: 
Indeed, not to give due recognition to freedom of testation will, to my mind, also fly in the face 
of the founding constitutional principle of human dignity. The right to dignity allows the living, 
and the dying, the peace of mind of knowing that their last wishes would be respected after 
they have passed away.312 
In turn, statutory limitations on freedom of testation limit both the right to property and the 
right to dignity. In its judgment, the SCA quoted Du Toit, who has said that:  
308 In Dawood (n10) [37], the constitutional court held that the right to enter into and sustain a marriage 
or marriage-like relationship is of ‘defining significance’ for most people and is protected by the right to 
dignity. Any legislation which ‘significantly impairs’ their ability to honour their legal obligations towards 
each other would similarly violate their right to dignity.  
309 BOE Trust (n306). 
310 Ex Parte BOE Trust Ltd 2009 (6) SA 470 (WCC) [9]. 
311 Para 26. Cf the views expressed by numerous courts in the USA, that the right to make a will and the 
right to inherit is not a natural or fundamental right but one which derives from statute, and that it is the 
sovereign who is the natural successor to a decedent’s property. The US view has been attributed to 
the views of Blackstone and Pufendorf, which are contrary to the views of Grotius and Maine. See the 
discussion by McMurray ‘Liberty of testation and some modern limitations thereon’ (1919–1920) 14 Illinois 
LR 96, 99 where he (seems) to suggest that the view is out of step with modern social and economic 
norms and leads to ‘seriously confuse[d] legal thinking’. 
312 See paras 26–27.  
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Freedom of testation is considered one of the founding principles of the South African law of 
testate succession: a South African testator enjoys the freedom to dispose of the assets which 
form part of his or her estate upon death in any manner (s)he deems fit.313 
 
Death benefits do not form part of the assets of a member’s estate for the simple reason that 
the legislature removed them from the member’s estate, and therefore control, by enacting 
s37C. The fact that it is not technically an asset in the estate cannot save s37C from judicial 
scrutiny for the simple reason that, but for s37C, it would be an asset, and quite possibly the 
most valuable asset, in the member’s estate. It is not enough to say that the member’s 
freedom of testation, in respect of other assets, is preserved. The member may have no other 
assets. It is the content of the right that matters, not the packaging. An egg, with the yolk 
and albumen removed, is not an egg – it is the empty shell of an egg.  
 
Some argue that freedom of testation lies in the realm of property law, while limitations on 
freedom of testation lie in the realm of family law.314 The argument that then follows is that an 
individual’s family obligations are more important than their rights in and to property. This 
argument is an over-simplification. Most testators use their testamentary power to benefit 
family members.315 In most instances, their testamentary choices affirm rather than deny their 
commitment to family. To the extent that their choices prefer some family over others, their 
preferences reflect their affection and sense of obligation. From the perspective of the 
chosen beneficiaries also, discounting the member’s wishes denies or diminishes the 
significance of that relationship. It is as much a limitation of the beneficiaries right to dignity, 
as it is of the member’s right to dignity. A bequest, or a nomination of beneficiary, when it is 
to a family member or friend, speaks to the relationship between the member and the 
intended beneficiary. It affirms the relationship. To deny the intended beneficiary the 
 
313 Du Toit 'The constitutionally bound dead hand? the impact of the constitutional rights and principles 
on freedom of testation in South African Law' (2001) 12 Stell LR 222, 224. See further Du Toit 'The impact 
of social and economic factors on freedom of testation in Roman and Roman-Dutch Law' (1999) 10 
Stell LR 232; Du Toit 'The limits imposed upon freedom of testation by the boni mores: lessons from 
common law and civil (continental) legal systems' (2000) 11 Stell LR 358. 
314 See McMurray (n311) 537. 
315 Humphrey et al Inheritance and the family: attitudes to the will-making and intestacy National 
Centre for Social Research (2010), 32. 
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bequest is to deny or diminish the importance or relevance of the relationship as between 
testator and beneficiary.  
The most compelling judicial justification for freedom of testation was that made by the 
Queen’s Bench in Banks v Goodfellow.316  
The instincts and affections of mankind, in the vast majority of instances, will lead men to make 
provision for those who are the nearest to them in kindred and who in life have been the 
objects of their affection. Independently of any law, a man on the point of leaving the world 
would naturally distribute among his children or nearest relatives the property which he 
possessed. 
…. 
Among those, who, as a man's nearest relatives, would be entitled to share the fortune he 
leaves behind him, some may be better provided for than others; some may be more 
deserving than others; some from age, or sex, or physical infirmity, may stand in greater need of 
assistance. Friendship and tried attachment, or faithful service, may have claims that ought not 
to be disregarded. 
… 
The Roman law, and that of the Continental nations which have followed it, have secured to 
the relations of a deceased person in the ascending and descending line a fixed portion of the 
inheritance. The English law leaves everything to the unfettered discretion of the testator, on 
the assumption that, though in some instances, caprice, or passion, or the power of new ties, or 
artful contrivance, or sinister influence, may lead to the neglect of claims that ought to be 
attended to, yet, the instincts, affections, and common sentiments of mankind may be safely 
trusted to secure, on the whole, a better disposition of the property of the dead, and one more 
accurately adjusted to the requirements of each particular case, than could be obtained 
through a distribution prescribed by the stereotyped and inflexible rules of a general law. 
Freedom of testation thus emerged to allow for finer adjustments than fixed rules permit.317 
This freedom has not been restricted through s37C by the introduction of fixed rules, which 
have the benefit of certainty, or to permit that the freedom be curtailed only when it is 
abused. Instead, the right to make those fine adjustments has simply been transferred to a 
third party, the trustees of a retirement fund. What has effectively happened is that someone 
better equipped, and with a better moral claim, to make fine adjustments has been stripped 
316 (1870) LR 5 QB 549. 
317Maine Ancient Law (1905). See Lehmann ‘Testamentary freedom versus testamentary duty: in search 
of a better balance’ 2014 Acta Juridica 9, fn68 & accompanying text for an alternative explanation 
that links the emergence of testamentary freedom with the need to protect agricultural landholdings 
from uneconomic division between the heirs. Cf Croucher ‘How free is free: testamentary freedom and 
the battle between family and property’ (2012) 37 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 9, who 
subscribes to the view that the emergence of testamentary freedom in England with regard to both 
immovable and movable property was as a result of the demise of feudalism and the rise of laissez-faire 
individualism. Helmholz ‘Legitim in English legal history’ (1984) 3 University of Illinois LR 659 indicates that 
children’s right to a legitimate portion of their parent’s movable property had disappeared in most of 
England before the 17th century under the influence of the Catholic Church and its desire for 
testamentary bequests.  
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of that right, and that right has been transferred to someone less equipped to make those 
fine adjustments.318  
Section 37C implicates the right to dignity in two further ways. In depriving the individual of 
freedom of choice the legislature has interfered in the two central relationships that give 
meaning to individuals’ lives: family and work. In Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of 
Health,319 the CC stated that the freedom to choose one’s occupation is about more than 
the right to earn a living, for work is the ‘foundation of one’s existence’, ‘constitutive of one’s 
identity’ and the ‘relationship that completes one over a lifetime of devoted activity’.  
Achieving personal satisfaction and fulfilment is not the principal reason most people work, 
however. Their main motivation is to earn a living. And their main motivation for earning a 
living is to provide for family. Family is the centre of most people’s lives.320 Family is why 
people work; work is how people support family.321 The law not only recognises that 
individuals have a right to provide for their families; it places a duty on them to do so. Their 
right to do so is not extinguished by death; neither is their duty, in so far as their spouses and 
children are concerned. Section 37C impairs the fundamental relationship between family 
and work. Members cannot rest assured that the very reason they work, to make provision for 
their families, will be respected after they die. Dawood held that legislation that ‘significantly 
impairs the ability of spouses to honour their obligations to one another’ infringes the right to 
dignity.322 The same must apply with respect to children, and arguably anyone to whom the 
member owed a moral or legal obligation arising from their family relationship. 
318 See similarly McCosker v McCosker [1957] HCA 82 Kitto J [5]. 
319 Affordable Medicines Trust (n10) [59]. 
320 See Dawood (n10) [30], ‘Marriage and family are social institutions of vital importance.’ 
321 Recent research conducted in Europe confirms that most people consider family to be the most 
important aspect in their lives, with work being the next most important. It also confirms that earning a 
living is the main reason people work. Self-fulfilment increases in importance as the need to work 
decreases – in other words more people in wealthier countries consider it important compared with 
those in poorer countries. See Méda The future of work: The meaning and value of work in Europe ILO 
Research Paper 18 (2016) International Labour Organisation, para 2.2. On the importance of family for 
individual well-being, see Thomas, Liu, Umberson ‘Family and well-being’ (2017) 1(3) Innovation in 
Ageing 1. 
322 Dawood (n10) [37].  
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Section 37C impairs the right to dignity in another way. The freedom to enter into close 
personal relationships is also central to human dignity, both intimate and platonic. 323 Those 
relationships are of varying significance. Some relationships mature and strengthen with time; 
others do not. Some result in marriage; some do not. Some result in separation and divorce, 
some do not. Friendships fade, affections change. The future is uncertain, and no one can 
predict whether a relationship, whatever its nature, will endure. Some trends have been 
observed across jurisdictions: marital relationships are more enduring on average than 
cohabitation relationships; most cohabitation relationships that do not lead to marriage 
dissolve within five years;324 divorce rates are increasing and marriage rates decreasing;325 
cohabitation relationships are increasing;326 relationship dissatisfaction increases over time;327 
the longer the relationship has already endured, the greater the likelihood that it will 
continue.328 
The upshot is simply that all relationships are at risk of dissolution, and the shorter the duration, 
the higher the likelihood. An individual contemplating marriage or cohabitation with a new 
partner places her ability to provide for her existing family and friends at risk. If she 
323 See also Struening ‘Feminist challenges to the new familialism: lifestyle experimentation and the 
freedom of intimate association’ (1996) 11(1) Hypatia 135. 
324 See Law Commission of England and Wales Cohabitation: the financial consequences of 
relationship breakdown (Consultation Paper No 179, 2006), para 2.39: (3-4, UK); (<3 years, USA). An EU-
wide survey showed that cohabitation rates vary considerably in Europe and that it is more common in 
Western and Northern Europe. Cohabitation rates are increasingly most rapidly amongst the younger 
generation (25-29), and of these10% dissolve within the first year, and one-third within five years, Kiernan 
The State of European Unions (2000). Cohabitation rates in South Africa are very high, while marriage 
rates are relatively low. See Posel & Rudwick ‘Changing patterns of marriage and cohabitation in South 
Africa’ 2013 Acta Juridica 169l; Mhongo & Budlender ‘Declining rates of marriage in South Africa: what 
do the numbers and analysts say’ 2013 Acta Juridica 181.  
325 StatsSA Marriages and Divorces 2017, Tables 19 & 20. 
326 Many commentators have thus, as yet unsuccessfully, called for the legal recognition and 
protection of domestic partnerships. Amongst the many are Kruuse ‘’Here’s to you, Mrs Robinson’: 
peculiarities and paragraph 29 in determining the treatment of domestic partnerships’ (2009) 25 SAJHR 
380; Sloth-Nielsen & Van Heerden ‘The constitutional family: developments in South African child and 
family law 2003–2013’ (2014) 28 (1) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 100. The SALC has 
similarly proposed that domestic partners obtain the same rights as married partners. See SALRC 
(Project 118) Report on Domestic Partnerships (2006) and the consequent Domestic Partnership Bill in 
GN 30663 of 14 January 2008.  
327 Disillusionment is a significant cause of separation and divorce amongst those who unrealistically 
idealised their partners at the beginning of the relationship. This may explain why divorce rates increase 
significantly after five years of marriage. Niehuis, Reifman, Lee ‘Disillusionment in married and 
cohabiting couples: a national study’ (2015) 36(7) Journal of Family Issues 951. 
328 StatsSA (n325) Table 19, shows that the highest proportion of divorces occurs between 5 and 9 years 
of marriage and decreases incrementally thereafter. 
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understands the implications of s37C, she will understand that she is faced with a choice: 
preserving her ability to provide for existing family and friends, or exercising her right to enter 
a new relationship. She will have to choose between two aspects of life that have both been 
recognised as fundamental to human dignity. The need to choose between them in itself 
impairs her right to dignity.329  
6.7 CONCLUSION 
Section 37C does not simply limit a member’s freedom of testation; it completely removes 
the lump sum from the member’s testamentary control. For those members who do not have 
other assets of value, it extinguishes their freedom of testation. Spouses married in community 
of property or subject to the accrual system lose the share of the member’s benefit that they 
would otherwise have been entitled to. Section 37C transfers the right to control the 
devolution of the lump sum from the member to the trustees. It is trustees who are given the 
wide discretion to decide who, amongst the member’s dependants and nominees, should 
share in the death benefit, and in what proportion. 
Section 37C is not a carefully designed limitation on testamentary freedom, which limits the 
individual’s right only to the extent required. It simply deprives the individual of the right to 
decide how her property should be divided amongst those naturally entitled to her bounty 
and transfers her right to quasi-administrative officials, free of the legal constraints to which 
testators are themselves subject.  
Section 37C transfers the right to control the devolution of the lump sum from the member to 
the trustees. It is trustees who are given the wide discretion to decide who, amongst the 
member’s dependants and nominees, should share in the death benefit, and in what 
proportion. Trustees may include, and exclude, beneficiaries as they deem equitable. In this 
their power is even greater than that enjoyed by the member, for they can effectively 
329 Dawood (n10). 
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‘disinherit’ a spouse or child, even though they were owed a legal duty of support. They may 
override a member’s wishes, even when those wishes are reasonable, much less indisputably 
harmful.  
 
The deleterious impacts are borne disproportionately by less affluent members, spouses and 
children. If testators have no separate estate to speak of, they have no residual freedom of 
testation. Spouses and children similarly have no estate against which they can enforce their 
proprietary and maintenance rights. The need to protect dependants may provide a 
sufficiently compelling justification to limit a member’s testamentary freedom, but there is no 
justification for doing so at the expense of the very persons the law recognises as the 
member’s primary dependants.  
 
Section 37C therefore raises numerous constitutional concerns. It is not the fact of s37C’s 
existence that is problematic so much as its design. Despite the arguments that favour 
freedom of testation,330 most countries do restrict freedom of testation. These limitations exist 
either to protect beneficiaries’ inheritance rights, or to correct the deceased’s unjust 
treatment of a beneficiary.  
 
Could s37C be refashioned to increase both the equitability of outcomes and to keep 
limitations on constitutional rights within bounds that are reasonable and justifiable? This 
question is the focus of the next chapter, in which I look to the limitations on testamentary 
freedom that exist in other jurisdictions, to determine whether there are less restrictive means 




330 Turnipseed ‘Why shouldn’t I be allowed to leave my property to whomever I choose at my death?’ 
(2005-2006) 44 Brandeis LJ 737; Scalise ‘Public policy and antisocial testators’ (2010-2011) 32 Cardozo LR 












South Africa is not unique in treating retirement savings and death benefits as non-estate 
assets. Many countries do so.1 They too restrict members’ access to their retirement savings 
before retirement, and to select their death-benefit beneficiaries.2 Although South Africa is 
not unique in treating retirement savings and death benefits as special assets subject to 
special rules, s37C is, nevertheless, unique. I have found no other country in which the law 
transfers the right to select beneficiaries to the trustees of the fund. The identity of 
beneficiaries is either determined by fixed rules, as is the case in Canada; or by trustees 
exercising their contractual power of selection and apportionment, as is the case in Australia 
or England; or by members exercising their right to make a binding nomination, as is the case 
in Australia and Malawi. While none of these jurisdictions vest trustees with powers 
comparable to those of s37C trustees, they do give their judiciaries comparable powers to 
intervene in a deceased’s estate.  
 
 
1 They form part of a class of assets regulated by contract rather than the law of succession (such as 
individual life insurance). Even without s37C, they may thus not automatically have fallen into the 
estate of the deceased member and would have done so only in the absence of a nomination by the 
member. There is no fundamental difference between distributing assets via a will and doing so 
contractually. Legislatures permit contractual assets to bypass the estate and be transferred directly to 
the designated beneficiary, thereby insulating them from creditors’ claims. They could remove their 
tacit permission. They are already treated as estate assets for estate duty purposes in South Africa and 
for family provision purposes in Canada and New South Wales. See the Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955, s3(3). 
See also Succession Act 2006 (NSW), s59 and Part 3.3. See further Langbein ‘The nonprobate revolution 
and the future of the law of succession’ (1983-1984) 97 Harvard LR 1108 and Braun ‘Pension death 
benefits: opportunities and pitfalls’ in Häcker & Mitchell (eds) Current Issues in Succession Law (2016). 
2 See §7.2 below. 
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In this chapter I first compare how the distribution of death benefits is regulated in each of 
the aforementioned countries. I do so in order to demonstrate that none of the comparative 
approaches are appropriate for South Africa, and that any future reform of s37C should not 
be modelled on those approaches.  
 
The nature and scope of trustees’ discretionary power in South Africa differs in important 
respects from that of trustees in Australia, England and Malawi. It more closely approximates 
the judicial power to override a deceased’s testamentary choices, notwithstanding that the 
trustees’ powers are distributive while the courts powers are corrective.  
 
I therefore consider the judiciary’s control of testamentary freedom, and how it has evolved 
over the course of the past century. In doing so, I hope to identify principles and practices 
that could prove useful when reforming s37C and formulating guidelines to promote the 
equitable distribution of death benefits, while simultaneously ensuring that trustees intervene 
to override members’ wishes only when those wishes are indisputably harmful.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is partly to demonstrate that there are less restrictive means that 
are reasonably available to the legislature, if it wishes to protect dependants from members 
who exercise their testamentary freedom inequitably. It is also to demonstrate that the grant 
of wide discretionary powers still represents too great an intrusion into testamentary freedom, 
even when the power is entrusted to judges, and even when they are permitted to override 
testators’ wishes only when necessary to correct inequitable choices. 
 
7.2 A SURVEY OF THE TREATMENT OF DEATH BENEFITS 
 
There is tremendous variation in the scope of members’ freedom to select their beneficiaries, 
and in whether trustees have any discretionary power. I will briefly describe the position in 
Australia, Canada, England and Malawi. In each of these jurisdictions, death benefits are 
subject to a sui generis regime, while courts have the concurrent power to redistribute the 
284 
 
deceased’s assets if, and to the extent, they consider it equitable to do so. Why, then, do I 
propose examining judicial rather than trustee powers and practice? The answer lies in the 




Australian law allows for binding and non-binding nomination of beneficiaries. It has done so 
since 1999. The law is permissive – it neither mandates nor proscribes binding nominations.3 It 
is left to each fund to decide whether to allow them. The law does prescribe formalities for 
binding nominations,4 and provided they have been complied with trustees must give effect 
to the member’s nomination, subject to only one important proviso: that the member has 
nominated only dependants or her estate as her beneficiary.5 A binding nomination cannot 
be challenged on the basis of unfairness or unreasonableness.6 Despite the potential for 
unfairness, courts are increasingly encouraging members to make binding nominations when 
given the choice.7 If the nomination is not binding, trustees also have the discretion to 
allocate the death benefit between the dependants. Unlike s37C trustees, trustees in 
Australia may pay the benefit to the member’s estate even when there are dependants.8 
The circle of dependants is, however, smaller: it is limited to spouses (including life partners), 
children, financial dependants9 and those in a relationship of interdependency.10 They, 
 
3 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993, s59(1A), effective 31 May 1999. 
4 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 6.17A (4). The nomination must be in 
writing, addressed to the fund, signed in front of two independent witnesses, and executed not more 
than three years prior to the death of the member.  
5 Ibid. 
6 Collins v AMP Superannuation Ltd [2000] FCA 1110 (nomination of adult sons with no provision for 
minor daughters). See also SCT determination D16-17/124 (nomination of cohabiting partner of three 
years, made 18 days before he died, replacing and excluding his minor children).  
7 McIntosh v McIntosh [2014] QSC 99; Burgess v Burgess [2018] WASC 279. The reason is that a 
dependant who is also the executor of an estate is not permitted to seek payment of the death benefit 
to themselves but is required to seek payment of the death benefit to the estate. Seeking payment in 
their personal capacities is considered a conflict of interest and contrary to their fiduciary duties as 
executor. In both cases a surviving spouse who had been paid a death benefit was required to 
account to the estate for that sum since she was also the executor of the estate. However, this only 
applies to non-binding nominations in which beneficiaries are selected at the trustees’ discretion. It 
does not apply to binding nominations.  
8 Cf Muir v Mutual & Federal [2002] 9 BPLR 3864 (PFA), which held that members may not nominate their 
estate.  
9 To qualify as a financial dependant the recipient does not have to be in ‘need’. See Faull v SCT [1999] 
NSWSC 1137. See also Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) Superannuation Circular No. 
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moreover, have a guiding principle to help them when there are competing beneficiaries – 
that the object of retirement savings is to provide an income for the member after 
retirement.11 What this means, according to the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal (SCT), is 
that trustees should prioritise financial dependants, because it is they who have a 
‘reasonable expectation of receiving ongoing support’ from the member.12 The order of 
preference is thus almost always spouses and minor children, then financial dependants, 
inter-dependents and, lastly, adult children.13 Trustee distributions can be challenged, but the 
SCT may only scrutinise trustee decisions for substantive unfairness,14 it may not review their 
decision for procedural fairness.15 The SCT routinely substitutes its view of fairness for that of 
the trustees.16 
 
The Adjudicators’ prioritisation of financial dependants mirrors that of the SCT,17 but it should 
not. The Australian approach is not appropriate for South Africa for three reasons: South 
African trustees have an obligation to effect an equitable distribution amongst a potentially 
far larger circle of beneficiaries; the socio-economic circumstances of most beneficiaries are 
incomparably different – need is immeasurably greater, and future prospects significantly 
bleaker; and, very importantly, in Australia death benefit dependants are also eligible 
dependants under each state’s family provision laws.18 The same dependants can, in other 
words, lodge a claim against the deceased’s estate. In South Africa, very few members have 
 
I.C.2 Payment Standards for Regulated Superannuation Funds (September 2006) para 16; SCT Key 
Considerations that Apply to Death Benefit Claims (2006) para 3.4.1 and 3.4.2.  
10 Superannuation Act (n3), ss10 and 10A; Superannuation Regulations (n4), reg 1.04AAAA. 
11 SCT Determinations D06-07\024, 11 (17/8/2006); D16-17\136 [36] (28/02/2017); D16-17\120 [17, 22] 
(12/01/2017).  
12 Ibid. 
13 D06-07\024 (n11) 
14 Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993, s14(2). See also Stock v NM Superannuation 
Proprietary Limited [2015] FCA 612. 
15 Wilkinson v Clerical Administrative & Related Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 51. The 
reasons relate to the constitutional separation of powers. 
16 See (n11) and D12-13\090 (24/4/2013); D13-14\164 (31/3/2014); D14-15\185 (11/3/2015); D16-17\127 
(30/1/2017). 
17 See §4.8 above. 
18 Eligibility is not identical across each of the statutes or the Superannuation Act, but they are by and 
large the same, although eligibility tends to be broader under family provision legislation. See Testator’s 
Family Maintenance Act 1912 (Tas), s3A; Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic), s90; Family 
Provision Act 1969 (ACT), s7; Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA), s6; Family Provision Act 1972 




a separate estate of any significant value, and the only dependants entitled to claim 




Canada has different rules governing the savings portion and insured portion.19 The legislative 
overlay is complex, given the diversity of provincial and federal law, and a comprehensive 
analysis is beyond the scope of the dissertation. The essentials are, however, as follows. A 
federal Act, the Pension Benefits Standards Act 1985, governs retirement benefits of federal 
employees. All other employees’ retirement benefits are governed by provincial laws, and 
each province has its own family provision legislation.  
 
The beneficiaries of the savings portion are fixed by either federal or provincial legislation, but 
the principles are broadly similar: it must be paid to the member’s spouse or common-law 
partner; failing either, to the nominated beneficiary; failing which, to the member’s estate.20 
The insurance portion is governed by insurance laws, which ordinarily entitle members to 
nominate beneficiaries, and the nomination is binding.21 There is an important proviso to the 
binding effect of nominations: a dependant’s right to maintenance overrides a nominated 
beneficiary’s contractual right to be paid the insurance portion. When a dependant seeks 
maintenance from a deceased estate, any life insurance proceeds payable as a result of 
the member’s death are deemed property in the estate.22 The court thus has the authority to 
 
19 I use the term savings portion for convenience. It is the vested retirement benefits to which the 
member was entitled at the time of death. See Government of Canada Digest of Benefit Entitlement 
Principles (2017), 5.3. 
20 See Pension Benefits Standards Act RSC 1985, s23(1) and the definition of ‘survivor’, s1. The Act applies 
to federal employees only. If the deceased is survived by both a cohabiting partner (of at least one 
year) and spouse, the partner is entitled to the benefit. State laws apply to non-federal employees. The 
order is the same, except that in most cases spouses rank ahead of partners. Some condition a 
spouse’s entitlement on other factors, like not being estranged for a certain period prior to the death; 
others require a longer period of cohabitation for partners. See eg Employment Pension Plans Act SA 
2012, s1(3), which defines a ‘pension partner’ as a married spouse, provided they have not been living 
separately from the member for more than three years, or a cohabitating partner of at least three years 
or one who is in a relationship of ‘some permanence’ if the couple bore or adopted a child.  See also 
Pension Benefits Standards Act SBC 2012, s1(3); Pension Benefits Act RSO 1990, 1(1) definition of 
‘spouse’.  
21 Insurance Act RSA 2000, s660; Insurance Act RSBC 2012, s59; Insurance Act RSO 1990, s190.  
22 See eg Succession Law Reform Act RSO 1990, s72(1)(f).  
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override the nomination and award all or part of the proceeds to the dependant if they 




In England, trustees commonly also have the power to select the beneficiaries and allocate 
the death benefit between them. The difference is that their power derives from the rules of 
the fund; it is entirely contractual in nature. The law governing the administration of 
retirement funds, the Pension Schemes Act 1993, neither expressly allows nor disallows 
binding nominations. It is fund rules that do so, and the rules usually do not permit binding 
nominations. The reason is simply that if fund rules allow binding nominations, the death 
benefit will be subject to inheritance tax.24 When the fund rules vest the discretion to choose 
beneficiaries in the trustees, or provide fixed rules governing the distribution, the death 
benefit is inheritance-tax exempt. The law, moreover, contains no limitations on who the 
beneficiaries must be for the inheritance-tax exemption to apply. Eligibility is determined 
exclusively by fund rules, and many include a wide circle of potential beneficiaries who need 
not be dependants.25  
 
Trustee decisions can be taken on review,26 but can only be tested on the grounds of 
common law review.27 Provided the trustees did not make a mistake of fact or law,28 ask 
 
23 See eg Stevens v Fisher 2013 ONSC 2282, in which the beneficiary was not a dependant. For a case 
involving a dependant claim by a surviving spouse against policy proceeds payable to a former 
spouse, appointed as the irrevocable beneficiary pursuant to a divorce order, see Dagg v Cameron 
Estate 2017 ONCA 366. The purpose of the life insurance was to secure the deceased’s obligation to 
pay spousal and child support. The court held that the former spouse and child were first entitled to so 
much of the proceeds as were required for their actual maintenance needs, while the survivor would 
be entitled to the surplus. 
24 Inheritance Tax Act 1984, ss5(1)-(2) and 151(4). See further Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC) Inheritance Tax Manual paras 17051 & 17052.  
25 See eg  Y v New Airways Pension Scheme (PO9844, 11 January 2017), in which the beneficiaries 
include members’ descendants, all those related to the member through their parents or grandparents 
and their respective spouses or civil partners; the member’s own surviving or former spouse or civil 
partner and those similarly related to that person (including their former or subsequent spouse or civil 
partner); financial dependants and interdependants; the member’s estate and nominated 
beneficiaries, including charities.  
26 Pension Schemes Act 1993, s146(1)(c). 
27 Edge v Pensions Ombudsman [1999] 4 All ER 546 (CA).  
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themselves the incorrect question,29 or fail to consider the relevant facts,30 the trustees’ 
decision will be set aside only if the decision is ‘perverse’, one no reasonable board of 
trustees could reach.31 I have not come across a single determination in which the 
distribution itself was held to be perverse in circumstances in which the beneficiaries were all 
eligible and all relevant facts had been taken into consideration.32 Trustees usually give 
effect to the member’s nomination if they are satisfied it still reflects her wishes when she 
died, even when, by the Australian standard of review, it would clearly be considered unfair 
and unreasonable towards the complainant.33  
 
Pensions Ombudsman determinations are helpful for laying down principles of law, and for 
giving content to the meaning of concepts like financial dependence, but they do not 
provide guidance as to the equitability of distributions. Fund rules do not constrain trustees to 
do what they think is equitable.34 Just as trustee decisions typically respect member 
nominations, so too does the Ombudsman respect trustee decisions, recognising that 
reasonableness exists across a spectrum, and that ‘there is unlikely to be only one answer 
that is ‘right’, with all others being wrong’.35  
 
As is the case in Australia and Canada, eligible dependants can also claim maintenance 
from a deceased member’s estate under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and 
 
28 Such as too readily identifying a person as a financial dependant. See Wild v Smith [1996] OPLR 129. 
See also Hughes v Inchcape Motors Pension Scheme (L00713, 10 December 2003), in which the 
Ombudsman held that no reasonable body of trustees would have concluded, on the available 
evidence, that the deceased was ‘helping to maintain’ his girlfriend. 
29 See Catchpole v The Trustees of the Alitalia Airlines Pension Scheme [2010] EWHC 1809 (Ch). 
30 Usually due to investigatory shortcomings. Examples include Young v Essential SIPP (PO 1758, 13 
August 2013); McNee v Local Government Pension Scheme (PO 2780, 27 April 2011); Ingram v Paterson 
Arran Ltd Group Personal Pension Scheme (PO 80843/1, 27 April 2011). 
31 See Jones v The Barclays Bank UK Retirement Fund (N00036, 13 April 2005) [28].  
32 See eg PO 10413, in which the PO stated that any one of the following distributions would not have 
been perverse: a 100% distribution to a cohabiting partner, a 100% distribution to the surviving spouse 
from whom the member was separated, or a decision to share the benefit between the cohabiting 
partner and surviving spouse, since both women were financially dependent on the member.  
33 See Dudley v Chubb Security (M00489, 24 March 2004). 
34 Although it is arguably implicit in the nature of discretion. See Grosskopf J in Media Workers 
Association of South Arica v Press Corporation of South Africa Ltd ('Perskor') [1992] 2 All SA 453 (A). 
35 PO Annual Report 2005-2006, 17. 
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Dependants) Act 1975, and the discretion to override the member’s wishes has also been 




Nominations in Malawi are binding,36 provided they are ‘current’37 and the member 
nominated a spouse, child or close relation as the beneficiary – and a close relation extends 
as far as the deceased’s aunts, uncles and their spouses.38 Absent a binding nomination, the 
trustees must apportion the benefit between the member’s financial dependants as they see 
fit.39 There is no specific mention of an equitable distribution. Only children and spouses may 
seek maintenance from a testate estate, and the court may award so much as it, on 
‘reasonable grounds’, considers ‘just and proper’.40 Courts have unusual powers in respect of 
the deceased’s intestate estate. They have the power to distribute the estate as they 
consider equitable between the deceased’s spouse(s), children, parents and any other 
minor child whom the deceased was supporting financially.41 The Act lays down principles of 
fair distribution to guide the courts.42 These principles are particularly relevant for s37C 
trustees. Courts have also been given the power to affect an equitable distribution. Their 
powers are not merely corrective, as is the case in other jurisdictions. It thus provides more 
helpful guidance as to the equitability of death benefit distributions than does the approach 
of the Australian SCT or the English Pensions Ombudsman. I therefore discuss the principles in 





36 Pension Act 6 of 2011, s71(1). 
37 A member may revoke the nomination, while divorce or a later marriage automatically revokes it. 
See ss71(4) and (5). 
38 Section 1 defines a close relation as a ‘spouse, brother, sister, parent, child, child of the spouse, aunt, 
uncle, grandparent and the spouse of any of these’. 
39 Section 71(3).  
40 Deceased Estates (Wills, Inheritance and Protection) Act 14 of 2011, ss3 and 15.  
41 Section17 and the definition of immediate family and dependants in s3.  
42 Section 17(1)(a)-(e). Additional principles govern polygynous marriages, ss71(2) & (3). Chinkwende v 
Chinkwende (Probate Cause No 757 of 2016) [2017] MWHC 68 (15 March 2017) provides an excellent 
example of a court exercising its power of distribution. 
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The only jurisdictions in which trustees have a broad discretion to allocate death benefits is 
Australia and England. Malawi specifically limits the discretion to financial dependants. In 
none of the three are trustees expressly required to effect an equitable distribution. In none 
has the legislature transferred the power to select beneficiaries to the trustees, and in none 
are the trustees constrained by the constitutional rights of members and beneficiaries. 
Section 37C is a legislated intrusion into the member’s freedom of choice, and as such it must 
be a reasonable and justifiable interference. I suggest that this means that the interference 
must be limited to those instances in which the deceased has failed to fulfil her legal and 
moral obligations. It is the concept of moral obligation that lies at the heart of equitability.43  
 
Legislation in Australia, Canada, England and New Zealand grants the courts broad 
discretionary powers to award maintenance out of a testate or intestate estate when the 
deceased failed to make proper provision for the applicant. Courts have interpreted the 
scope of their powers through the lens of moral obligation. Even though the court’s role is to 
correct injustice, while the trustees’ role is to distribute the benefit and prevent injustice,44 
trustees perform an adjudicative function that is similar to that performed by the courts in 
those jurisdictions. In the sections that follow, I discuss how courts have construed and 
applied their power to effect an equitable redistribution of the deceased’s estate. In so 
doing I hope to identify principles of equitability that should underpin any future guidelines 
for s37C distributions. 
 
7.3 JUDICIAL CONTROL OF TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM 
 
7.3.1 The origins of judicial control  
 
 
43 In Botha v Botha 2009 (3) SA 89 (W) [46], Satchwell J explained that the word ‘just’ requires the court 
to assess whether and what sum of maintenance it would be morally right and fair, in the sense of 
appropriate as between the parties, to award. 
44 Sutton & Peart ‘Testamentary claims by adult children: the agony of the “wise and just” testator’ 
(2003) 10(3) Otago LR 385, believe courts are blurring the bounds of ‘corrective justice’, the judicial role, 
and ‘distributive justice’, the testator’s role, because of the degree and extent to which they override 
the deceased’s wishes. 
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The judicial power to override a deceased’s wishes is unusual, and of relatively recent 
origin.45 There is, of course, nothing exceptional about restrictions on testamentary freedom.46 
It is unbridled freedom that is exceptional. Restrictions have existed for as long as the 
concept of testamentary freedom has existed. In their original form they guaranteed a 
minimum share of the testator’s estate to specific relatives, subject to the testator’s right to 
disinherit them for good reason.47 Civil law countries continue, in modified form, to follow this 
approach.48 England and its colonies did not follow the fixed-share model, but protected 
widows and children through other devices, like the widow’s dower rights, which gave her 
the right to use one-third of her husband’s immovable property for the remainder of her 
lifetime if he predeceased her.49 It was only after dower rights were extinguished in 1833 that 
testators in England and elsewhere obtained near unrestricted testamentary power.50 Their 
power was, justifiably or unjustifiably, perceived as the power to disinherit those whom they 
had a moral obligation to maintain.51 It was thanks to the activism of the women’s 
movement that common law countries gradually began to re-introduce restrictions on 
testamentary freedom. However, having been briefly persuaded by the virtues of 
 
45 Other than the countries discussed in the thesis, the only others to have granted courts similar powers 
of intervention of which I am aware are Singapore and China. I have, however, not done a global 
survey. See Singapore’s Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1966, which is modelled on the English 
Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938. See also Province ‘Killing me softly: a comparative review of 
Chinese inheritance law to address the problem of elder abuse and neglect in the United States’ (2012) 
22(1) Indiana International and Comparative LR 71. 
46 Turnipseed ‘Why shouldn’t I be allowed to leave my property to whomever I choose at my death?’ 
(2005-2006) 44 Brandeis LJ 737 identifies the state of Georgia as the only state in the USA that permits 
complete freedom of testation. Every other state provides some form of protection for surviving 
spouses, but not for other dependants, either through the elective share model that permits a surviving 
spouse to claim a fixed share of the deceased’s estate, or through matrimonial property laws that are 
similar to South Africa’s accrual system. Despite the lack of formal restrictions on testamentary freedom, 
Leslie ‘The myth of testamentary freedom’ (1996) 38 Arizona LR 235 identifies numerous cases in which 
the US courts have covertly overridden the testator’s intentions, because of a perceived failure of moral 
duty, by their creative manipulation of, inter alia, the doctrine of undue influence.  
47 See Monro (tr) The Digest of Justinian (1904) D5.2 on ‘inofficious testaments’. See also BGB (German 
Civil Code), s2339.  
48 See Van Erp ‘New developments in Succession Law’: General Report to the XVIIth International 
Congress of Comparative Law (2007) 11(3) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law and the national 
reports contained in the same issue. 
49 Husbands acquired similar 'curtesy' rights on the death of their wives. The abolition of dower left 
married women vulnerable if disinherited, particularly since any property they had owned on entering 
the marriage automatically became that of their husband. The Married Women's Property Acts of 1870 
and 1882 ameliorated their position somewhat, for it gave married women full ownership and control 
over their separate income and property. See further Haskins 'The development of common law dower' 
(1948-1949) 62 Harvard LR 42. 
50 Keeton & Gower ‘Freedom of testation in English Law’ (1934-1935) 20 Iowa LR 326. 
51 Atherton ‘New Zealand’s Testator’s Family Maintenance Act of 1900 – the Stouts, the women’s 
movement and political compromise’ (1990) 7(2) Otago LR 202. 
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testamentary freedom, they chose not to adopt the fixed-share model, because it operated 
as an invariable limitation on testamentary freedom.52 Instead they opted for a model they 
considered to be a lesser restriction – that of empowering courts to override a testator’s 
wishes in appropriate cases.  
 
New Zealand was the first country to do so, in 1900,53 granting courts the power to order such 
maintenance from an estate as they considered fitting when the testator had failed to make 
‘adequate provision for the proper maintenance and support’ of a spouse or child.54  
 
That New Zealand was the forerunner has been attributed to the fact that it was also the first 
country to grant women the suffrage in 1893.55 It was in the same year that testamentary 
freedom became a ‘political issue’,56 as women protested their lack of property rights and 
vulnerability to disinheritance. Australia and Canada soon followed New Zealand’s lead.57 
England too, followed suit, but only in 1938, after much parliamentary debate and numerous 
unsuccessful attempts.58  
 
7.3.2 The emergence of the moral obligation norm 
 
 
52 For a discussion on the parliamentary debates in New Zealand and England respectively, see Sutton 
& Peart (n44); Lehmann ‘Testamentary freedom versus testamentary duty: in search of a better 
balance’ 2014 Acta Juridica 9. 
53 Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1900. 
54 Section 2. Although initially limited to testate succession, family provision laws today apply on 
intestacy also. Since intestacy may be construed as expressing the tacit intention of the deceased, I will 
use the term testator to refer to the deceased in a testate and intestate estate, unless the context 
clearly indicates otherwise. English intestacy laws were historically modelled on the presumed intention 
of the majority, as derived from an analysis of wills. See Law Commission of England and Wales (LCEW) 
Intestacy and family provision claims on death (Consultation Paper No 191, 2009) para 1.38. 
55 Atherton ‘The Stouts’ (n51).  
56 Ibid 207.  
57 Victoria was the first Australian state to do so with the adoption of the Widows and Young Children 
Maintenance Act 1906 (Vic). Alberta was the first Canadian state to do so with the adoption of the 
Married Women’s Relief Act in 1910, see eg McBratney v McBratney 1919 CanLII 696 (ABCA). In both 
Australia and Canada family provision laws are state/provincial laws rather than federal laws. In 
Australia a reform project to introduce a model law with the aim of increasing consistency across 
jurisdiction has not been successful. See New South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC) Uniform 
succession laws: family provision Report 110 (May 2005); South Australia Law Reform Institute (SALRI) 
Distinguishing between the Deserving and the Undeserving: Family Provision Laws in South Australia 
Report 9 (2017) states that New South Wales is the only state to date to substantially align its laws with 
the model law (para 2.1.22). 
58 Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938. See Lehmann (n52) 31-33. 
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Since New Zealand was the first country to adopt family provision legislation, its judiciary was 
also the first to interpret and apply such legislation. The principles first articulated by the New 
Zealand courts have shaped judicial understanding of the proper role of the courts in all 
countries that subsequently adopted family provision legislation.59 The seminal cases are 
those of Allardice v Allardice60and Re Allen (deceased), Allen v Manchester.61 They continue 
to be cited extensively by contemporary courts.62  
 
7.3.2.1 The four rules of family provision 
 
Allardice was the first family provision case to come before the Court of Appeal. Stout CJ, an 
influential champion of family provision legislation,63 summarised the four ‘rules’ applicable in 
family provision cases: (i) that the purpose of family provision is not merely to protect eligible 
beneficiaries against indigence; (ii) that the court’s power is not to re-write the testator’s will; 
(iii) that a court may interfere with the testator’s wishes only in order to make proper provision 
for the testator’s spouse and children to the extent that the testator’s will did not make such 
provision; (iv) that a court would make more generous provision for a widow (if not a 
widower) than for children who were capable of supporting themselves.64  
 
Of these four rules, the third rule has proven the most challenging for courts to apply. 
Anything in excess of an award of ‘proper provision’ is, after all, tantamount to re-writing the 
deceased’s will, in violation of the second rule.65 The third rule also goes together with the 
fourth rule, which, as will be seen, is not a rule that the deceased owes no moral duty 
 
59 See eg Garrett v Zwicker 1976 CanLII 1981 (NS CA) 336, acknowledging the influence of the NZ courts 
on Canadian jurisprudence. 
60 (No 2) NZCA (1910) 30 NZLR 222.  
61 [1922] NZLR 218. 
62 Re Allen (n61) has been cited in 197 cases on the Austlii database (as at 22/11/2018). Of these, 105 
were judgments handed down between 20 April 2000 and 2 November 2018. Allardice has been cited 
in 59 cases, 54 of them between 8 April 2011 and 18 September 2018. These citations reflect only the 
decisions handed down by Australian and New Zealand Courts. They have also been cited in 
Canadian decisions, such as Cummings v Cummings (2004) 69 OR (3d) 397. 
63 Atherton ‘The Stouts’ (n51). 
64 At 756. 
65 In Walsh v Public Trustee [2016] NZFC 8163, the judge expressly admitted that he was re-writing the 
testator’s will. The estate was so tiny that no provision could be made from it – it was the provision. The 
moral claims of the deceased’s children were so compelling, and the selected beneficiaries’ virtual 
strangers, that the court awarded the entire estate to the children. 
294 
 
towards adult self-supporting children. Delineating the circumstances and extent to which a 
court may permissibly override a testator’s wishes on the application of a self-supporting 
adult child has become a thorny contemporary question for the judiciary in New Zealand 
and Australia.66 English and Canadian courts have also had occasion to grapple with the 
issue in recent years,67 with the Nova Scotia Supreme Court declaring unconstitutional 
provincial legislation that granted courts the power to override a testator’s will for the benefit 
of a non-needy adult child.68  
 
New Zealand’s Testator’s Family Maintenance Act of 1900 granted courts the power to make 
any order they deemed fit for the provision of the spouse and children where the testator’s 
will did not make ‘adequate provision for the[ir] proper maintenance and support’.69 The use 
of the word ‘proper’ and ‘support’ was the basis on which courts interpreted the legislation 
as permitting them to make provision in excess of the recipient’s strict maintenance needs, 
i.e. as something more than merely protecting them against indigence.70 As such, courts 
could not simply apply a needs-based test to determine whether the testator had failed to 
make proper provision and what provision it should in turn make. The corollary, however, was 
that proper provision could, in appropriate cases, also be less than the applicant’s actual 
maintenance needs.71 The obvious example was if an estate was too small to 
accommodate every person’s maintenance needs. If a court could not determine ‘proper’ 
provision by reference only to the applicant’s needs, on what basis could it do so? The 
answer is by devising a novel test – that of the testator’s ‘moral’ duty. 
 
7.3.2.2 The moral duty of the wise and just testator 
 
 
66 See §7.3.4 below. 
67 Ilott v The Blue Cross [2017] UKSC 17; Cummings (n62). 
68 Lawen Estate v Nova Scotia (Attorney General) 2019 NSSC 162. 
69 Section 2. The wording remains essentially unchanged, see the current Family Protection Act 1955, 
s4(1). 
70 Allardice (n60). 
71 For eg Cummings (n62). 
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The moral duty test was first formulated by Edwards J in his concurring judgment in 
Allardice:72  
It is the duty of the Court so far as is possible to place itself in all respects in the position of the 
testator, and to consider whether or not, having regard to all existing facts and surrounding 
circumstances, the testator has been guilty of a manifest breach of that moral duty which a 
just but not a loving husband or father owes towards his wife, or towards his children as the 
case may be.  
The test was affirmed, in slightly modified form, by Salmond J in Re Allen and by the Privy 
Council in Bosch v Perpetual Trustee Company.73 It is Salmond J’s more neutral exposition, 
that does not require that there be a ‘manifest breach’ of a moral duty, which has become 
the leading formulation:  
The provision which the Court may properly make in default of testamentary provision is that 
which a just and wise father would have thought it his moral duty to make in the interests of his 
widow and children, had he been fully aware of all the relevant circumstances.74 
Edward J’s formulation, and that of the Privy Council in Bosch v Perpetual Trustee Company75 
approving the decisions of Allardice and Re Allen, more explicitly distinguish between the 
choices an impartial wise and just testator would make, and those of a ‘loving’, ‘fond or 
foolish’ testator. The standard against which a testator’s choices are to be measured is that 
which a dispassionate person would consider it their moral duty to make. This standard is not 
the standard against which the testator’s provision for all the beneficiaries is measured; it is 
the standard of behaviour expected by the testator towards the aggrieved applicant, in 
assessing whether the provision that was made to that person is sufficient, objectively 
considered. Testators are free to make choices commensurate with the degree of affection 
they feel for a beneficiary. They cannot be condemned for acting in accordance with their 
affections, but only for acting in neglect of their duty. It is not the court’s role to condemn 
testators’ positive choices; only to judge their omissions.  
72 (n60). 
73 Bosch v Perpetual Trustee Company [1938] AC 463 (PC). 
74 Re Allen (n61), 613. 
75 Bosch v Perpetual Trustee (n73). 
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The moral obligation test appears to underpin the approach to family provision claims in all 
jurisdictions that confer discretionary powers on courts.76 An important consideration is that 
financial need is only one relevant factor. It is not determinative of the existence or scope of 
the deceased’s moral obligation. In Thomson v Harrison,77 the New Zealand High Court 
considered it ‘rather unfortunate’ that some previous decisions had focused on financial 
need. The court emphasised that it was required to consider the factors holistically, for they 
are all ‘inter-related’ and cannot be considered ‘in vacuo’.78 The mere fact that an 
applicant does not have financial need does not mean that an award for financial provision 
should not be made. Conversely, the mere fact that an applicant does have financial need 
does not mean that an award should be made.  
 
7.3.2.3 The problem of small estates 
 
In Re Allen, Salmond J distinguished between the court’s role in family provision claims 
involving small and large estates. A small estate is one which cannot satisfy the moral claims 
of all those towards whom the testator owed a moral duty. A large estate is one which can. 
Salmond J explained that if the estate is too small to satisfy the moral claims of all eligible 
beneficiaries, a testator can only do his best to apportion it according to each beneficiaries 
‘deserts and necessities’.79 All the court can do in its turn is to ensure that the estate is ‘justly’ 
divided between competing beneficiaries in proportion to the ‘relative urgency’ of their 
moral claims, recognising that an award to one will necessarily be at the expense of another. 
In such cases the court is concerned with the equitability of the deceased’s distributive 
 
76 See all Australian, Canadian and New Zealand cases discussed in this chapter. Many similar cases 
have been handed down in England. The most influential are Re Coventry [1979] 3 All ER 815; Jennings 
(Deceased), Re [1993] EWCA Civ 10. See also the important recent decision of Ilott v The Blue Cross 
(n67), which sets out authoritatively what the correct approach is in family provision claims involving an 
adult child. For a discussion of English case law, see Douglas ‘Family provision and family practices – the 
discretionary regime of the Inheritance Act of England and Wales’ (2014) 4(2) Onati Socio-Legal Series 
222. It also informs claims in China, see Province (n45), 78. 
77 Re Harrison (Deceased) Thomson v Harrison [1962] NZLR 6. 
78 At 13. Quoted in Williams v Aucutt [2000] NZCA 289 [61]. Peart describes Re Harrison as marking a 
turning point in the jurisprudence of family provision claims in New Zealand, for it was after this decision 
that courts routinely began to award provision to adult children irrespective of financial need. See 
Peart ‘New Zealand report on new developments in succession law’ (2010) 14(2) ECJL 1, fn117 and 
accompanying text. 
79 At 614. 
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choices. It is implicit that in such cases the deceased will have no residual freedom of 
testation, for the full estate must be used to fulfil the testator’s moral duties. By contrast, if the 
estate is sufficiently large to satisfy all moral claims, the court’s role is quite different: it is 
required to put a monetary value on proper provision. Of the two, Salmond J considered the 
latter the more difficult, for it requires a court to determine the ‘absolute scope and limit of 
the moral duty’.80  
 
Salmond J recognised that most estates are small estates. Even though he considered these 
the easier cases to decide, I suggest that the jurisprudence proves otherwise. Division is more 
difficult than addition. The moral duty on the testator, and thus on the court, to divide the 
benefit equitably according to each beneficiaries’ relative needs and deserts is arguably 
greater than is deciding on an appropriate absolute sum, however challenging the latter 
task may be. When Re Allen was decided, the only potential applicants were the 
deceased’s spouse and children. The ‘rule’ that a court should prefer the claims of a spouse 
over those of adult children may have made the task of assessing the equitability of the 
testator’s division somewhat easier, particularly when the estate is so small that a child’s 
moral claim must yield to the greater claim, in the circumstances, of the surviving spouse.81  
 
 In the intervening century the substantive essentials of family provision laws have remained 
the same as those set out in Allardice and Allen, but the context within which they operate 
has changed fundamentally. The only significant change that has been made to the law to 
accommodate the changing context has been to expand the circle of eligible beneficiaries, 
which different jurisdictions have done to differing degrees.82  
 
 
80 At 614. An example of which is Lemon v Mead [2017] WASCA 215, in which the testator left his 
youngest daughter, born outside the marriage, a bequest of A$3m out of an estate of A$1bn, and the 
bulk of the remainder to his two daughters of his marriage. The Master ordered that the daughter’s 
share be increased to A$25m. On appeal, the court reduced it to A$6m. 
81 See eg Higgins v Wilkinson [2017] VCC 1534, in which the applicant was a 21-year-old student, and 
the beneficiary was the deceased’s wife of 13 years. The estate was A$40 000. 
82 The expanding circle of beneficiaries has caused considerable consternation in some jurisdictions. 
See Croucher ‘How free is free: testamentary freedom and the battle between family and property’ 
(2012) 37 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 9, esp 18ff. 
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7.3.2.4 A contested concept 
The notion that a court acts as a surrogate wise and just testator fulfilling the deceased’s 
moral duty continues to dominate judicial conceptions of their role in family provision cases, 
despite criticism of its use. The key consideration remains whether the deceased owed a 
moral obligation to a claimant to bestow a (greater) share of the estate on them.  
Describing the court’s role using the language of moral obligation is not without its critics. In 
Singer v Berghouse83 the Australian High Court described the concept as an unhelpful ‘gloss’ 
on the wording of the statute.84 The New Zealand Law Commission (NZLC) in 1997 similarly 
criticised judicial reliance on the ‘obscure concept of moral duty’.85 Amongst the specific 
concerns raised by the NZLC was that: 
The test also makes a second incorrect assumption: that New Zealand society is culturally and 
ethnically homogenous…The consequences of the absence of any norm of this kind are that a 
deceased’s perception of his or her moral duty is overruled by a particular judge’s assessment 
of current social norms. This assessment is necessarily based on the judge’s personal sense of 
the fitness of things… 
These criticisms did not gain traction within the judiciary. In Vigolo v Bostin,86 the Australian 
High Court (HCA) criticised its earlier judgment in Singer and engaged in a spirited defence 
of courts’ use of the concept. It remains a central part of Australian, Canadian and New 
Zealand jurisprudence. However difficult to apply, the concept serves as a reminder that 
whether and how much financial support a wise and just testator would make for an eligible 
beneficiary must be determined by reference to the prevailing moral convictions of society.  
7.3.3 The Canadian perspective: Tataryn v Tataryn 
83 [1994] HCA 40.  
84 At [17]. Cf Atherton ‘Concept of moral duty in the law of family provision – a gloss or critical 
understanding’ (1999) 5 Australian Journal of Legal History 5, which traces the philosophical 
underpinnings of the concept and demonstrates that it was a deliberate, and essential, part of early 
family provision laws.  
85 New Zealand Law Commission (NZLC) Report 39 Succession Law: A Succession (Adjustment Act): 
modernising the law on sharing property on death (August 1997). 
86 [2005] HCA 11. 
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Tataryn87 contains the most helpful synthesis of the principles courts should apply when 
assessing claims involving competing beneficiaries.88 The case involved a claim under British 
Columbia’s Wills Variation Act.89 The Act, like its New Zealand and Australian counterparts, 
gave courts a wide discretion to make such provision as it considered ‘adequate, just and 
equitable’ in all the circumstances of the case where a testator had failed to make 
‘adequate provision for the proper maintenance and support’ of the applicant.90  
The Court identified two fundamental interests protected by the Act: that eligible 
beneficiaries receive proper provision from the estate; and that the deceased’s 
testamentary freedom be respected. The latter must give way to the former, but only to the 
extent necessary to achieve the former. These two interests led the court to articulate the 
following series of principles:  
- A court should not lightly interfere with a testator’s wishes. There are many ways in
which testators could choose to divide their estates, each one of which will be a
reasonable and equitable division. If their chosen distribution falls within the range of
reasonable choices, the court should not interfere with their choices. If it falls below
the standard expected of them, the court should interfere only to the extent
necessary to correct the testator’s failure.91
- The meaning of ‘proper provision’ must be determined with reference to
contemporary values and expectations. It is not a purely needs-based analysis.
- Contemporary values require that a court consider both the deceased’s legal and
moral obligations.
87 [1994] 2 SCR 807. 
88 Tataryn has been cited 412 times as at 13 September 2020 in cases and documents that appear on 
the CanLii website and has been approved by the courts of other Canadian provinces. See eg 
Cummings (n62); Ostrander v Kimble 1996 CanLII 6978 (SKQB); Petrowski v Petrowski Estate 2009 ABQB 
196.  
89 Wills Variation Act RSBC 1996, since repealed and replaced by the Wills, Estates and Succession Act 
SBC 2009 (BC).  
90 Section 2(1). 




- In so far as there are competing claimants, the deceased’s legal obligations enjoy 
priority over her moral obligations. Legal norms reflect ‘a clear and unequivocal 
social expectation’.92 
 
- Legal obligations are determined by reference to the testator’s inter vivos duties of 
support. The court must consider what, if anything, an applicant would have 
obtained had she claimed provision while the deceased was still alive. In the case of 
claims by surviving spouses, the extent of the deceased’s legal obligation is what the 
spouse would have received had the marriage ended in divorce.  
 
- Once proper provision has been made from the estate to meet the deceased’s legal 
obligations, the court must assess whether the deceased owed any applicant a 
(further) moral obligation. This moral obligation can exist in conjunction with a legal 
obligation, or entirely independently of a legal obligation.  
 
- The existence and scope of the deceased’s moral obligation is determined by asking 
what provision a ‘judicious person’, a wise and just testator, would have made in the 
circumstances. The provision a judicious testator would make is, in turn, determined 
by reference to contemporary community standards. 
 
- Some moral claims are stronger than others. The court must thus weigh the relative 
strength of each, and thereby ‘assign to each its proper priority’.93  
 
Under the Tataryn approach, the testator’s first obligation is to fulfil his legal obligations. His 
legal obligation is his minimum obligation. To the extent that there is a surplus in the estate, 
that surplus should be distributed in accordance with his moral obligations. His primary moral 
obligation may also be towards the same persons to whom he owed a legal obligation. The 
Court strongly rejected the contention that it should apply a needs-based analysis in 
 
92 At 18. 
93 At 20. 
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determining the scope of the deceased’s obligation to the claimant. The contention had 
been raised in support of the argument that once the applicant’s financial needs had been 
met, the testator’s wishes should remain undisturbed. The Court emphasised that a moral 
obligation could be owed even in the absence of need, and it could still be owed even 
once the claimant’s needs had been met.  
 
In Tataryn, the Court did not have to rank the competing moral claims. The Court found that 
the testator’s only legal and moral duty was towards his spouse of 43 years. His moral duty 
towards his adult, financially independent sons was insignificant, and the Court awarded 
them C$10 000 each out of an estate of C$315 000.  
 
Tataryn was, however, unusual in that the spouse was the mother of the two sons. The 
testator had arranged his affairs to favour his one son to the exclusion of his other son. To this 
end, he had bequeathed the family home to his favoured son subject to a usufruct in favour 
of his wife. He bequeathed the residue of his estate to a discretionary trust to be 
administered by the son for the benefit of his wife for her lifetime. On her death the trust was 
to terminate, and its capital assets devolve on his son. Although the Court overrode his wishes 
and awarded the bulk of the estate to his widow outright, it gave some recognition of the 
testator’s wishes, even though they were the result of an irrational prejudice he had formed 
against his disinherited son during the latter’s childhood. It ordered that on their mother’s 
death, the residue was to be divided between the sons in a 2/3, 1/3 proportion in favour of 
the testator’s chosen heir.  
  
Tataryn in some ways represents the archetypal situation that the creators of family provision 
legislation sought to protect against. An unjust husband and father abusing his testamentary 
power to capriciously disinherit a son and deprive his wife and life partner, in the literal sense, 
of the right to own, and control, property that had been acquired through their shared 
contributions and which had been intended for their joint use and enjoyment. In awarding 
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the bulk of the estate to the widow there was no prejudice to his sons, for they were 
expected to ultimately inherit via their mother in any event. 
 
Most cases do not fit this mould. In Tataryn, the equities clearly favoured the mother, the 
children were financially independent, the defendant son did not contest his sibling and 
mother’s claim (at least in the two appeals)94 and the court was able to make an award that 
merely delayed rather than denied him receipt of the bulk of his intended inheritance. The 
court did thus not have to make the difficult distributive choices that arise in small estates, or 
in circumstances in which a re-allocation involves a permanent and substantial loss of the 
beneficiary’s intended share. The principles it lays down are nevertheless useful, even in 
contested cases, for determining whether and to what extent a deceased’s wishes should 
be overridden. 
 
7.3.4 Contested obligations: spouses and children 
 
Thousands of family provision disputes have come before the courts in the past century.95 
More often than not, the competing beneficiaries are the deceased’s surviving 
spouse/partner, and the children of a previous relationship.96 They have been the principal 
 
94 The first appeal was heard by the BC Court of Appeal: Tataryn v Tataryn Estate 1992 CanLII 871 
(BCCA), the second by the SCC (n87). The trial court’s judgment has not been reported. 
95 The increasing number of family provision claims, and the devastating impact that costs, which are 
normally borne by the estate, have on the value of small estates, is an issue of growing concern, 
particularly in Australia. White et al ‘Estate contestation in Australia: an empirical study of a year of case 
law’ (2015) 38(3) UNSW LJ 880 found that there were 195 estate-related disputes in Australia in 2011, of 
which 99 were family provision claims. Case law suggests that estate litigation is lucrative for the legal 
fraternity, and judges have questioned the disproportionate costs charged in such cases, sometimes 
capping the costs. See eg Abrego v Simpson [2008] NSWSC 215; Stern v Sekers [2010] NSWSC 59. 
Opinion within the fraternity is divided as to whether costs should follow the cause or be borne by the 
estate. See the discussion in SALRI Report 9 (n57), paras 7.7.11 - 7.7.22. 
96 The civil law’s fixed rules of succession derive from restrictions that were first adopted in Roman Law 
before the first century AD, for the express purpose of protecting children’s moral claim to share in their 
parent’s estate against the competing claims of a second spouse. The first known example is the Lex 
Falcidia (40 BC), entitling children to at least a quarter of their intestate share. In the absence of 
children, the right to a minimum share passed to parents, and after them siblings. See Monro (n47) 
D35.2. Gaius, writing between 130-170AD, explained that: ‘A parent ought not to be humoured who 
commits a wrong against his children in his testament; the reason why he does so often being that he 
has allowed the cajolery and incitements of the stepmother of his children to pervert his mind to the 
extent that he conceives a prejudice against those of his own blood’. See D 5.2.4. Children enjoyed 
special protection, spouses did not. Half a century later the Emperor Justinian recognised a poor 
widow’s right to protection when inadequate provision had been made to meet her needs. Additional 
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‘disputants’ through the ages, and they remain so today,97 in South Africa as much as 
elsewhere,98 but they are not the exclusive disputants. Parents and siblings are regularly 
amongst the circle of competing beneficiaries, and their claims equally need to be weighed 
against those of a spouse or third party.  
 
How are these competing claims resolved by the courts? What are the contemporary 
community standards that guide them in determining the existence, scope and strength of 
competing moral claims?  
 
If community standards are discernible from judicial decisions, which I believe they are,99 
they remain, on the face of it, remarkably similar today to what they were 100 years ago, at 
least in so far as the treatment of spouses and children is concerned. There are, however, 
discernible differences across jurisdictions in what is best-described as the level of judicial 
‘sympathy’ towards spouses and children, which influences the ‘intuitive assessment’100 that 
courts make in determining whether, and the extent to which, a testator has failed in his 
moral duty. Judicial sympathy towards spouses and children is strongest in Australia and New 
Zealand. Their courts appear to approach the enquiry principally from the perspective of the 
 
measures to protect the respective rights of children from first and later marriages were introduced. 
Testators were encouraged but not obliged to treat their children equally. See further Beinart ‘The 
forgotten widow’ 1965-66 Acta Juridica 285. 
97 Civil law countries predominantly favoured children, while common law favour spouses. Reform 
projects in civil law countries have sought to reduce or remove the statutory restrictions that favour 
children, and thereby permit more favourable testamentary dispositions for spouses. The judiciary in 
New Zealand and Australia have restricted testamentary freedom by recognising the moral claims of 
almost all children to some share of the estate. See further: Van Erp (n48); Croucher ‘A lament for family 
provision – a good idea gone wrong? Australian Reflections’ Colloquium on 40 years of the PRA: 
reflection and reform 8 December 2016 (2016). 
98 Two of the three reported claims against deceased estates were by spouses seeking to overturn their 
husband’s will that favoured the children: Oshry v Feldman 2010 (6) SA 19 (SCA) and Friedrich v Smit 
2017 (4) SA 144 (SCA). The Malawian case of Chinkwende v Chinkwende (n42), concerning a dispute 
about the appropriate division of an intestate estate, similarly involved a second spouse and children. 
Many death benefit disputes similarly involve competing spouses/partners and children, see §5.4 & 5.5 
above. Increasing numbers of estate-related disputes are coming before the courts in which the 
validity of a spouse’s marriage under customary law is in issue – because it determines whether the 
spouse or the deceased’s family have the right to be appointed administrators of the estate, to decide 
burial arrangements, and rights to inheritance. See Marai v Rasello [2015] JOL 34564B (FB); None v 
Tshabalala [2016] JOL 36713 (GSJ); Mrapukana v Master of the High Court [2008] JOL 22875 (C); 
Fungisani v Minister of Home Affairs [2017] JOL 38091 (LT). The applicants are usually either competing 
spouses or parents. 
99 Cf NZLC Report 39 (n85); Sutton & Peart (n44). 
100 Grey v Harrison [1996] VSC 74 [30]. 
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applicant, and their expectation is that the testator use financial provision in order to protect 
applicants from future harm and compensate for past harm. The principal constraints are the 
size of the estate and the competing moral claims of the other beneficiaries. In Canada and 





Early New Zealand cases described a widow’s claims as ‘paramount’,101 and held that ‘she 
has a higher moral claim on his estate than anyone else’.102 Similarly, in McKenzie v Topp,103 
the Victoria Supreme Court stated that:  
 
Other things being equal, right thinking members of society are likely to accept that the needs 
of the widow of a second marriage should rank in priority ahead of the claims of the children of 
a first marriage; although of course it is always a question of fact.104 
 
Modern sentiment thus still accords with Stout CJ’s ‘fourth rule’ in Allardice.105 However, the 
fact that a spouse is considered to have a higher moral claim than other beneficiaries does 
not mean that a testator is under a moral obligation to make provision for a spouse in every 
case. In Re Allen, in dismissing a widow’s claim for additional provision and upholding the 
testator’s will appointing their two minor sons as his primary heirs, Salmond J expressed the 
view that a testator’s moral obligation towards his widow, in cases in which there were no 
competing moral claims, is to provide her with such provision as would enable her, together 
with her own means, to enjoy a life of comfort, free from financial anxiety and at the same 
standard of living she had enjoyed prior to the testator’s death.106 This the testator had amply 
provided the widow, since the estate was large enough to accommodate all moral claims. 
 
101 De Renzi v De Renzi  (1915) 17 GLR 620. It was described as such by all three judges in the case. 
102 Russell v Dunn 9 NZ Gaz LR 5og, 5io (Sup Ct 1907), quoted in Laufer 'Flexible restraints on 
testamentary freedom - a report on decedents' family provision legislation' (1955) 69 Harvard LR 277, 
305. 
103 [2004] VSC 90. See similarly Tataryn (n87), 20. Cf Bladwell v Davis [2004] NSWCA170. 
104 Para 58. 
105 (n60). See Tataryn (n87); Cummings (n62); Skworoda v Skworoda 2008 ABQB 240; Kish v Sobchak 
2016 BCCA 65 (and the cases discussed therein); NZLC Report 39 (n85); Croucher (n97). 
106 At 615.  
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Salmond J was of the view that in bequeathing the greater portion of the estate to his sons, 
the testator was fulfilling his moral duty. More recently, in Marsella v Wareham,107 in finding 
that the testator had breached her moral duty towards her spouse of 30 years, the court 
affirmed that as ‘general rule’ a testator is under a duty to provide the survivor with 
‘appropriate accommodation, a secure income, a fund against contingencies and an 
entitlement to independence, self-respect and autonomy.’108 The court nevertheless 
emphasised that it is a general rather than absolute rule, and that the existence and scope 
of the duty will always depend on the particular facts of the case – including the ‘totality of 
circumstances’ of the relationship between the testator and spouse, as well as that between 
the testator and others who have a ‘legitimate claim’ on her bounty.109 In Marshall v 
Carruthers,110 the claim of a cohabiting partner of five years was rejected by the court not 
merely because she had no financial need, and was in fact considerably more affluent than 
the deceased’s son, his chosen beneficiary, but also because the relationship was of 
relatively short duration, she had suffered no financial disadvantage as a result of the 
relationship, nor had she contributed to the growth of the deceased’s estate. The Chief 
Judge, in his concurring judgment, pointed out that the ‘general rule’, which had been 
formulated in the 1980s, was probably only applicable to the typical ‘mid-century widow’: 
one who had sacrificed her own economic opportunities in order to raise children and 
support her husband while he was amassing his estate.111  
In Canada and England, the courts’ starting point is the amount of provision that the spouse 
would likely have received had the marriage ended in divorce. In England, it is a factor 
courts are statutorily required to consider, but it represents neither the lower nor the upper 
limit that a court can award; it is merely intended as a guide.112 England has no matrimonial 
property regime governing the proprietary rights of the parties, so there is nothing which a 
107 [2018] VSC 312. 
108 Ibid [109]. See similarly Iqbal v Ahmed [2011] EWCA Civ 900. 
109 Ibid. See also McKenzie, Re [2017] VSC 792. 
110 [2002] NSWCA 47. 
111 Ibid [74], [76] (Young, CJ). 
112 Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, s3(2). See eg Fielden v Cunliffe [2005] 
EWCA Civ 1508; Moore v Holdsworth [2010] EWHC 683 (Ch). 
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spouse can claim as of right. The focus of enquiry is thus typically not maintenance, but an 
equitable redistribution of the spouses’ separate estates.113  
Canadian provinces predominantly follow a hybrid community of property and accrual 
system, and the parties’ proprietary rights are thus fixed by their matrimonial property 
regime.114 What spouses are entitled to as of right under matrimonial property law is separate 
from the question of whether the deceased should have made better testamentary provision 
for the survivor than she did. The Supreme Court in Tataryn approved and applied the 
divorce benchmark in answering this question.115 What the spouse may have received on 
divorce represents the scope of the deceased’s legal obligation towards her and is the 
minimum to which she is entitled. A widowed spouse should not be in a worse position than 
she would have been had her marriage ended in divorce.116 Moral obligations remain 
important in determining whether, and how much, additional provision should be made.  
Although the discretion whether, and how much, spousal maintenance to award on divorce 
rests with the court,117 spousal support guidelines have been drafted to promote certainty 
and consistency in the quantum of maintenance awards.118 Although non-binding, they are 
113 There is considerable variation between the awards made by courts in different parts of England, 
which has become a matter of concern. See LCEW Report on Matrimonial Property, Needs and 
Agreements (Law Com No 343, 2014). 
114 See eg Family Law Act SBC 2011, ss85-86 (BC) - spouses jointly own property acquired during the 
marriage, while property acquired before the marriage, together with property received by way of 
inheritance, gift or damages award, remains separate property. However, any increase in value of 
separate property does form part of family property. Manitoba and Saskatchewan follow the same 
model, except that in Saskatchewan family property includes the family home and household goods 
irrespective of when acquired, see Family Property Act CCSM (Ma) and Family Property Act SS 1997, 
s20-23 (Sk). Alberta is similar, except it gives courts a broader discretion to divide matrimonial property 
as it considers just and equitable. Once again, the value of property acquired before marriage, plus 
inheritances, gifts and so forth, is excluded, while growth thereon is included. Property acquired during 
marriage should ordinarily be divided equally; see Matrimonial Property Act RSA 2000 (AB).  
115 (n87), 17-18, 22.  
116The provision of maintenance following divorce has decreased significantly in light of women’s 
increased economic opportunities, from lifetime maintenance to rehabilitative maintenance in most 
instances. In Messier v Delage [1983] 2 SCR 401, 416 the Canadian Supreme Court observed that a 
person does not acquire a lifetime pension through marriage. See also Botha v Botha (n43). 
117 See eg Divorce Act RSC 1985, s15.2(1).  
118 Rogerson & Thompson Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines 2008 Presented to: Family, Children and 
Youth Section, Department of Justice Canada (July 2008). The Law Commission of England and Wales 
has also recommended that guidelines be formulated to provide clarity and consistency in the division 
of property; see LCEW Report on Matrimonial Property (n113) [1.31]. 
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widely-used in practice.119 The guidelines translate an inchoate legal claim into a concrete 
monetary claim. The federal Divorce Act requires that courts consider a basket of factors,120 
in conjunction with the objectives of spousal support,121 when exercising their discretion to 
award maintenance. The factors include the spouses’ respective means and needs; the 
length of time they cohabited; and the functions each performed while cohabiting. The 
objectives include compensating a spouse for any economic disadvantage suffered 
because of the marriage or its breakdown;122 alleviating financial hardship arising from the 
relationship breakdown; and promoting self-sufficiency. The provisions of the Divorce Act 
proved difficult to apply in practice, and there was considerable variation in the quantum of 
maintenance awarded by different courts. Following an analysis of judicial decisions 
interpreting and applying these provisions, the authors of the guidelines distilled two key 
considerations that typically inform the quantum of maintenance awarded: the impact that 
children frequently have on one parent’s economic opportunities, and the fact that 
relationships ‘merge over time’, even in the absence of children.123 The guidelines are 
modelled on these two key insights.  
 
 
119 They are widely used in practice. Over 90% of lawyers reported using the guidelines when 
maintenance was an issue in a divorce; over 70% had found them helpful in resolving disputes without 
the need for litigation, and approximately 52% found them useful in predicting what the award was 
likely to be. Judges, however, made less use of the guidelines – just over 60% reported doing so. See 
Bertrand The Practice of Family Law in Canada: Results from a Survey of Participants at the 2016 
National Family Law Program Canadian Research Institute for Law and the Family (2016). 
120 Divorce Act RSC 1985, s15.2(4).  
121 Ibid, s15.2(6). 
122 See eg Yemchuk v Yemchuk 2005 BCCA 406, for an award based on compensation for economic 
opportunities foregone by a husband. A claim based on similar facts was rejected by the Appellate 
Division in the much-criticised decision of Kritzinger v Kritzinger 1989 (1) SA 67 (A). See Clark & Van 
Heerden ‘Asset redistribution on divorce – the exercise of judicial discretion’ (1989) 106(2) SALJ 243; 
Sinclair ‘Divorce and the judicial discretion – in search of the middle ground’ (1989) 106(2) SALJ 249. The 
objective of compensating a spouse for losses attributable to the relationship is particularly relevant to 
the functional role assumed by the spouses, the conventional example being the wife as homemaker 
and the husband as breadwinner. The Canadian Supreme Court provided an extensive analysis of 
compensatory spousal support in the seminal decision of Moge v Moge [1992] 3 SCR 813, which has 
been cited over 3000 times in subsequent cases on the Canadian Legal Information Institute website 
(CanLii). The compensation-based approach has, however, proven difficult to apply in practice, which 
is amongst the reasons the Guidelines were formulated. The LCEW Report on Matrimonial Property 
(n113) has similarly concluded that it suffers from ‘drawbacks’ [3.5], while a leading QC described it as 
a ‘useless concept’ in determining spousal support [3.27]. Problems most frequently arise when parties 
seek to quantify the actual economic loss suffered, which in most cases is difficult to impossible. The 
Guideline’s use of ranges permit courts to take account of the need for compensatory adjustments, 
without the need to quantify the actual loss.  
123 See Spousal Guidelines (n118) ch7.2.  
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The premise informing the guidelines is that the purpose of maintenance awards is to make 
provision for a lower-income earning spouse who is unable to maintain the relationship 
standard of living on her separate income. The guidelines thus employ two formulae, which 
distinguish between couples with children and those without, in so far as the child is a child 
born of the relationship and is still a dependant. Under the with-child formula, a lower-
income earning custodial parent is entitled to an award of between 40-46% of the couple’s 
combined ‘individual net disposable income’.124 This is only the spousal award. The sum to 
which the child is entitled is determined under binding child support guidelines.125  
 
 The without-child formula is particularly helpful, for the most difficult family provision claims, 
and s37C contestations, involve surviving partners who do not have the ongoing responsibility 
of supporting a dependent child of the relationship. It is in these cases that the competing 
legal and moral claims of spouses and children come to the fore. The significance of the 
without-child formula is its recognition that relationships merge over time. The duration of the 
relationship is thus the key consideration in calculating the amount of maintenance that 
should be awarded.126 The longer the relationship, the more intertwined the economic and 
non-economic aspects of a couple’s lives become, and the more their emotional and 
financial dependency and interdependency increases. Contribution to and dependency on 
a relationship inevitably increase over time. Relationships are analogous to plants that have 
been planted close together. The longer they remain in close proximity, the more intertwined 
their roots become. The more intertwined the roots, the slower and more complex the 
process of unwinding the roots – and there may come a point at which it becomes 
impossible to separate them completely.127  
 
124 See ch8.3. For example, if the annual net disposal income of spouse one is $20 000 and spouse two is 
$100 000 (after deducting all permissible expenses), spouse one’s annual income should be between 
$48 000 and $55 200, entitling her to monthly maintenance of between $2 333 and $2 933. 
125 Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175. 
126 The Spousal Guidelines emphasise that they are strictly a guide to calculating the quantum of the 
award. It is the court that must decide whether the spouse has any entitlement to maintenance, see 
ch3.2.2. 
127 The duration of a maintenance award in long marriages, those of 20 years or more, would thus be 
for an indefinite rather than fixed period, subject to review as the parties’ life circumstances change 




The without-child formula entitles the lower-income spouse to a percentage of the difference 
between their respective incomes. The percentage to which she is entitled, and the duration 
of the award, are both determined by the duration of the relationship.128 The longer the 
relationship, the higher the maintenance and the longer the period for which it will be 
awarded.129 Conversely, the shorter the relationship, the lower the amount and the shorter 
the duration of the award.130 The aim of the formula, in the case of a long relationship, is to 
enable the poorer spouse to maintain her pre-divorce standard of living as far as possible.131 
If that is not possible, the aim is to equalise the standard of living of both spouses. The aim in a 
medium-length relationship is to assist the poorer spouse become self-sufficient, or to re-
adjust to her pre-relationship standard of living. When the relationship is a short one, which is 
one of less than five years, the spouse does not have an automatic entitlement to support, 
notwithstanding disparities in income and the other spouse’s ability to afford maintenance. 
Any sum awarded will thus be small and for a short duration.  
 
The formulae do not remove judicial discretion. They are not purely mathematical formulae 
in which income and duration are fixed inputs that would yield the identical amount in every 
case in which these two inputs were identical. The formulae provide input-bands, or ranges 
of support, which permit judges to adjust the inputs having regard to the particular facts of a 
case.132 The Guidelines also recognise that exceptional circumstances may warrant a 
departure from the formulae. For example, in relationships of short duration, the formula may 
not provide the dependent spouse with sufficient income to meet even her basic 
 
128 The Spousal Guidelines use this phrase but explain that it refers to the period during which the parties 
have cohabited.  
129 If the relationship was 20 years of longer, maintenance will be awarded for an indefinite period, see 
Spousal Guidelines ch7.1.  
130 There are two parts to the formula: the amount and the duration. The duration of the relationship is 
relevant to both. The amount is determined by multiplying 1.5–2% x duration of the relationship. Thus, if a 
relationship lasted 8 years, the poorer spouse would be entitled to between 12–16% of the difference in 
their respective incomes. The duration is determined by multiplying 0.5–1% x duration of the relationship 
(4-8 years). Thus, if the difference in income was R100 000, the poorer spouse would be entitled to 
between R12 000–R16 000 p.a. for between 4–8 years. See eg McCulloch v Bawtinheimer 2006 ABQB 
232. 
131 Discussed throughout but see especially ch6.7. 
132 Guidelines ch7.3. 
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maintenance needs if she was wholly dependent on the deceased. In this case a court may 
depart from the formula, but only to the limited extent of providing for basic maintenance 
needs, and only for a short ‘transition’ period to give the recipient the opportunity to 
become self-sufficient.133  
 
South African divorce courts also have the discretion to award such maintenance as they 
consider ‘just’ in the circumstances of the case.134 The Divorce Act requires courts to take into 
account various factors that speak to the financial circumstances of the parties, the age of 
the parties, the marital standard of living, the duration of the marriage, and any other 
relevant factor in deciding what, if any, maintenance to award. Courts have emphasised 
that no spouse has a right to maintenance.135 The leading case that discusses the concept of 
equitability in the context of post-divorce spousal maintenance is Botha v Botha,136 in which 
Satchwell J explained that the word ‘just’ requires the court to assess whether and what sum 
of maintenance it would be morally right and fair, in the sense of appropriate as between 
the parties, to award. In refusing both permanent and rehabilitative maintenance, she 
emphasised that to the extent the applicant had financial need (which she had not proven), 
such need was not attributable to the marriage.137 Both spouses had established careers and 
life paths by the time they married, at age 39 and 50 respectively;138 the husband had prior 
to and during the marriage earned considerably more than the wife, which had enabled 
him to acquire the marital home and significant assets; the wife had never owned 
immovable property and had no expectation that she would ever do so; no children had 
 
133 Guidelines ch12.7. A further exception is that if the combined age of the spouse and the duration of 
the marriage is 65 years (or more), then a maintenance award will be for an indefinite period. Both 
need and the so-called ‘rule of 65’ might have been applicable on the facts of Glazer v Glazer 1963 (4) 
SA 694 (A) 707. Although the couple had only been married for 18 months, the estate was large, and 
the husband left his wife no bequest in his will. She was entitled to a small sum under their ante-nuptial 
contract. Adjusted for inflation using 1 January 1960 as the valuation date, the relevant sums today 
would be about R337 million vs R746 000. He would doubtless also be considered to owe her a moral 
obligation. 
134 Divorce Act 70 of 1979, s7(2). 
135 See Botha v Botha (n43). 
136 Ibid.  
137 See also EH v SH 2012 (4) SA 164 (SCA), confirming that need is a prerequisite for a maintenance 
order. 
138 In the more evocative words of Satchwell J, the wife’s ‘life choices and experiences had already 
determined most of life's opportunities, enjoyments and difficulties’ [51].  
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been born of the marriage, and the wife had suffered no financial or economic 
disadvantage as a result of the marriage; she had instead obtained financial and social 
advantages from the marriage - her standard of living had increased significantly, her 
husband bore all household expenses and paid for additional ad hoc expenses for her and 
for her daughter (such as university fees), even though he had not adopted her daughter 
and had not undertaken a duty of support towards her; the daughter’s biological father was 
still alive, but the wife had chosen never to seek maintenance towards her daughter’s living 
expenses; they had married out of community of property; the wife had remained an 
‘economically independent adult’ during the course of the marriage.139  
The court’s most important statement of principle was that it was not enough for the wife to 
satisfy the court that she was unable to maintain her marital standard of living on her own 
means, and that the husband had the means to maintain her at that standard of living. 
Justice requires that a court consider factors other than the financial circumstances of the 
parties.140  
The Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act (MSSA),141 by contrast, makes no reference to 
equitability. It gives the surviving spouse a right to maintenance. The lack of explicit reference 
to equitability has, I suggest, led to difficulties in interpretation and application. The right 
appears to entitle the survivor to whatever sum she needs to meet her maintenance needs, 
and that all that needs to be established is what that sum is.142 This may explain the course of 
events in Friedrich v Smit NO,143 in which the executor, Master of the High Court, the HC of first 
instance and later of appeal, all agreed that the widow had a right to maintenance from 
the deceased estate, but disagreed on whose responsibility it was to determine the 
139 See also AV v CV 2011 (6) SA 189 (KZP) and the cases cited therein, which illustrate the 
circumstances under which courts have granted or refused maintenance. 
140 Paras 48 & 49. 
141 Act 27 of 1990. 
142 See Oshry v Feldman (n98); Van Niekerk v Van Niekerk [2011] 2 All SA 635 (KZP). 
143 (n98).  
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amount.144 On appeal, the SCA summarily rejected the widow’s claim on the basis that she 
had not discharged the onus of proving that she was in need of maintenance.  
 
Although the MSSA appears to give a spouse an absolute right to maintenance in cases of 
need, the Act identifies other factors that suggest her right is not as absolute as it has been  
interpreted. She is entitled only to her reasonable maintenance needs, and in deciding on 
the appropriate sum the executor is required to consider, apart from her financial needs, the 
duration of the marriage and the interests of other beneficiaries. 
 
The Canadian approach is particularly helpful, for it clearly distinguishes between what a 
spouse should receive as of right, and whether and why an additional moral obligation was 
owed to her. It is an approach that better balances testamentary freedom and 
testamentary duty, because it requires a court to focus on, and explain, the distinctive 
elements of the deceased’s overarching obligation and how those elements translate into 
the eventual monetary award.  
 
Further cases illustrate how the tests are applied in practice. In Skworoda v Skworoda,145 the 
court concluded that despite 26 years of marriage, the husband owed his widow no legal 
obligation of support and that she would not have succeeded in obtaining maintenance 
had the marriage ended in divorce. The reasons were their estates and incomes were similar, 
she had made no contribution to the growth of his estate, although he had to hers, nor had 
she had to sacrifice her economic opportunities as a result of her role within the family. The 
court concluded further that he nevertheless owed her a moral obligation to make sure that 
her needs were met, but he had fulfilled his obligation prior to his death, by way of a 
substantial inter vivos gift.146 The court also concluded that the claim was animated by the 
 
144 The executor had already awarded her a generous sum: R4.5m out of an estate of R7m, for a 3.5-
year marriage. He had already paid her R3m before the matter was heard. She was 43 when they 
married. 
145 2008 ABQB 240. 
146 Cf the Australian case of O’Loughlin v O’Loughlin [2003] NSWCA 99, in which a 67-year-old widow of 
a marriage of short duration, with assets in the region of A$ 3 million but a relatively small income, was 
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widow’s desire to build her estate for the benefit of her children, at the expense of his 
children.  
 
Numerous other decisions have also emphasised that the purpose of family provision is not to 
enable an applicant to build their estate for the benefit of their beneficiaries and to the 
detriment of the deceased’s beneficiaries.147 Naturally, this principle only constrains the 
scope of the deceased’s moral obligation and not the deceased’s legal obligation. It is a 
consideration that has arisen most commonly in the context of a second or later relationship, 
in which one or both parties has children of a prior marriage.148 The nature and 
circumstances of the claim do therefore create the suspicion that the main motivation is not 
to obtain provision for a needy spouse, but a legacy for the benefit of the spouse’s children.  
 
Canadian jurisprudence indicates that the scope of the legal obligation infuses the moral 
obligation. The greater the legal obligation, the greater the moral obligation is likely to be. In 
Thronberg v Thronberg Estate149 the court held that the deceased owed his widow neither a 
legal nor a moral obligation after 18 years of marriage. Their assets were similar; they had 
agreed to keep their estates separate to benefit their children; she was age 90 at the time of 
application, and an award was more likely to build her estate for the benefit of her intended 
heirs; and her income was just sufficient to meet her needs. In Seier v Scott150 the deceased 
had made generous provision for his 74-year-old partner of nine years but had left the 
residue of his estate to his sister. Much of the residue consisted of inherited assets. The partner 
had sufficient assets and income to maintain the relationship standard of living. She also had 
three adult children, who the court believed would probably be the ultimate beneficiaries of 
 
awarded an additional A$700 000 out of an estate of roughly A$ 5 million that had been bequeathed 
to the testator’s 10 children. The deceased had bequeathed the widow the marital home and its 
contents, plus he had made inter vivos gifts in the region of A$ 230 000. 
147 Thronberg v Thronberg Estate 2003 SKQB 114; Seier v Scott 2015 SKQB 244; Kish v Sobchak (n105). 
148 Ibid. The same applies to other applicants. See Petrowski v Petrowski (n88), an application by an 
adult child.  
149 (n147). 
150 2015 SKQB 244. 
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her claim. In Kish v Sobchak,151 the court concluded that the deceased probably did owe his 
widow a legal duty of support since she had some need and his income was higher than 
hers, even though her estate was somewhat larger than his. He did not, however, owe her an 
additional moral duty of support. They had expressly agreed to keep their estates separate 
and had both bequeathed their estates to their respective children. The court emphasised 
that he also owed his sole heir, his adult daughter, a significant moral obligation. In the 
circumstances the court held that contemporary community standards required that 
significant weight be given to testamentary autonomy. The claim had been brought by the 
widow’s adult son, for she suffered from dementia and was in a care home. Her principle 
asset, her house, could therefore be sold to meet most of her additional needs.  
 
When spouses have married out of community of property, have thereafter kept their 
financial affairs strictly separate for the duration of the marriage, and the survivor has 
suffered no disadvantage as a result of the marriage, the smaller the legal and moral 
obligation owed to that spouse will be, and the more significant the other competing 
interests become: autonomy, and the legal and moral obligations owed to other 
beneficiaries – most often children. The cases clearly illustrate that the fact that a spouse 
enjoyed a higher standard of living due to the contributions of the deceased does not entitle 
them to retain that standard of living for the duration of their lives, at the expense of the 




Stout’s ‘fourth rule’, that a court would make better provision for a widow than for 
independent children, even in the early 20th century, was not an inflexible rule. It was more 
relevant to the extent of the deceased’s moral obligation than to the existence of that moral 
obligation. It meant only that in appropriate cases, a testator might justifiably prioritise a 
 
151 2016 BCCA 65. 
152 Cf death benefit cases: Whitcombe v Momentum [2016] 2 BPLR 290 (PFA); Kirsten v Allan Gray [2017] 
3 BPLR 566 (PFA).  
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dependent widow over his self-sufficient children if the full estate was needed to make 
proper provision for her. The rule did not mean that a testator was not entitled to make 
provision for his adult children, or that a court would not intervene on behalf of a financially 
independent, adult applicant. In Allardice,153 Stout CJ himself qualified his own ‘rule’ by 
stating that: 
A child, for example, that has been living on a father's bounty could not be expected to begin 
the battle of life without means. A child, however, who had maintained her or himself and had 
perhaps accumulated means, might well be expected to be able to fight the battle of life, 
without any extraneous aid. But, even in such a case if the fight was a great struggle, and 
some aid might help and the means of the testator were great, the Court might, in my opinion, 
properly give aid. The whole circumstances have to be considered.154 
In Allardice, five adult children of the testator’s first marriage claimed provision from an 
estate that had been bequeathed to the testator’s widow for the benefit of his second 
family, which included six children, aged 3 to 19. The estate was a large one,155 and the 
widow was ordered to utilise a portion of the estate to provide annuities for the testator’s 
three middle-aged, married daughters. The court justified its award on the basis that the 
daughters’ husbands had low incomes and uncertain futures. The sons, although also 
experiencing some hardship, were young men in their 30s, in employment, and while Stout 
was doubtful that no provision should be made for them, he ultimately concluded that they 
could secure better lives for themselves with a bit more industry and drive. The decision to 
exclude them from consideration altogether is more probably because of the size of the 
estate and the relative urgency of the competing moral claims of the testator’s financially 
dependent family.156  
153 (n60). 
154 At 757. 
155 £20 000, which is roughly £2.3million today using the Bank of England’s inflation calculator. 
156 Cf Renwick ‘”Responsibility” to provide: family provision claims in Victoria’ (2013) 18(1) Deakin LR 159, 
who interprets the decision as evincing a general reluctance on the part of early courts to make family 
provision for adult, independent sons. My reading is that the court was sympathetic to the claims of the 
adult sons, but the competing claims were such that the court did not feel able to make an award. 
Renwick, and Atherton (n51), identify Stout as an early-proponent of family provision legislation, but that 
he preferred the fixed-share model rather than the discretionary model. This points to a greater innate 
sympathy for the claims of adult children, for children would then be entitled to a minimum statutory 
share of the estate as of right.  
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In McKenzie v Topp,157 the statement that ‘right thinking’ members of society would agree 
that a widow’s claims should, ordinarily, rank ahead of those of those of adult children of a 
first marriage, was made by the court in the context of assessing a stepmother’s moral 
obligation towards a stepson. The court simply affirmed that a father’s decision to leave his 
entire estate to his 58-year old widow, after 20 years of marriage, to the exclusion of his son 
aged 30, was entirely reasonable. The stepmother’s subsequent decision to exclude her 
stepson from her estate, 30 years later, was not. The son was aged 60 when the testatrix died, 
and he had been living with and caring for her for the last ten years of her life. He was in 
considerable financial need and would have been reduced to a life of hardship and living in 
‘doss’ houses without some provision from her estate.158 Her heir was her financially 
independent and reasonably affluent nephew. The deceased had a moral duty to make 
proper provision for the son in light of the nature of their relationship, which was that of de 
facto mother and son, the duration of their relationship, the considerable contribution that 
he had made to her physical and emotional well-being through his caregiving once she had 
become so frail that she could no longer attend to her own basic feeding and ablution 
needs, and the fact that his father’s estate was of significant value at the time of the father’s 
death, approximating the value of the house in which they lived as a family, and in which 
the stepmother and stepson had continued to live together for much of their lifetime.159 
Despite the son’s considerable contribution, the court emphasised the need to respect the 
stepmother’s testamentary choices. In limiting the provision to be paid from the estate to 
roughly one-third its value, which was only so much as was necessary to enable the son to 
purchase a modest home, and maintain a standard of living similar to that which he had 
enjoyed while living with his stepmother, the court said: 
 
 It is plain, however, that the discretion [to order provision] is not untrammelled or to be 
exercised according to idiosyncratic notions of what is thought to be fair or in such a way as to 
transgress unnecessarily upon the testatrix’s freedom of testation, but rather carefully and 
 
157 (n103). 
158 Ibid [64].  
159 She had left the equivalent sum, A$12 500, to her stepson’s three children in equal shares. Its present 
value was of course infinitesimal compared to what it was when she received it.  
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conservatively according to current community perceptions of the provision which would be 
made by a wise and just testatrix.160 
 
In both Allardice161 and McKenzie162 the child applicants were in financial need, and the 
provision made for them was only enough to meet that need.  
 
Existing financial need is not, however, an essential precondition for a successful claim by an 
adult child. Financial vulnerability also creates a moral obligation to make further provision 
for a child. A just and wise testator should make provision for a child against the vicissitudes 
of life when able to do so. The point was made in Re Sinott in 1948,163 apropos the financial 
vulnerability of a daughter. The fact that the applicant was a daughter was clearly a 
relevant factor for the court, but the same vulnerabilities were not unique to women then 
and are certainly not unique to women today. 
 
The daughter was in no way dependent on him. … She was well able to earn her own living. … 
She was in no need, and there was no probability that she would be in need in the calculable 
future. But she was a woman, she might not marry, she would grow old, she might fall ill, she 
might in some way or other find herself in a position in which a substantial sum of money would 
be a great help.164  
 
Courts thus recognise that the future is uncertain and may bring hardship. The view of the 
courts has repeatedly been that a parent’s moral duty extends throughout the child’s life, 
albeit that this does not mean that all children can in all circumstances expect parents to 
provide for them. However, where possible, it does include providing younger adults with a 
 
160 Para 63. Cf State Trustees Ltd v Bedford [2012] VSCA 274, in which the trial court had assessed a 
friend‘s contribution to the deceased’s welfare, principally by virtue of being his ’close personal friend 
and intimate partner‘ [146], and that of her 9-year-old son, in ’loving’ him when he had no children of 
his own[147], as entitling them to almost a quarter each of the deceased’s A$2.1 million estate. They 
had never cohabited with the deceased. The testamentary beneficiaries were the deceased’s siblings, 
nieces and nephews, whose contribution to the deceased’s welfare was held to have been limited, 
with the exception of one niece, who was similarly awarded almost a quarter of the estate by virtue of 
their longstanding ’loving relationship over a lengthy period‘ [148]. The size of the estate and the 
financial needs of the parties were also relevant in determining the quantum. Less emphasis was 
placed on the deceased’s testamentary autonomy, but the will had been drawn up 30 years prior to 
his death, when his estate was still a very modest one. The decision was upheld on appeal.   
161 (n60). 
162 Re McKenzie [2017] VSC 792. 
163 Sinnott, Re [1948] VLR 279. See also Butler v Tiburzi [2016] SASC 108 [24]; Marsella v Wareham [2018] 
VSC 312. 
164 Sinnott (n163), 282. 
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start in life,165 and alleviating the hardships of older children, or even the possibility of 
hardship, if the estate is large enough.166  
 
This holds true even when the child is, in large measure, the maker of their own misfortune 
and when they have already received considerable support from a parent.167 Having 
assumed the responsibilities of parenthood, it appears a parent can almost never be heard 
to say ‘enough is enough’ if there is any suggestion of financial vulnerability on the part of 
the applicant.  
 
The reason is, quite simply, because the parent-child relationship is the foundational 
relationship in society.168 As described by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Flathaug v 
Weaver:169  
 
The relationship of parent and child has primacy in our society. The moral obligation which 
attaches to it is embedded in our value system and underpinned by the law…[A] parent’s 
obligation to provide for both the emotional and material needs of his or her children is an 
ongoing one. 170  
 
In Flathaug, the Court held that the deceased owed his 47-year-old financially-needy 
daughter a moral duty of support, even though she was married, had only learned of his 
existence when she was 24-years-old, lived in England, and had spent brief periods of time 
with him and, sometimes, his family, on only six occasions. The moral obligation derived from 
the ‘close and affectionate’ relationship they had developed,171 despite the distance and 
limited interpersonal contact. The court held that before she learned of his existence, he had 
owed her no moral obligation to provide support. Once she acquired knowledge of his 
existence and they established a living parent-child relationship, he did acquire a moral 
duty. Nevertheless, the moral duty he owed her was proportionate to the nature of their lived 
 
165 Allardice (n60) 756; Huxtable v Hawkins [2018] NSWSC 174.  
166 Flathaug v Weaver [2003] NZCA 343; Carusi-Lees v Carusi [2017] NSWSC 590 [116(f)].  
167 Carusi-Lees (n166). See also McBride v Toth 2010 BCSC [133]. 
168 See also Glazer v Glazer (n133), 707: ‘However close the relationship between husband and wife, it is 
terminable, and not the same as the immutable natural relationship between parent and child’.  
169 (n166). 
170 Ibid [32].  
171 Ibid [6]. 
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relationship. It was thus significantly less than that which he owed his children in Australia, with 
whom he ‘had shared a lifetime relationship’.172 In determining the extent of the moral duty, 
and consequent proper provision, it is the lived parent-child relationship that matters most, 
not merely the biological fact of that relationship. The fact that a child is estranged does not, 
usually, extinguish the parent’s moral obligation towards the child, but it does affect its 
relative strength vis a vis the other beneficiaries. The more integral a child has been in a 
parent’s life, the stronger their moral claim to that of siblings who are estranged.173 
Courts have even accepted that a parent’s moral obligation can require them to make 
financial provision for symbolic reasons. It can exist even in the absence of financial need or 
vulnerability. One such circumstance is when a failure to make proper provision is seen as a 
form of rejection, a diminution of the child’s role as a valued and contributing member of the 
family. It can also arise when a parent has neglected or abused a child, and provision is seen 
as a form of reparation, or as providing restorative justice.  
In Williams v Aucutt,174 the court awarded additional provision to an affluent daughter. The 
deceased had bequeathed 5% to the claimant, and 95% to her poorer sibling. The court 
held that the deceased had been under a moral duty to affirm her affluent daughter’s sense 
of ‘belonging’ within the family,175 since the parental obligation to provide proper support 
encompasses more than financial support – it extends to the comfort, affirmation and 
emotional support that parents are expected to provide children. A failure to give due 
recognition to a child may thus be tantamount to a form of rejection, a breach of the 
parent-child relationship which courts feel compelled to repair by awarding additional 
provision to the adult child.176 Another circumstance in which financial provision plays a 
172 Ibid [41]. 
173 See Stern v Sekers (n95). 
174 [2000] NZCA 289. The provision can range from an heirloom in the case of a small estate if the child 
has sufficient means, to a more substantial monetary legacy if the estate is large, even if the child has 
sufficient means [53]. 
175 Para 52. 
176 In Williams v Aucutt (n78), the estate was close to A$1 million, of which A$50 000 had been 
bequeathed to the applicant. The trial court increased her award to A$200 000. The appeal court 
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symbolic role is as a form of reparation or ‘restorative justice’ for children who were 
neglected or abused by their deceased parent.177 In such circumstances courts seek to 
acknowledge and make some recompense for the harm caused by an abusive parent. In 
some circumstances the testator’s decision to disinherit children may fall within the classic 
paradigm of the abusive testator – the very act of excluding them may be a form of 
abuse.178  
7.3.5 The deceased’s wishes 
In assessing the existence and scope of a testator’s moral duty towards an applicant, it is 
easy to forget that the court has been tasked with overriding the testator’s wishes if and only 
to the extent the testator failed in her moral duty to the applicant. It is also easy to forget that 
the court is required to assess not only the moral obligation the deceased owed to the 
applicant, but also that owed to the intended beneficiaries. Moral obligation plays an 
important role both in justifying judicial interference with a deceased’s wishes, and in giving 
effect to a deceased’s testamentary wishes.  
In the Canadian case of Cummings v Cummings,179 the Ontario Court of Appeal relied on 
the deceased’s moral duty towards his widow to limit a child’s claim for further provision from 
the estate. The court of first instance had awarded an adult child, who was suffering from a 
progressive disability that would eventually paralyse him, additional provision from the estate. 
The son appealed, seeking further provision. If awarded, it would have required that his 
widow sell the home she and the deceased had bought together. Although the widow’s 
information to the court was that she was not in need and could provide for herself, the 
Court felt that the deceased’s moral obligation towards her, after 11 years of a close, 
mutually-supportive marriage, required that she at least be able to retain the family home.  
considered this excessive and increased the original award by A$50 000 only. See also Smart v Webster 
[2017] NZFC 7264. 
177 Roben v Public Trustee [2016] NZFC 6313 [45]. See also McBride v Toth (n167) [132]. 
178 In Roben (n177) the testator had been an abusive father who had bequeathed his estate to his 





In the Australian decision of Grey v Harrison,180 a testator had bequeathed his modest estate 
to his elderly sister and grandchild in equal shares, to the exclusion of his middle-aged, 
unemployed son, who was the father of his grandchild. The son was a recovering alcoholic. 
He had been a practising barrister before his alcoholism destroyed his career, his marriage 
and rendered him homeless. He had been living with his father for one year prior to the 
latter’s death. The court of first instance awarded the son one-third of the estate. On appeal, 
the son sought a greater share, specifically from the bequest to the sister rather than that of 
his daughter. In dismissing his appeal, the Court emphasised two things. One was that the 
elderly sister’s moral claim was also one worthy of protection. A deceased can, after all, owe 
a moral duty to someone who is not eligible to apply for a family provision order: 
 
It is all too easy to underestimate the claims of an elderly sibling and to subordinate them to 
the perceived needs of a man in middle life or a neglected grand-daughter. Additional 
security and the opportunity to enjoy a few luxuries are all the more important for a person of 
Mrs. Henderson's age.181 
 
The other was that freedom of testation is a fundamental human right. If a court interferes 
with that right in circumstances in which the testator has not abused that freedom, the court 
is not correcting an injustice perpetrated against the applicant but is itself perpetrating an 
injustice on the intended beneficiary.  
 
… there is no equity, as it were, to interfere with a testator's dispositions unless he or she has 
abused that right. To do so is to assume a power to take property from the intended object of 
the testator's bounty and give it to someone else. … A breach of moral duty is the justification 
for curial intervention and simultaneously limits its legitimate extent. So much may be derived 
from the concept of "proper" maintenance and support but also, and more fundamentally, 
from those considerations.182 
 
The deceased’s wishes, and the reasonableness of those wishes, thus plays an important part 
in assessing whether the testator was in breach of his moral obligations towards the 
applicant. The cases serve as an important reminder that testamentary freedom is not an 
 
180 (n100). 
181 Ibid [14]. 
182 Ibid [29].  
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abstract principle. It exists because the law respects the individual’s right to choose who, 
amongst her kith and kin, are entitled to share in her property. The testator’s moral obligation 
towards an aggrieved beneficiary is informed both by her obligations towards her selected 
beneficiaries, and also by her moral right to prefer those for whom she feels a greater bond 
of loyalty, affection or obligation.  
 
7.3.6 Moral convictions: contemporary developments 
 
If ever there was an area of law that proved the truth of the expression ‘the more things 
change, the more they stay the same’,183 it is family law and its intersection with freedom of 
testation. Contemporary debates regarding the appropriate balance that should be struck 
between testamentary duty and testamentary freedom are little different to those that were 
raised a century ago by English parliamentarians debating the introduction of family 
provision laws. Their concern even then was to adopt a model that achieved the twin 
objectives of preserving freedom of testation and protection of the family.  
 
Critics of all the proposed models argued that instances of disinheritance were so rare as to 
make any limitation unnecessary – and that it would make good testators hostage to the few 
bad testators. Critics of the minimum-share model felt that it constituted an absolute 
limitation on freedom of testation, protecting those who did not need, or deserve, provision 
at the expense of those who did. Critics of the discretionary model feared that it would lead 
to a flood of litigation, the costs of which could consume a small estate, create discord 
amongst family members, and that it would lead to arbitrary awards.184  
 
 
183 Attributed to the 19th century French writer Jean-Baptise Alphonse Karr: "Plus ça change, plus c'est la 
même chose."  
184 For the main debates see Hansard House of Commons Debates 27 April 1934, vol 288, cols 2015-
2098; 22 January 1937, vol 319, cols 491-544; 5 November 1937, vol 328, cols 1287-1374. The fears raised 
regarding the discretionary model have been realised. See Crawford ‘Family provision applications in 
small estates: Cope v Public Trustee of Queensland’ (2013) 20 James Cook University LR 118; SALRI 
Looking after one another: family provision laws in South Australia Background Paper (2017), para 3.55ff.  
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Clearly, getting the balance right is a perennial concern that is, probably, raised anew by 
every succeeding generation. Given that most estates are, and always have been, small 
estates, formulating principles that are equitable to all is all-but impossible. There is one 
principle that has remained largely constant – all things being equal, and absent disentitling 
behaviour on their part, an individual’s ‘natural heirs’ are spouses and children. The problem 
is that they are often the competing beneficiaries.  
The past century has witnessed two significant developments in the law of family and 
property. The first is that wives acquired significantly greater rights to control and share in 
matrimonial property. The second is that the legal conception of the family has changed 
quite fundamentally. Much of the legal activism of the 20th century was directed at 
improving the proprietary rights of wives. Once that had largely been achieved, as family 
forms began to change, activism was redirected at achieving equal recognition and 
protection for de facto spouses. The result of both trends is, I suggest, that children’s legal 
and moral claims within the family has become subordinate to the claims of married and 
unmarried partners.185   
This may explain why it is that most family provision applicants in Australia and New Zealand 
are by adult children,186 and why the number of applications is growing.187 In previous 
generations, most applicants had been surviving spouses.188 Today it is adult children.189 
185 See Peart ‘Protecting children’s interests in relationship property proceedings’ (2013) 13(1) Otago LR 
27, commenting on how children’s proprietary interests in property are usually side-lined in proceedings 
for the division of relationship property following divorce or separation. The Property (Relationships) Act 
1976 made marriage in community of property the default regime. Although some property is separate 
property, the family home and family chattels are always considered relationship property. After three 
years of marriage or de facto relationship, the family home and chattels will be divided equally. 
Although property acquired before marriage or by inheritance is usually separate property, this does 
not apply to the family home or chattels. See ss8(1)(a)&(b) and 10(4). Unsurprisingly, there are concerns 
about the inherent unfairness of the equal division principle, and a review of the law is currently 
underway. See NZLC Dividing relationship property: time for change? Issues Paper 41 (2017).  
186 Hannah & McGregor-Lowndes ‘From testamentary freedom to testamentary duty: Finding the 
balance’ (2008) Queensland University of Technology Working Paper CPNS 42; White et al (n95). 
187 McGregor-Lowndes & Hannah ‘Every player wins a prize? Family provision and bequests to charity’ 
The Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Non-Profit Studies, Queensland University of Technology 
(2008). Re Allen (n61) has been cited in 211 cases on the Austlii database (as at 13/109/2020), of which 
160 were handed down between 20 April 2000 and 13/09/2020. 
188 Laufer (n102).  
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Whereas claims by spouses were, and remain, sympathetically received, claims by adult 
children receive less sympathy. In 1997, the New Zealand Law Commission described claims 
by non-needy adult children, based only on the deceased’s alleged breach of some 
‘undefined moral duty’, as ‘indefensible’.190 It recommended that children’s eligibility be 
limited to those who are minors, students, incapacitated or genuinely in need.191 The New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission in 2005 proposed similar reforms, and expressed the 
view that the only applicants whose eligibility was not likely to be ‘seriously disputed’ were 
spouses, de facto partners and minor children.192 The Commission’s reforms were not 
adopted, and most judges do not appear to share their views, given that successful family 
provision claims by ‘greedy’193 adult children in Australia have become so common that one 
commentator has described them as ‘right out of hand’194  
 
Are these criticisms entirely justified? In some the only reason for the claim may well be to 
acquire more wealth. However, family relations are too complex to permit such a 
straightforward conclusion in all cases, as the facts of many cases indicate.195 ‘[E]very 
unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.’196 The applications that arguably evidence 
greater avarice are those by surviving spouses who, despite a lack of need, wish to obtain a 
greater share in the deceased’s estate for the benefit of their own children and to the 
inevitable cost of the deceased’s chosen beneficiaries.197  
 
Children are most often aggrieved when they are excluded from their parent’s ‘bounty’ in 
favour of a surviving spouse who is not their parent, or when they are treated less favourably 
than a sibling. The courts, even if not law commissions and commentators, are clearly 
 
189 See the table of cases at Annexure A in Hannah & McGregor-Lowndes (n186). 
190 NZLC Report 39 (n85) para 4. 
191 Ibid para 70, 77. 
192 NSWLRC Uniform succession laws: family provision Report 110 (May 2005) para 2.5.  
193 White et al (n95). 
194 Croucher (n97) 34.  
195 Williams v Aucutt (n78); Flathaug (n166); Roben (n177).  
196 Tolstoy Anna Karenina (1878) tr by Garnett, Constance (1901). 
197 Thronberg v Thronberg (n147); Seier v Scott (n147); Kish v Sobchak (n105). 
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sympathetic to their claims. In Australia, about 70% of their claims are successful.198 In New 
Zealand their success is such that one commentator has concluded that ‘children nowadays 
have a right to share in their parent’s estate, irrespective of age or financial position’, and 
that society is being forced ‘to abandon the ideas of individualism inherent in a concept of 
private property and to place family rights ahead of personal rights.’199   
In order to curb claims by adult children the leading Australian commentator on family 
provision has suggested that a distinction be drawn between: 
… the position of partners/spouses from that of children. Marriages, or marriage-like 
relationships, are based on different logic than simply being a child (or analogous relationship) 
of someone.200 
The view that there is a ‘different logic’ to the relationship between spouses versus that of 
‘simply’ parent and child, implies that the logic that favours the former is more compelling 
than that which includes, or favours, the latter.  
The relationship of parent and child versus that of partners is, admittedly, a different type of 
relationship. But what logic dictates that the moral claims of partners be preferred to those of 
children? One is not ‘simply’ a child; there is no relationship ‘analogous’ to being a child. The 
relationship of parent and child is distinct from that of parent and foster child, and parent 
and stepchild.201 Exceptionally, these relationships may become that of de facto parent and 
198 White et al (n95), 899. 
199 Peart ‘Towards a concept of family property in New Zealand’ (1996) 10 International Journal of 
Politics & Family 105, 118, 125. 
200 Croucher (n97), 23-24 (emphasis added). Although acknowledging the ‘problem’ of balancing the 
competing moral claims of children and spouses is ‘aggravated by the problem of “serial monogamy”’ 
(§5.2) she does not return to address the problem in her discussion.
201 Legislatures are beginning to include non-biological and non-adoptive children within the definition
of child, or separately as an eligible applicant, for family provision claims, but not for all purposes (such
as the right to inherit on intestacy). See England’s Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants)
Act 1975, s1(1)(d); New Zealand’s Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s2; Australia’s Succession Act 2006,
s57(2)(e) (NSW) and the Administration and Probate Act 1958, s90 (Vic), in which step-children were
held to include the children of domestic partners in Scott-Mackenzie v Bail [2017] VSCA 108. This does
not mean that the relationship between the parent and step-or-other child is generally thought to be
equivalent to that between parents and their biological children. In Williams, Re: Smith v Thwaites [2017]
VSC 365 [63], eg, the court described the deceased’s relationship with her biological children as her
‘primary relationship and very different’ to her relationship with her stepdaughter [63]. The fact that the
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child, but that appears to be rare. Parent-child relationships are enduring.202 Increasingly, the 
relationships between spouses and partners are not. For most children, they last from the 
beginning of the child’s life to the end of the parent’s life. The relationship does not come to 
an end when the child becomes an adult. And the challenges facing young adults today 
are greater than those that faced their parent’s generation - youth unemployment, 
increasing insecurity in employment, inadequate education, the higher cost of 
accommodation, to name but a few.203  
Is it defensible that a deceased can be thought to owe a moral duty of support to a partner 
of a few years’ duration but not to a child of many years’ duration, particularly when the 
estate was acquired through the contributions of the deceased and predeceased parent 
rather than the surviving spouse; or when the child relinquished a claim on another’s estate in 
favour of their parent on the understanding that it would, on their death, pass to them; or 
when the child made significant contributions to the welfare and well-being of the parent; or 
when the assets in the estate are inherited assets?  
Critics of the courts’ sympathetic treatment of adult children nevertheless assert that the 
courts have not struck the right balance between testamentary autonomy and testamentary 
responsibility. 204 They argue that courts are not being true to the original conception of family 
provision laws: to interfere with freedom of testation only in order to correct a testator’s 
breach of her moral duty, as judged against the standard of the wise and just testator whose 
testators in McKenzie v Topp (n103) and Carney v Jones [2012] NSWSC 352 did not include their long-
term step-and-foster children, respectively, amongst the beneficiaries in their wills also suggests that the 
relationship was qualitatively different for the deceased, notwithstanding the close bond of affection 
that existed between them in both cases. That the majority of parents feel a closer bond of affection 
for their biological children than stepchildren and foster children has been confirmed in a number of 
studies. See eg Becker et al ‘What narrows the Stepgap? Closeness between parents and adult 
(step)children in Germany’ (2013) 75(5) Journal of Marriage & Family 1130, which cites additional 
studies. The fact that numerous applicants are step-children indicates, perhaps, that either their 
perception of the relationship differed from that of the deceased step-parent, or that they were 
aggrieved that their prior relationship with their own parent, which had benefited the step-parent, is not 
given proper legal recognition and protection.  
202 Glazer v Glazer (n133). 
203 United Nations World Youth Report: Youth and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
(2018); McKee ‘Young people, home ownership and future welfare’ (2012) 27(6) Housing Studies 853. 
See also Peart (n185) ‘Protecting children’s interests’, 29. 
204 Peart (n199) ‘Towards a concept of family property’; Croucher (n97).  
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values are informed by contemporary community standards. They suggest that the 
community does not expect a testator to make provision for financially independent adults; 
or, arguably, even for financially needy adults.205  
 
Their arguments are of course true – up to a point. There is no ‘clear and uniform’ 
expectation that every parent make provision for every child in every circumstance.206 It is, in 
most cases, simply impossible to do so.207 Nevertheless, such evidence as exists clearly shows 
that the majority of parents do wish to make provision for their children, particularly when 
their surviving spouse is not also the parent of their children; and that most believe that they 
should treat their children equally – absent exceptional circumstances.208 This is perhaps why 
children are so aggrieved when their parents flout the norm – the choices that most parents 
choose to make when they have the means to do so. 
 
 What is the evidence? Apart from academic research,209 it is apparent from the choices 
most testators make (and always have made);210 the majority preference is reflected in the 
laws of intestate succession;211 the majority preference has been confirmed by research 
conducted by or for law reform institutions.212  
 
 
205 NZLC Report 39 (n85); Croucher (n97). 
206 NZLC Report 39 (n85) para 74. 
207 Sappideen ‘Families and Intergenerational Transfers: Changing the Old Order?’ (2008) 31(3) UNSW LJ 
738. 
208 McBride v Toth (n167) [134]; Sappideen (n207) 756; Humphrey et al Inheritance and the family: 
attitudes to the will-making and intestacy National Centre for Social Research (2010).  
209 Sappideen (n207); Humphrey et al (n208); Drake & Lawrence ‘Equality and distributions of 
inheritance in families’ (2000) 13(3) Social Justice Research 271. 
210 Drake & Lawrence (n209), 272 citing Finch et al Wills, Inheritance and Families (1996).  
211 Reid, De Waal, Zimmermann (eds) Comparative Succession Law Vol 2: Intestate Succession (2015). 
212 Humphrey et al (n208). The National Centre for Social Research conducted extensive public surveys 
in 2009 on behalf of the LCEW as part of its review into intestacy laws. The research revealed that 73% 
of testators had included children in their will, while only 65% had included spouses or cohabiting 
partners. Women were more likely to include their children than were men (77% vs 68%), while men 
were more likely to include their spouse than were women (75% vs 57%). The majority of spouses who 
had prioritised their spouse in their will assumed that the estate would in due course pass to their 
children, 32. Those who were single, divorced, separated or widowed prioritised their descendants, 32. 
See also NSWLRC I give, devise and bequeath: an empirical study of testators’ choice of beneficiaries 
Research Report 13 (2006), paras 4.12–4.14. 
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The fact that most parents choose to make provision for their children does not mean that 
every parent should be expected to do so. It does not mean that a parent who chooses not 
to do so has made an unjust choice.213 What it does mean, however, is that when a parent 
has made the choice to benefit a child, a court or other decision-making body should be 




The original raison d’être for family provision laws no longer exists: to protect vulnerable 
widows, where their vulnerability is due to the legal and social consequences of marriage, 
which subordinated their person and property to the power of their husbands.214 Women are 
no longer almost inevitably dependent on men, whether as husbands or fathers.215 
Dependency, when it exists, is no longer necessarily attributable to marriage. Intimate 
relationships are no longer exclusively constituted by marriage. Relationships have become 
terminable at the will of either party. The incidence of multiple (sequential) relationships over 
the course of an individual’s lifetime, and thus of step and blended families, has increased.216  
 
These changes should inform the existence and scope of a deceased’s perceived moral 
duty towards partners, children, and other relatives. They point to a loosening of the bonds 
 
213 Most of the concern about adult children is directed at those who are not in financial need, see the 
cases discussed by Croucher (n97) §6. White et al (n95) found that at least one-third of adult children 
were ‘financially comfortable’ who simply wanted a greater share of their parent’s estate (at 902). 
However, when a child has need because of their own life choices, why should their claim be any more 
compelling than that of siblings who are more affluent due to their own effort and prudence? Need 
alone should also not be a sufficient basis for entitlement. See Ilott v The Blue Cross (n67). 
214 Tataryn (n87), 12; Atherton ‘Expectation without right: testamentary freedom and the position of 
women in 19th Century New South Wales’ (1988) 11 University New South Wales LJ 133; Atherton ‘The 
Stouts’ (n51), 204. Olive Schreiner in Woman and Labour (1911) argued that women should be allowed 
greater participation in the economy rather than being forced to rely on proprietary claims against 
men.  
215 This is not to say that women have achieved economic equality, but family provision laws cannot 
address the wage gap or employment gap. These are issues that are not specific to wives – they affect 
all women in society.  
216 OECD Doing Better for Families (2011). In South Africa marriage rates have also been decreasing 
while divorce rates have been increasing. See StatsSA Marriages and Divorces 2017. The trend is most 
pronounced amongst Black African women and a variety of explanations have been offered, 
including that women consider their children, particularly daughters, a more reliable source of future 
care than husbands. See Mhongo & Budlender ‘Declining rates of marriage in South Africa: what do 
the numbers and analysts say’ 2013 Acta Juridica 181, 193-4.  
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created by marriage, and a tightening of the bonds that develop, and mature, over time. 
These changes should be reflected in any future guidelines that are adopted, to ensure that 
s37C is constitutional in its design, and consistently equitable in its application.  
 
There are important differences in approach between jurisdictions. The starting premise in all 
jurisdictions is that the wishes of the deceased should be respected, and that judicial 
intervention should be limited only to the extent that the deceased’s wishes were not those 
of a ‘wise and just’ testator. However, judicial intervention in Australia and New Zealand 
appears today to occur almost as a matter of course. In New Zealand especially, there is a 
strong sense that parents owe their children a moral obligation to make some provision for 
them, even if only as an affirmation of the parent-child relationship. This is in contrast to the 
position in Canada, which displays considerably greater respect for testamentary autonomy.  
 
The approach adopted by the courts in British Columbia, as laid down in Tataryn v Tataryn,217 
lay down a particularly helpful set of principles that could inform future legislative guidelines 
which ‘confine, structure and check’ trustee intervention:218 that respect for the testator’s 
wishes is important; that intervention should be permitted only to correct the failure to fulfil 
legal and moral obligations; that intervention should be limited to the extent necessary to do 
so; that legal obligations must be fulfilled ahead of moral obligations; and that the existence 
and scope of the deceased’s moral obligations must be informed by contemporary 










CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Testamentary freedom is an indivisible part of the right to property. The essence of that 
freedom is the right to select who will benefit from one’s property after one has died. 
Testamentary freedom exists because individuals have moral agency, and the law 
recognises that those who acquire property, particularly through their own labour, have the 
moral right to apportion their property as they consider equitable. It is part of the inherent 
dignity and equality of all individuals that their moral choices are deserving of recognition 
and respect, unless their choices are indisputably harmful or manifestly unjust. Testamentary 
choices are deeply personal choices, which speak to the relationship between the testator 
and beneficiary and the testator’s perception of the moral obligations that attach to that 
relationship. To deny individuals of the right to dispose of their property to the beneficiaries of 
their choice is to deprive them of a fundamental aspect of their right to property. To transmit 
their right to third parties strips them of their dignity, for it suggest that they are incapable of 
making moral choices. To permit third parties to override testamentary choices that are not 
manifestly unjust is an unreasonable and unjustifiable limitation of their right to property and 
their right to dignity.  
This is s37C’s effect. It deprives members of the right to select the beneficiaries of their death 
benefits, while transmitting that right to the (lay) trustees of retirement funds. The limitation is 
all the more severe when the death benefit is the member’s only or main asset — which is the 
case for most members in South Africa. The member’s death simultaneously deprives spouses 
and children of their respective proprietary and maintenance rights. The justification that is 
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offered is that the deprivation is necessary to protect the member’s dependants from the 
hardship that would result were the member permitted to select her own beneficiaries. It 
presupposes that trustees are readily able to identify members’ dependants, and that 
trustees are better able to allocate the benefit equitably than are members.  
This thesis sought to interrogate s37C’s constitutionality and equitability. My original objective 
was threefold: to analyse s37C’s inherent challenges, its applied challenges, and its impact 
on fundamental constitutional rights. All three are relevant to the question of whether s37C is 
a reasonable and justifiable limitation of those rights. The inherent challenges arise from the 
definition of dependant, which requires that trustees perform both an investigatory and an 
adjudicative function. The two are overlapping: trustees must ‘identify’ who amongst the 
circle of eligible relatives qualifies as a legal and future dependant, but to do so they need 
to decide questions of fact and law when the facts are disputed, and the law is uncertain. 
Even the apparently straightforward category of dependant, spouse, requires trustees to 
determine the existence and validity of contested customary marriages, or whether the 
requisites of a life partnership have been satisfied. These are questions that tax the courts, yet 
trustees are expected to decide these difficult questions as though they are simply part of 
the routine business of administering a retirement fund.  
The applied challenges arise because of the wide discretion that trustees have been given 
to select who, amongst the member’s dependants and nominees, will share in the benefit 
and in what proportion. Trustees are expected to apportion the benefit equitably, but they 
have been given no guidance by the legislature as to what ‘equitability’ means. The socio-
economic context within which trustees need to distribute the benefit requires them to make 
hard choices. Rather than protecting the member’s dependants, which is s37C’s ostensible 
purpose, they are instead required to choose which dependants to protect, and which to 
leave exposed to the vagaries of fate and, in South Africa, probability of misfortune, given 
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the high poverty rate and levels of unemployment.1 Section 37C often provides only some 
protection for some dependants, at best – and it is the trustees who must decide who they 
will be.  
 
Regarding s37C’s impact on constitutional rights, there are serious concerns about the extent 
to which it limits rights to property, equality and dignity. At the very least, given the extent to 
which it limits fundamental rights, the legislature’s failure to provide proper guidance to 
trustees is itself unconstitutional.  
 
Adjudicators have been critical of trustee decision-making, despite the absence of 
legislative guidelines. Adjudicators have, however, been unable to provide the necessary 
guidance. To the extent that they have tried to do so, their determinations have been 
inconsistent and demonstrate that there is no common conception of equitability. The 
Adjudicators’ understanding of s37C’s purpose, which is that it exists to ensure that a 
member’s financial dependants are prioritised over non-financial dependants, has promoted 
expediency over equitability. Adjudicators most consistent message to trustees has been 
that s37C’s purpose is ‘to restrict freedom of testation’,2 and cautioned them against 
‘following’ the members’ wishes.3 In consequence, trustees routinely override members’ 
wishes, with little regard for testamentary freedom, matrimonial property law, or the special 
legal protections afforded minor children. Trustees do not seek to limit their intervention to 
only when the member’s choices were indisputably harmful. Instead it is their intervention 
that is sometimes the more harmful, given their disregard for the member’s wishes even when 




1 See §1.7.1 above. 
2 See eg Phashe v Metro Group [2003] 9 BPLR 5123 (PFA) [11]. 
3 See §5.5.1 above. 
4 See eg Tsele v Bidvest [2016] 1 BPLR 146 (PFA). 
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The question, then, is what should be done with s37C? National Treasury posed this question 
in 2004, as part of its investigation into general retirement reform. It proposed that 
nominations be binding on trustees, unless compelling reasons exist to override a 
nomination.5 Treasury received numerous submissions from the retirement fund industry in 
response to its proposal. A common observation was that s37C was ‘difficult’ to implement,6 
but there was no single view within the industry regarding whether s37C be retained, 
discarded, or reformed.  
 
One submission, by the Association of Financial Planners (LUASA),7 was that s37C be retained 
in its present form, which is exactly what happened. LUASA was of the view that determining 
what constitutes ‘compelling reasons’ would cause much ‘debate and legal argument’, and 
that the proposal did not necessarily provide proper protection for ‘the most vulnerable’ in 
society, since the nomination might not include the member’s ‘actual dependants’.8 One 
insurer was of the view that determining whether compelling reasons exist would be so 
onerous that trustees would simply follow nominations, which it thought particularly 
problematic because members often nominate their parents even though they are survived 
by minor children.9 Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) similarly felt that allowing a departure 
for ‘compelling reasons’ would require trustees to thoroughly examine the member’s 
‘personal circumstances in every case’, which would simply ‘reintroduce’ and possibly 
exacerbate s37C’s existing difficulties.10 It thus felt that the legislature had to make a firm 
decision as to whether to follow a non-paternalistic or paternalistic model. If the former, then 
nominations should be binding. If the latter, then s37C should be retained, albeit possibly in a 
‘modified’ form.  
 
5 National Treasury Retirement Fund Reform: a discussion paper (December 2004), para 3.4.1.4. 
6 See eg Submissions by Association of Financial Planners (LUASA) (28 November 2005), para 4.3; 
Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) (07 March 2005), para 2.22; Old Mutual (29 March 2005) para 11.57, 
which described s37C as a ‘source of great difficulty for trustees. 
7 The Association continues to use its former acronym, LUASA (Life Underwriters Association of South 
Africa). 
8 LUASA (n7), para 4.3.  
9 Submissions by Glenrand MIB Benefit Services (undated), para 7. This may, of course, be because they 
expect that their parents will look after their children and nominate them to provide them with the 
means to do so. Members cannot be expected to know of the existence of Beneficiary Funds as a 
vehicle through which their minor’s benefits can be administered. 




While LUASA and BUSA’s concern, that what constitutes ‘compelling reasons’ is itself open to 
contestation, is valid, this is not a sufficient argument that s37C be retained in its present form. 
Trustees are already expected to thoroughly investigate a member’s personal circumstances 
in every case. Who qualifies as an eligible dependant is itself open to ‘debate and legal 
argument’, and in most cases the successful and unsuccessful beneficiaries are both 
amongst the member’s ‘actual dependants’, if LUASA is referring to dependants as defined 
in the Act. If LUASA is referring only to the member’s financial dependants, it is in part the 
prioritisation of financial dependants to the detriment of the member’s legal and statutory 
dependants, who are usually the member’s spouse and children, that is the reason s37C, as 
applied, yields outcomes that are not consistently equitable. I have argued that s37C is 
unconstitutitional precisely because it permits trustees to override a member’s wishes even 
when the member’s own wishes are both reasonable and in keeping with society’s prevailing 
legal and moral convictions.11 The proposal that s37C be retained in its present form is not a 
viable recommendation for the future, given the concerns raised in this dissertation.  
 
An alternative proposal was that nominations be completely binding in all cases, and that 
absent a nomination, the benefit fall into the member’s deceased estate. The reasons given 
were simply that s37C ‘creates uncertainty’ and imposes considerable administrative costs 
on retirements funds.12 A slightly different proposal was that a nomination be binding, in the 
same way a will is binding, but that the death benefit be treated as an asset in the 
deceased’s estate for the purpose of maintenance claims, and that all those eligible as 
dependants under the Pension Funds Act be permitted to claim maintenance from the 
deceased estate.13 The rationale was that this would preserve the socially-desirable 
 
11 See eg Tsele v Bidvest (n4), in which the trustees included the member’s non-nominated major 
brothers, who had claimed that they were financial dependants, even though the member’s former 
partner advised that they were respectively an admitted attorney and television game show host. The 
nominated beneficiaries were the member’s minor daughter and his mother, who was deceased. 
12 Submissions by Sanlam Personal Portfolios Ltd (28 November 2005), 4.  
13 Submissions by Jonathan Mort, Edward Nathan Corporate Law Advisers (28 November 2005), para 27. 
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objective of protecting the member’s dependants, while simultaneously reducing the costs 
that funds incur administering s37C.14  
Others agreed with Treasury’s view, which was that a nomination be treated as binding 
unless compelling reasons exist to override it, but felt that clear guidelines should be provided 
as to what constitutes ‘compelling reasons’.15 Unfortunately, their submissions did not contain 
any suggestions as to the types of reasons they considered to be sufficiently compelling. 
In what follows, I will consider the merits of the three alternative proposals, before 
recommending the approach that I think best balances respect for members’ wishes with 
the need to protect dependants.  
8.2 POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM 
8.2.1 The first alternative: completely binding nominations 
Although trustees and the Adjudicator too readily override members' wishes, there is no 
doubt that s37C does protect vulnerable dependants. There are undoubtedly cases in which 
giving effect to the member’s wishes would cause hardship to the member’s closest family, 
particularly dependent children and spouses.16 Although such exclusions are probably more 
often inadvertent rather than deliberate, the result of nominations completed when a 
member first joined a fund and forgotten about in the intervening years as the member’s life 
circumstances changed, it would be indefensible to give effect to member nominations that 
exclude vulnerable spouses and children, the very dependants the law most seeks to 
protect.  
14 Ibid. These costs are highest for members whose ‘affairs are in a muddle’, but they are borne by other 
members of the fund, since they are part and parcel of the general administrative costs that are 
shared by all members 
15 Submissions by Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA) (undated), 5 and Old Mutual (n6) para 
11.15; 11.60.  
16 See eg Phashe (n2), in which the member’s nominated beneficiaries were his parents and siblings, to 




8.2.2 The second alternative: death benefits as an asset in the member’s 
estate  
 
If s37C was repealed the benefit would devolve according to the law of intestate or testate 
succession. Alternatively, a nomination could be treated as binding (a ‘will substitute’), but 
the benefit could form part of the deceased’s estate when needed to satisfy maintenance 
claims. A member’s testamentary wishes are binding, and the only persons who could 
potentially upset the member’s wishes are spouses and children, since only they are entitled 
to claim maintenance from a deceased estate.17 Absent a will, the benefit would devolve 
on the member’s intestate heirs – who would again be her spouse and children.18 Therefore, 
if the member bequeathed her estate to her spouses and children, or failed to make a will, 
the only potential complainants would be spouses and children as against each other. No 
other eligible dependant could intervene to upset the member’s wishes. On the other hand, 
if the member had included her parents, siblings or partner amongst her testamentary or 
nominated beneficiaries, only a claim from a spouse or child could override the member’s 
bequest.  
 
Since spouses and children are eligible beneficiaries under the Pensions Fund Act and 
entitled to claim maintenance from the estate, doing away with s37C should not be to their 
detriment. It would, in fact, be to their benefit – if the law remained unchanged and only 
they could seek maintenance from a deceased estate. How would this change affect other 
eligible beneficiaries? Would it work hardship on those not entitled to claim maintenance 
from deceased estates: unmarried partners; parents and siblings.19  
 
 
17 See §1.5 above.  
18 Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987, s1. 
19 Although eligible beneficiaries also include non-familial financial dependants and nominees, they do 
not loom large in s37C disputes. Most financial dependants are parents and siblings. Most members 
nominate relatives before they nominate an unrelated third party.  
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Given the way s37C is currently applied, I do not think it would work undue hardship on 
parents and siblings. My analysis of trustee decision-making shows that spouses and children 
are usually prioritised over parents and siblings. Trustees frequently override nominations that 
include parents and siblings, and they usually do so to make (better) provision for spouses 
and children. It is less common that a nomination in favour of a spouse or child is overridden 
for the benefit of a parent or sibling. The outcomes under s37C and under the law of 
succession are thus prima facie not likely to be very different for spouses, children, parents or 
siblings.  
 
The persons who would be most adversely affected by discarding s37C are unmarried, 
opposite-sex, partners, who have not been recognised as spouses in terms of the 
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act.20 Trustees routinely include them in death benefit 
distributions, even when they have not been nominated by the deceased. They are included 
even when the member is survived by a nominated spouse, children, parents and siblings. 
They would have no claim to maintenance if the death benefit formed part of the member’s 
estate, while nominations in their favour could be overridden to provide maintenance for 
spouses and children. Unmarried opposite-sex partners are thus the beneficiaries who derive 
the greatest protection from s37C. There are clearly cases in which a partner’s exclusion 
would be inequitable.21  
 
The existing maintenance laws could be reformed to allow maintenance claims by partners 
and other dependants.22 I don’t believe this to be the best solution, for two reasons. First, as 
the law stands at present, maintenance claims are decided by the executor of the estate 
rather than the court,23 who is no better equipped to make difficult adjudicative decisions 
 
20 Same-sex partners will most probably be recognised as such, for the same reasons that apply to their 
recognition as spouses under the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987. See Laubscher v Duplan 2017 (4) 
BCLR 415 (CC). 
21 This is particularly important in South Africa, given the low marriage and high cohabitation rate, and 
the incidence of polygynous marriages and relationships.  
22 Jonathan Mort’s submission (n13). 
23 See Du Toit v Thomas 2016 (4) SA 571 (WCC); Friedrich v Smit 2017 (4) SA 144 (SCA). In Friedrich, the 
executor, Master, HC of first instance and HC on appeal all agreed that the surviving spouse was 
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than are the trustees (or Master).24 Most executors are family members rather than 
professionals, and they often have an inherent conflict of interest, since they are amongst 
the estate heirs who would be adversely affected by admitting the claim.25 They are 
therefore likely to lack both the necessary skill and the necessary impartiality.  
 
The second possibility is to amend the law so that all maintenance claims against deceased 
estates are decided by the courts. While judicial oversight is preferable for deciding 
contested cases and evaluating evidence than the mixed investigative-adjudicative 
function expected of trustees, there is one compelling reason it should not be adopted. 
Litigation is expensive, and it is the intended beneficiaries, the member’s nominated 
beneficiaries or intestate heirs, who will pay the price. Even if they successfully defend a 
maintenance claim, it is very unlikely that they will be able to recover their legal costs from 
the applicant. The experiences of other jurisdictions are a cautionary tale that we would be 
well-advised to heed. 
 
8.2.3 The third alternative: reforming s37C 
 
At present, trustees override member nominations as a matter of course, sometimes causing 
inequity when none existed to begin with. The challenge is to develop rules and guidelines 
that promote equitable outcomes, while keeping trustee intervention within reasonable 
bounds. Two aspects need reform: first, the definition of dependant should be simplified. I 
believe this to be relatively straightforward; secondly, legislative guidelines should be 
formulated. Separate guidelines should be drafted for when a member has nominated 
beneficiaries, and when the member dies without doing so. In the first case, trustees should 
only intervene when there is good reason to do so. In the second, a set of fixed (or semi-
fixed) guidelines should be adopted to clarify, and simplify, the allocative process.  
 
entitled to maintenance but disagreed as to whose responsibility it was to decide the quantum. The 
SCA held that the widow had not proven she needed support, so dismissed her claim. 
24 See eg Friedrich v Smit (n23).  




To survive constitutional scrutiny, guidelines should ensure that trustees override the member’s 
nomination only when there is a sufficiently compelling reason to do so. The starting premise 
should be that trustees be expected to respect the member’s wishes, except to the extent 
that the member has failed in her legal or clear moral obligation to provide (better) support 
for a dependant towards whom she owed a legal or clear moral obligation to provide 
support. It is the guidelines that should clearly articulate the circumstances under which, and 
the extent to which, overriding the member’s testamentary wishes will be reasonable and 
justifiable.  
 
8.2.3.1 Simplifying the definition of dependant 
 
The only persons who are eligible to claim under the existing definition are members of the 
deceased’s family and financial dependants. The Adjudicator has already stretched the 
concept of financial dependant to include virtually all cohabiting partners. The definition 
could, therefore, simply identify precisely who would be eligible: spouses, cohabiting life 
partners, children, parents, siblings, grandparents and grandchildren (and further relatives in 
the vertical line), financial dependants and any other nominated beneficiary.26 ‘Children’ 
already include children adopted under the Children’s Act and customary law. 
Consideration will need to be given to whether there are other relatives to whom a duty of 
support may be owed under customary law, such as nephews and nieces. Failing any of the 
above, the benefit should fall into the member’s estate.  
 
More thought should, however, be given to the requirements to be met before a person 
becomes eligible as a cohabiting life partner or financial dependant. Under the current 
 
26 See the definition in the proposed Family Maintenance Bill of 1969, which was squashed by a 
parliamentary committee before being put to parliament. The categories were spouses/former spouses 
entitled to maintenance/minor children and siblings/parents and major children and siblings to the 
extent they were unable to provide for themselves because of age or disability. The definition would 
not be equitable today, given that many able majors are dependent due only to the limited 
employment opportunities. The Bill and its demise are discussed by Hahlo ‘The sad demise of the Family 
Maintenance Bill 1969’ (1971) 88(2) SALJ 201. 
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approach, a cohabiting partner of short duration or a partial financial dependant would 
automatically receive the entire death benefit if the member is survived by no other 
dependant or nominee. This is potentially inequitable to the member’s testate and intestate 
heirs. Simplifying the definition in the manner proposed would at least permit trustees to 
consider parents and siblings amongst the potential beneficiaries, even if they were not 
financially dependent on the deceased or at risk of becoming dependant, rather than 
being obliged to pay the entire benefit to a ‘dependant’ whose relationship with the 
deceased was tenuous and whose financial dependence was limited.27  
 
The definition of financial dependant should be restricted to persons who were dependent in 
the ‘literal sense’.28 Only persons unable to afford their reasonable maintenance needs from 
their own resources and who were receiving a substantial contribution towards those needs 
should be eligible.  
 
With respect to cohabiting partners who are not financially dependent in the literal sense, 
the legislature could adopt one of the following approaches. It could either require that 
couples have cohabited for a minimum period or it could require that a surviving partner 
provide sufficient evidence that they had entered into a life partnership in which they had 
undertaken reciprocal duties of support towards one another.29 If the former approach is 
adopted, it means that cohabiting partners will be eligible provided only that they 
cohabited for a minimum period of time, and irrespective of whether they had undertaken 
reciprocal duties of support. The period should be sufficiently long to establish that the 
relationship is a stable one. Most marriages that end in divorce do so in the first five to ten 
 
27 In Gerber v Aberdare [2010] 3 BPLR 275 (PFA), the trustees identified the member’s nominated 
beneficiary, his surviving spouse, and non-nominated foster child as his dependants. This means that 
had the spouse predeceased him, the foster child would have been entitled to the full benefit, which 
would clearly have been inequitable on the deceased’s testate or intestate heirs. See also Coetzee v 
Toyota (1) [2001] 5 BPLR 2007 (PFA) (divorced spouse whom member expected to retain on own 
medical aid). 
28 See §4.5.1, 4.8 &5.5.3 above. 
29 See §4.5.3 & 4.8 above. 
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years of the marriage. 30 Although there are no comparable statistics on the duration of 
cohabitation relationships, studies elsewhere suggest that they last for a considerably shorter 
period than marriage.31 I am of the view that a period of three years, which has been 
adopted in a number of common law jurisdictions, should be the minimum period required 
before a cohabitant is eligible as a ‘life partner’.32  
 
If the alternate approach is adopted, it will require that trustees obtain sufficient proof that 
the member and partner had intertwined their lives and financial affairs to such an extent 
that they could be said to have assumed a reciprocal duty of support towards one another. 
The factors that courts consider are the duration of the relationship, the extent to which the 
partners have conjoined their financial affairs, whether one or both partners have shown or 
expressed themselves willing to support a less affluent partner for an extended or indefinite 
period of time, whether the partners have identified each other as their dependant or 
primary beneficiary in their medical aid, investment or insurance policies, whether they have 
nominated each other as the beneficiaries of their respective estates.33 
 
From a practical perspective, the first approach is preferable. It will be difficult for the most 
vulnerable, those who do not own property, hold investments, have bank accounts or wills, 
to provide the type of evidence that speaks to their having assumed reciprocal duties of 
support. On the other hand, the more affluent are likely to have such evidence. One cannot, 
however, apply different eligibility criteria to cohabiting partners based on their relative 
affluence. The best approach would, I suggest, be a hybrid one. That cohabiting partners 
are eligible after a minimum period of cohabitation of three years, unless the member and 
cohabiting partner have entered into a cohabitation agreement in which they expressly 
 
30 StatsSA Marriages and Divorces 2018 (P0307), 8. 
31 Cohen, Daniels, Mosher ‘First premarital cohabitation in the United States 2006-2010 Survey of Family 
Growth’ (2013) 64 National Health Statistics Report 1. See also §6.6 fn324 above.  
32 See §2.3 fn132 above.  
33 See §4.5.3 above. 
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state that they are not undertaking reciprocal duties of support towards one another.34 If, 
notwithstanding their cohabitation agreement, the surviving partner can provide evidence 
showing that, after the agreement was concluded, circumstances had changed and they 
had undertaken reciprocal duties of support, they should also be included within the ambit 
of cohabiting life partner. 
 
8.2.3.2 Formulating equitable guidelines 
 
Ensuring that equitable guidelines are available to trustees is the crux of any future reform. 
Finding the balance between certainty, flexibility and equitability will be extremely difficult. 
However, the starting point should be the wishes of the deceased as reflected in her 
nomination of beneficiaries, provided it represents her intentions when she died. Trustees 
should, therefore, first determine whether the nomination form is one that reflects the current 
wishes of the deceased. A nomination that is more recent than three years should be 
presumed to be an accurate reflection of the contemporary wishes of the deceased, even if 
she married or entered into a partnership in the intervening period.35 Some members 
consciously choose to retain their existing nominated beneficiaries, notwithstanding their 




34 See Marais v Sasol [2017] 3 BPLR 615 (PFA), in which the fund rules made provision for a spousal 
pension to life partners who had undertaken reciprocal duties of support. A lump sum was also payable 
in terms of s37C. The fund identified the partner as a life partner and a financial dependent. The 
Adjudicator had no jurisdiction over the fund’s characterisation of the partner as a life partner for the 
purpose of the spousal pension, but doubted that she was a financial dependent because they had 
entered into a cohabitation agreement in which they agreed to retain separate ownership of their 
assets, to remain separately liable for their respective debts, and in which they renounced any intention 
to enter into a universal partnership. These indiciae do not speak to financial dependence, however, 
although they are relevant to whether they had entered into a life partnership as defined by the CC. 
The agreement is instead akin to an ante-nuptial contract entered into by spouses who choose to 
marry out of community of property. 
35 Cf Malawi’s Pension Act 6 of 2011, s70(5), which provides that nominations are automatically revoked 
on the member’s subsequent marriage or divorce. Its Deceased Estates (Wills, Inheritance and 
Protection) Act 14 of 2011, s10, contains a similar provision regarding wills. See also Wills Act 1837 (UK), 
ss18 & 19. Cf South Africa’s Wills Act 7 of 1953, s2B, which precludes a former spouse from inheriting 
should the testator die within three months of the divorce. This is to afford testators an opportunity to 
revise their wills. Should they not do so, any bequest to a former spouse remains valid. Marriage does 
not affect the validity of a testator’s prior will. 
36 See Ellis v MEPF [2014] 1 BPLR 36 (PFA); Van Schalkwyk v MEPF [2003] 8 BPLR 5087 (PFA). 
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National Treasury had proposed that members be required to update their nominations 
every five years.37 I suggest that this is too long a period. The purpose behind regular updates 
is to ensure that the nomination, as far as possible, reflects members’ wishes and personal 
circumstances when they died. The more recent the nomination, the less likely it is that 
members simply forgot to update the nomination, and more likely that they did not yet feel it 
appropriate to do so.38 The suggestion that members be required to update their 
nominations regularly does not mean that a failure to do so will render the nomination 
invalid. There is no penalty for non-compliance. The concern is simply that the older the 
nomination, the less reliance trustees can place on it as reflecting the member’s actual 
wishes when she died, and the greater the possibility that they will find that there has been a 
change in the member’s personal circumstances, justifying their allocating the benefit 
contrary to the member’s wishes. 
 
 Formalities for validity could, however, be introduced, as is the case in Australia, so that 
members realise the importance of updating their nominations regularly.39 The disadvantage 
is that a non-compliant nomination will be deemed invalid, even though the nomination 
reflects the true wishes of the member. This has been a longstanding concern in relation to 
wills. To address this problem the legislature amended the Wills Act in 1992 by obliging courts 
to declare non-compliant wills valid provided the court is satisfied that the deceased 
intended the document to be her will.40 The deceased’s intention must be clear and 
unequivocal.41 When the deceased has used language that suggests that the document is a 
 
37 See (n5) para 3.18.3.1. BUSA (n6) para 22.1.1, supported this proposal. 
38 Glenrand (n9) was of the same view, based on their experience that ‘members’ family 
circumstances on average change about every two years’.  
39 A binding nomination in Australia must be in writing addressed to the fund, signed in front of two 
independent witnesses, and executed not more than three years prior to the death of the member, see 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994, r6.17A(6)&(7). Old Mutual (n6) para 11.63 
similarly recommended that members be required to sign their nomination in the presence of two 
witnesses. 
40 Wills Act 7 of 1953, s2(3), which was inserted into the Act in 1992.  
41 Smith v Parsons 2010 (4) SA 378 (SCA) [suicide note accepted as valid will]. See also Van der Merwe v 
The Master 2010 (6) SA 544 (SCA) [email to friend]. 
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draft, or a non-binding expression of wishes, courts have not been satisfied that the 
deceased displayed the requisite intent.42   
 
Beneficiary nominations are less complex than wills. The practice within the retirement funds 
industry is that members complete the particular fund’s nomination form.43 They are akin to 
life insurance nominations. Funds typically require the member’s signature, but it is not a 
precondition for validity. The main difference is thus that wills must be executed in the 
presence of independent witnesses, which funds typically do not require. Unlike wills, 
nominations are quasi-public documents, in the sense that they are almost invariably 
completed and submitted to funds prior to the member’s death.44 Statutory formalities would 
thus not serve the same varied purposes that they do for wills.45 The purpose most relevant to 
nominations is that they perform a ‘cautionary function’, in that they help create awareness 
of the importance of the decision and the need for careful reflection.46  
 
The issue of formalities is becoming moot for members whose funds permit them to complete 
their nominations online.47 On balance, I would recommend that formalities not become 
statutory preconditions for the validity of nominations.  
 




42 See eg De Reszke v Maras 2006 (2) SA 277 (SCA); Taylor v Taylor 2012 (3) SA 219 (ECP); Marshall v 
Baker 2020 (3) SA 463 (WCC). 
43 PFA, s37C(1)(b) requires that the nomination be in writing addressed to the fund. See also Van 
Heerden v Fundsatwork [2017] 3 BPLR 706 (PFA) [4.5].  
44 I have personal experience of ‘nominated beneficiaries’ submitting unsigned nomination forms after 
the member’s death, and a signed nomination in which the signature was of doubtful authenticity. 
45 Courts and commentators in some jurisdictions are nevertheless of the view that nominations should 
comply with the same formalities as wills, since they are ‘will-substitutes’. See eg Carr ‘Will substitutes in 
Scotland’ in Braun & Röthel Passing Wealth on Death (2016), 96. 
46 Fuller ‘Consideration and form’ (1941) 41 Columbia LR 799 identified three purposes to contractual 
formalities: evidential, cautionary and channelling. Langbein ‘Substantial compliance with the Wills Act’ 
(1975) 88 Harvard LR 489 identified the same purposes as relevant to wills, but included a fourth, viz 
‘protective’. Of these purposes, the one I consider most relevant to beneficiary nominations is the 
‘cautionary’. As explained by Fuller (800), formalities help induce a ‘circumspective frame of mind’ and 
act as a check on ‘inconsiderate action’. 
47 For eg the University of Cape Town Retirement Fund, of which I am a trustee and member. 
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The member’s right to select the beneficiaries of her choice is the essence of testamentary 
freedom, which is protected by her constitutional rights to property and dignity. Her wishes 
should be overridden only when there are ‘compelling reasons’ to do so — in other words, 
when they are so unreasonable that enforcing them would be ‘unconscionable’ or 
‘manifestly unjust’. Trustees should, in other words, intervene only when necessary to correct 
the member’s choices rather than to make those choices in the member’s stead, as is 
currently the case.  
 
When, however, will the member’s choices be so unreasonable as to warrant intervention? It 
should not be left only to the moral judgment of trustees to answer this question. Although 
changing the nature of trustees’ powers, from distribution to correction, would go some way 
to limiting their discretion, their decision is likely to be influenced by their subjective 
preferences and perceptions of right and wrong. The answers must instead reflect the 
prevailing legal and moral convictions of the community. How are trustees to fathom what 
those are? Communities are not homogenous, and different members will have very different 
views on what conduct they consider just and unjust. The divergent attitude of the courts 
and law commissions in Australia and New Zealand to claims by adult children is one 
example.48 Simply reframing trustees’ powers will not provide them with the guidance 
required to remedy s37C’s unconstitutionality. It is the legislature that must provide trustees 
with guidelines, which balance members’ right to select beneficiaries with their legal and 
moral obligations. 
 
I propose the following guidelines as a point of departure. They are informed by the 
principles that courts in common law jurisdictions, particularly Canada and New Zealand, 
have adopted when deciding family provision claims,49 as well as the principles that 
underpin Canada’s spousal support guidelines. The main principles are that members’ wishes 
are deserving of respect; that legal obligations take precedence over moral obligations; that 
 
48 See §7.3.4 & 7.3.6 above.  




the scope of a member’s moral obligation may be greater or smaller than the extent of the 
beneficiary’s financial need; that the duration of a relationship informs the existence and 
scope of a member’s legal and moral obligation towards a spouse or cohabiting partner; 
that the focus of enquiry should not only be on the obligation the member owed the 




Any nomination of a spouse, partner, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, sibling, close 
personal friend or financial dependant is prima facie reasonable. Any intervention by trustees 
to exclude a nominated beneficiary or reduce their share is prima facie unreasonable.  
 
Conversely, an intervention by trustees to include a non-nominated spouse, cohabiting life 
partner or child, who is in financial need, is prima facie reasonable.  
 
It is not merely the fact of trustee intervention that must be reasonable, however, but also the 
scope of their intervention. Intervention must be justified having regard to: (i) the extent of 
the non-nominated beneficiary’s financial need and (ii) the extent of the legal and moral 
obligation the deceased owed the non-nominated beneficiary. The scope of trustee 
intervention must be determined having regard to both factors, and not merely the former.  
 
The appropriate scope is, at most, the product of (financial) need and (legal and moral) 
obligation. The non-nominated beneficiary must provide evidence of their financial need.50 
A scale to determine the degree of legal and moral obligation could be devised. The scope 
of trustee intervention should not exceed the scale but may be less having regard to the 
competing claims of the nominated and other non-nominated beneficiaries. The need to 
reduce a non-nominated beneficiary’s entitlement will be inevitable when there are 
 
50 In keeping with the requirements for a successful maintenance claim against the deceased’s estate. 
See Mgumane v Setemane [1998] JOL 1757 (Tk); Friedrich v Smit (n23). 
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numerous beneficiaries in financial need, towards whom the deceased owed an equal legal 
and moral obligation, and the size of the benefit is insufficient to meet all their legitimate 
claims.51  
 
So, for example, a possible scale could be as follows:  
 
- Minor children and those still studying: 100% up to majority/completion studies and up 
to 100% of the benefit; 
 
- Major children unable to provide for themselves by reason of disability: 100% of their 
needs that exceed the state disability grant, up to a maximum of 50% of the benefit; 
 
- Major children post-schooling/studying: 20% of their needs up to a maximum of 10% 
of the benefit; 
 
- Other relatives: 20% of their needs up to a maximum of 10% of the benefit; 
 
- Spouses and partners (without adult children of their own): 5% per year for the period 
they were either cohabiting or, in the case of spouses living apart, for each year that 
the deceased was married to and supporting the spouse up to a maximum of 100% 
of the benefit; 
 
- Spouses and partners (with adult children of their own): 2.5% per year on the same 
basis as above up to a maximum of 50% of the benefit. Therefore, in 
marriages/relationships of long duration: over 20 years: 100% or 50%; 15 years: 75% or 
37.5%; 10 years: 50% or 25%; 5 years: 25% or 12.5%; 0-1 year: 5% or 2.5%. 
 
I propose a scale along these lines because guidelines need to be clear and implementable, 
and they must seek to balance competing considerations: the fact that dependency and 
 
51 See eg Sangweni v Private Security [2013] 2 BPLR 252 (PFA), in which the deceased was survived by 
his spouse and six children from six mothers, two of whom were still minors. The death benefit was 




moral obligation both increase with the passage of time; that the deceased’s wishes are 
deserving of respect; and that the nominated beneficiaries are also usually owed an actual 
or contingent duty of support. The current approach, in which the spouse/partner’s financial 
needs are prioritised and calculated over the remainder of her lifetime, is indefensible, other 
than in relationships of long duration. Even then, should the spouse have adult children of her 
own, it is not fair that the burden of support be effectively wholly transferred to the 
nominated children or relatives of the deceased member.52 Therefore, I suggest that where a 
spouse has adult children, their entitlement should not exceed 50% of the benefit.  
 
Allocating a sum that exceeds the scale would be appropriate only if the deceased’s 
choices were perverse. In the South African context this means exposing a non-nominated 
beneficiary, who falls within the definition of dependant, to considerable financial hardship 
when the nominated beneficiary is neither in any financial need nor a dependant, under 
both the existing and proposed definitions. Therefore, a nomination that favours a nominee, 
such as a cousin, uncle, or friend who has no existing financial need to the detriment of a 
dependant facing genuine financial hardship is perverse.53 In these circumstances, 
departing from the scales above, to meet the full financial needs of the dependant, would 
be justifiable. 
 
 On the other hand, a nomination in favour of a spouse or child is not perverse. A nomination 
in favour of a parent or sibling similarly so – they are, after all, persons who are owed a 
contingent duty of support under both common law and customary law; and the frequency 
with which they are nominated beneficiaries indicates that contemporary community 
standards, or the moral convictions of the community, confirms the continued existence of a 
moral duty of support towards them. Even a nomination in favour of a former spouse or 
 
52 See eg Oshry v Feldman (n25). 
53 See eg Gwebu v Assupol PFA/WE/1679/02/CN [cousin only nominated beneficiary, despite an aged 
and needy mother, who claimed to have been financially dependency].  
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partner can hardly be considered perverse, for it cannot be perverse to nominate a person 
with whom one was once in a relationship of ‘profound significance’.54  
 
What, however, of the hard cases that regularly come before the Adjudicator and the courts 
in other jurisdictions: those involving competing claims between spouses/partners and adult 
children, when the size of the benefit is a small one? These cases are hard when the 
nominated beneficiaries are self-sufficient adult children and the other beneficiary, whether 
also nominated or non-nominated, is a financially-dependent or inter-dependent spouse or 
partner. In such instances, the spouse/partner should be entitled to the minimum statutory 
sum to which spouses are entitled on intestacy: R250 000, with the balance allocated to the 
nominated children. If, on an application of the scales, the sum that will be allocated to a 
partner exceeds this minimum sum, it should not be increased further, for it will mean either 
that the size of the benefit was very small to start with, leaving little by way of surplus for 
distribution to the nominated children, or that the relationship was of short duration. 
Conversely, if the nominated beneficiary is a spouse or partner and the competing claimant 
is a non-nominated financially-needy adult child, parent or sibling, the spouse or partner 
should, at a minimum, receive R250 000 before any provision, up to a maximum as outlined 
on the above scales, is made for any dependant other than minor children.  
  
8.2.3.5 Default guidelines where there are no nominated beneficiaries 
 
There are already sources that provide a useful starting point for default guidelines. One 
example is the principles that govern the distribution of intestate estates in Malawi. Another is 
the rules of retirement funds that governed the distribution of lump sums before the Pension 
Funds Act was adopted in 1956 or s37C enacted in 1976. The key considerations are clarity, 
simplicity, and generally accepted principles of fairness.  
 
 






Courts have the power to distribute an intestate estate if family members cannot agree on 
how the estate should be divided amongst themselves. The court thus becomes the 
‘testator’, performing a role that is much the same as that of s37C trustees. The applicable 
legislation lays down principles of fairness that the court must observe when dividing the 
intestate estate.55 The only persons eligible to share in the intestate estate are the 
deceased’s spouse/s, children, parents and any minor whose education the deceased was 
paying for.56 The principles of fair allocation laid down in the Act are: 
 
- A spouse is entitled to all household goods; the remainder shall be used to protect the 
eligible relatives against hardship; any surplus shall then devolve on the spouse and 
children. The Act specifically defines hardship.57 
 
- The distribution as between spouses and children will be equal, unless special 
circumstances exist warranting a differential distribution. The factors that must be taken 
into consideration are: the deceased’s wishes (as communicated to reliable witnesses); 
any assistance the deceased has already provided to a spouse or child, for example by 
paying for educational costs; any contributions made by the spouse or child that 
increased the value of the deceased’s business or property.  
 
- In so far as the children’s shares are concerned, younger children are ordinarily entitled 
to a larger share than older siblings, but good reason may nevertheless exist to divide the 
benefit equally.  
 
- Additional principles govern polygynous marriages.58 
 
 
55 Deceased Estates (Wills, Inheritance and Protection) Act 14 of 2011, s17. 
56 Section 17(1) read together with the definition of ‘immediate family’ and ‘dependant’ in s 3(1). 
57 Section 3(1): ”hardship” means deprivation of the ordinary necessities of life according to the way of 
living enjoyed by that person during the lifetime of the intestate, and in the case of a minor includes 
deprivation of the opportunities for education which he or she could reasonably have expected had 
the intestate continued to live. 
58 Section 17(2)-(4). 
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The eligible beneficiaries are clearly defined, the principles according to which a fair 
distribution should be decided are clear, and there is scope for flexibility when necessary to 
alleviate hardship or promote equitability. Given the increased circle of eligible beneficiaries 
under s37C the appropriate guidelines may need to be more complex, but the Malawian 
example is a clear indication that appropriate guidelines are possible.59  
 
Looking to the past 
 
One example of pre-s37C rules governing the distribution of lump sums is the 1929 rules of the 
Cape Town Municipal Pension Fund.60 The rules would no longer be entirely suited to 
contemporary families, but they provide both a helpful definition of dependant and an order 
of preference amongst the eligible dependants.  
The eligible dependants were: 
a) spouses, children and step-children; 
(b) a financially-dependent parent or sibling; or 
(c) any other financial dependant. 
 
The order of preference was:  
1) the surviving spouse;  
2) the children and step-children in equal shares  
3) the father and mother in equal shares;  
4) the brothers and sisters in equal shares;  
5) the persons wholly dependent in equal shares. 
 
This was the default order of preference. It could be varied by application to the trustees of 
the fund.61 The need to do so would not arise any longer, since members are permitted to 
nominate beneficiaries.62  
 
59 Chinkwende v Chinkwende (Probate Cause No. 757 of 2016) [2017] MWHC 68 (15 March 2017), 15, 
provides an illustration of how the principles were applied by a court. 
60 Set out in Ex Parte City of Cape Town In Re Municipal Pension Fund1941 CPD 117. See also the 
superannuation fund rules contained in the Railways and Harbours Service Act 28 of 1912, which also 
identifies eligible beneficiaries and lays down an order of preference. 
61 The member had been permitted to vary the order of preference, to the benefit of his two 
‘illegitimate’ sons to the exclusion of his wife (who had deserted him). She nevertheless came forward 
to lay claim to the benefit upon his death. The issue before the court was whether the member’s 
nomination of his eldest son was valid. His eligibility depended on whether he fell within the category of 
a ‘child’ of the deceased. The younger son was in any event eligible because he was totally 




In Ex Parte City of Cape Town In Re Municipal Pension Fund,63 the court pointed out that the 
order of preference prioritised those relatives the deceased ‘is ordinarily and usually liable in 
law to support’ (spouses and minor children), than those relatives the deceased is 
‘sometimes though far less often legally called upon to support’ (parents and siblings) and 
‘lastly those whom he is in fact wholly supporting’.  
 
Every aspect of these rules was preferable to s37C. They were clear, certain and 
implementable. They clearly identified the potential dependants; they laid down an order of 
preference; and they were flexible  
 
With some tweaking, the definition of dependant, and the order of preference, could be 
utilised to simplify the distribution of death benefits. It would have the merit of clarity and 
certainty and would promote consistent and predictable decision-making. The only change 
that I would recommend is that spouses are not automatically preferred ahead of the 
deceased’s children and other relatives. However sensible the order of preference favouring 
spouses in 1929, it is no longer so, if only because marriage is terminable at will and, given the 
high incidence of divorce, there can be no expectation that it will endure. Linking the scope 
of a spousal claim to the duration of the relationship would also make it easier to equalise 
the treatment of married and unmarried partners. It is not equitable that spouses and 
partners be automatically singled-out for special protection, when all dependants are 
equally vulnerable because of the high incidence of poverty and unemployment in South 
African society.  
 
The order of preference should be: 
 
his nomination was valid and binding. In dismissing the application to have him excluded, the court 
said: ‘That an injustice or inequity is if possible to be avoided in construing a quasi – statutory provision 
of this kind is too trite to need the citation of authority.’ 
62 Members were also permitted to vary the order of preference under the Railways and Harbour 






- Minor children, spouses with children born of the relationship, and spouses without 
children born of the marriage in relationships ten years or longer, to share equally; 
- Major children and spouses in relationships of short to medium duration, to share equally; 
- Financially dependent parents and siblings and spouses in relationships of short to 
medium duration, with the parents/siblings receiving no more than a share proportionate 
to the level of support the deceased was providing to them when she died. 
 
These are only guidelines, and as such a departure from those guidelines, to prefer one 
dependant over another, even when they are in the same order of preference, may be 
warranted. The same factors that courts are required to consider in Malawi and in other 
jurisdictions could be incorporated into the guidelines to allow for flexibility: namely, the 
extent of support that one beneficiary may already have received that others have not, and 
the extent to which the beneficiaries have contributed to the deceased’s estate, or physical 




In one of his earliest determinations, the Adjudicator described s37C as a ‘hazarous, 
technical minefield’, which created ‘legal anomalies and uncertainties’, rendering it difficult 
to apply and ‘potentially prejudicial’ to both trustees and beneficiaries. He observed that 
despite its ‘noble and worthy policy intentions’, the problem lay in its ‘execution’, and that 
the call for ‘revision is almost universal’.64  
 
Twenty years later s37C is still unreformed, remains difficult to apply, produces inequitable 
outcomes, and is, I believe, unconstitutional. It is in urgent need of reform, and part of that 
reform must include the formulation of clear, certain and implementable guidelines for 
 




trustees. Formulating those guidelines will be challenging. Whatever their eventual content, 
they must be informed by the legal and moral convictions of the community. In South Africa 
and other jurisdictions, contemporary community convictions include: that trustees should be 
slow to override a deceased’s wishes; that they should intervene only to correct a legal or 
moral wrong; that they should only do so to the extent necessary; that the moral claims of 
spouses and children should generally be paramount; that spouses in relationships of short 
duration do not have the same legal or moral claim as partners of long duration; that 
unmarried partners should be treated in the same way as similarly-situated married partners, 
but only after a minimum period of cohabitation; and, finally, that laws that simply discount 









ANNEXURE 1: Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 (Extracts) 
 
“dependant”, in relation to a member, means— 
(a) a person in respect of whom the member is legally liable for maintenance; 
(b) a person in respect of whom the member is not legally liable for maintenance, if such person— 
(i) was, in the opinion of the board, upon the death of the member in fact dependent on the 
member for maintenance; 
(ii) is the spouse of the member; 
(iii) is a child of the member, including a posthumous child, an adopted child and a child born out of 
wedlock. 
(c) a person in respect of whom the member would have become legally liable for maintenance, had the 
member not died; 
[Definition of “dependant” inserted by s. 21 (a) of Act No. 101 of 1976, substituted by s. 10 of Act No. 80 of 1978, 
amended by s. 38 of Act No. 99 of 1980 and by Act No. 22 of 1996 and substituted by s. 20 of Act No. 54 of 1989 
and by s. 1 (i) of Act No. 11 of 2007.] 
 
“spouse” means a person who is the permanent life partner or spouse or civil union partner of a member in 
accordance with the Marriage Act, 1961 (Act No. 68 of 1961), the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 1998 
(Act No. 68 of 1997), or the Civil Union Act, 2006 (Act No. 17 of 2006), or the tenets of a religion; 
[Definition of “spouse” inserted by s. 1 (u) of Act No. 11 of 2007.] 
 
37C. Disposition of pension benefits upon death of member.—(1) Notwithstanding anything to the 
contrary 
contained in any law or in the rules of a registered fund, any benefit (other than a benefit payable as a pension to 
the spouse or child of the member in terms of the rules of a registered fund, which must be dealt with in terms of 
such rules) payable by such a fund upon the death of a member, shall, subject to a pledge in accordance with 
section 19 (5) (b) (i) and subject to the provisions of sections 37A (3) and 37D, not form part of the assets in the 
estate of such a member, but shall be dealt with in the following manner: 
 
(a) If the fund within twelve months of the death of the member becomes aware of or traces a dependant 
or dependants of the member, the benefit shall be paid to such dependant or, as may be deemed equitable by 
the 
fund, to one of such dependants or in proportions to some of or all such dependants. 
[Para. (a) substituted by s. 5 (a) of Act No. 22 of 1996 and by s. 51 (a) of Act No. 45 of 2013.] 
 
(b) If the fund does not become aware of or cannot trace any dependant of the member within twelve 
months of the death of the member, and the member has designated in writing to the fund a nominee who is not a 
dependant of the member, to receive the benefit or such portion of the benefit as is specified by the member in 
writing to the fund, the benefit or such portion of the benefit shall be paid to such nominee: Provided that where 
the aggregate amount of the debts in the estate of the member exceeds the aggregate amount of the assets in his 
estate, so much of the benefit as is equal to the difference between such aggregate amount of debts and such 
aggregate amount of assets shall be paid into the estate and the balance of such benefit or the balance of such 
portion of the benefit as specified by the member in writing to the fund shall be paid to the nominee. 
[Para. (b) substituted by s. 21 of Act No. 54 of 1989.] 
 
(bA) If a member has a dependant and the member has also designated in writing to the fund a nominee 
to receive the benefit or such portion of the benefit as is specified by the member in writing to the fund, the fund 
shall within twelve months of the death of such member pay the benefit or such portion thereof to such dependant 
or nominee in such proportions as the board may deem equitable: Provided that this paragraph shall only apply to 
the designation of a nominee made on or after 30 June 1989: Provided further that, in respect of a designation 
made on or after the said date, this paragraph shall not prohibit a fund from paying the benefit, either to a 
dependant or nominee contemplated in this paragraph or, if there is more than one such dependant or nominee, in 
proportions to any or all of those dependants and nominees. 
[Para. (bA) inserted by s. 21 of Act No. 54 of 1989 and substituted by s. 5 (b) of Act No. 22 of 1996.] 
 
(c) If the fund does not become aware of or cannot trace any dependant of the member within twelve 
months of the death of the member and if the member has not designated a nominee or if the member has 
designated a nominee to receive a portion of the benefit in writing to the fund, the benefit or the remaining portion 
of the benefit after payment to the designated nominee, shall be paid into the estate of the member or, if no 
inventory in respect of the member has been received by the Master of the Supreme Court in terms of section 9 of 
the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act No. 66 of 1965), into the Guardian’s Fund or unclaimed benefit fund. 
[Subs.(1) amended by s. 28 of Act No. 104 of 1993 and by s. 27 (a) of Act No. 11 of 2007. Para. (c) substituted 








1. Republic of South Africa.—The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the 
following values: 
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. 
(b) Nonracialism and nonsexism. 
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multiparty 
system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness. 
 
2. Supremacy of Constitution.—This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct 




BILL OF RIGHTS 
 
7. Rights.—(1) This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all 
people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom. 
(2) The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. 
(3) The rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the limitations contained or referred to in section 36, or 
elsewhere in the Bill. 
 
9. Equality.—(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the 
law. 
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of 
equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. 
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
(4)* No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in 
terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that 
the discrimination is fair. 
 
10. Human dignity.—Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and 
protected. 
 
25. Property.—(1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no 
law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application— 
(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which have 
either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court. 
 
28. Children.—(1) Every child has the right— 
(a) to a name and a nationality from birth; 
(b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family 
environment; 
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services; 
(d) to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation; 
(e) to be protected from exploitative labour practices; 
( f ) not to be required or permitted to perform work or provide services that— 
(i) are inappropriate for a person of that child’s age; or 
(ii) place at risk the child’s wellbeing, 
education, physical or mental health or spiritual, moral or 
social development; 
… 
(2) A child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child. 





36. Limitation of rights.—(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including— 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any 




ANNEXURE 3: Table demonstrating extent to which members’ wishes 
are overridden 
Case Name  T T A A A 
  F O U R S 
Ackermann v Lifestyle Retirement Annuity Fund [2013] 3 BPLR 295 (PFA)    〤   〤       
Bakumeni v Old Mutual Staff Retirement Fund [2001] 2 BPLR 1573 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Baloyi v Denel Retirement Fund PFA/NP/109/00/CN   〤   〤       
Berge v Alexander Forbes Retirement Fund [2009] JOL 23698 (W)   〤   〤       
Bester v Central Retirement Annuity Fund [2003] 11 BPLR 5253 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Bolsiki v Private Sector Security Fund PFA/EC/10538/2006/LN   〤   〤       
Botha v Cape Gate Negotiated Provident Fund PFA/GA/12495/2007/EMD 〤     〤       
Brabant v Central Retirement Annuity Fund PFA/WE/4801/2005/LS   〤     〤     
Brummelkamp v Babcock Africa (1997) Pension Fund [2001] 4 BPLR 1811 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Chittenden v Estcourt Butchery (Pty) Ltd Provident Fund [2001] 5 BPLR 2001 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Coetzee v CRAF [2007] JOL 20902 (PFA)   〤   〤       
De Beer v Nissan PFA/GA/5557/2005/SM   〤   〤       
De Kock v EMC Provident Fund [2004] 4 BPLR 5618 (PFA) 〤     〤       
Esterhuizen v Central Retirement Annuity Fund [2013] 3 BPLR 355 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Gerber v Aberdare Cables (Pty) Ltd Provident Fund [2010] 3 BPLR 275 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Gorrah v Metal Industries Provident Fund [2014] JOL 31420 (PFA)   〤     〤     
Govender v Santam Insurance Retirement Fund PFA/GA/6041/05/LCM   〤     〤     
Gowing v Lifestyle Retirement Annuity Fund [2007] 2 BPLR 212 (PFA)   〤       〤   
Gwebu v Assupol Retirement Fund PFA/WE/1679/02/CN 〤       〤     
Hattingh v Hattingh [2003] 4 BPLR 4539 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Jacoby v Metal Industries Pension Fund [2017] JOL 38735 (PFA)  〤         C 
Jones v National Technikon Retirement Fund [2002] 1 BPLR 2960 (PFA)    〤   〤       
Jordaan v Protektor Pension Fund [2001] 2 BPLR 1593 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Karam v Amrel Provident Fund [2003] 9 BPLR 5098 (PFA) 〤     〤       
Kgapola v Fidelity CMS Retirement Fund [2007] JOL 20987 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Khulu v Mangxola PFA/GA/8012/2006/SM   〤     〤     
Kipling v Unilever SA Pension Fund (1) [2001] 8 BPLR 2368 (PFA)   〤       〤   
Kitching v Central Retirement Annuity Fund PFA/KZN/33168/2009/RM   〤   〤       
Koekemoer v Macsteel Group Retirement Plan [2004] 2 BPLR 5465 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Koopman v Municipal Gratuity Fund [2010] 1 BPLR 100 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Kruger v Central Retirement Annuity Fund [2002] 7 BPLR 3643 (PFA)    〤   〤       
Mahlambi v Chubb Group Pension Fund [2001] 5 BPLR 2034 (PFA)    〤   〤       
Mahomed v Argus Provident Fund PFA/KN/00013780/2015/UM   〤     〤     
Maime v Municipal Councillors Pension Fund PFA/GA/5379/05/JM   〤   〤       
Maji v Cape Joint Pension Fund [2004] 4 BPLR 5624 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Makola v Eskom Pension and Provident Fund PFA/MP/00012374/2014/TKM   〤   〤       
Makume v Sentinel Mining Industry Retirement Fund [2014] 2 BPLR 244 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Malan v Preservation Provident Fund [2017] 2 BPLR 256 (PFA)   〤     〤     
Malindi v British American Tobacco Retirement Fund PFA/GA/4233/05/VIA   〤   〤       
Maphothoma v Telkom Retirement Fund [2016] 1 BPLR 117 (PFA)   〤       〤   
Marais v Sasol Pension Fund [2017] 3 BPLR 615 (PFA)   〤     〤     
Mashazi v African Products Retirement Benefit Provident Fund 2003 (1) SA 629 (W)   〤   〤       
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Masoabi v Central Retirement Annuity Fund PFA/FS/6859/06/CN   〤   〤       
Masuku v Liberty Provident Fund [2014] 3 BPLR 390 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Minnaar v Central Retirement Annuity Fund [2015] 2 BPLR 236 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Moir v Reef Group Pension Plan [2000] 6 BPLR 629 (PFA) 〤         〤   
Mojapelo v Road Crete Construction Provident Fund PFA/GA/11501/2006   〤   〤       
Monoko v Firestone [2007] JOL 20414 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Mphahlele v AON Umbrella Pension Fund PFA/LP/00002257/2013/MR   〤   〤       
Muller v Central Retirement Annuity Fund [2014] 2 BPLR 265(PFA)   〤   〤       
Musgrave v Unisa Retirement Fund [2000] 4 BPLR 415 (PFA)   〤       〤   
Nduku v VWSA Provident Fund PFA/EC/14187/2007/NVC   〤   〤       
Nyathi v Leonard Dingler Defined Contribution Provident Fund PFA/GA/3328/05/LCM   〤   〤       
Owen v Metal & Engineering Industry Bargaining Council Pension Fund [2016] 1 BPLR 136 (PFA)   〤     〤     
Pandlev v South African Authorities Local Pension Fund PFA/EC/00004962/2013/MD   〤   〤       
Phahlane v Sasol Negotiated Provident Fund PFA/KZN/2182/2006/NVC   〤   〤       
Phashe v Metro Group Retirement Fund [2003] 9 BPLR 5123 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Ramanandh v Alexander Forbes Retirement Fund PFA/KZN/19520/07/CN   〤   TB     
Ruiters v Telkom Retirement Fund [2003] 3 BPLR 4501 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Sakildien v Cape Municipal Pension Fund PFA/WE/6643/05/CN   〤   〤       
Schleicher v South African Retirement Annuity Fund [2002] 7 BPLR 3677 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Schoeman v Rentmeester Pensioenfonds [2003] 9 BPLR 5145 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Segal v Lifestyle Retirement Annuity Fund [2001] 1 BPLR 1519 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Selomo v Personal Provident Fund PFA/GA/4894/2005/RM   〤   〤       
Sesinyi v Amplats PFA/GA/6587/2006/LTN   〤   〤       
Sinclair v Nedcor Defined Contribution Pension Fund PFA/GA/4094/05/VIA   〤   〤       
Sithole v ICS Provident Fund [2000] 4 BPLR 430 (PFA) 〤         〤   
Smith v MM Retirement Annuity Fund PFA/GA/5229/2005/RM   〤   〤       
Taljaard v Corporate Selection Umbrella Retirement Fund [2016] 2 BPLR 271 (PFA)   〤     〤     
Tau v Municipal Gratuity Fund PFA/GA/9044/06/LCM   〤     〤     
Thene v Bidcorp (2008) PFA/GA/6863/05/LCM   〤     〤     
Titi v Fundsatwork Umbrella Provident Fund [2011] JOL 28125 (ECM)   〤   〤       
Tlou v Amplats Mines Retirement Fund [2011] 3 BPLR 439 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Tsele v Bidvest South Africa Retirement Fund [2016] 1 BPLR 146 (PFA)    〤     〤     
TWC v Rentokil Pension Fund [2000] 2 BPLR 216 (PFA) 〤         〤   
Van der Merwe v Corporate Selection Retirement Fund [2005] 5 BPLR 463 (PFA)   〤     〤     
Van der Walt v Fugro PFA/NW/3487/2005/RM   〤   〤       
Van der Westhuizen v Mine Employees Pension Fund [2015] 2 BPLR 295 (PFA) 〤     〤       
Van Jaarsveld v OVK Aftreefonds No 2 [2015] 2 BPLR 303 (PFA)   〤     〤     
Van Schalkwyk v Mine Employees Pension Fund [2003] 8 BPLR 5087 (PFA)    〤   〤       
Van Vuuren v Central Retirement Annuity Fund [2000] 6 BPLR 661 (PFA)   〤       〤   
Van Zelser v Sanlam Marketers Retirement Fund [2003] 2 BPLR 4420 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Varachia v South African Breweries Staff Provident Fund [2015] 2 BPLR 310 (PFA)    〤   〤       
Wellens v Unsgaard Pension Fund [2002] 12 BPLR 4214 (PFA)   〤   〤       
Williams v FFE Minerals South Africa Pension Fund (1) [2001] 2 BPLR 1678 (PFA) 〤         〤   
Winnan v Mine Employees Pension Fund PFA/KZN/12789/07/MQ   〤     〤     
Symbols:  
T = Trustee: F = Followed member’s wishes; O = Overrode member’s wishes. 
A = Adjudicator: U = Upheld (trustee decision); R = Remitted to Trustees; S = Substituted own decision 
TB = Time-barred 





LEGISLATION and LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENTS 
 
South Africa 
Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1971 
Children’s Act 38 of 2005 
Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 
Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
Divorce Act 70 of 1979 
Domestic Partnerships Bill 2008 (GN 30663 of 14 January 2008) 
Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955 
Financial Institutions Amendment Act 101 of 1976  
The Financial Institutions Amendment Act 80 of 1978 
Financial Institutions Amendment Act 99 of 1980 
Financial Institutions Amendment Act 51 of 1988  
Financial Institutions Amendment Bill 2nd Reading Tuesday 16 March 1976 (2R, 3241) 
Financial Institutions Second Amendment Act 54 of 1989  
Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 
Government Employees Pension Law 1996 (Proc 21 GG 17135 of 19 April 1996) 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
Interim Constitution 200 of 1993 
Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 
Long-Term Insurance Act 52 of 1988 
Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 
Marriage Act 25 of 1961 
Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 1988 
Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 
Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956  
Pension Funds Amendment Act 22 of 1996 
Pension Funds Final Default Regulations (GN 41064 of 25 August 2017) 
Pension Funds FSCA Conduct Standards 4 of 2020: minimum skills and training requirements 
for  
board members of pension funds (GN 43514 GG 760 of 10 July 2020)  
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Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000  
Railways and Harbours Service Act 28 of 1912 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998  
Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 
Revenue Laws Amendment Act 81 of 1965 
Revenue Laws Amendment Act 60 of 2008 
Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004  
Social Assistance regulations relating to the application for and payment of social assistance 
and the requirements or conditions in respect of eligibility (GNR 898 GG 31356 of 22 August 
2008) 
Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 
Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 
Union Government Service Act 32 of 1936 
Wills Act 7 of 1953 
 
Australia 
Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) 
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) 
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) 
Family Provision Act 1969 (ACT) 
Family Provision Act 1972 (WA) 
Family Provision Act 1974 (NT) 
Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA)  
Succession Act 1981 (Qld) 
Succession Act 2006 (NSW) 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) 
Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth) 
Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1912 (Tas) 
Widows and Young Children Maintenance Act 1906 (Vic) 
 
Canada 
Adult Interdependent Relationships Act SA 2002 c A-4.5 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
Dependants’ Relief Act SS 1996 c D-25.01 (SK) 
Divorce Act RSC 1985 c 3 (2nd Supp)  
Employment Pension Plans Act SA 2012 c E-8.1 (AB) 
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Family Law Act RSO 1990 c F.3 (ON) 
Family Law Act SBC 2011 c 25 (BC) 
Family Property Act CCSM c F25 (MB)  
Family Property Act SS 1997 c F-6.3 (SK) 
Federal Child Support Guidelines SOR/97-175  
Insurance Act RSO 1990 c I.8 (ON) 
Insurance Act RSA 2000 c I-3 (AB) 
Insurance Act RSBC 2012 c 1 (BC) 
Married Women’s Relief Act 1910 (AB) 
Matrimonial Property Act RSA 2000, c M-8 (AB) 
Pension Benefits Standards Act RSC 1985 c 32 (C) 
Pension Benefits Act RSO 1990 c P.8 (ON) 
Pension Benefits Standards Act SBC 2012 c 30 (BC) 
Succession Law Reform Act RSO 1990 c S.26 (ON) 
Testators’ Family Maintenance Act RSNS 1989 c 465 (NS) 
Wills Variation Act RSBC 1996 c 490 (BC) (repealed or spent) 
Wills, Estates and Succession Act SBC 2009 c 13 (BC)  
Wills and Succession Act SA 2010 c W-12.2 (AB) 
 
England 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 
Dower Act 1833 
Forfeiture Act 1982 
Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938 
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 
Inheritance Tax Act 1984 
Pension Schemes Act 1993 
Wills Act 1837 
Workmen’s Compensation Act 1897 
 
European Union 
Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men 
and women in matters of employment and occupation 
 
Germany 
Grundgesetz (Constitution/Basic Law) for the Federal Republic of Germany (as amended 
July 2002) of 23 May 1949 
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Burgerliches Gestetzbuch [BGB] (Civil code) of 1896 (as amended 1 October 2013) 
 
Malawi 
Deceased Estates (Wills, Inheritance and Protection) Act 14 of 2011 
Pension Act 6 of 2011 
 
New Zealand 
Family Protection Act 1955 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976 
Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1900 
 
Singapore 
Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1966 (Revised edition 1985) 
 
United States of America 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act 1974 (ERISA) 
 
International  
UN General Assembly Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, United 





Davis Tax Committee First Interim Report on Estate Duty for the Minister of Finance (2015)  
The Davis Tax Committee Second Interim Report on Estate Duty for the Minister of Finance 
(2016) 
Financial Services Board (www.fsca.gov.za) 
Annual Report (2001)  
Annual Report (2008)  
Annual Report (2015) 
Annual Report (2017) 
Annual Report (2018) 
Pension Funds Circular 130 (2007) 
Hansard House of Assembly Debates col 3241 (16 March 1976) 
National Treasury (www.treasury.gov.za) 
- Retirement Fund Reform: a discussion paper (December 2004)  
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- Social Security and Retirement Reform: a second discussion paper (February 2007) 
- Memorandum on the Objects of the Pension Funds Amendment Bill, 2007  
- Strengthening Retirement Savings: an overview of proposals announced in the 2012 
budget (14 May 2012)  
National Treasury: submissions received in response to the Retirement Fund Reform Discussion 
Paper (2004)  
<http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/retfund/default.aspx> (last accessed 13 September 2020) 
- Business Unity South Africa (07 March 2005) 
- FEDUSA (undated)  
- Glenrand MIB Benefit Services (undated) 
- Jonathan Mort (28 November 2005) 
- LUASA: The Association of Professional Financial Planners (28 November 2005) 
- Old Mutual (29 March 2005) 
- Sanlam Personal Portfolios Ltd (28 November 2005) 
Office of the Pension Fund Adjudicator (www.pfa.org.za)  
- Annual Report 2004/2005 
- Annual Report 2007/2008 
- Annual Report 2008/2009 
- Annual Report 2009/2010 
- Annual Report 2013/2014  
- Annual Report 2014/2015  
- Annual Report 2015/2016  
- Annual Report 2016/2017  
- Annual Report 2017/2018  
Registrar of Pension Funds (www.fsca.gov.za) 
- 18th Annual Report for the year ended 31 December 1976 
-  57th Annual Report for the year ended 31 December 2015 
-  59th Annual Report for the year ended 31 December 2017 
South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin December 2017 – can’t find in footnotes 
South African Social Security Agency (www.sassa.gov.za) 
- Annual Report 2016/2017 
- Annual Report 2017/2018 
- You and Your Grants 2016/2017 
Statistics South Africa (www.statssa.gov.za) 
- Census 2011 Fact Sheet (2011) 
- Mortality and Causes of Death in South Africa 2016 (PO309.3) 
- Vulnerable Groups Series 1: The Social Profile of Youth 2009-2014 (2016) 
- Financial statistics of consolidated general government 2016/2017 (P9119.4) 
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- Marriages and Divorces 2017 (P0307) 
- Mid-year Population Estimates 2018 (P0302) 
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- Recorded live births 2018 (PO305) 
- Cohort fertility in South Africa Report No. 03-00-03 (2019) 
 
Australia  
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) Superannuation Circular No. I.C.2 Payment 
Standards for Regulated Superannuation Funds (September 2006) 
<http://www.guardianaudit.com.au/files/docs/circular-i-c-2-payments-standards-for-regulated-
superannuation-funds.pdf (last accessed 13 September 2020)> 
Superannuation Complaints Tribunal Annual Report 2016-2017 (2017)  
< www.sct.gov.au.> (last accessed 1 January 2019) 
Superannuation Complaints Tribunal Key Considerations that apply to death benefit claims 
(2006)  
<www.sct.gov.au> (last accessed 9 September 2018) 
Saunders, Peter & Bedford, Megan ‘New estimates of the costs of children’ Family Matters 
100 (May 2018) (Australian Institute of Family Studies, Australian Government) 
 <https://aifs.gov.au/publications/issue/new-estimates-costs-children> (last accessed 13 September 2020) 
 
Canada 
Bertrand, Lorne et al The Practice of Family Law in Canada: Results from a Survey of 
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